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Managing a supra-national 
public-private platform still 
based on sovereign interests
Boris Vujčić
Governor of the Croatian National Bank  
and Chairman of the Vienna Initiative
The Vienna Initiative is a unique project, a platform that consists of representatives 
of international financial institutions, national and supranational regulators and 
industry representatives who meet regularly to exchange views on financial trends in 
a group of European countries. It has been an interesting and successful experiment. 
None of the participating institutions has a formal obligation to attend and there is 
no money on the table, yet all old stakeholders, and some new ones, ten years after 
the crisis that created the Vienna Initiative, are still happy to go on. People vote 
with their feet, it is often said, and in this sense the support provided by various 
stakeholders suggests that they have recognized the Vienna Initiative as a purposeful 
platform for coordination and information exchange. In particular, the strong 
involvement of Western European banks confirms that they have a long-term 
commitment to the Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe (CESEE) region, 
despite the controlled deleveraging that took place in the aftermath of the global 
financial crisis.
The historical role of the Vienna Initiative
The desire to protect CESEE countries from disorderly deleveraging was the 
original motive for establishing the Vienna Initiative. The region was in a vulnerable 
position at the onset of the global financial crisis. Following several years of credit-
driven economic expansion, many of these countries suffered from severe internal 
and external imbalances. Part of the blame for the unsustainable expansion of 
CESEE countries rests with Western European banks. Specifically, banks from 
advanced EU Member States borrowed at low rates in European money markets 
and channelled these funds to their subsidiaries in CESEE. In addition, they fought 
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aggressively for market share by lowering lending standards. Such a combination 
resulted in excessive credit growth. Demand-side factors also contributed to the 
credit expansion, as the propensity to borrow in CESEE was high due to relatively 
low interest rates and overly optimistic expectations regarding the convergence 
potential of these countries.
The outbreak of the financial crisis in late 2008 and the consequent global recession 
hit the CESEE region very hard. External demand weakened considerably, while 
domestic demand collapsed due to a significant drop in confidence and a sharp 
slowdown in credit growth. The need to eliminate excessive imbalances further 
contributed to the contraction of domestic demand in some CESEE countries, 
as they were no longer able to finance these imbalances by borrowing extensively 
from abroad. Due to weak fundamentals, almost none of the countries concerned 
had sufficient space to engage in fiscal loosening that could have helped mitigate 
the recession. On the contrary, most of them were forced to tighten fiscal policy 
in the midst of the crisis in order to preserve debt sustainability and restore 
investor confidence. 
An additional problem for CESEE countries was that, in the context of lower 
capital inflows and diminishing investor confidence, their national currencies faced 
depreciation pressures. While in advanced countries depreciation of the currency in 
times of recession is typically considered beneficial because it can stimulate recovery 
by increasing net exports, in emerging market (EM) countries currency depreciation 
often only makes things worse. The reason is that economic agents in emerging 
market countries, including the CESEE region, are typically heavily indebted in 
foreign currencies. If, for some reason, the value of domestic currency were to decline 
substantially, these debts would become more expensive to service. A sharp drop in 
disposable income caused by increased debt repayment costs would far outweigh 
the gains resulting from improved price competitiveness, thus exacerbating the 
economic downturn.
Therefore, CESEE countries were confronted with numerous challenges both 
domestically and externally. In such a difficult environment, the decision of 
foreign banking groups to maintain their presence in the region had a great positive 
impact. On the one hand, it enabled private and public sector entities to retain 
access to financing at the peak of the crisis, when the availability of external sources 
was limited. On the other hand, the foreign banks’ decision to maintain their 
investments in CESEE reduced the likelihood of detrimental currency and debt 
crises. Had large banking groups had not made that decision, the withdrawal of 
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foreign currency liquidity from CESEE would have been so large that central banks 
would have likely failed to defend national currencies from severe devaluations. 
In such a scenario, not only would the private sector borrowers have struggled to 
service their foreign currency indexed loans, but also public debt sustainability 
would have come into question. 
The success of the Vienna Initiative illustrates how an ambitious coordinated effort 
can lead to a positive outcome with substantial benefits for all parties involved. 
Of course, the question remains what would have happened if it were not for the 
Vienna Initiative, but that we shall never find out. Although from the perspective 
of individual banks it seemed reasonable to exit overheated markets in CESEE, 
a simultaneous withdrawal of many banks would have imposed such a heavy 
toll on the CESEE economies that the banks’ investments in the region would 
quickly lose value. Due to the size of cross-border operations, for some banking 
groups large credit losses in the region could have jeopardized the solvency of the 
parent institution. In such a context, it was in foreign banks’ best interest to keep 
supporting these economies. There was a case for coordination.
Several other successful international initiatives took place during the recent global 
financial crisis with a view to containing the impact of the crisis and making the 
financial system and the economy more resilient. Probably the most important of 
these was the coordinated monetary policy loosening by major central banks. The 
large monetary stimulus was key to alleviating the liquidity crisis, which threatened 
to trigger further failures of systemically important institutions and lead the entire 
global economy into a depression. Furthermore, it is worth mentioning the swap 
arrangements among the major central banks and a number of key EM central 
banks, coordinated efforts of advanced countries to boost the lending capacity 
of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), implementation of the common EU 
framework for banking system support, and the ambitious overhaul of global 
prudential standards through the work of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and 
the Basel Committee. 
There is a broad consensus among policymakers and academics that the global 
crisis would have been much more severe if such measures had not been taken. This 
view is based on a simple comparison between the recent global crisis and the Great 
Depression of 1929-33, when international cooperation was virtually non-existent. 
While both crisis episodes were characterized by systemic bank failures, stock market 
crashes and deep economic downturns, total output loss was considerably larger 
during the Great Depression. The literature suggests that the Great Depression was 
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extremely severe because the largest countries relied excessively on inward-oriented 
policies to protect their economies, instead of working together through mutually 
beneficial policy co-ordination. The situation worsened when some major central 
banks adopted a harmful monetary tightening in a failed attempt to preserve the 
gold standard. The resulting substantial reduction in the money supply led to the 
collapse of a large number of banks, which in turn amplified the credit crunch and 
the economic downturn. 
The Great Depression was a major failure of international policy coordination and 
macroeconomic management and therefore an important lesson for the future. 
The vigorous response of the leading central bankers, the IMF, the World Bank 
and other policymakers after the outbreak of the recent global financial crisis was 
motivated by the desire to avoid another economic catastrophe similar to the Great 
Depression. Against such a background, the launch of the Vienna Initiative in 2009 
and the concerted efforts of participating institutions can be viewed as a reflection 
of a more responsive international financial architecture, where major actors – if 
confronted with serious challenges – are willing to cooperate with each other to 
reduce overall costs. Maintaining financial support to CESEE was clearly a positive-
sum game, as foreign banks not only helped CESEE countries to weather the crisis 
but were also protecting their own investments in these countries from severe losses. 
The decision of foreign banks to maintain their exposure to the CESEE region 
was also important in order to facilitate the implementation of macroeconomic 
adjustment programme supported by the IMF. Namely, at the height of the global 
financial crisis, the IMF provided financial support to some of the CESEE countries 
experiencing severe balance of payments problems. Had foreign banks decided 
to withdraw funds from the region, this would have led to a depletion of foreign 
currency liquidity that these countries obtained through financial arrangements 
with the IMF, thus reducing the likelihood of success of adjustment programme. 
While foreign banking groups still dominate the banking systems in CESEE, their 
business models have changed considerably since the crisis. Despite the fact that 
borrowing conditions in European markets are extremely favourable, which Western 
European banks could use to support their operations in CESEE, hardly any carry 
trade occurs. In fact, in the last few years foreign-owned banks have been funded 
almost exclusively by retail deposits. This is partly related to regulatory interventions, 
such as the Austrian regulator’s decision of March 2012 to monitor closely the loan-
to-local stable funding ratios of internationally active Austrian banks. In addition, 
stronger reliance on retail deposits reflects the fact that the available local supply 
of deposits was more than sufficient to maintain the desired volume of lending. As 
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the entire region experienced a prolonged economic slump after the outbreak of the 
global crisis, banks’ asset quality deteriorated, which in turn prompted them to cut 
back on new lending. In addition to supply-side factors, a weakening credit demand 
also contributed to the sharp slowdown in lending. Although more recently credit 
activity has accelerated somewhat, subsidiaries of foreign banks have no reason to 
import additional funds from abroad, since banks still operate in an environment of 
abundant excess liquidity and loan-to-deposit ratios of around unity. 
The switch to local funding sources is encouraged by both home and host country 
regulators. Having in mind the detrimental impact of the global crisis on countries 
that previously experienced a foreign-funded credit boom, regulators are now well 
aware of the importance of prudent funding and lending practices. Prior to the 
crisis, excessive reliance on capital inflows as an engine of credit growth was not just 
a feature of CESEE countries. It was also a major source of vulnerability for some 
advanced countries. For instance, the subprime crisis in the US was the consequence 
of a protracted housing market boom, which was partly generated by large European 
banks that were heavily involved in the securitization business in the US. Likewise, 
the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area, at least in some of the affected countries, 
emerged as an indirect result of local banks’ excessive short-term borrowing in 
European financial markets. 
The dire consequences of excessive cross-border banking – what some economists 
call the “banking glut” – triggered several waves of regulatory reforms. The most 
important of them was the adoption of a set of new global prudential standards – 
Basel III. The enhanced regulatory framework introduced by Basel III provides 
an expanded toolkit that can be used to prevent an excessive accumulation of both 
refinancing and credit risks in banks’ balance sheets. The database on macro-
prudential measures collected by the European Systemic Risk Board reveals that 
national regulators in the EU are very active in applying these measures, although 
the degree of regulators’ responsiveness varies somewhat between member states. 
Current and future tasks
In view of the stricter regulatory framework and notable changes in the foreign banks’ 
business models, it does not seem likely that CESEE countries will soon encounter 
challenges similar to those that led to the establishment of the original Vienna Initiative. 
However, this does certainly not mean that the platform has lost its purpose. Over 
time, the Vienna Initiative has evolved from a temporary crisis-mitigation platform 
to a permanent forum for discussions, where competent policymakers and industry 
representatives share views on specific issues from different perspectives. Monitoring 
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reports that are regularly published under the Vienna Initiative – the Deleveraging 
and Credit Monitor, the NPL Monitor and the Bank Lending Survey – are valuable 
because they provide an analytical basis for discussions. These reports and discussions 
have allowed participants to gain valuable insight into cross-border funding flows, 
bank lending and asset quality developments. They also enable central banks of 
host countries to understand better the funding and lending strategies of foreign 
banking groups, which in turn allows them to make well-informed monetary and 
macroprudential policy decisions. 
There are many specific areas where cooperation between the industry and the public 
sector within the framework of the Vienna Initiative can produce visible gains. In that 
regard, a good example is the nonperforming loan (NPL) Initiative. This project aims 
to identify the main obstacles for the disposal of non-performing loans and promote 
best practices in debt restructuring, in order to facilitate the NPL resolution process in 
the participating countries. The ultimate objective of the NPL Initiative – a reduction 
of the persistently high stock of bad loans – would be beneficial for both participating 
countries and banks, as it would potentially release banks’ capital and thus enhance 
their capacity to extend loans to the real economy. Specifically, while liquidity is 
currently not a concern in CESEE, some banking groups are still capital-constrained, 
and therefore a reduction in NPLs would be likely to increase their lending potential. 
Another important strand of work relates to financial instruments of international 
financial institutions (IFIs). The basic motivation for launching a discussion on 
IFIs’ instruments under the Vienna Initiative stemmed from the need for a more 
effective blending of public sector resources with the funds provided by commercial 
banks. Tailoring the IFIs’ products to the investment needs of CESEE countries was 
recognized as crucial as it may lead to higher take-up rates and thus stimulate the still 
subdued investment activity in the region. Namely, in the aftermath of the global 
financial crisis, investment activity in CESEE countries has remained well below levels 
observed in the pre-crisis period, undermining their catching-up potential. However, 
when comparing investment levels, it should be borne in mind that a significant portion 
of total investment in the pre-crisis period was financed by foreign savings and allocated 
to sectors with lower productivity, such as housing construction. What CESEE 
countries need today is a higher level of domestically funded productive investment, 
preferably investment in innovation and human capital. 
Fostering productive investment should include, among other measures, improving 
access to finance for innovative start-ups. This will require an adequate response 
from both international financial institution (IFIs) and commercial banks. These 
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small businesses are often not bankable in a traditional sense, because their main 
assets are the knowledge and skills of their employees, rather than physical assets 
that are easier to pledge as collateral. Developing the appropriate products to suit 
their borrowing needs is key to keeping up with global trends and reducing the 
likelihood that small to medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) migrate from traditional 
banking to less regulated shadow banks. Failure for secure necessary resources to 
this sector would produce adverse long-term effects, as it could hinder innovation 
and productivity growth. Given the collateral constraints and higher risks associated 
with lending to small innovative firms, credit guarantees and other instruments 
provided by IFIs could play a vital role in stimulating bank lending to these firms. 
Cooperation between IFIs and banks under the Vienna Initiative is beneficial in this 
respect, as it may shorten the time needed to set up public-private arrangements 
that are most effective in promoting investment in CESEE. 
The Vienna Initiative has served also as a forum for discussions on various regulatory 
issues. Given that the financial markets in the region are generally underdeveloped, 
it is quite difficult for CESEE countries to comply with some of the requirements 
originally designed to tackle risks in more sophisticated financial markets. Challenges 
associated with the introduction of minimum requirement of own funds and eligible 
liabilities (MREL) rules are one of the most debated topics. The provisions on MREL 
require banks to maintain a sufficient level of junior liabilities, which could be bailed 
in if the bank experiences solvency problems. This poses a particular problem when 
a multiple-point-of-entry approach is applied, where, in view of the shallowness of 
financial markets in CESEE, it is highly uncertain whether banks will succeed in 
finding sufficient demand for such debt instruments, and at what price would that 
be feasible. Moreover, in the context of already high excess liquidity, it is unclear 
what banks would do with additional liquidity obtained by issuing bail-in-able 
liabilities. The meetings of the Vienna Initiative have also been a convenient place 
for participating non-EU countries to express concerns about some of the adverse 
effects of EU banking regulation on their financial systems. 
Finally, should Europe face another financial crisis, the Vienna Initiative could take 
its primary role and protect CESEE from a potentially harmful abrupt capital flight. 
While from the current perspective it seems unlikely that the CESEE countries will 
be hit by a large crisis anytime soon, it is certain that a new crisis will emerge at some 
point in the future. This is yet another reason for the Vienna Initiative to continue 
operating despite the fact that foreign banks’ deleveraging no longer represents an 
imminent threat to financial stability. The presence of a permanent crisis-mitigation 
platform for the CESEE region is justified both because the CESEE region is the place 
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where most cross-border banking takes place and because many of these countries 
still suffer from structural vulnerabilities – such as large currency mismatches in the 
non-financial sector – which makes them highly sensitive to capital flow shocks. 
The region would be more resilient to such shocks if there were a network of foreign 
exchange swap agreements between national central banks and the European 
Central Bank (ECB) in place, which would allow CESEE countries’ central banks 
to borrow euros from the ECB in the event of foreign currency shortages. The 
mere existence of swap lines could help dispel investors’ fears and thus contain 
depreciation pressures in times of crisis. Swap arrangements proved to be very 
effective globally in late 2008 and in 2009, with the US Federal Reserve playing 
a leading role by providing both advanced and emerging market countries with 
much needed dollar liquidity. In the absence of such swap agreements in Europe, 
close cooperation between national regulators and West European banks within 
the framework of the Vienna Initiative is important in minimizing the risk of self-
fulfilling runs on currencies. 
Concluding remarks
In view of the important historical role of the Vienna Initiative, as well as its current 
and future relevance, it has been both an honour and a pleasure to serve as a chair 
of the Steering Committee. Taking part in the work of the platform has been 
useful to me personally, given the unique cross-dimensional perspective that the 
Vienna Initiative’s work and discussions provide to participating stakeholders, while 
performing duties has not been a difficult task, given the ambitious involvement 
of all participating institutions. Despite the informal nature of the body, all 
work, including the work done by designated working groups, is carried out very 
professionally, and with a clear intention to provide value added. Involvement of 
IFIs and industry representatives has been particularly valuable, as they are able to 
provide market intelligence that is usually not available to other stakeholders. In 
future I also look forward to the further involvement of new European institutions 
such as the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), European Banking Authority 
(EBA) and EU Single Resolution Board (SRB) that were not originally part of 
the Vienna Initiative, as they were created after the crisis, but which now create 
new supervisory and regulatory environments and are therefore a key part of the 
future work of the Initiative. In a way, the CESEE region is to some extent what 
many envisaged the integrated banking market of the EU would one day look 
like – a common banking market with much a smaller role for national champions 
and with greatly reduced home country bias. In a way, and in a contemporary 
language, also a sandbox for the rest of the EU.
11







Ten years of the Vienna Initiative: 
a chronology
Mark Allen
EBRD, IMF and CASE Research
Introduction
The Vienna Initiative1 was launched in early 2009 to help the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe overcome the impact of the global financial crisis on their 
economies. It was designed as a cooperative approach to ensure that the cross-
border banks, which owned the major part of the banking system of most of the 
countries in the region, did not exacerbate the crisis by withdrawing funding 
and capital from their subsidiaries. The adjustment programmes implemented 
by several countries facing difficulties in the region, supported by the Vienna 
Initiative process, allowed them to overcome their problems and reduce their 
vulnerabilities over the next couple of years. 
But in 2011, the global financial crisis took another turn, with sovereigns in 
the euro area and their banks coming under pressure. The measures taken by 
the euro area countries to provide support to sovereigns and strengthen their 
banking systems ran the risk of creating negative spill-overs to the functioning 
of the banks’ subsidiaries in Central and Eastern Europe. The Vienna Initiative 
was relaunched at the start of 2012, and rechristened Vienna Initiative 2.0, with 
a new focus on managing the tensions that might follow from new supervisory 
1 Membership of the Vienna Initiative is in principle open to all host countries among the new EU member states 
(NMS) and EU candidates in the West Balkans, as well as EU countries which were the home authorities for cross-
border banks operating in the CESEE region. A number of the NMS (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia) either did not participate in any of the Vienna Initiative’s activities, or only did so occasionally. 
Other countries might be admitted as appropriate. In 2012, Ukraine was admitted as a member, as discussed below. 
Cyprus, which had become involved in the work of the NPL Initiative, joined the Vienna Initiative in 2017.
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actions applied to the banks by their home supervisors, or other pressures on 
cross-border banks. The transposition of international financial standards into 
European law, and the creation of the European Banking Union, has affected 
cross-border banking and the functioning of the financial systems of the region, 
which the Vienna Initiative has tried to mitigate. 
The Origins of the Vienna Initiative
The expansion of cross-border banking into Central and Eastern Europe was an 
important driver of the transition process. The region had been underbanked and 
provided a profitable market for expansion for several West European banking 
groups in the late 1990s and early 2000s. In turn, this allowed the rapid penetration 
of modern and what appeared at the time to be relatively well-supervised banking 
into the region, with considerable benefit to business and consumers. The cross-
border banking links created a channel for capital to flow into the region, providing 
abundant finance particularly during the years of the Great Moderation at the start 
of the new millennium. This financing channel was supported by the narrative of the 
convergence process within the European Union, which many of the countries joined 
in the enlargements of 2004 and 2007, and to which many of the remaining countries 
aspired. The larger financing flows were also supported by a general view that new 
financial technology allowed credit risks to be better handled than in the past. 
At the same time, however, the flow of capital through the cross-border banking 
system and the increase in financial leverage created vulnerabilities. The banking 
systems in the region were dependent on parent banks and international financial 
markets for funding, with the value of loans being considerably higher than the 
stock of local deposits. This left the system vulnerable to a shock to the funding 
model. External funding also provided funds mainly in foreign currencies, in part as 
the result of the thinness of local currency financial markets. But this also gave the 
banks an incentive to denominate their lending in foreign currency, which satisfied 
a strong demand for foreign exchange finance by local borrowers, particularly in 
the mortgage market, on account of the lower interest rate costs such borrowing 
entailed. The abundance of financing promoted asset price booms.
Impact of the global financial crisis on CESEE and the Vienna 
Initiative Response
When the global financial crisis began, international funding markets began to 
dry up, and this affected European banks disproportionately. The vulnerabilities 
of some of the Central and Eastern European countries became obvious. With 
the parent banks scrambling for funding, their generous provision of finance to 
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subsidiaries in the region came into question. And for the countries involved, 
an interruption of cross-border bank funding was experienced as a sudden stop 
in the capital inflows that had financed very large current account deficits. The 
depreciation of exchange rates, or pressure for such depreciation, worsened the 
financial position of those companies and individuals with debt denominated in 
foreign currencies. This in turn led to payments difficulties and to a growing non-
performing loan (NPL) problem. The rollover needs in 2009, particularly of the 
private sector, were substantial. There was a risk that the rise in NPLs would require 
a considerable injection of capital into the region’s banks. 
The chairmen of the main banks involved in cross-border lending to the CESEE 
region (Erste, Intesa San Paolo, KBC, Raiffeisen, Société Générale and Unicredit) 
expressed their concern over the financial situation in emerging Europe in a letter to 
the European Commission and G20 Chair on 27 November 2008. They called for 
the measures to increase the provision of liquidity in these countries and strengthen 
deposit insurance to be supplemented with action to revive the real economy, 
including more IFI funding and various forms of regulatory accommodation. 
The first CESEE countries that were hit by the crisis were Ukraine, Hungary and 
Latvia. Internationally supported adjustment programmes, with assistance from 
the IMF, the World Bank Group and (in the case of the EU members) the EU, were 
agreed in October, November and December 2008, respectively. In December 2008, 
the Austrian Ministry of Finance agreed with a proposal of the EBRD to organize 
an urgent meeting with the home and host supervisory and fiscal authorities of the 
large EU-based bank groups operating in emerging Europe, together with the IFIs, 
namely the EIB, the EBRD and the IMF. This meeting and informal seminar took 
place in Vienna on 23 January 2009, with some seven host and six home countries 
represented.2 The establishment of a “Vienna Club” as a collective action platform 
was proposed, but the name actually assigned was “Vienna Initiative” to reflect the 
nonbinding nature of the movement.3 This was intended as a way to deal with the 
collective action problem among the banks, to send a signal to the markets and to 
allow the IFIs to complement each other’s work. It was agreed that the IMF would 
draw up a proposal for burden-sharing rules between home and host authorities. 
Such a proposal was presented and broadly approved at a follow-up meeting of the 
group at the Joint Vienna Institute on 17 March 2009. The Vienna Initiative was 
formally named the European Bank Coordination (Vienna) Initiative. 
2 See Nitsche, 2010.
3 Pres_Vienna_HH.pdf.
16
Ten years of the Vienna Initiative 2009-2019
The Initiative was complemented by the announcement on 17 February 2009 by the 
EBRD, the EIB and the World Bank Group of a Joint IFI Action Plan to channel 
€24.5 billion into the region over the next two years, including for the purpose of 
supporting parent banks in maintaining their exposures.4 This responded to the 
November 2008 call by banking group chairmen. Between March and June 2009, 
the EIB, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and 
the World Bank/International Finance Corporation (IFC) met jointly with each 
of the seventeen cross-border banking groups to assess what assistance they might 
need under this exercise.5 By the end of September 2009, some €16.3 billion of IFI 
support had been disbursed in the form of senior loans, tier 1 and 2 capital, trade 
finance, facilities for small business loans and syndicated loans.6
The spread of the crisis was marked by further programmes with Serbia (January 2009), 
Romania (May 2009), and Bosnia-Herzegovina (July 2009). These programmes 
provided for financing to cushion the fiscal adjustment path, action to repair 
the banking system and deal with non-performing loans (NPLs) and somewhat 
formal arrangements with individual banks to maintain exposures as part of an 
international support package with the approval of their home authorities and 
to recapitalize subsidiaries should stress tests performed by the host authorities 
require it. These agreements to maintain exposure and capitalization were the 
central feature of the original Vienna Initiative. 
From the time of the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s, if not before, action 
to encourage creditors to maintain exposure and not to succumb to the temptation 
of withdrawing financing precipitately from a debtor country in distress had been a 
feature of the international handling of debt crises. In the Latin American crisis case, 
where the main form of distressed debt was syndicated bank lending to sovereigns, 
bank steering committees were established to provide a forum to negotiate with 
the debtor and to communicate with the IFIs, and also to resolve the collective 
action problem by restraining those banks that might have preferred to dump their 
claims. Similarly, in the Asian crisis, where most of the debt was in the form of bonds 
or credit to non-sovereign entities, adjustment programmes provided for the close 
monitoring of daily developments in exposures by individual creditors, and moral 
suasion was applied to prevent any exit of capital from disrupting the economic 
4 Actual lending under the JIFIAP by end-2010 was €33 billion.
5 List of banks participating: Alphabank, DnB NORD, Erste Group Bank AG, BayernLB, Piraeus Bank, Eurobank 
EFG, Hypo Alpe-Adria, Intesa Sanpaolo, KBC Group, National Bank of Greece, NLB Group, Nordea Bank, RZB 
Group/Raiffeisen, Société Générale, Swedbank, Unicredit and Volksbank International.
6 De Haas, R., Y. Korniyenko, A. Pivovarsky, and T. Tsankova, 2015. Taming the herd? Foreign banks, the Vienna 
Initiative and crisis transmission”, Journal of Financial Intermediation, 24(3), 325-355.
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adjustment. Those earlier experiences guided policy makers in setting up the Vienna 
Initiative, a similar arrangement for these CESEE countries where the funding of 
international bank subsidiaries was the main channel of capital market pressure. 
The international banks with subsidiaries in the region faced different sources of 
pressure. They were finding it increasingly difficult to fund their balance sheets. They 
also knew that in the wake of the Asian crisis of 1996-98, European policymakers had 
been particularly insistent on private sector involvement (PSI) as a central part of the 
support for a country facing capital account pressures. This had been interpreted 
to mean that the official sector would not provide massive financial resources to a 
country if a large part went simply to repay private sector creditors. And the banks 
were aware that there was a collective action problem: if one creditor withdrew funds, 
stealing a march on its competitors, this would precipitate a deepening of the crisis 
and the destruction of the value of their investments. In this environment, the 
banks were highly responsive to the project embodied in the Vienna Initiative. 
The precise arrangements for maintaining exposure differed from case to case.7 
The arrangements for Latvia were fairly informal: the main banks involved were 
Nordic banks, and the Swedish Riksbank was instrumental in ensuring that the 
parent banks’ own adjustment strategies did not put undue pressure on Latvia. 
No formal agreement was reached in the case of Ukraine, given problems with the 
implementation of the IMF programme. In other cases – Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Hungary, Romania and Serbia – there were formal agreements between individual 
banks and the central banks of the host countries on maintaining a level of exposure 
to their subsidiary and its capitalization. The approval of IFI lending was linked to 
the signing and implementation of these agreements.8 The adjustment programmes 
all involved banks taking actions to deal with weaknesses revealed by stress tests. 
In some cases where the parent bank had received state aid in response to the crisis, 
efforts had to be made to ensure that the remedial actions required by the European 
Commission’s DG COMP did not undermine these agreements. Throughout this 
period, there was concern that other countries in the region would require financial 
support from the IFIs, and that similar arrangements might have to be put in place. 
But, as it was, the combined action of the countries’ adjustment programmes, the 
IFI and EU support, the Vienna Initiative and the Joint IFI Action Plan limited 
the spread of problems beyond the countries listed.
7 See De Haas et al., ibid. p. 332.
8 In March 2009, the EU leaders summit agreed that national bank support packages should not require constraining 
banks’ CESEE operations. De Haas et al., ibid.
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The main cross-border banking groups agreed in each case to maintain the level of 
overall exposure to their subsidiary, taking into account the availability of adequate 
lending opportunities and sound risk management practices. In addition, they 
committed to maintain their subsidiaries’ good financial standing through periods 
of market turbulence and economic slowdown. The banks would have preferred 
a “regional approach”, allowing them to shift both capital and exposure between 
countries, in conformity with normal banking practice and the EU’s principles of 
free movement of capital, but this was not possible. It would have made monitoring 
in the national context next to impossible and ran the risk of spreading contagion to 
non-programme countries in the region. There were continued calls for flexibility, 
especially as the recession in the adjusting countries was reducing the amount 
of profitable lending opportunities, and earlier over-lending had ultimately to 
be corrected. It proved possible to accommodate some of these calls during the 
reviews of the commitments in individual country cases. Another call was for public 
guarantees to be given to bank lending, but this was generally resisted as it was 
contrary to the principles of PSI.
There was a conflict between the desire of the banking groups to be able to use 
resources in their networks to the benefit of the bank as a whole, and the desire of the 
host authorities to ringfence and protect their domestic financial systems by preventing 
outflows of capital or liquidity. This was a matter of trust, not only between the host 
authorities and the banking groups, but between host and home supervisors, with the 
stakes of potential national financial crisis and bank group failure being very high for 
all participants. The commitments to maintain exposure and replenish capital levels 
for the programme countries were embedded in the international support packages 
for these countries, implicitly giving primacy to rebuilding financial stability at the 
national level. The Vienna Initiative forum, however, provided a useful complement 
by opening up the channels for communication and discussion that could mitigate 
tensions that might arise and identify solutions to emerging problems. 
Effectiveness of the Vienna Initiative response
When the success of the initiative was reviewed at the first Full Forum meeting 
of the Initiative in Brussels in September 2009, it was found that reductions 
in exposure has been contained.9 Bank exposures to their subsidiaries had 
9 The meeting was chaired by the European Commission’s DG ECFIN, and gathered about 90 participants from 
(i) 15 European banking groups active in the countries receiving EU/IMF balance-of-payments assistance (Hungary, 
Latvia, Romania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia); (ii) representatives from central banks and finance ministries of 
the host countries (iii) home country supervisors (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Greece, Sweden, Austria); and 
(iv) representatives from the European Commission (DG ECFIN and DG COMP), IMF, EBRD, EIB and the World 
Bank Group, the ECB and CEBS (the predecessor of the EBA).
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fallen somewhat in Latvia and Hungary, but had been broadly maintained in 
Romania and Serbia, and had actually risen in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Commitments lapsed with the expiry of the officially supported adjustment 
programmes, by which time the country situations had stabilized and pressure 
to withdraw funding had abated. The assistance given to banking groups under 
the Joint IFI Action Plan often contained provisos requiring their continued 
engagement, and this certainly encouraged the rollover of exposures. On the 
other hand, the change in the strategies of some banking groups which sought 
to withdraw from some or all countries in the CESEE region complicated 
matters. In one case this resulted from the application of competition rules by 
the European Commission’s DG COMP on account of the state aid the group 
had received.
Stable financial conditions were broadly restored by the third quarter of 2009. 
This was the result of the adjustment programmes in many CESEE countries, the 
success of the exposure agreements under the Vienna Initiative and the financing 
for banks mobilized in the Joint IFI Action plan. After sharp recessions in 2009, 
growth in most of the CESEE region resumed in 2010 and 2011. 
The Vienna Initiative in its first incarnation helped stabilize the financial situation 
of CESEE countries, restore market confidence and build trust between home 
and host regulators, the banks and the IFIs.10 It was an ad hoc vehicle, filling a 
gap in the arrangements developed and envisaged earlier by the European Union, 
which had focused on problems in individual banks rather than systemic problems. 
However, it created mechanisms that were complementary to EU mechanisms 
rather than competitive with them. The temptation to apply national ring-fencing 
during the crisis was high, for both home and host regulators, concerned about 
contagion and leakage of financial support or bank profits across borders. But the 
Vienna Initiative created a framework in which these issues could be discussed, 
and pragmatic solutions reached, at least during the period of the adjustment 
programmes. In particular, the principle was established that the conditions of 
national support packages should not discriminate between local and foreign 
banks. The Vienna Initiative received most support from those home supervisors 
whose banking systems were most exposed to the region – Austria, Italy and 
Greece. Elsewhere in Europe, cross-border banking issues were treated in a less 
cooperative manner.
10 Wolfgang Nitsche, “The Vienna Initiative/European Bank Coordination Initiative: Assessment and Outlook”, BMF 
Working Paper 4/2010.
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Taking stock and drawing lessons from the crisis response
The key players – the host countries and supervisors, the cross-border banks and 
their home supervisors, the EBRD, the EIB Group, the World Bank Group, the 
IMF and the European Commission – recognized that the Vienna Initiative 
had created a useful forum for discussing current and emerging problems and 
identifying cooperative solutions to cross-border banking issues in the CESEE 
region. At a meeting of the IFIs and the European Commission in Vienna on 
20 January, 2010, it was proposed to focus attention on using the Vienna Initiative 
framework to tackle the vulnerabilities revealed by the crisis and the crisis legacy. 
A second Full Forum of the Vienna Initiative was held in Athens on 17-18 March 
2010.11 To tackle the continuing vulnerabilities of the region, two working groups 
involving a range of public and private sector participants were set up, one on 
local currency and capital market development and one on the absorption of EU 
structural funds. This shift of the Vienna Initiative work in the direction of crisis 
prevention was accompanied by a rebranding of the initiative as “Vienna Plus.”12
The Working Group on Local Currency and Capital Market Development, 
chaired by the EBRD, reported in November 2010. As foreign currency lending 
financed with cross-border flows had created serious vulnerabilities in the countries 
of the region, the report recognized the need to move to a funding strategy relying 
on domestic savings, particularly in domestic currencies. The report recommended 
that regulators tighten prudential requirements on foreign currency lending and 
issue sovereign debt in local currency, that banks discontinue the riskiest forms of 
foreign exchange lending and shift the funding of their subsidiaries towards local 
currency markets, while IFIs promote macroeconomic policies conducive to local 
currency market development, support the development of a local institutional 
investor base, raise funding themselves in local currencies, and provide such 
funding to investors in the region.13
The Working Group on Absorption of EU Structural Funds, chaired by the 
European Commission, noted the low level of absorption in the countries of the 
region, in particular Romania and Bulgaria, and made several recommendations 
by which the involvement of commercial banking groups could facilitate the use 
11 The meeting was chaired by Deputy Governor Ioannis Papadakis of the Bank of Greece, and attended by some 
20 cross-border bank groups; those listed earlier, together with ING Bank, OTP Bank, Piraeus Bank, and SEB, as 
well as the Czech and Polish authorities.
12 See EBRD note of May 2011 “Vienna Initiative – moving to a new phase”.
13 These conclusions fed into the ESRB Recommendations on Lending in Foreign Currencies, 21 September 2011. 
For subsequent Vienna Initiative work on developing local capital markets, see the discussion below of the Working 
Group on Capital Markets.
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of EU Structural Funds. This would both speed recovery from the crisis and 
strengthen the asset side of banks’ balance sheets. Although not directly linked 
to the recommendations of the Working Group, utilization rates of EU structural 
funds in the region subsequently improved markedly. (The activity of this Working 
Group is discussed below in the chapter on supervisory and regulatory changes 
by Keereman et al.)
At the third Full Forum meeting of the Vienna Initiative held in Brussels on 
17-18 March 2011, participants adopted these two reports, and considered 
the future of the Initiative. They agree that the Vienna Initiative framework 
should be preserved as such given remaining risks in the region, but that its 
main focus should be issues of crisis prevention that benefitted from its unique, 
f lexible private-public sector composition, based on the model of the first two 
working groups. The structure and governance of the Initiative should also be 
formalized. Two new working groups were set up, one on the implications of 
the new Basel III regulations for emerging Europe; and the other on dealing 
with nonperforming assets. 
The euro area crisis
In mid 2010, the global financial crisis spread to Greece, where the spreads on 
sovereign paper began to rise sharply. Pressures were also felt in other euro area 
countries, in particular, Spain, Portugal and Ireland. The increasing riskiness of 
sovereigns spread to West European banks, as major holders of claims on these 
sovereigns, and in turn worsened the creditworthiness of sovereigns who were the 
ultimate source of backing for their banks. Funding pressures began to rise in mid 
2010 and market turmoil continued to increase during 2011. Banks operating in 
CESEE faced difficulties raising finance, and European national regulators and 
shareholders also pressed the parent banks to take additional action to clean their 
balance sheets, increase capital levels and reduce reliance on volatile funding. 
By the last quarter of 2011, euro area banks were seeking to improve their 
capital ratios and under severe pressure to deleverage. Fears rose that funding for 
subsidiaries in CESEE would be withdrawn or the subsidiaries themselves sold, and 
that this could exacerbate a credit crunch in the region, pushing some countries 
into recession. The situation of Greek banks with their subsidiaries throughout 
the Balkans was of particular concern, as the parent balance sheets were suffering 
from the crisis in the domestic economy. The home bias of regulators and of fiscal 
authorities made it likely that the interests of host countries would not receive 
sufficient weight as the problems of euro area banking groups were addressed. 
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On 27 October, the European Council adopted a measure to raise the core 
tier 1 capital requirement temporarily to 9% by 30 June 2012 for all euro area 
banks. The Chief Economist of the EBRD suggested to the press at the start of 
November that a new Vienna Initiative, Vienna Initiative 2.0, might be called for as a 
cooperative venture to shield the CESEE region from external risks and deleveraging.
The increasing concerns about the stability of the euro area and of soundness of 
banks led the Austrian authorities on 21 November 2011 to introduce stricter 
requirements on the capitalization and cross-border activities of their banks. The 
three biggest Austrian banks, all of which were active in CESEE, were required 
to increase their core tier 1 capital to 7% of risk-weighted assets by January 2013 
with an additional 3% buffer by January 2016, considerably in advance of the 
date provided in European regulations implementing Basel III. Local subsidiaries 
with more than 2.5% of the Austrian bank’s external assets, mainly in the CESEE 
region, would have to limit the growth in new lending to 110% of new deposits. 
Other subsidiaries would have to produce a plan to reduce their loan to deposit 
ratio to 110%. And on 25 November, the Swedish authorities announced that the 
largest Swedish banks would have to meet a capital target of 10% by January 2013 
and 12% by January 2105.
The Austrian measures were introduced without consultation with regulators 
in those countries that would be affected by the new restrictions on lending. 
Subsequently, the Austrian authorities held a series of meetings to explain their 
actions to the European Commission, to the supervisors in affected host countries, 
both inside and outside the European commission, and to the IMF and EBRD. 
The Austrian actions showed that there were very real dangers of the spill-over 
of supervisory action in home countries to host countries where relatively small 
subsidiaries might be systemic. The fear that Austrian actions might be emulated 
by others, lead to an accelerated deleveraging of banks in the region and hamper 
growth prospects brought about a revitalization of the Vienna Initiative.
Relaunching of Vienna Initiative 2.0
On 16 January 2012, the official sector participants of the Vienna Initiative – home 
and host authorities, IFIs (EBRD, EIB, IMF and the World Bank), the European 
Commission, along with the ECB, EBA and ESRB as observers – met in Vienna 
to relaunch the Initiative. Recognizing that many banks did need to reduce their 
leverage, the meeting looked for ways to improve the coordination of national 
policies to avoid excessive and disorderly deleveraging and other adverse cross-border 
effects in the CESEE region, including credit crunches in host countries. 
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The meeting agreed that home country authorities should take into account the 
cross-border effects on EU and non-EU countries when formulating measures 
and coordinate them with host authorities. Recapitalization plans of international 
banks should be scrutinized by the supervisory colleges under the EBA for 
their systemic impact on host economies. Host authorities should further the 
development of local sources of bank funding to the extent possible. Information 
sharing between home and host authorities should be stepped up to avoid 
unnecessary ring-fencing of liquidity. Finally, in the event of sales of systemically 
important subsidiaries, home and host authorities should share information and 
take each other’s concerns into account. It was agreed that the official sector 
participants in the Vienna Initiative would elaborate these principles and ensure 
their implementation. The banking groups, whose cooperation was vital, were 
debriefed at a meeting the following day. 
Following the January 2012 Vienna meeting, a process of consultation with 
stakeholders was launched. Five host countries (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland) and five home countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, Sweden) 
were visited by an EBRD-IMF team. The team also visited the European Commission, 
the EBA and the Bank for International Settlements (BIS)/Financial Standards Board 
(FSB), as well as bank groups in home and host countries. The consultations showed 
that the problem of negative spill-overs from supervisory actions continued. Cross-
border banking groups were revising their business models in the light of market 
and balance sheet pressures, and the resulting deleveraging and changed models were 
having an impact on activities in the region. The question was raised of how the IFIs 
could give more support to the banks’ adjustment of their business models.
Basic principles of Home-Host Authority Coordination
The first order of business of Vienna Initiative 2.0 was to flesh out the principles 
which should be expected to govern the cooperation between home and host 
authorities in the circumstances of CESEE. 
The principles laid out by the CEBS (Committee of European Banking 
Supervisors, later European Banking Authority, EBA) were primarily designed 
for cases where the major part of a country’s banking system consisted of local 
banks subject to the local supervisor, and where cross-border establishment was 
a minor feature.14 Each jurisdiction’s supervisory authority was responsible for 
14 Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation between the Financial Supervisory Authorities, Central Banks 
and Finance Ministries of the European Union on Cross-Border Financial Stability of 1 June 2008.
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financial stability within its borders. Branches located abroad were the supervisory 
responsibility of the home supervisor, while subsidiaries came under the host 
supervisor. This failed to address the close relationship between parents and 
subsidiaries within banking groups, and the spill-overs of home and host regulator 
decisions on to each other’s financial markets. The tendency to reach for national 
solutions by ring-fencing had been evident in the response of supervisors to the 
difficulties in the Franco-Belgian Dexia bank in 2008-9.
After consultation with participants of the Vienna Initiative, Basic Principles for 
Home-Host Authority Coordination under Vienna 2.0 were adopted by the Fourth 
Full Forum held in Brussels on 12 March 2012.15
Basic principles for Home-Host Authority Coordination under Vienna 2.0
As parts of the European banking sector undergo a process of deleveraging, it is important to recall that stability of the 
financial sector and orderly credit conditions in CESEE are in the shared interest of the private sector and home and host 
country authorities. The following interconnected principles are designed to enhance cooperation and coordination 
among the various stakeholders so as to help ensure mutually beneficial outcomes even in times of global financial 
stress and a shifting financial-sector landscape. 
1)  Principle of free allocation of liquidity and capital consistent with safeguarding financial stability. The commitment 
to free movement of bank liquidity and capital in accordance with the Treaty for EU members is reaffirmed. In this 
context, ex-ante coordination of financial stability measures among home and host authorities is essential, especially 
in conditions of financial market stress.
2)  Principle of matching the supervisory framework with the cross-border integration of financial markets: Arrangements 
for cross-border supervision need to be made compatible with the integrated financial markets across Europe. 
Mechanisms should be adopted to involve jurisdictions outside the EU where European banking groups are active.
3)  Principle of fiscal authority cooperation: Supervisory coordination must be accompanied by coordination among the 
fiscal authorities, particularly with regards to crisis management and resolution issues.
4)  Principle of considering spill-overs from national actions. Supervisors, central banks, and fiscal authorities must take 
account of the implications of their actions for other national jurisdictions and for the European financial system as a whole.
5)  Principle of the central role of European institutions: The European Commission should play its role in promoting an 
EU single and stable market in financial services. The European Supervisory Authorities should play a central role in 
supervisory cooperation and mediate among country authorities. The European Systemic Risk Board should play a 
key role in macroprudential oversight.
6)  Principle of private sector engagement. Banking groups active in the region should cooperate actively with national 
authorities in efforts to promote financial stability, orderly credit conditions and sustainable cross-border banking.
7)  Principle of IFIs involvement. International organizations, internalizing the impact of cross-border spill-overs, should 
promote adjustment to more robust financial systems. They can assist the implementation of these principles through 
their surveillance, mediation, timely data collection, and financial support functions.
8)  Principle of focus on implementation. Participants are committed to the structured implementation of these principles. 
A Steering Committee will report on the proposed approach to operationalize these principles.
15 See Press Release for 13 March 2012 and http://vienna-initiative.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/Principles-for-
Home-Host-Authority-Coordination.pdf
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Following the adoption of the principles, the participants at the March 2012 
Full Forum gave their attention to concrete actions that might be possible. 
Among the areas to be covered were the functioning of supervisory colleges, 
cooperation on resolution issues, the establishment of host-country cross-border 
stability groups and how international institutions might best support this 
process. A proposal to set up four implementation groups covering these areas 
was rejected. In particular, a danger was seen that the work on supervisory 
and resolution colleges would duplicate or conflict with work being done by 
European Union institutions, work which would lead to the road map for a 
Banking Union later in the year. The principles were therefore followed up in 
a more ad hoc fashion, as discussed below.
The March 2012 Fourth Full Forum also adopted the reports of the working 
groups on Basel III implementation and on Non-Performing Loans (NPLs). 
The report of the Working Group on Basel III Implementation in Emerging 
Europe, coordinated by the World Bank and EBRD, was motivated by the 
concern that transposition of Basel III rules into the EU’s Capital Requirements 
Directive (CRD IV) might have unintended consequences for financial 
market development and cross-border relationships in CESEE. The report 
made a number of recommendations concerning capital definitions, liquidity 
requirements, the coordination of macroprudential instruments and home-host 
supervisory collaboration. It pointed out that future regulation and calibration 
should better take account of the emerging market perspective and market 
development needs.
The Working Group on Non-Performing Loans (NPLs) in CESEE , 
coordinated by the IMF and World Bank, was established in light of concerns 
that the 2008-9 crisis legacy of a high level of NPLs throughout the region 
would be a major obstacle to recovery and sustained growth. The working 
group drew on surveys conducted by the EIB/EBRD and the ECB. It concluded 
that the resolution of the problem by individual bank action was proceeding 
slowly. A more comprehensive and concerted approach was needed, with 
distinct roles for the various stakeholders: the relevant country authorities 
should press ahead with removing burdensome regulatory, tax and legal 
impediments to NPL resolution identified in the report; regulators should 
tighten supervision to eliminate incentives to let NPLs linger; banks should 
step up their collective effort to speed up NPL resolution; and avenues for out-
of-court debt restructuring and corporate rehabilitation negotiations between 
debtors and creditors should be explored.
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Formalization of the Vienna Initiative
It was also decided to make the Vienna Initiative structure more formal, with a 
Chair, a Steering Committee and a Mission Statement or terms of reference. The 
latter was adopted at a meeting in Warsaw on 18 July 2012, which clarified that 
the objective of the Vienna Initiative 2.0 was to help:
1. Avoid disorderly deleveraging, which could jeopardize financial stability in host 
countries and ultimately hurt home and host country economies alike;
2. Ensure that potential cross-border financial stability issues are resolved;
3. Achieve policy actions, notably in the supervisory area, that are taken in the 
best joint interest of home and host countries.16 
While the Vienna Initiative 1.0 was focused on West European banking groups’ 
maintaining exposure to their CESEE affiliates and their providing capital and 
liquidity as needed, the Vienna Initiative 2.0 was, despite private sector participation, 
mainly geared towards encouraging authorities to cooperate in order to avoid 
disorderly deleveraging. 
The organizational aspects of the Initiative were clarified in a note adopted following 
a meeting in Prague in June 2012. This specified that the participants in the Initiative 
take part in accordance with their respective legal framework and policies. This 
allowed them to participate in whichever aspects of the work they wished, without 
necessarily committing their institutions to endorsing the recommendations. The 
Full Forum, consisting of all participants, sets the priorities for the Initiative by 
consensus, approves the work programme and adopts reports and recommendations. 
Between the meetings of the Full Forum, a Steering Committee conducts the 
work of the Initiative and the chairman of the Steering Committee coordinates all 
public statements. Operational support for the Vienna Initiative’s work is provided 
principally by the EBRD, and a website, www.vienna-initiative.com, was set up. 
The Steering Committee of the Vienna Initiative consisted of representatives of 
the four IFIs (the EIB, the EBRD, the World Bank and the IMF), the European 
Commission and the European Council’s Economic and Finance Committee 
(EFC), and, on a rotational basis, one home and one host supervisor (initially Italy 
and Romania). Marek Belka, Governor of the National Bank of Poland, agreed to 
serve as chairman of the Initiative for five years.17 In January 2013, a position on 
16 http://vienna-initiative.com/vienna-initiative-part-2/mission-statement/
17 Boris Vujčić, Governor of the Croatian National Bank, replaced Marek Belka as chairman in November 2016.
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the Steering Committee was created for Albania, as representative of non-EU host 
countries. From July 2013, a representative of a cross-border banking group was 
also appointed to the Steering Committee.
Monitoring developments
With a focus on orderly deleveraging in the CESEE region, the Steering Committee 
created and published a Deleveraging Monitor showing and analysing trends in the 
region. It was largely prepared by the IMF staff and based upon BIS international 
banking statistics and information collected by the IMF on balance of payments 
developments. This publication was initially prepared with a quarterly frequency, 
and the first issue was in July 2012. From November 2012, the report included 
more timely and forward-looking information gathered by the EIB in a quarterly, 
and later semi-annual, survey of both parent banks and their subsidiaries in the 
CESEE region. The detailed results of this survey were also published by the EIB in 
a separate publication, CESEE Bank Lending Survey, starting in December 2013. 
The Deleveraging Monitor gradually expanded its coverage of credit developments in 
the region, and how successful banks were in replacing external funding, primarily 
from parent banks, by domestic deposit funding. It was renamed Deleveraging and 
Credit Monitor in October 2013 and the frequency was changed to semi-annual 
starting in December 2016. From the middle of 2016, these publications were joined 
by a semi-annual NPL Monitor for the CESEE prepared by the EBRD.
Host-Country Cross-Border Banking Forums (HCCBs)
The Vienna Initiative had shown itself to be a useful forum to bring together the 
banking groups and authorities involved in cross-border banking for the CESEE 
region, to generate solutions to broad problems and to discuss issues that arose in 
the process. However, while there were similarities in the problems that countries 
faced, there were also many specific country-by-country issues, and the constellation 
of actors was different in each. One of the ideas that was generated during the 
planning for Vienna 2.0 was to establish individual country forums that could 
help generate trust and resolve issues that arose from cross-border banking. The 
model here was in part the Nordic-Baltic Cross-Border Stability Group, established 
in August 2010.
The HCCBFs were designed as a framework to allow host country authorities 
to interact with the banks that are systemic in their local banking systems, the 
banks’ parents and the parent’s home regulators. IFIs and European bodies might 
participate as observers. While in most countries outside the CESEE region banks 
respond to local conditions and supervisors have the undisputed ability to influence 
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their activities, in CESEE banks may respond instead to the conditions of the parent 
banks or the concerns of the parents’ supervisors. In a low-key informal setting, and 
with all parties in the same room, issues could be thrashed out properly and the root 
cause of problems identified. The HCCBF was designed to be a discussion forum 
only, and not a framework for obtaining commitments, as the country meetings 
in the original Vienna Initiative had been. The aim would be to build trust and 
understanding and promote a sound and responsive banking system. 
A pilot HCCBF was convened by the Croatian National Bank in October 2012, 
attended by the systemically important banks in Croatia, their parents and 
Austrian and Italian regulators, and was considered to be a success. Subsequently, 
HCCBF meetings were held in Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia and Slovenia; 
in some cases several such meetings were held. A similar format, the Ukraine 
Financial Forum was used several times by Ukraine, to bring together its cross-
border banks and their supervisors. However, the idea petered out. There were 
possibly unrealistic expectations of what could be achieved, and what might have 
been a long-term programme to build up trust was displaced by more urgent 
immediate matters. 
Expanding on the Basic Principles for the Supervision of Cross-
Border Banks
Rather than establish a formal group to expand on the Basic Principles in the 
area of supervisory practices, an ad hoc approach was taken. A note containing 
observations on supervisory practices was prepared by Lars Nyberg, former 
Deputy Governor of the Swedish Riksbank, and some colleagues, with support 
from the EBA, based on the experience of the IFIs and host countries, and after 
informal consultations with EU institutions. A draft was discussed at a workshop 
in London of Vienna Initiative participants on 12 September 2012 and the final 
version issued on 18 October 2012.
The document pointed out that recent experience showed that home and 
host supervisors can differ in their assessment of the systemic risk of financial 
institutions, not least because subsidiaries may account only for a minor part of a 
banking group yet be systemic in host countries. These concerns can be even more 
pronounced in countries outside the EU where EU-based banks have systemic 
operations. Practices in this area were improving as the EBA gained experience 
in implementing its mandate. Some of the issues were related to the work under 
way on the EU’s Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), as well as 
proposals for a Banking Union.
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The document contains some 22 observations concerning supervisory gaps, as seen 
primarily from the point of view of host country authorities, together with some 
proposals. The proposals focused on the following.18
1. Addressing potential conflicts of interest to ensure that supervisory colleges 
take a wider European perspective.
2. Ensuring that the EBA guidelines are observed and implemented in practice. 
3. Fostering more open and active discussions in supervisory colleges.
4. Strengthening the position of the EBA as an “honest broker” in mediation and 
involving fiscal authorities when fiscal issues are relevant.
5. Bringing the relevant non-EU countries into the supervisory cooperation 
framework. 
6. Highlighting the need to ensure appropriate conditions for the non-euro area 
countries to participate in the banking union (“opting in”).
7. Bringing the macroprudential perspective into the discussion of cross border 
supervision, including in supervisory colleges.
These proposals were submitted to the EBA, the ECB and the European 
Commission as an input into the design of Europe-wide supervisory arrangements.
The Fifth Full Forum meeting, which took place in Brussels on 9 November 2012, 
discussed the large agenda of regulatory developments under way at the European 
Union level. These included the CRD IV, deposit guarantee schemes, the recovery 
and resolution framework and the new proposals for a Banking Union. A draft note 
of observations on resolution practices and the implications of the Banking Union 
for CESEE were presented. Work on the development of local capital markets to 
improve local bank funding, on the resolution of NPLs, and possibly on bank taxes 
was proposed.
Second Joint IFI Action Plan
The day before the Full Forum, the presidents of the European Investment Bank 
Group (EIB), the World Bank Group (WBG), and the EBRD announced a new 
Joint IFI Action Plan (JIFIAP) for Growth in Central and Eastern Europe. 
This was spurred by evidence that the effect of the euro area crisis on demand 
for CESEE exports, and the cross-border deleveraging under way, were already 
having a negative effect on the region. The three institutions committed themselves 
to providing at least €30 billion of new resources to the region over  2013-14 
18 See Press Release.
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to rekindle growth by supporting private and public sector initiatives, including 
infrastructure, corporate investment and the financial sector.
The JIFIAP was developed in the context of the Vienna Initiative, and based 
on the 2009-10 Joint IFI Action Plan. Financing under the second JIFIAP was 
envisaged to support economic restructuring, consolidation and diversification, 
as well as enhancing long-term competitiveness through increased availability of 
long-term credit and equity, mobilizing export trade finance and supporting policy 
reform. This broad range of activity contrasted with the bank-focused operations 
of the first JIFIAP. Nevertheless, a major objective was to help ensure that the 
region’s banking system remained in a condition to extend credit, especially to 
SMEs and mid-caps, and this was achieved by providing a large volume of reliable 
funding and actions to help cross-border banking groups use their capital more 
efficiently. 
The EIB committed a minimum of €20 billion, mainly in the form of long-term 
loans to the private and public sector, addressing priority areas such as SMEs, 
renewable energy and energy efficiency, innovation and convergence. The EIB 
was also the main provider of first loss guarantees and private equity and venture 
capital to the region, as well as making particular efforts to support the mobilization 
of EU grants. The World Bank commitment was for about €6.5 billion, the IBRD 
and International Development Association (IDA) providing policy-based lending 
and technical assistance; the International Finance Corporation (IFC) supporting 
the private sector through its investments and advisory services; and Multilateral 
Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) providing political risk insurance to support 
investments across all sectors. EBRD investments were projected at €4 billion in 
loans, equity and trade financing to facilitate regional integration and export-led 
growth. In the event, these commitments were exceeded, with delivery by December 
2014 reaching €28.3 billion for the EIB, €7.4 billion for the WBG, and €7.0 billion 
for the EBRD, a total of €42.7 billion.19
Observations on resolution
After the Observations on Supervisory Practices, another strand of the Basic 
Principles for Home-Host Authority Coordination that needed elaboration was 
that of cooperation on resolution issues. Again, the approach taken was for Lars 
Nyberg to consult and prepare a note on the topic. A preliminary draft was discussed 
19 See Final Report on the Joint IFI Action Plan for Growth in Central and South Eastern Europe.
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at the London workshop on 12 September 2012, and subsequent draft at the Full 
Forum on 9 November 2012 in Brussels. 
The discussion of the resolution of cross-border banks took place against the 
background of the European Commission’s proposal for BRRD of 6 June 2012, 
and the proposals for a Banking Union, involving a single resolution authority. 
The note pointed out that the approach of creating resolution colleges to handle 
cross-border issues was promising but untested, with cross-border use of resolution 
funds being problematic. The EU should give legal backing to the principle that 
if host countries were expected to participate in resolution procedures, then they 
needed to be fully involved in the normal non-crisis work of supervisory colleges. 
But the subsidiaries and branches of cross-border banks in host countries were 
often too small to be of concern to home regulators. 
For supervisory and resolution colleges to work properly, the note stated, there 
must be an adequate two-way exchange of information and participation in college 
discussion. Host authorities should also be involved in the preparation of group 
Recovery and Resolution Plans (“living wills”). While the EBA rules provide for 
much of this as far as hosts that are EU members are concerned, the rules need to be 
properly enforced and participation of non-EU host countries ensured. Memoranda 
of understanding could help regulate these issues.
The incentives facing home and host countries on resolution issues were not aligned. 
The proposed BRRD shifted more power to home authorities, while host country 
authorities were still to be responsible for financial stability in their domestic 
economies. Host countries must have a clear say in matters affecting their domestic 
financial stability. If the role of the EBA as a binding mediator was to be generally 
respected, the interest of host countries, whether in the euro area or not, must be 
properly recognized in the EBA mandate and voting structure. Ring-fencing of 
resources was a critical issue, and the Commission proposal provided a basis for 
discussing the matter. But it was unclear whether the proposals for intra-group 
support would work as intended, especially as the imbalance between decision power 
and responsibility for local financial stability still exists. A “comply or explain” 
procedure might help protect the interests of host countries.
Burden-sharing issues might ultimately be resolved for countries in the Banking 
Union but were much more problematic for non-members of the euro area, both 
within and especially outside the EU. Finally, the issue of bail-in-able bonds in 
countries with weak capital markets could be very difficult.
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These observations and proposals were submitted to the European Banking 
Authority, the European Central Bank, the European Systemic Risk Board and 
the European Commission in January 2013. 
Since 2013, the work of the Vienna Initiative has had three main strands. The 
first has been the monitoring of developments in the region, as a form of early 
warning of larger developments that might have negative spill-overs for the stability 
of local banking systems and the strength of local economies. The second has been 
to examine the consequences of regulatory and supervisory proposals and actions 
that have an impact on CESEE, particularly those countries outside the European 
Union, and to try to resolve difficulties that emerge. Thirdly, the Vienna Initiative 
has sought to foster renewed growth in the CESEE region, by removing obstacles 
to bank credit activity and examining how IFI finance might facilitate this. The 
last two areas are the focus of much of the rest of this chapter.
The impact of regulatory and supervisory change on CESEE
In January 2013, a Working Group on the European Banking Union and 
Emerging Europe, led by the IMF and the EBRD, was established to look at the 
impact of the proposed Banking Union on host countries and the banks operating 
there. The work focused on the impact on EU members and non-members in the 
CESEE region that were not part of the euro area, but where banking groups 
headquartered in the euro area were active. This work took place while intensive 
preparations for the Banking Union were underway in the EU, including the 
proposals for the BRRD and the single rate mechanism (SRM), and allowed a more 
precise formulation of some of the concerns of countries in the region. At the time of 
the discussions, the prospect of non-euro area countries becoming members of the 
Banking Union and the conditions for this were under close scrutiny.20 The Working 
Group drew upon the Vienna Initiative’s earlier Observations on Supervision and 
on Resolution, and an April 2013 report on the Single Supervisory Mechanism.
The report of the Working Group, issued in April 2013, distinguished between 
the concerns of three groups of countries in the region.21 Those subject to the 
Single Supervisory Mechanism (the euro area members) faced a situation where 
supervision was now supranational, but bank resolution and deposit guarantees 
remained national, creating a mismatch between decision-making power and fiscal 
20 In the event, no non-members of the euro area applied to join the Banking Union until Bulgaria requested this in 
2018 in the context of its application to adopt the euro.
21 The report of the Working Group provided input into the work of the European Union on the design of the Banking 
Union, and several of its recommendations were subsequently incorporated in the final documents.
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responsibilities. Countries which were considering opting in to the Banking Union 
would find it easier to do so if they could benefit from the availability of ECB 
liquidity facilities in times of crisis. Finally, those countries that remained outside 
the Banking Union would benefit from the establishment of permanent cooperation 
mechanisms with the ECB, including through supervisory colleges and agreements 
between the EBA and non-EU members.
This latter point received particular attention at a Full Forum session devoted to 
the concerns of South Eastern Europe (SEE), the West Balkans, where the countries 
were candidates or potential candidates for EU membership but not yet eligible to 
belong to EU institutions. It was pointed out that some of these countries could not 
participate in supervisory colleges because they did not comply with supervisory 
and confidentiality standards. To gauge compliance the EBA needed to perform an 
assessment, and there was a backlog of these. Given the importance of these issues 
to the countries in question, it was proposed that the assessments be accelerated 
and a procedure for doing this be elaborated. Similarly, there would be a need for 
formal lines of contact between the SRM/SRB and the countries of SEE. 
The increased importance of the West Balkan countries of SEE in the work of 
the Vienna Initiative was reflected in the appointment of a representative of these 
countries to the Steering Committee. The first representative, the Governor 
of the Bank of Albania, served to raise awareness of these issues by hosting 
a Technical Meeting in Tirana on 3 October 201322 to promote cooperation 
between these countries. 
He pointed out that the worsening of the euro area crisis had rapidly affected the 
region through lower risk tolerance of lenders and an interruption of lending by 
the subsidiaries of European banking groups. This reduction occurred even when 
subsidiaries were mainly financed through domestic deposits. The requirements 
of the EBA for additional capital at the group level prompted banks to “save” 
regulatory capital by reducing lending rather than by raising more capital. One 
unfortunate example of this had occurred when Raiffeisen’s Albanian subsidiary 
had reduced its holdings of Albanian government paper by selling the equivalent 
of 3% of Albania’s GDP of such holdings on the market in a very short period of 
time in order to help raise the group’s capitalization level. The Governor pointed 
22 BIS central bankers’ speeches, Ardian Fullani: Overview of Albania’s recent economic and financial market 
developments, 3 October 2013. The steering committee position was later filled by the Governor of the National 
Bank of the Republic of Macedonia.
34
Ten years of the Vienna Initiative 2009-2019
out that the Vienna Initiative had been relaunched to protect economies from 
disorderly deleveraging and called for effective measures to restore healthy 
lending in the economies of SEE. A permanent working relationship between the 
countries of the region and the ECB as the new regulator of most parent banking 
groups should be established. In addition, barriers to the exchange of supervisory 
information should be eliminated and non-EU members should participate fully 
in relevant supervisory colleges.
These issues were taken up at a session of the October 2013 Sixth Full Forum in 
Brussels. Subsequent regional cooperation meetings were held in Banja Luka in 
September 2014 and Podgorica in November 2014. 
Cooperation with EU and euro area regulators
As the European Union was developing the legal texts for the SRM and the 
BRRD, the Vienna Initiative working group on Banking Union submitted 
observations on the EU proposals at the end of 2013. These dealt in particular 
with how to protect the interests of countries outside the Banking Union, 
especially those outside the EU, and where the subsidiaries of cross-border banks 
based in the Banking Union were of local systemic importance. Among the 
matters raised were the need for credible fiscal backstops in such jurisdictions, 
local recovery plans to supplement group recovery plans, and the avoidance by the 
SRM of action which might trigger instability elsewhere. While recognizing that 
these are all difficult and sensitive issues, the solutions proposed concentrated 
on greater participation of non-EU authorities in the resolution process and 
SRM, in crisis management groups, supervisory and resolution colleges, the 
importance of early engagement in advance of a crisis, and the establishment of 
effective mediation procedures.
The Vienna Initiative has been particularly well placed to tackle issues arising 
from the Banking Union facing non-EU countries in the West Balkans. The 
centralization of supervision with the SSM at the ECB and creation of the 
Single Resolution Board create a large single euro area authority supervising 
most of the banks engaged in cross-border banking in CESEE. The European 
Union’s own regulations in this area, administered by the European Banking 
Authority (EBA) and the European Commission seek to ensure that EU member 
countries outside the euro area are not discriminated against in this regulation. 
However, this principle does not extend to third countries, such as those in the 
West Balkans, or to countries such as Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine in the EU’s 
Eastern Neighbourhood.
35
 Ten years of the Vienna Initiative: a chronology
The first task was to ensure that these countries could participate in supervisory 
colleges for the cross-border banks. This was particularly important for the 
countries in question, since a bank subsidiary could be systemically important 
in the host’s banking system while only constituting a relatively insignificant 
part of the banking group’s overall operations. Participation in the supervisory 
colleges was governed by regulations issued by the EBA23 and required that the 
confidentiality standards of the host supervisor reached the standards required 
by the European Union. 
During 2015, the Vienna Initiative negotiated an umbrella agreement, a Memorandum 
of Cooperation, with the EBA covering a number of West Balkan countries. The 
Memorandum was a non-binding agreement establishing a framework of cooperation 
and information exchange designed to strengthen banking regulation and supervision 
of banks operating in the EU and the West Balkan countries. Within this framework, 
the EBA would update the partner authorities on the relevant developments of the 
single rule book and of progress in convergence of supervisory practices, thus facilitating 
their participation in the colleges of supervisors.24 The EBA also opened its regular 
training activities to the partners, while the signatory authorities agreed to provide 
the EBA with regular and ad hoc information for risk analysis purposes on relevant 
developments in their banking systems. At the same time the signatory authorities 
aimed to bring their own regulatory and supervisory standards and institutional 
arrangements into line with those in the EU, according to a timetable appropriate to 
the conditions in individual countries.
After some months of discussion, and a review of the countries’ supervisory systems, 
this Memorandum was signed on 23 October 2015 under the auspices of the 
Vienna Initiative by the EBA and the supervisory authorities of the Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska (two entities constituting the 
Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina), Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Albania. 
The Memorandum is supplemented with agreements with each of the individual 
signatories, after a finding that their confidentiality regimes could be deemed 
equivalent to that of the EU.25 
The creation of the Banking Union and the transfer of supervisory and resolution 
authority to the ECB (SSM and SRM) made it desirable to supplement the agreement 
23 Article 116(6) of the CRD IV, Directive 2013/36/EU.
24 See EBA press release of 23 October 2015.
25 The Central Bank of Kosovo signed the Memorandum in March 2017, and the National Bank of Moldova in 
February 2019.
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with the EBA with memoranda of understanding with the ECB itself. Discussions 
were held subsequently with the ECB by representatives of the Vienna Initiative 
regarding an umbrella agreement with the West Balkan countries, but the ECB 
preferred the route of taking over the individual memoranda that host supervisors 
had signed with the SSM’s predecessors. Nevertheless, the discussion helped to raise 
the priority given by the SSM to supervisory spill-overs to and from the West Balkans. 
Discussions with the ECB also provided an opportunity to raise matters connected 
with the subsidiaries of Greek banks, where the parents came under severe pressure 
in the first half of 2015 and had to receive considerable support. Restructuring 
plans were agreed by DG COMP with four major Greek banking groups, and most 
of these plans involved a focusing of the groups’ operations, usually including the 
disposal of some subsidiaries abroad. The distress in the Greek banking system 
also caused a weakening of confidence in some of the subsidiaries in the Balkans, 
although most deposit flight remained in the local banking system and the local 
central banks could provide the needed liquidity support. While ensuring the 
stability of Greek subsidiaries in the European Union (primarily Bulgaria, Romania, 
Cyprus, the UK and Germany) was at the centre of the EBA’s attention, the position 
of subsidiaries outside the EU was more problematic.
The Governor of the National Bank of Macedonia wrote to the chairman of the 
Vienna Initiative at the end of July 2015. On behalf of Macedonia, Serbia and 
Albania, he requested that the Vienna Initiative facilitate a unified regional response 
in arranging a financial backstop facility with the ECB, which would enable the 
three central banks access to ECB’s refinancing operations, should the situation 
worsen with respect to subsidiaries. He also requested help in ensuring that host 
supervisors could actively participate in decision-making that might affect the 
operation of Greek subsidiaries, or at least participate through a regular exchange 
of relevant information. Subsequently, the chairman of the Steering Committee 
engaged in discussions with the senior ECB officials on these issues. Nevertheless, 
it proved hard for host supervisors to obtain information about the restructuring 
plans of parents agreed with the European Commission (DG COMP) even when 
they involved divestment of relevant subsidiaries.26
Another area in which the Vienna Initiative has sought to ameliorate the 
regulatory spill-over of new European banking regulations relates to the 
26 In November 2015, the EBRD announced an investment of €250 million to support the recapitalization of Greece’s 
four systemic banks (Alpha Bank, Eurobank, National Bank of Greece and Piraeus Bank).
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application of Article 114 of CRD IV.27 This provision required banking 
groups to apply a 100% risk weight on exposures of their subsidiaries to non-
EU sovereigns and central banks when presenting consolidated group accounts. 
This was a change from the previous zero risk weight regime, which made it very 
expensive for subsidiaries in certain countries to engage in normal operations in 
government debt or central bank paper, hampering monetary and fiscal policy 
and fostering capital outflows. The resolution of the issue identified by Vienna 
Initiative participants required the affected countries to take steps to allow a 
positive assessment by the European Commission of the equivalence of their 
regulatory and supervisory regimes with that of the EU, and for the acceleration 
of such assessments by the Commission.
The Vienna Initiative served two important functions when it helped the countries 
of South Eastern Europe, and especially the non-EU candidate countries in the 
West Balkans, adjust to the European Banking Union. One was to raise the profile 
of these countries and the priority which European institutions give them in their 
work. In setting up the new European supervisory and regulatory structures, it has 
been necessary to reach equivalency and cooperation agreements with supervisors 
in many other locations. In this process, the more important of the world’s financial 
markets have inevitably taken precedence, since this is where the bulk of the 
EU’s cross-border banking business takes place and is most crucial to the largest 
European financial institutions. The Vienna Initiative has helped to redress the 
balance as far as the smaller markets of the West Balkans are concerned, since 
while operations there are relatively insignificant for Europe’s banking system 
as a whole, the spill-overs from the European Union can be destabilizing for the 
local markets and can stymie development and growth. The other function was 
to provide a forum where the countries of the region can discuss common issues 
and exchange experience, additional and complementary to the events that are 
organized by the EBA and the ECB.
In implementing the Basel III requirements for total loss-absorbing capacity 
(TLAC), the European authorities established targets for each bank of a MREL 
to act as an additional loss absorber in the face of stress. This requirement has 
created some difficulties for cross-border banks in the CESEE region. It is even 
more difficult to issue such liabilities in countries with small and shallow capital 
markets, such as those in the region, than it is in Western Europe, and this will 
tend to raise the banks’ funding costs. This is a complicated issue, with BRRD 
27 See the contribution by Angelovska et al. in this volume.
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provisions not yet transposed uniformly into national legislation. Banks have 
sought solutions, including the suggestion that IFI funding be ruled MREL-
eligible or that IFIs assist them by making markets for MREL. At the same time, 
host regulators face the problem that if MREL requirements are met by their 
banks raising more capital, their profitability will suffer, and this may affect their 
ability to provide credit. Since 2018, the Vienna Initiative has provided a venue 
for the discussion of how these issues might be resolved. 
Reviving Credit in the CESEE region
Another principal focus of the Vienna Initiative 2.0 has been to revive the growth 
of credit in the CESEE region, which had been largely flat over the period 2009-13. 
The participating banks considered the main obstacle impeding new credit to be 
the regulatory uncertainty that increased risks to their operations. This uncertainty 
related in part to the new initiatives at the EU level, but also to the degree of ring-
fencing that home and host supervisors might require to limit the domestic costs 
of financial instability. The authorities tended to view the problem in terms of 
weak credit demand, the high NPL level and inadequate action by banks to clean 
their balance sheets of non-performing assets. There was potential for IFIs or local 
credit enhancements to help overcome the perceived riskiness of SME lending in 
these countries. 
Credit Guarantees
The need to remove obstacles to the extension of bank credit in support of growth 
led to two lines of activity, the first work on tackling NPLs and the second the 
use of guarantee schemes to support small and medium-sized enterprise’s (SME’s) 
access to finance. When expressing their priorities in July 2013, the banking 
groups considered that credit guarantees and other risk-sharing mechanisms were 
key instruments to support lending to SMEs and SME access to capital markets. 
A Working Group on SME Guarantee Schemes was proposed in October 2013 
to assess existing national credit guarantee schemes in this area, to review the 
relevant EU instruments in this area and to come up with concrete proposals for 
more effective credit enhancement schemes. This was established at the November 
2013 Full Forum.
The Working Group was jointly chaired by the EIB, the World Bank and the 
National Bank of Poland. It surveyed national credit guarantee agencies, banks 
and regulators concerning the adequacy of existing facilities. In its report, finalized 
in November 2014, it concluded that there was a strong demand for SME credit 
guarantees in the CESEE region, and they could be an effective way to improve 
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SME access to finance. Public funding was under stress, but EU and IFI funding 
could play a key role at this time. There was scope for credit guarantee schemes 
to improve the clarity of their objectives and the evaluation of their operations. 
Improved procedures could alleviate the need of borrowers for collateral and avoid 
too narrow a definition of eligible clients. A more uniform treatment by national 
authorities of the credit risk mitigation and associated capital relief would promote 
the use of these instruments and a more coherent approach by regulatory and 
supervisory authorities would be helpful. 
Following the discussion of the report at the November 2014 Full Forum, the 
members of the working group instituted a programme of outreach to endure 
that the messages reached both national credit guarantee schemes and banks. A 
guideline was issued by the EBA to clarify conditions under which regulatory 
capital relief could be provided in the presence of guarantees. A joint EIB-EIF-EBA 
seminar was held in London in May 2016 on synthetic securitization and financial 
guarantees following up the Vienna Initiative working group. It brought together 
regulators, banks and IFIs to discuss the regulatory and supervisory treatment of 
such production, including in the funding and risk transfer areas, as a step towards 
a more consistent approach by regulators to such instruments, allowing guarantee 
programmes to be more effective and banks to have more confidence in their use. 
The report and recommendations of the Working Group were also important inputs 
into subsequent discussions on the role of guarantees in SME finance throughout 
the European Union. 
NPL Initiative
The NPL Initiative, a regional project, was launched at the November 2014 Full 
Forum. (See the contribution by Marković, Cloutier and Jerić, below.) Resolving 
the high stock of NPLs was seen one of the elements needed to create the conditions 
for balanced credit recovery, the others being credit enhancements schemes (to 
address high risk perceptions) and local currency capital market development. 
The report of the Working Group on NPLs issued in March 2012 had identified 
the obstacles to reducing the large stock of such assets in the region, as well as 
making recommendations on how banks and countries might tackle the problem. 
Nevertheless, the problem remained severe in many countries, and remained at the 
forefront of attention in Vienna Initiative meetings. 
Even before the issue of the Working Group’s 2012 report, implementation 
workshops were being held around the region and NPL workout programmes 
established in several countries. The World Bank provided assistance on NPL 
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issues through its Financial Sector Advisory Center (FinSAC) in Vienna (funded 
by the Austrian government) to Albania, Montenegro, Kosovo and Serbia; 
the IMF worked with Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia on the subject as part 
of adjustment programmes. Bank regulation and tax and collateral legislation 
were amended in several countries. The parent banks resident in Vienna were 
working on common principles for out-of-court action. And there was investor 
activity, purchasing portfolios of non-performing assets in Croatia, Hungary, 
Montenegro, Romania and Slovenia. The October 2013 Full Forum welcomed 
the publication of the new harmonized definitions of NPLs and regulatory 
forbearance by the European Banking Authority (EBA). Nevertheless, NPL 
levels throughout the region were still high and rising.
The NPL Initiative brought much of this work together in a regional project 
with country-specific action plans. At the regional level, the focus was placed 
on knowledge-sharing, policy support and monitoring. At the country level, 
domestic forums (including HCBBFs) focused on removing the obstacles specific 
to each market and building capacity to resolve NPLs. Corporate restructuring 
has been promoted where needed, potential investors brought in and support 
sought from the European authorities. The IFIs have provided both advice and 
investment, while the banking groups, led by Raiffeisen, helped finance the 
coordination. Full-time staff were hired by the EBRD, but the initiative drew on 
the work of the IMF, the World Bank, the EIB and the European Commission. A 
website (http://npl.vienna-initiative.com/) was set up, with the aim of promoting 
the transparency of restructuring frameworks and disseminating information 
on best practices. 
Successive issues of the NPL Monitor show the progress made in removing 
impediments to reducing the stock of NPLs. These include changes in laws and 
regulations, including on provisioning, and tax provisions governing asset sales, 
as well as training of bank officials and the promotion of local loan servicing 
capacity. The NPL Initiative has promoted markets in non-performing assets, 
and out of court resolution frameworks. The NPL Initiative has held a series of 
national and regional workshops. There has been a marked reduction in the level 
of NPLs in the region and a growing market in distressed assets. The work of 
the NPL Initiative has informed the guidance produced by the ECB, the ESRB 
and the European Commission concerning the NPL problem in Europe as a 
whole. The work of the NPL Initiative has extended to Cyprus and Greece, and 
Cyprus requested to join the Vienna Initiative primarily in light of its interest 
in this work.
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Local Capital Market Development
The parent-to-subsidiary funding model which fuelled cross-border banking in 
CESEE created several vulnerabilities, from both the mismatch of the funding and 
the local currency and the dependency of the subsidiary on the financial market 
access of the parent. The earliest work of the Vienna Initiative looked into how 
alternative funding models could be promoted, among them the development of 
local capital markets.28 Recognizing that this was a difficult endeavour in small 
countries without a tradition of financial depth and stability, the IFIs sought to 
address this issue.
The EBRD launched its Local Currency and Capital Market Development Initiative 
in 2010 to reduce reliance on foreign currency lending and borrowing. This involved 
EBRD lending and borrowing in local currency, investing in local currency and 
developing a long-term institutional investor base. Complementing this was a 
programme of policy dialogue, technical assistance and advisory work. The IFC 
similarly had a programme for local capital market development and the issue of 
local currency bonds, and the EIB issues in local currencies. And the World Bank 
and IMF have been assisting the development of local government bond markets.29 
During the years since the crisis, banks in the CESEE region have been remarkably 
successful in replacing parent funding with local deposits, a process that is 
documented in the Deleveraging and Credit Monitor. However, deposit-based bank 
financing has limits in these countries, and regulators have also pressed for more 
stable funding arrangements, so the banks have been eager for IFI help in supporting 
longer-term funding instruments in local currencies. Promoting this development of 
local currency capital markets has been the subject of much discussion at successive 
Vienna Initiative meetings.
The European Commission adopted in September 2015 an action plan on building a 
Capital Markets Union (CMU) with the aim of establishing the “building blocks” of 
an integrated EU capital market by 2019. The aim was to create more opportunities 
for investors, connect financing to the real economy, foster a stronger and more 
resilient financial system, deepen financial integration and increase competition. 
Since a CMU could have a major impact on financing investment and sustaining 
growth in CESEE countries, this was seen as an area where the Vienna Initiative 
28 See the above discussion of the Working Group on Local Currency and Capital Market Development of 2009.
29 A discussion of IFI operations to strengthen local currency capital markets in the CESEE region can be found in the 
First Report on the Joint IFI Action Plan for Growth in Central and South Eastern Europe, pp. 12-13.
42
Ten years of the Vienna Initiative 2009-2019
had a role to play. At the November 2015 Full Forum in Warsaw, the meeting 
encouraged CESEE authorities to identify areas where EU technical assistance 
could help them implement CMU-related measures of relevance to their countries. 
A Working Group on Capital Markets Union, chaired by the European 
Commission, was set up at the March 2017 Full Forum in Luxembourg. Its objective 
was to provide an overview of challenges faced by capital markets in the CESEE 
region, and to identify measures needed to enhance local capital markets which 
might be implemented at national, cross-border and European level. To this end, 
the working group carried out a twelve-country survey among its members of the 
challenges they were facing and the solutions they were considering. The survey 
respondents were all EU member states, with the exception of Macedonia.
The report made recommendations at the national, regional and EU level. At the 
national level, the report called for national capital market strategies, support for listing 
by SMEs and encouraging the privatization of state-owned enterprises through capital 
market floatation. Regional recommendations were aimed at increasing cross-border 
cooperation by facilitating foreign listings, creating cross-border links between local 
market infrastructures, cooperation between stock exchanges and their merging and 
harmonized regulations. At the EU level, the report recommended providing relief 
for disproportionate regulations such as excessive penalties for small companies, the 
possibility of bank investment in MREL issued by subsidiaries in some circumstances 
and further harmonizing regulations in some areas, such as fintech. Financial support 
from IFIs could both help overcome market failures and increase the funding pool for 
investments. The report was primarily focused on EU member states in the CESEE 
region. (See also the discussion in the chapter below on supervision and regulation 
by Keereman et al.)
The Working Group report was presented to the March 2018 Full Forum in 
London, where it was endorsed and transmitted to the European authorities. The 
Commission followed it up with a Communication on EU support for local capital 
markets. This emphasized the importance of the development of smaller financial 
centres as a way to realize the CMU, rather than relying excessively on the expansion 
of established financial centres.
Investment in CESEE
At the March 2017 Full Forum there was a discussion of the investment needs 
of the countries in the CESEE region. The EIB’s Investment Survey had 
found that investment levels in EU member states in the CESEE region, while 
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somewhat higher than in the rest of the EU, were below the levels needed to 
sustain convergence. The funding channels of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
and cross-border bank flows were not working as before, and more firms in the 
region considered themselves credit-constrained. EU funds had been important 
in sustaining investment levels, but could be used more effectively, especially by 
levering investment through credit enhancements and other mechanisms. The 
banking groups supported this analysis and suggested they might have a role to 
play in improving the design of IFI instruments. In this connection, they were 
now as interested in forms of funding that would give them capital relief as in 
simple risk transfer. There were unnecessary differences in how different national 
authorities treated regulatory capital relief. 
The subject thus defined became matter of finding solutions that served the interests 
of the banking groups, the EU, the IFIs and the banks’ home and host regulators, 
and the Vienna Initiative provided a suitable platform for elaborating these. A 
Working Group on IFI Financial Products Supporting Investment in CESEE, 
chaired by the EIB, was set up at the April 2017 Steering Committee meeting. Its 
objectives were to identify the market gaps and priority policy areas where IFIs could 
best support investment, support the development of instruments best meeting the 
investment needs of the CESEE region and assess the local investor base and how 
to improve cooperation amongst IFIs, thus helping to shape the new IFI products.
The working group reported in early 2019 and concluded inter alia that IFIs 
could play a catalytic role as the region developed a new growth model based 
on productivity growth through human capital development and home-grown 
innovation. More accessible information on IFI activity and product mix would 
make for better investor take up. The bank capital relief that IFI products for SMEs 
and mid-caps provided was at least as important as the funding itself, and the IFIs 
should also broaden their local currency offerings. Complying with MREL was 
challenging for banks in the region and the Vienna Initiative should devote more 
attention to the issue. IFIs should adapt their product offers to the characteristics of 
the region, with smaller ticket sizes and more flexibility in loan structures, among 
other things. Grants combined with financial instruments had a high potential in 
the region as their socio-economic impact could be large. 
The discussion of new growth model for the CESEE region, which lay behind 
the establishment of the Working Group on IFI Financial Instruments for 
Investment, also led to a recognition of the need to ensure that investment in 
the CESEE region was more focused on intangibles and sustaining innovation. 
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A further Working Group on Financing for Innovation, proposed by the EIB 
and cochaired by the EBRD, was set up at the March 2018 Full Forum. The terms 
of reference provided that the Working Group would: review and identify gaps 
in existing policies targeting innovation and entrepreneurship; investigate the 
role of banks and other providers of financing in the different stages and forms 
of innovation; help develop tools for banks to assess innovative firms and select 
appropriate financing vehicles; and assess how to facilitate cooperation between 
IFIs, banks and alternative providers of financing for innovation, such as venture 
capital and private equity firms.
Concluding Remarks
Cross-border bank supervision issues are among the most complicated in the 
whole regulatory area, and international rule-making has not resolved many of 
the most serious issues. The failure of a bank or banks in one jurisdiction can have 
spill-over effects threatening the financial stability of another. While cooperation 
between supervisors can ameliorate the situation, each has responsibility for 
financial stability in his or her own country, where the taxpayer will hold each 
to account for any bailout or compensation that has to be paid in the event of 
failure. The issues are not resolved at the global level, particularly in the event of 
the failure of a cross-border bank or banks. For most countries, however, the bulk 
of the domestic banking system consists of home country banks, and inward and 
outward cross-border spill-overs are likely to be relatively small and contained. 
But when banking systems are interlinked, these effects are likely to be large. 
For the euro area, when a crisis hit the banking system, the response was to 
centralize supervision and resolution create a Banking Union, so that problems 
of supervisory cooperation could be eliminated. Even implementing that solution 
has been to climb a political mountain.
But the problems are much larger for the countries of the CESEE region, where 
often virtually their entire banking system is externally owned. Not only that, 
but, given their small domestic financial markets, a subsidiary which is a small 
part of the parent bank and an afterthought in a recovery or resolution plan 
can be systemically vital to the host country. The challenges of supervisory 
and regulatory cooperation in the CESEE region are of a different order from 
elsewhere. Changing ownership in the banking system would bring another group 
of problems to countries that need a well-managed and properly functioning 
banking system to underpin their growth. The Vienna Initiative is needed to 
help the countries of this region to engage in a responsive dialogue with the home 
supervisors and regulators of their banks. 
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In its first phase, Vienna Initiative 1.0, it was a spectacular success, helping to 
stabilize the financial markets of the region and limit contagion, while allowing 
the banks to repair their balance sheets and remain engaged with the countries. 
Vienna Initiative 2.0 was also launched at a time of crisis, with banks facing 
huge deleveraging pressures and home regulators on the verge of taking actions 
to ring-fence their markets. Deleveraging occurred for some years, but at a pace 
that could be contained. The monitoring under the Vienna Initiative put in 
place an early warning system so that action could be taken, or discussions held, 
when anything untoward occurred. The region’s banking systems have weathered 
reduced parent funding and the disengagement from the region of several banks. 
The Vienna Initiative has been a forum for identifying new ways of helping the 
cross-border banks continue to supply the region with the credit it needs. And, 
most importantly, it has helped the smaller countries, particularly those in the 
West Balkans, to raise issues when regulatory reform had or threatened to have 
serious spill-overs on their banking systems. The Vienna Initiative is a framework 
for ensuring the financial stability of the countries of the region, and it has been 
quite successful in doing so.
The weaknesses of the Vienna Initiative 2.0 are a mirror image of its strengths. It 
is not a decision-making forum, and the desire of various participants to obtain 
commitments in that forum have been unsuccessful. Banking groups would have 
liked to see the Initiative take a firmer view on bank taxes in various countries, 
as well as measures that put the financial burden of resolving foreign exchange 
mortgages onto the banks. They would also have liked more binding agreements 
to limit ring-fencing of capital and liquidity. CESEE countries would have liked 
to have stronger commitments from banks to provide the credit and financing 
needed to support the domestic economy. They would also have liked stronger 
commitments from home supervisors to involve them in decisions and home 
country authorities to provide them with resources in extremis. 
On the other hand, if the various participants were bound to implement decisions, 
they would have institutional difficulties in engaging in the forum. The terms of 
reference are explicit that participant takes part in activities under the Initiative 
in accordance with its respective legal framework and policies. Each institution 
has its own governance structure, be it an intergovernmental board, domestic 
legislation and charter or shareholders. If decisions taken in the Vienna Initiative 
context bound these bodies, there would have to be formal decisions taken. And 
for many of the participants, the issues that the Vienna Initiative deals with, while 
important for a part of their activity, may have relatively minor significance in the 
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context of all their activities. Discussions would therefore be stymied from the 
difficulty of mobilizing enough management and board attention to the subject.
The Vienna Initiative is more than a “talking shop”, and has been able to mobilize 
its members to take actions needed to promote the financial stability of the region. 
It has had some singular successes, and some of its work, for example, on resolving 
NPLs and the use of credit enhancements, has been broken the ground for EU-wide 
initiatives. But cross-border banking is a difficult area where regulators struggle and, 
as Andrea Enria notes in a recent paper on financial fragmentation in Europe,30 in 
time of crisis foreign business is still the first to be curtailed and supervisors and 
states still reach at once for measures to defend the national interest. But he cites 
the Vienna Initiative as a notable exception, “a cooperation framework involving 
relevant central banks and supervisory authorities, large banking groups with 
systemic presence in several Central, Eastern and South-Eastern European countries 
committed to maintaining cross-border activity and keeping their subsidiaries 
well capitalised, hence decreasing the need of ring-fencing responses from host 
authorities.” 
Annex: Ukraine and the Vienna Initiative31 
Ukraine was exceptionally hard hit by the global financial crisis, with GDP falling 
14.9 percent in 2009. An adjustment programme was agreed with the IMF in 
October 2008, and Ukraine participated in some of the initial discussions concerning 
the Vienna Initiative.32 Country meetings were held with the Ukrainian government 
and its foreign-owned banks in January and February 2009, but these did not result 
in letters committing the banks to maintain their exposure.33 This was in part due 
to the depth of the adjustment problems facing Ukraine and its banking system, 
and in part because the ownership structure differed from that of the other Vienna 
Initiative countries, in that, while a large share of Ukraine’s banking system was 
foreign-owned, Russian banks owned a larger share than did EU banks. 
Ukraine maintained its interest in the Vienna Initiative, even though it was not a 
potential candidate country for European Union membership. In June 2012, the 
Governor of the National Bank of Ukraine, Serhiy Arbuzov, wrote to the chairman, 
30 Andrea Enria, Chairperson of the European Banking Authority (EBA), “Fragmentation in banking markets: crisis 
legacy and the challenge of Brexit”, Speech at the BCBS-FSI High Level Meeting for Europe on Banking Supervision, 
17 September 2018.
31 See also the discussion in the chapter in this volume on supervision and regulation by Keereman et al.
32 See Nitsche, Wolfgang. 2010. The Vienna Initiative/European Bank Coordinational Initiative: Assessment and 
Outlook. Austrian Federal Ministry of Finance Working Paper Series 2010 (4).
33 De Haas et al., ibid., p.331.
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Marek Belka, asking to participate more fully in the work of the Vienna Initiative. 
The Steering Committee considered Ukraine’s involvement desirable, as it was an 
important host of European banks. Ukraine participated in the November 2012 
Full Forum, and the Vienna Initiative facilitated cooperation between the NBU 
and the EBA concerning participation in supervisory colleges.
Following the events in Ukraine in early 2014, there was an intensification of work 
with the Vienna Initiative. The steering committee meeting with selected banks 
in Warsaw in May 2014 discussed the consequences for cross-border banks of the 
annexation of Crimea and subsequent measures by the Ukrainian authorities. 
The possibility of support to Ukraine under arrangements similar to those of 
the original Vienna Initiative was discussed. In the event, Ukraine was more 
interested in the Host Country Cross-Border Banking Forums as a venue for 
productive discussions between public and private sector participants, primarily 
cross-border banks and regulators. 
A first Ukraine Financial Forum was organized in Kyiv on 5 July 2014, bringing 
together cross-border banks active in Ukraine, their supervisors, the IFIs and 
European Commission, together with the Ukrainian authorities. The participants 
discussed the implications for the banking system of Ukraine’s IMF-supported 
adjustment programme, in particular, bank restructuring, recapitalization and 
resolution, as well as NPLs and changes in bank supervision. 
A second such forum was held in Brussels on 14 November 2014, the day following 
the Vienna Initiative Full Forum. Discussions focused on the implications for 
Ukraine’s banking sector of exchange rate movements, asset quality, NPLs, 
capitalization levels and the constraints on new lending, as well as the disruption 
to banks’ business from the situation in Eastern Ukraine and Crimea.
A third Ukraine Financial Forum under the auspices of the Vienna Initiative took 
place in Kiev on 15 March 2016 and took stock of reforms in Ukraine’s banking 
sector. Participants discussed the high level of NPLs, a proposed national action 
plan for NPL resolution to be developed as part of the Vienna Initiative’s NPL 
Initiative, actions needed to revive bank lending and the structure of Ukraine’s 
banking system and its regulatory framework. 
Ukraine has also been active in the NPL Initiative, with conferences on NPL 
issues in March and April 2018 organized by the World Bank and the EBRD, 
respectively.
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Meetings in the Vienna Initiative Framework34
Date Forum Place Results/Subjects Considered
2009
23 Jan Vienna informal seminar Vienna “Vienna club” to be established
27 Feb Launch of Joint IFI Action Plan
17 Mar Meeting of official sector participants Vienna
Broad home-host burden-sharing rules 
agreed
26 Mar Meeting on Romania Vienna Agreement to support subsidiaries
27 Mar Meeting on Serbia Vienna
Agreement to work towards supporting 
subsidiaries
25 Apr Meeting of official sector participants Washington Stock-taking
15 May JIFIAP meeting London Stock-taking
19 May Coordination meeting on Hungary Brussels Commitments to support subsidiaries
20 May Coordination meeting on Romania Brussels Commitments to support subsidiaries
22 Jun Meeting on Bosnia-Herzegovina Vienna Agreement to support subsidiaries
22 Jul Meeting on Romania Reaffirmation of support
11 Sep Meeting on Latvia Stockholm Commitment letter signed
24 Sep First Full Forum Brussels
Stock-taking. Possible relaxation on 
deleveraging 
19 Nov Meeting on Romania Brussels
20 Nov Meeting on Hungary Brussels
2010
18 Jan Official sector meeting Vienna
26 Feb
Meetings on Serbia and  
Bosnia-Herzegovina
Vienna
Relaxation of exposure commitments for 
Serbia
17 Mar Second Full Forum meeting Athens
Discussion of use of VI framework beyond 
crisis management. Working Groups on local 
currency market and EU fund absorption set 
up.
22 Jul Meeting on Romania
23 Jul Meeting on Hungary
2011
16 Mar Meeting on Romania Brussels Stock-taking
18 Mar Third Full Forum Brussels
Vienna Initiative to shift focus to crisis 
prevention. Reports on local currency market 
and EU fund absorption adopted. Working 
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Date Forum Place Results/Subjects Considered
2012
16 Jan Special Official side meeting Vienna Relaunch of Vienna Initiative 2.0
17 Jan Debriefing for banks Vienna
12 Mar Official Side Meeting Brussels
Understanding the new co-ordination 
framework (EC, EBA, ESRB, FSB); Principles 
and Responsibilities
13 Mar Fourth Full Forum Brussels
Reports of Working Groups on Basel III and 
NPLs; Monitoring of economic situation; 
Coordination principles for Vienna 2.0
20 Apr Steering Committee Washington
Monitoring, Governance structure; 
Recommendations for implementing Vienna 
2.0 principles
18 May Informal meeting with banks London Report on activities post-March
13 Jun Informal Steering Committee 
EBRD 
London
Mission statement, Workstreams on 
supervisory colleges and resolution 
framework, Selection of Chairman, Ukraine
26 Jun Informal Steering Committee Prague
Mission statement, Workstreams, HCCBF, 
Deleveraging report
18 Jul Steering Committee Warsaw
Adoption of Vienna Initiative 2.0 mission 
statement. Discussion of deleveraging, 
supervisory colleges, resolution, HCCBFs, SEE/
Greek banks
12 Sep
Workshop on Bank Supervision and 
Resolution 
London
8 Nov Steering Committee Brussels Next steps: enhancing bank participation
9 Nov Fifth Full Forum Brussels
Monitoring; EU Regulations; IFI lending; 
Progress under VI; Resolution and Banking 
Union
2013
14 Jan Steering Committee with Banks Vienna
DCM; BLS; NPL Working Group on BU;  
LCM dev; Addition of non-EU country to 
Steering Committee
19 Apr Steering Committee Washington Note from Working Group on BU and EE
17 Jul Steering Committee Luxembourg
SRM including SEE; NPLs and credit 
guarantees to help SMEs;
3 Oct
Technical Meeting for Regional 
Cooperation 
Tirana Impact of Banking Union on SEE
11 Oct Steering Committee Washington
Funding WE banks; Report on SEE issues;  
note on success indicators
21 Oct Sixth Full Forum Brussels
Monitoring deleveraging and credit growth; 
NPLs; SRM; call for special SRM and EBA 
arrangements
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Date Forum Place Results/Subjects Considered
2014
13 Jan Steering Committee Vienna
Five Priorities established for 2014;  
Progress reports
11 Apr Steering Committee Washington Update on Working Groups
15 May Steering Committee with banks Warsaw Banking Union, Ukraine, NPLs
5 Jun First Ukraine Financial Forum Kiev
23 Sep
Debt Restructuring and NPL 
Resolution 
Vienna NPL Initiative Regional Conference
10 Oct Steering Committee Washington
Monitoring; AQR and ECB measures on 
parent banks; Working Groups on Credit 
Enhancements, NPLs, BU, Ukraine and 
Bulgaria, Strategic Directions
13 Nov Seventh Full Forum Brussels
Monitoring, Banking Union, Working Group 
on Credit Enhancement, NPLs
14 Nov Second Ukraine Financial Forum Brussels
2015
19 Jan Steering Committee Vienna
17 Apr Steering Committee Washington
Monitoring, Progress report on NPL work, 
Banking Union Working Group, Work 
Programme
14 May Meeting with banks Tbilisi
26 Jun NPL Resolution in Emerging Europe Vienna NPL Initiative Regional Conference
26 Jun Steering Committee Vienna
Monitoring, Impact of QE on region, NPL 
Workshop, Update on Working Groups on BU 
and Credit enhancements
23 Oct Memorandum of Cooperation Signing EBA London EBA and Vienna Initiative
27 Oct Macroprudential Workshop Vienna OeNB and NBP
17 Nov
Workshop on Bank Ownership 
Changes 
Warsaw
18 Nov Eighth Full Forum Warsaw
2016
20 Jan Steering Committee Vienna
Greek banks,  
Work programme implementation
15 Mar Third Ukraine Financial Forum Kiev
15 Apr Steering Committee Washington
Monitoring, NPL work,  
Working Groups on Banking Union and 
Guarantees, Organizational matters
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Date Forum Place Results/Subjects Considered
2017
6 Mar Ninth Full Forum Luxembourg
Monitoring, Bank regulation,  
Investment in CESEE, CMU, Ukraine
27 Apr Steering Committee Washington
Monitoring; West Balkans,  
Working Group IFI Instruments, CRD IV
14 Oct Steering Committee Washington
Monitoring, West Balkan Banking systems, 
Working Group on IFI instruments,  
CRD Art.114
11 Dec




12 Mar Tenth Full Forum London
Monitoring, Working Groups on CMU and 
IFI instruments, NPL Initiative, Financing 
Innovation, MREL and Regulatory Issues
21 Apr Steering Committee Washington
Monitoring, Working Groups on IFI 
Instruments, Innovation, CMU
26 Apr
Workshop on Financial Restructuring 
and NPLs
Kiev NPL Initiative Regional Conference
8 Oct Workshop on MREL Vienna
13 Oct Steering Committee Bali
Monitoring, Working Groups on IFI 
Instruments, and Innovation, MREL
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Reflections on multi-country 
and multi-player issues
Erik Berglöf, Anne-Marie Gulde-Wolf, 
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EBRD, IMF, EBRD and Bruegel
Abstract
The segment of the global financial crisis and later the euro area crisis that triggered 
the Vienna Initiative differed from other crisis situations and experiences. The 
multitude of countries and players involved made it more difficult to recognise 
and understand the problem at an early stage and mitigate free rider concerns. 
At least four distinct sets of players had to coordinate within and among 
themselves – governments, international institutions, banks and central banks/
supervisors – each with its own and sometimes conflicting interests. In particular, 
the authorities of home and host countries of the banks operating in the region 
had to deal with inherent conflicts of interest. A major difference to previous 
attempts of cross-country coordination in crisis situations was the presence 
of European institutions. While these institutions enhanced the potential for 
effective enforcement, there was no clear role for them in financial supervision 
and no common bank resolution mechanism existed. Some issues to be dealt 
with arose within the euro area, within the EU and other parties outside. This 
added complexity. This chapter examines whether the institutional reforms in the 
aftermath of the crisis have made future crisis resolutions easier, and whether there 
are also broader lessons to be learned from the Vienna Initiative outside Europe.
Introduction
The genesis of the global financial crisis (GFC) has been widely discussed and 
analysed. Europe had to deal with the fallout from the GFC in a number of distinct 
phases and events. Best remembered will be the euro area crisis, which we can 
approximately date from the end of 2009 to 2012/3. The earlier phase of the crisis in 
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Central Eastern European (CEE) countries from 2008 onwards is less well anchored 
in public memory, as the Vienna Initiative largely dissipated and mitigated the crisis.
By now the impact of the Initiative has been well documented, and some of the 
lessons have already been integrated into regulatory and supervisory frameworks 
for cross-country coordination.1 This paper recapitulates some of the initial 
coordination issues and looks at the lessons learned, drawing policy conclusions 
for the future. In particular, we are interested in how the insights from the Vienna 
Initiative can help strengthen the Global Financial Safety Net and facilitate cross-
border banking in Europe and elsewhere.
The timeline and the participation of different actors during the first phase 
of the Vienna Initiative have well been documented on the Vienna Initiative’s 
website.2  The timeline illustrates the pressure building in the banking sector 
throughout the autumn of  2008. Despite a strong global response and rapid 
(national) interventions in Europe, liquidity in CEE economies started drying 
up. Ukraine and Hungary were the first to face serious balance of payments crises 
requiring International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Ukraine) and IMF/EU (Hungary) 
programmes. Several other countries were in the pipeline for similar interventions. 
Lending had increased dramatically in the CEE economies in the period leading 
up to the global financial crisis, partly in anticipation of, and then as a result, of 
EU membership. However, once the crisis hit, the institutions of these countries 
had weaker credibility as they had only been EU members for a few years. The 
perceived riskiness of exposure was reflected in the equity prices of the parent banks 
and ultimately in the sovereign spreads of their home countries. As banks had been 
encouraged to hold domestic paper, this was the beginning of the infamous “doom 
loop”, which later became the core of the euro area crisis.
A number of other interdependencies played out and amplified the potential fallout 
in the early stages of the crisis. Changes in the supply and maturity structure of bank 
funding increased the liquidity needs of parent banks and put pressure on them 
to withdraw liquidity from CEE subsidiaries. Possible credit contraction in CEE 
countries risked leading to further economic downswings, forcing parent banks to 
write off losses in subsidiaries. In turn, this would see home country governments 
1 Haas et al. (2012) document that the Vienna Initiative prevented fire sales and slowed down leveraging with no 
negative spill-overs for countries that decided not to join. The Vienna Initiative today is part of the European regional 
financing arrangement (RFA) safety net.
2 See http://vienna-initiative.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/Timeline2.pdf
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having to prop up these banks, given the resulting liquidity and capital needs. The 
market perceptions of increasing country risk of home countries put additional 
pressures on them to raise regulatory requirements. 
Cooperation in crisis: The G20 response
Many, but by no means all, actors understood early on that combatting a cross-
border crisis requires cross-border solutions, which in turn necessitate cross-border 
cooperation. The more actors there are, the stronger the need for a coordinating 
entity. Preferably this entity should have been designated in advance – once the 
crisis has broken out, agreeing on a coordinator is more difficult. 
The post-Lehman response to the drying up of global liquidity was coordinated 
swiftly and efficiently by major central banks, particularly through the swap lines 
provided by the US Federal Reserve. A limited number of actors, one single set of 
policy instruments and concerns about an imminent meltdown helped make this 
coordination effective. 
The global fiscal response was coordinated by the reactivated G20, culminating in 
the London Summit in April 2009. The “finest hour” of the G20 worked reasonably 
well. It built on an existing institutional structure, a joint analysis of the problem 
and exceptionally strong leadership by the heads of government of the UK and the 
US, who clearly appreciated the dangers of the situation.3
Recognising and acknowledging the global dimension of the crisis and its gravity 
was not too difficult for policymakers as the Lehman event and the post-Lehman 
situation were adequately dramatic. Analysis by the international institutions was 
concise and clear and helped to push policymakers in the right direction.
The number of actors was large, but comparatively limited in the sense that 
addressees were essentially central banks and finance ministers. Convocation and 
coordination rested clearly with the G20 presidency, underpinned by the clear lead 
of the IMF in providing the drafts of the economic rationale and blueprints. The 
3 “We face the greatest challenge to the world economy in modern times; a crisis which has deepened since we last met, 
which affects the lives of women, men, and children in every country, and which all countries must join together to 
resolve. A global crisis requires a global solution.” The Leaders went on to “pledge to do whatever is necessary to: 
restore confidence, growth, and jobs; repair the financial system to restore lending; strengthen financial regulation 
to rebuild trust; fund and reform our international financial institutions to overcome this crisis and prevent future 
ones; promote global trade and investment and reject protectionism, to underpin prosperity; and build an inclusive, 
green, and sustainable recovery. By acting together to fulfil these pledges we will bring the world economy out of 
recession and prevent a crisis like this from recurring in the future.” G20 London Summit - Leaders’ Statement, 
2 April 2009.
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world was less multipolar than it is today. Even so, herding more than 20 sovereigns, 
with diverse interests and many with strong internal divisions, towards a single set 
of policy actions was a major achievement. 
Participants understood that commitments rested on voluntary action, some of 
which would have to come from the jointly owned institutions and some from 
national action. In the absence of legally binding powers or judicial recourse, moral 
suasion and peer pressure were the main means of enforcing commitments. 
Yet the G20 process left a gaping void. To be efficient it focused on the “globally 
systemically important” economies, but abstracted from possible spill-overs and 
developments in countries of regional systemic importance. Global and regional 
processes and arrangements were not linked up. In particular, Austria and Sweden, 
whose banks owned much of the banking sectors in Emerging Europe, were not 
part of the G20 process. 
The set-up leading to the Vienna Initiative
The quick and effective global response at the G20 level clearly helped stabilize 
banking sectors around the world, and in this sense it was also helpful for the 
financial systems in Central and Eastern Europe. At the same time, the limited 
fiscal resources available to governments in these countries and the pressures from 
policymakers in the home countries of the banks active in the region initially 
triggered outflows and, more importantly, made liquidity provision by parent banks 
more difficult.
The potential macroeconomic consequences of the GFC were severe. While 
there was no sudden stop as in previous emerging market crises, CEE experienced 
a gradual withdrawal of credit as international banks started to cut back exposure 
in these markets.4 These pressures were fuelled by severe funding mismatches of 
banks, many of which had relied on wholesale or parent funding. The drying up of 
liquidity – in particular in foreign exchange – forced instant problem recognition 
in the CEE. 
However, coordination in Europe faced some specific challenges. On the eve of the 
GFC the EU lacked clear regulatory, supervisory and resolution mechanisms for its 
large cross-border banks. The fundamental mismatch between the supranational 
4 Analogous retrenchment was occurring outside Europe, notably as European banks downsized their Asian exposures. 
However, European banks had a much smaller footprint in those markets.
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cross-border nature of banks and their essentially national regulatory/supervisory 
and resolution mechanisms was laid bare when the GFC hit in autumn 2008. For 
“core” Europe (EU-15), this mismatch was addressed only when the euro area crisis 
erupted in autumn 2011, leading to the creation of the European Banking Union 
with a single supervisory system and nascent supranational backstop mechanisms, 
the beginning of what is today the European Stability Mechanism. 
For Emerging Europe, this mismatch had to be addressed much earlier, in late 2008, 
simply because the region’s banking sector consisted of virtually only cross-border 
banks: most banks in the CEE countries were owned by advanced core EU-15-
based parent banks. The Vienna Initiative was brought to life in late 2008 in the 
debilitating absence of European institutions and coordination structures to deal 
with cross-border financial stability issues in Emerging Europe.
Cross-border impacts underestimated
Despite these clearly visible signs, politicians and policymakers in Europe were slow 
in realizing the cross-border dimensions. One of the more striking illustrations was 
the extension of significantly higher, sometimes unlimited deposit insurance. When, 
to give an example, Slovenian officials complained to Austrian colleagues that the 
increase in Austrian deposit insurance had led to significant capital outflows, 
the Austrians in turn complained that they themselves had experienced outflows 
after the German government had declared the “absolute security” of deposits. 
The Germans extended the chain, justifying their action as a reaction to the Irish 
blanket guarantee on deposits. The governments in CEE, on the other hand, could 
not credibly respond, as the amounts involved were very large compared to their 
reserves. In the end, uncoordinated national actions led to deposit volatility and a 
beggar-thy-neighbour attitude. 
There were several scenarios with considerable potential spill-overs. Bombastic 
statements made by several leading politicians in Western Europe, saying that no 
taxpayer money should be used to save banks in Central and Eastern Europe, added 
to the risks.5 Had these threats been carried out, affected countries would have 
prevented subsidiaries from transferring money to headquarters. If one country had 
done so, all countries would eventually have been forced to do the same.6 
5 The Swedish prime minister Fredrik Reinfelt famously promised that “not a single krona” should go to the Swedish 
bank subsidiaries in the Baltic states.
6 This scenario was effectively avoided thanks to the EU heads of state meeting of 1 March 2009, where it was deemed 
against the EU treaties to prevent capital from flowing from one EU Member State to another. There was nevertheless 
some ring-fencing in many Central and Eastern European countries, but it never led to major disruptions.
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In the private sector the challenge was that while it was in the interest of a single 
bank to withdraw as quickly as possible, the banks as a collective would prefer to 
draw down on their exposures more gradually to preserve asset values. There was 
also a lack of communication between parent banks and host governments, and as 
a result little appreciation for the system effects in host countries of decisions taken 
at the headquarters of these banks.
Macrofinancial linkages (“doom loop”) unknown, real sector 
thinking prevailing
These uncoordinated actions were all the more problematic as the majority of actors 
in Europe were still stuck in thinking in terms of the real economy suffering a 
supply shock. They had not yet internalised the role that the financial sector had 
come to play over the previous two decades, and still regarded the transmission of 
shocks as something that occurred through the trade account. The “doom loop” 
between banks and sovereigns, and between sovereigns and banks, was not really 
visible yet and certainly had not been factored into policy making in most countries. 
The cross-border dimension through the capital account was poorly recognized. 
The probability of contagion was seen as small, each crisis being regarded as an 
individual country crisis with little cross-correlation.7
While CEE supervisors were getting concerned about the risks from poor 
supervisory dialogue among home and host country authorities, they lacked both 
the authority and the capacity to act. For example, the Croatian central bank, on 
behalf of most CEE central banks and supervisory authorities, wrote a letter to the 
European Commission in 2004 on this problem. Shortly before the crisis the EU 
had managed, under Slovenian presidency in the first half of 2008, to negotiate 
a Memorandum of Understanding between finance ministers, central banks and 
supervisors on modalities of cooperation in the case of a crisis.8 The final document 
had some 120 signatories but was of very limited help as the crisis struck. Too 
many actors jealously guarding national information, no formal coordinating and 
command structure and above all no final clarity on where losses would ultimately 
7 In the early years of the new millennium Klaus Regling, then Director General of the Economics and Financial 
Directorate at the European Commission had travelled Europe together with the late Max Watson. They had discussed 
these issues with regulators, central bankers and supervisors, highlighting the risks inherent in financial markets 
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impact. Needless to say, the cooperation regime envisaged in the Memorandum of 
Understanding never played a role in the ensuing crisis.9
Personalities do play a role in historic developments, even though their contributions 
can be exaggerated at times. The genesis of the Vienna Initiative was, however, 
clearly influenced by the fact that many leading actors in Brussels (and some of the 
capitals) had still not internalised the enlargement of the EU. Their world view and 
understanding of economic policies was still resolutely EU-15 centric, apart from 
severely underestimating the real effects of financial sector events. This led to the 
view that the financing issues of Western European banks could be alleviated by a 
retrenchment of operations in CEE. That this would exacerbate a regional real shock 
to the economies and would add to financial instability instead of resolving it was 
not clear to all policymakers. These attitudes hampered and delayed the involvement 
of some Member States, and above all that of the European Commission.
No clear lead institution, especially as European Commission 
reticent and ECB not too supportive
Lack of a clear lead added to the potential convening and coordination issues that 
such an initiative faced. The Commission is one of the very few institutions with the 
institutional structure and reputation that would have been unequivocally respected, 
and whose call would have been headed by all concerned. Given the reticence of the 
Commission, the European Central Bank (ECB) at the outset felt obliged to play a 
low-key role, perhaps out of institutional solidarity but also because it was also just 
learning on the job in many respects. In particular, it did not provide real currency 
swap arrangements to CEE countries such as Poland and Hungary in 2009 (unlike 
the US Fed, which had done so for Mexico, for example).10
It was symptomatic that the intervention from the Commission in the first informal 
Vienna meeting was about the asymmetry in the government support provided by 
the EU-15 and the support offered in the countries in Central and Eastern Europe. 
9 It is worth mentioning the agreement signed by the authorities in the Nordic and Baltic region post GFC. This 
Nordic-Baltic Memorandum of Understanding of the Nordic-Baltic Stability Group was first signed in 2010. The 
document is not legally binding, but it goes quite far in spelling out the obligations of the authorities which have 
signed up, particularly when it comes to how to share the burden in a financial crisis in the region. While the Nordic-
Baltic Memorandum has never been tested, it served as an important benchmark as the Vienna Initiative was revised 
in late 2011 to respond to the deleveraging pressures on the banks in non-EU SEE countries. 
10 We should clarify that the ECB did provide swaps to these countries but only against euro-denominated assets. These 
naturally did nothing to help with currency mismatches but curiously eased market concerns that did not recognise 
this difference. (Half of the ECB swaps for Hungary were reported to have been converted against local currency 
collateral in autumn 2009.) The ECB did provide real currency swap for Sweden (a non-euro-area member), which 
in turn passed on these swaps to Baltic countries where Swedish banks operated. More importantly, ECB liquidity 
support to parent banks did trickle down to subsidiaries thus indirectly helping CEE countries.
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At the time EU institutions also lacked both a mandate in financial supervision 
and a dedicated framework for dealing with bank restructurings.11 
An important issue was also that not all countries affected were EU members, 
first and foremost Ukraine.12 These countries benefitted from the home country 
guarantees provided to parent banks, and from the decision to prevent national 
authorities from impeding banks from supporting their subsidiaries abroad, 
but they were also exposed to the same pressures as the Central European EU 
members.13 A fortiori most countries concerned, at least as far as the host countries 
were concerned, were not members of the euro area – an issue which has become 
more important with the formation of the Banking Union and strengthening of 
the mechanisms for financial supervision and the financial safety net. 
Results in IMF and EBRD taking the institutional lead
Given this situation at the European level, the regional knowledge and policy 
capacities of the IMF and EBRD made them acceptable as the lead institutions 
at the start, as the Commission was unwilling to take on that role. The IMF 
had deeper knowledge and experience from previous financial crises around 
the world and naturally had well-established contacts with regulatory and 
supervisory authorities in the concerned countries, while the EBRD had a deeper 
understanding of the situation in the individual banks active in the region and 
a freer role in communicating with the private sector. Both institutions took on 
expanded responsibilities. The IMF had to take on an initial lead role in the EU. 
The EBRD had to move into policy issues to help steer policy and private sector 
thinking towards a coordinated approach. As the mandate and set of tools of the 
Commission increased it took on a more equal or even lead role, including a larger 
share in financing.
It was less clear who should be convening and coordinating the participating 
countries and other actors. The issue was definitely not one for the EU presidency, 
which at the turn of the year had passed from France to the Czech Republic. Neither 
11 Throughout the crisis the European Commission dealt with bank restructurings through competition policy, initially 
even without distinguishing them from non-financial corporations.
12 Ukraine was invited to participate in the Vienna coordination exercise (in fact the first preparatory “Vienna” 
coordination meeting took place in Kiev in December 2008), and it was initially represented by a Deputy Governor 
of the National Bank of Ukraine. After Maidan in 2014, the EBRD and the IMF also initiated a special forum to 
manage deleveraging in the foreign banks, including the Russian banks, represented in the country. Ukraine then 
also participated in a Full Forum in Brussels later the same year.
13 An unintended consequence of the determination that home country authorities could not prevent parent banks from 
providing liquidity to their subsidiaries was that subsidiaries in countries outside the EU could also be supported – 
once the capital had left the home country it could be redirected to a country outside the EU.
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was there an established group or setting such as the G20 which had clear rules on 
which country would organize meetings at which point in time. 
In this chaotic setting the Austrian Ministry of Finance took on the organisation and 
convened the first meetings in January–March 2009 in Vienna, closely working with 
the EBRD and the IMF. Austria invited the key home and host country authorities 
of parent banks, international financial institutions and the European Commission; 
the ECB and the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS), the nascent 
European Banking Authority (EBA), participated as observer. The first meeting 
adopted the name “Vienna Initiative”.14 The EBRD hosted the Vienna Initiative 
Secretariat from the outset.15 
Both home and host countries of banks active in CEE participated from the very 
beginning. However, the level of engagement differed. Germany only sent rather 
low level and mostly no representation. The Nordic home countries participated, 
but they largely viewed their problem as confined to the Nordic-Baltic region. Even 
getting the host countries to participate was by no means as easy as one might 
expect. One central bank from outside the EU claimed that it could not afford the 
price of a plane ticket to Vienna (the Austrian taxpayer happily obliged). There 
was definitely a concern in some quarters, particularly in Bulgaria and the Czech 
Republic, which had until then weathered the crisis better than some of the other 
CEE countries, that there would be a stigma associated with the initiative that 
could lead to further outflows.
Participants came mainly from ministries of finance and the central bank, plus at 
times also supervisors – finance ministry participation was viewed as critical as 
burden-sharing was an important part of the discussions. Within the European 
Union there is a well-established network of senior officials of finance ministries 
and central banks who meet at least once a month in the Economic and Financial 
Committee (EFC). Central bankers and supervisors have their additional separate 
institutional cooperation. This well-structured and regular cooperation has been 
further deepened over the last decade. 
14 Initially, we thought of calling it “Vienna Club”, modelled on the Paris Club and the London Club, which manage 
official and private sector debt restructuring, respectively, but we settled on “Vienna Initiative” to reflect the voluntary, 
cooperative, multi-player and continuous characters of the endeavour. Later, as the Initiative had made good progress 
and the European Commission assumed a lead role for EU-wide policies and coordination, it was agreed that the 
European Commission and the IMF would jointly lead the effort, which was given the rather anodyne name of the 
“European Bank Coordination Initiative”, which never really took hold, participants and markets preferring to use 
the original Vienna Initiative name.
15 Pistor (2012) calls the EBRD an “anchor tenant” of the Initiative – a non-dominant f lexible player that can credibly 
create motivation for important others to engage.
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The institutions directly affected, the banks themselves, did not participate directly 
in the meetings of officials at the outset, but their joint letter in late November 
2008 to EC President Barroso and G20 french presidency (finance ministers and 
central banks), copied to the heads of the EBRD, EIB and the IFC, helped nudge 
policy thinking towards a more supranational crisis response. Bank views were 
initially taken on board through separate meetings, the results of which were 
channelled into the meetings of officials. Over time these separate meetings become 
more formalised and larger joint meetings were organised back-to-back, though 
they became rather large, with more than 100 people around the table during 
Annual Forum discussions. 
The separate meetings of the public sector were also important as confidentiality 
was critical to the discussions, particularly within the public sector. An important 
contribution to these meetings later came from the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS) which produces very important data on changes in bank exposures 
over time. The lag between collection of these data and eventual publication was, 
in the early years of the crisis, more than nine months. Thanks to the willingness 
of BIS to share these data in preliminary form with the public sector participants, 
the lag could be reduced to four months. 
In parallel, investing IFI members of the Vienna Initiative – the EBRD, the EIB 
(with the largest balance sheet), the World Bank Group including the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC) and the small but proactive Multilateral Investment 
Guarantee Agency (MIGA) – developed a large joint financial package called 
the Joint IFI Action Plan (JIFIAP). This was launched in late February 2009, 
and ultimately provided €33 billion (US$40 billion) to banks to support their 
commitments under the Vienna Initiative. Along with the large IMF and EU 
balance of payments support, the sizeable JIFIAP helped market confidence and 
financing to the real economy in a high-risk environment. 
The delivery on the Vienna commitments was thus simultaneously supported by 
the IFIs and the EU for those at risk: host countries and commercial banks. The 
Vienna Initiative was about both coordination and funding. 
Incentives and commitments under Vienna 
The Vienna Initiative is a special form of what is called a private sector involvement 
(PSI) exercise, in which the IMF had extensive experience during the Asian crisis 
and in Latin America over the decades. At the core, PSI commitments imply a 
burden-sharing in the case of financial crises and minimise the amount of public 
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money used to bail out the private sector. The IMF stressed the importance of PSI 
early on, and precursors of the later Vienna Initiative commitment letters were 
signed as part of the programme in Hungary in autumn 2008. 
But the Vienna PSI mechanism differed in important aspects, which may inform 
future crisis management. It was a regional, multi-country, public-private sector 
commitment device to address a well-defined common objective. Private banks’ 
commitments were contingent upon policy delivery by host countries and backed 
by IFI and home country support; host country policy delivery was backed by IFI 
and Commission support and private bank commitments; and the IFIs shared the 
crisis-related high risks of their transactions through each others’ participation. For 
the first time IFIs acted not as individual (and sometimes excessively competing) 
institutions but as a joined-up system. 
The enforcement mechanism of the Vienna commitment letters were “light touch”: 
these were not legally binding and there were no “sanctions” for defectors.16 Yet 
the coordination was not a simple “mediation” between home and host countries, 
or banks and IFIs (Pistor 2012): the Vienna Initiative created ground rules for an 
informal governance framework that required a degree of transparency and extensive 
collaboration among the stakeholders to effectively stabilize the financial system. 
These ground rules were simple but powerful: open discussion among all relevant 
stakeholders; publicity about commitments made; and trust and authority bestowed 
to the IFIs and eventually the Commission.
The basic principles for crisis management and quid-pro-quos were explicitly agreed 
upon during a series of meetings of the official sectors and IFIs in January-March 
2009. The development of these “Vienna principles” was led by the IMF. Host 
country authorities were responsible for appropriate macroeconomic policies and 
liquidity support in local currency irrespective of bank ownership nationality, as well 
as for funding their deposit insurance schemes. Parent bank groups and the home 
country authorities behind them were responsible for providing funding in foreign 
exchange and recapitalising subsidiaries. IFIs were responsible for providing as much 
support as possible within their remit and coordinating their assistance closely. 
16  The first fully-fledged parent bank commitment letters were signed in Vienna by parent banks active in Romania and 
Serbia in late March 2009; others (including for Hungary) followed quickly. Subsequent country review meetings to 
assess the delivery of bank commitments were linked to IMF-EU programme reviews. 
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Impact
The GFC-related crisis management phase of the Vienna Initiative was concluded 
by early 2010, but participants, and most importantly the Commission, opted to 
continue. The Initiative has since evolved with conscious modifications in response 
to evolving financial sector risks. During the “Vienna Plus” phase, joint public-private 
working groups were set up to address these risks: foreign exchange lending; rising 
non-performing loans; impediments to access EU funds; and so on. Each working 
group was led by one of the IFIs or the Commission.
The euro area crisis reactivated the original crisis-management mode (“Vienna 2.0”) 
in 2011. And as Southern European countries have been moving closer to EU 
membership, the geographic focus of the Initiative has shifted to that region, 
supporting them to build linkages with the European Banking Authority, which 
has become an important player in the subsequent Vienna Initiative phases, and 
the ECB, which has also worked closely with the Initiative and backed important 
Vienna Initiative issues such as foreign exchange lending risks and addressing the 
rising problem of non-performing loans (NPLs). 
The Vienna Initiative’s governance structure also evolved, with the formal 
establishment of a Steering Committee in 2009 and later the arrival of its inaugural 
chairman, the President of the National Bank of Poland, Marek Belka, in mid-2012, 
as the fallout from euro area crisis intensified. This enabled more structured work 
and gave a stronger role to the host countries in the process. 
In sum, the meetings of the Vienna Initiative in the first few years had a very diverse 
make up, with numerous institutions, agencies and actors participating, most of them 
contributing actively in discussions, problem definition and problem solving. Given 
the gravity of the situation, the lack of formal structure, rules and precedent proved 
not to have been a major obstacle, and the related flexibility proved beneficial when 
quick actions were needed in often rapidly changing environments. This was to a 
certain degree due to the good will and strong incentives of many of the people and 
institutions involved, but also to a measure of good luck.
Implications 
Problem recognition was delayed, despite the GFC having shown the magnitude 
and rapidity of financial contagion issues. There were no established structures or 
rules that actors could rely upon. There was thus no algorithm for defining a lead 
institution or a coordinator, for the provision of analysis, or for the development of 
policy options and their implementation. 
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Yet more than at the G20 level there was a clear “do ut des”, and the spill-overs 
from the failure to coordinate were more immediate and much larger due to the 
geographic proximity and advanced integration of the financial sectors in the 
countries most affected. In this context a number of key institutions internalised 
these spill-overs, including the IMF, with existing and prospective programmes in 
several of the countries, the EBRD, with investments in more than 200 banks in 
the region, and the private banks which had many subsidiaries in several countries, 
in some cases numbered in the double digits.
What do we learn for the future?
Next time will be different, because of the measures taken since the crisis and because 
the source of the crisis is likely to be different. The regulatory and supervisory 
framework put in place through the Banking Union and other supportive structures 
is something of which those present at the creation of the Vienna Initiative could only 
have dreamed. Yet, history tells us that the triggering factor in a particular crisis is 
different from that in the preceding one. Next time one may occur in regions of the 
world where institutional setups are different and where financial integration has 
taken on other forms. Nevertheless, we may try to draw some conclusions from the 
genesis of the Vienna Initiative.
Despite current attempts by major actors to roll back financial integration and 
multilateral cooperation, cross-border issues will not go away. Financial sector 
interlinkages will remain strong in one form or another. The current tide of retrenching 
cross-border banking is likely to recede, and other channels for cross-border flows, 
possibly more volatile, will grow stronger – the economic logic for these flows is, if 
anything, likely to strengthen. Even though the reforms of the last decade have made 
the financial sector more resilient, spill-overs between the financial sector and the 
real economy will also be important in future crises. 
The overall risk level in the part of the European financial system addressed by the 
Vienna Initiative has undoubtedly decreased – in part as a result of the improved 
regulatory and supervisory framework and in part because of actions taken by the 
individual banks operating in the region. More local savings have been mobilized 
and cross-border f lows have been cut back to safer levels, but the net effect is 
most likely that financial access and opportunities for risk diversification have 
both become more limited in most countries in Central and Eastern Europe. The 
impact would have been even greater had it not been for the expansive monetary 
policy pursued by the ECB, which provided ample liquidity that trickled down 
even to non-members of the euro area through cross-border banking. When the 
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policy stance shifts, pressures on these financial systems are likely to increase 
substantially. 
There are also remaining coordination challenges not fully addressed by the 
creation of the Single Supervisory Mechanism and the Single Resolution 
Mechanism. Even in their full-blown form they would mainly address the 
problem of coordination within the public sectors – across and between levels 
of regulation and supervision – but these measures will not really deal with the 
coordination within the private sector and between the parent banks and host-
country regulators and supervisors.
In order to mobilise the true potential of the European financial system inside the 
EU and adjacent regions and increase its resilience we need to find ways of further 
strengthening the institutional framework. We suggest the following lessons from 
the Vienna Initiative.
Effective macrofinancial surveillance is key to crisis prevention. This will entail a 
larger role and deeper interaction between national and regional macroeconomic 
analysis and interlinkages with financial sector risks. Surveillance efforts by 
countries, the Commission, the IMF and others need to be part of a comprehensive 
framework for stress testing financial systems and linkages, with close cooperation 
among players (see also below) a key to success.
Close cooperation in times of need has to build on close cooperation in good times. 
This was instrumental in swiftly knowing who could contribute what in crisis times. 
Thanks to established track records, trust already exists. Building up cooperation 
structures is much more difficult once a crisis has hit. Cooperation in peacetime 
should also involve preparation for cooperation in war. Stress-testing existing 
structures and running through scenarios to determine what burden-sharing might 
look like are good ways to anticipate issues and address them preventively.
Clear structures with clear responsibilities are important, and they need to rest 
on voluntarily accepted principles. Such formats existed to some extent at the 
G20 level, but were largely absent in Europe before the Vienna Initiative – there 
was precious little in the global agreements that could have helped coordination 
within Europe. Global and regional structures must be made more compatible with 
a complete coverage of regions and sectors by institutions and procedures that can 
swing into action if a crisis occurs. Current discussions on stitching together the 
Global Financial Safety Net need to go further. 
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Designation of leadership is essential as agents have overlapping responsibilities and 
interests. In the case of the EBRD, the IMF and, slightly later, the World Bank, 
IFC and some others, this was fairly easily solved, as complementarity was high and 
interests aligned, but with other actors this could have become a tedious process. 
Within the EU we can be certain that nowadays the lead institutions would be 
clearly defined. They would happily acknowledge their responsibility, and their role 
would be accepted by all. This division of labour has evolved throughout the euro 
area crisis and thanks to the joint work on European Financial Stability Facility/
European Stability Mechanism programmes over the years. The question, of course, 
remains of how to ensure such clear attributions of responsibility outside the EU. 
For future crises that straddle the EU and its neighbours, we will need to think 
of the role of the IMF in Europe, with a sharing of responsibilities as well as of 
financial burden. We may also want to reflect on whether the ESM should have a 
role outside the euro area, or even outside the EU.
A continuous structured dialogue is needed at different levels to ensure that these 
issues are present in the minds of decision makers and translated into action. At 
the European level it would also be good to have regular meetings, building on 
concrete policy projects, in good times. But these reflections are needed at the level 
of sub-regions and individual countries as well.
A more balanced engagement of home and host country supervisors is needed. There 
was an important home country bias in the regulatory and supervisory framework 
at the time of the Vienna Initiative. Home country authorities as the “lead regulator 
and supervisor” were supposed to be responsible. These arrangements obviously 
failed. The creation of the Single Supervisory Mechanism was meant to address 
these shortcomings, but some of the bias still persists as host country perspectives 
are not always properly reflected in the analysis and actual decisions. The Vienna 
Initiative tried to compensate for this bias rooted in underlying power structures 
and often weaker institutional capacity of host countries by creating the so-called 
host country financial stability fora to strengthen the host country perspective.17 
Such conversations can also be part of the pre-accession process for candidate 
countries, but would require a separate format for those countries where accession 
17 These meetings involve representatives from both home and host country regulators and supervisors, as well as 
representatives from finance ministries and private sector banks present at the table along with the ECB and the 
international financial institutions. They have become an increasingly important means to ensure that systemic issues 
in individual host countries were taken into account in the decisions taken by regulators and supervisors as well as 
bank headquarters in home countries. This approach, along with several other features of the Vienna Initiative, are 
now “integrated features of the European financial architecture”, as the then Commissioner for Financial Affairs, 
Michel Barnier, expressed it in 2014.
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is not foreseen, at least for now. The split mandate between the SSM and national 
authorities is here a complicating factor as both EU-level and national institutions 
need to be sensitized to the host-country perspective. 
Deeper cooperation, information sharing and strengthening of supervisory colleges 
are also needed, particularly when non-EU members are involved. Transparency 
about financial sector issues and the health of national systems is well established 
within the EU, but more needs to be done in and with some of the countries outside 
the EU. This has been a focus of the Vienna Initiative in recent years. Other regions 
are institutionally and constitutionally less closely linked and intertwined than 
Europe. Without institutions and legal frameworks, let alone supervisory cross-
border institutions, preparations must take account of these facts. The mutual 
reticence even of EU supervisors before the crisis is a good indicator of some of the 
issues that need to be addressed. Setting up regular exchanges of information on 
the financial sector, ensuring that all relevant actors are institutionally acquainted 
with each other and providing and setting up at least a framework for increased 
transparency seem to be realistic ambitions. 
IFIs should be working as a system. It was under the Vienna Initiative and the 
Joint IFI Action Plan that IFIs started to work as a system and not as separate and 
sometimes excessively competing entities. Policy options including conditionality 
were shared among IFIs and joint missions were conducted to maximize the impact 
of individual IFI funding. Joint coordinated actions also meant effective risk-
sharing, with IFIs taking comfort for their individual balance sheets from each 
other’s crisis-related engagements. More needs to be done in this area, as the recent 
G20 Eminent Persons Group report (2018) highlights, but the seeds of close IFI 
collaboration in Europe were sown under the Vienna Initiative. 
Strategic engagement of the private sector is needed in policy coordination 
and implementation. When the global financial crisis hit, banks were among 
the first to alert policymakers of cross-border dimensions; in subsequent years 
the Vienna platform has benefitted from the insights and knowledge of banks, 
and their commitments served as leverage vis-à-vis other Vienna participants, 
most importantly host countries to deliver appropriate policies under IMF/EU 
programmes. The process naturally must be carefully managed to avoid regulatory 
capture while maximizing private sector buy-in.
“Soft power” and publicity should be used with publicly made commitments and 
continuous monitoring. Bank commitments in the form of joint public letters were 
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not legally binding – but they were made public and closely followed by the media. 
Publishing monitoring reports such as the Deleveraging and Credit Monitor, the 
Banking Survey, the Reports of the Joint IFI Action Plan and related investor calls 
also helped credibly inform markets at crucial times. 
Regional and sub-regional arrangements should be linked to the global safety net. 
An important issue is also the link between regional arrangements and the global 
safety net. There is a clear interest in having a central institution, the IMF, engaged 
in these issues in all regions, as the dimensions of cross-border issues may not be only 
regional but also spread beyond. Regular dialogue between participants in these 
different regional set-ups should be encouraged, and efforts should be made to ensure 
the interoperability of structures and procedures. It would probably be helpful if the 
global institutions and those at regional level could draw on each other’s procedures. 
For example, qualification for liquidity support from the IMF could also trigger 
complementary support from regional frameworks. Information exchange should 
also protect the integrity of the views expressed by different stakeholders to ensure 
that different perspectives are taken into account in decision making. 
These proposals still do not provide final solutions to the problems in terms of analysis 
and problem recognition. Challenges will continue to evolve with the structures of 
our economies. Within Europe, membership in the Monetary Union may over time 
impact the policy-making capabilities of national actors, which may be a risk at some 
stage in the future. What appear to be missing are regional and global policy shops 
where best practices in analysis in policy are shared. The IMF has such a role for 
mainly junior policymakers, but there appears to be a need in all regions for all levels 
of policymakers and politicians to engage in a more professional debate.
Concluding remarks
Regional and global financial stability is a global public good. Its provision cannot 
be left to market forces alone, or to the workings of a benevolent hegemon. This 
needs to be recognized in good times. Globally and regionally we can build on 
existing structures and institutions. 
In the end, the Vienna Initiative has been a success thanks to the good will and 
strong incentives of many of the persons and institutions involved, the gravity of the 
situation that was recognized at an early stage by some and a fortunate alignment 
of the stars. Whether the same coordination would be achievable with the current 
nationalistic tendencies is not clear. Yet, preparing structures for even deeper 
cooperation than we see at present would be a benefit for the future.
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A perspective from 
the World Bank Group
by World Bank and IFC staff *
Abstract
After more than ten years from the start of the 2008 financial crisis, it is very 
timely to remember how critical things were at the time and how close we were to 
a full meltdown of the financial systems of several countries globally and in the 
Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe (CESEE) region.1 It is significant that, 
for a change, the financial crisis did not start at the periphery of the international 
financial system in an emerging economy, but originated in the largest economy, 
hub to the most important international banks and largest capital market. The 
crisis spread from the financial centre, impacting most countries in the world. This 
note focuses on one of the regional responses (the Vienna Initiative) to contain the 
crisis and avoid a much deeper contraction of financial intermediation, with the 
possible failure of domestic systemically important financial institutions (D-SIFIs), 
combined with a possible balance of payments crisis and steeper credit and economic 
contraction. 
* Prepared by the joint World Bank and IFC team, including Fernando Montes-Negret, Jean-Marie Masse, Mario 
Guadamillas, Miquel Dijkman, Matija Laco, Alena Kantarovich under the guidance from Alfonso Garcia Mora, 
Global Director for Finance, Competitiveness, and Innovation, the World Bank Group. Comments and contributions 
from Anwar Aridi and Aurora Ferrari are gratefully acknowledged.
1 Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe includes Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Croatia, Estonia, the Republic of North Macedonia, Hungary, Kosovo, Latvia, Lithuania, Montenegro, Poland, 
Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Slovenia, all members of the European Union, candidate or potential candidate 
countries.
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The Origins of the Vienna Initiative: Urgent Need for Collective 
Action
Build-up of risks prior to the crisis
After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the adoption of a market economy model, 
new EU Member States in Central Europe and countries in the Western Balkans 
experienced a rapid privatization of their financial systems and the entry of regional 
international banking groups to the local markets through the purchase of local 
banks, either establishing subsidiaries or opening branches. The rapid expansion 
of cross-border banking coupled with a lack of sufficient domestic financial savings 
led to a banking model with the following characteristics. 
1. High dependence of subsidiaries and branches of foreign banks on financing 
from the parent banks, resulting in a rapid credit growth, mostly foreign 
financed (mainly from Austrian and Italian banks), with extremely high loan-
to-deposit ratios (LTD) – as shown in Figure 1. Broadly speaking, LTD ratios 
of around 3, like the one reached by Latvia in mid-2009, mean that only one-
third of the bank loans were funded with domestic deposits, while two-thirds 
were funded with possibly more volatile and expensive sources (e.g., wholesale 
funds, parent bank financing, syndications or issuance of Euro-bonds); and
2. Built-in currency mismatches, as lending was largely provided in foreign 
currency mostly to unhedged domestic borrowers and often with large duration 
gaps (as many of the long-term housing loans were financed in foreign exchange 
with shorter-term financing). 
Banking systems in many CESEE countries went through major credit booms in 
the pre-crisis period, when financing from parent banks was ample. Consequently, 
countries in the region experienced rapid increases in household and corporate 
indebtedness and booming asset and real estate prices. When the inflows of 
financing dried up, banks in those countries faced rising levels of non performing 
loans (NPLs) while remaining highly dependent on parent banks providing liquidity 
and funding in an environment of shallow or inexistent local funding markets and 
over-indebted borrowers with poor information but presumably with high debt-
to-income (DTI) and debt-service-to-income (DSTI) ratios. Aspirations to reach 
EU standards of living had been running ahead of citizens’ capacity to service 
debts, particularly as domestic currencies depreciated against the various foreign 
currencies (euro, Swiss franc, and Japanese yen) in which many mortgages were 
denominated, with the misleading incentive of low interest rates but large ignored 
foreign exchange risks that ended up materializing during the crisis.
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Figure 1.
Loan-to-deposit ratio, in percent
Source: World Bank Global Financial Development database.
The presence of foreign-owned banks with a systemic footprint in host countries 
in CESEE, combined with highly dollarized economies, significantly restrained 
the authorities’ policy options when market conditions took a drastic turn for 
the worse in 2008, with liquidity crunches followed by eventual insolvency – as 
NPLs skyrocketed and bank losses increased. In the immediate aftermath of the 
Lehman Brothers failure, external financial markets largely closed for banks (euro 
bonds, wholesale funding and syndications), creating a major problem for banks 
to meet their refinancing needs, with firms and individuals in those countries 
increasingly defaulting on their obligations. Even some of the strongest institutions 
and systemically or regionally important banks were faced with liquidity stresses 
until the European Central Bank (ECB) and the US Fed intervened massively to 
provide liquidity (to “do whatever it takes” to save the euro system) and provide 
dollar financing, respectively.
In the CESEE region, this situation was aggravated by the significant currency 
and maturity mismatches in the banks’ balance sheets, with several countries 
facing serious housing crises and political pressure to convert foreign-exchange-
denominated loans at favourable exchange rates, passing enormous losses to the 
foreign banks and their subsidiaries.
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While a regional systemic financial crisis was avoided, real gross domestic product 
(GDP) growth fell sharply in most countries and a “V-shaped” deep recession was 
unavoidable during the years 2008-10 (see Figure 2). The economic contraction 
was more severe in the Baltic countries, which had the highest LTD ratios and 
were more dependent on external financing, which closed completely at the time, 
resulting in a sudden stop of credit, extremely high NPLs, high unemployment and 
overall economic distress. Things were made more difficult with the onset of the 
Greek sovereign crisis and the risk of contagion through the Greek banks being 
present in several countries in the CESEE region.
Figure 2.
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Source: WB staff calculations based on October 2018 IMF WEO database.
Note:  Visegrád 4 are Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Czech Republic. Baltics are Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania. South Eastern Europe includes Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania. Western 
Balkans includes Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, 
Serbia.
The need for collective action
A collective action problem occurs when all stakeholders would be better off 
cooperating but fail to do so because of conflicting interests, the presence of “free 
riders” and the inability to exclude them. At the time of the crisis there was a big 
risk of a diverging scenario, 
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with host authorities trying individually to “ring-fence assets” of subsidiaries/branches 
at the national level, while home authorities were trying to contain parent banks’ 
losses – independently of the effects on host financial systems – repatriate profits 
and bring more capital to the centre (under pressure from the home regulators to 
raise more capital). This was a very dangerous situation, which could have had a high 
probability of triggering disorderly deleveraging processes as a result of uncooperative 
actions, amplifying stress on banking sectors in CESEE host countries.
On the contrary, an effective response to the collective action problem could 
restore market confidence benefiting all stakeholders. However, it was not easy 
to achieve this level of cooperation given the need for: i) avoiding a “rush to the 
exit” (i.e., exiting a jurisdiction under threat); ii) providing sizeable countercyclical 
funding; iii) adopting sounder domestic macroeconomic policies and resisting 
populist policies to benefit national debtors at the expense of foreign banks; and 
iv) strengthening domestic regulatory and supervisory frameworks and capacity. 
The biggest concern at that stage was the sustainability of the proposed collective 
solution. It was critical to avoid a short-term approach, in which major foreign 
banks could have just exited the host markets, after the provision of countercyclical 
funding by IFIs, essentially converting the IFIs into lenders funding capital flight 
from a particular borrowing jurisdiction. 
The critical role of IFIs
IFIs were seen as “honest brokers”, able to use their reputation, convening power 
and lending to bring all stakeholders to the table (home and host regulatory 
authorities and governments, the European Commission (EC), foreign banks and 
their subsidiaries, IFIs and international private lenders) to implement a collective 
solution. IFIs were able to play a neutral and constructive role (as non-interested 
parties) and, at the same time, collectively provide sizeable countercyclical funding. 
Also, the decisive action of those IFIs leading the effort was critical in overcoming 
initial doubts and distrust, restoring confidence and facilitating the participation 
of all critical stakeholders in maintaining their exposures at national levels and 
launching the Vienna Initiative. 
The IFIs’ strong commitment to support the region materialized in the sizeable and 
complementary funding programmes that were delivered to the CESEE countries. 
Under the Vienna Initiative, IFIs launched the Joint IFI Action Plan (JIFIAP, 
discussed further below) in February 2009, with two main objectives in mind: 
i) to support local banking systems, prevent their failure and/or exit from new EU 
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member countries and the countries in the Balkans; and ii) to prevent or mitigate 
an even more serious credit crunch with a devastating negative impact on the real 
economy of these countries. A pragmatic division of labour was for the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(BRD) (policy dialogue through Development Policy Loans) and EC be involved in 
the macroeconomic policy dialogue, while the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (EBRD), European Investment Bank (EIB), International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) and Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) would 
focus on assisting the private financial system stakeholders. The Vienna Initiative had 
built-in flexibility with joint assessments of the economic conditions and financial 
strength of regional banks, but with each participating institution using its own 
methods and internal guidelines in its lending decisions. The approach was initially 
more about “learning by doing”, as there was no ex ante blueprint to guide the process.
Private banks’ engagement was critical to providing a sustainable solution. In January 
2009, the representatives of the IFC, EIB, EBRD and EC held a meeting in Paris, 
where the need to meet with major European banks was voiced. In particular, 
it was important to understand private banks’ perspective on expected regional 
development in 2009-10, the financial needs of their subsidiaries in the region 
and to identify a proper strategy for IFIs financing support to the region. For 
that reason, in the three months following the launching of the JIFIAP, a series 
of meetings took place with the largest banking groups operating in the CESEE 
region (controlling 60 percent of bank assets in the region). The meetings with the 
private banks were attended by the IFC representatives, who also acted on behalf 
of MIGA. In March 2009, the first set of parent banks signed commitment letters 
to maintain their presence and recapitalize their subsidiaries based on the stress test 
results in Romania and Serbia. Subsequently, such commitment letters were signed 
for Hungary, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Latvia. The first Full Forum meeting in 
September 2009 of the EC, IMF, EBRD, EIB, WBG and ECB with 17 systemically 
important EU-based parent banks of subsidiary banks in CESEE and their home 
and host country supervisors, fiscal authorities and central banks was a reflection 
that collective action solutions could be achieved. A combined effort to coordinate 
appropriate host government policies, major international support and parent bank 
engagement helped stabilize the economies in the region. Bank groups benefited from 
a stabilizing macroeconomic environment and access to the funding under the Joint 
IFI Action Plan launched by the EBRD, EIB and the World Bank Group (WBG).
As mentioned earlier, the JIFIAP was launched on 27 February 2009 to support the 
banking sectors in the CESEE region and to facilitate lending to businesses hit by 
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the global economic crisis. The drafting of the Plan was done in close cooperation 
with the European Commission, key European institutions and the IMF. The initial 
commitment under the JIFIAP of up to €24.5 billion was exceeded by a significant 
margin. Upon its completion at end-2010, more than €33 billion had been made 
available by IFIs in crisis-related support for the financial sectors and for replenishing 
the foreign exchange reserves of countries in the region, of which €28.6 billion were 
in the form of signed loans. The contributions provided by each IFI were as follows: 
EBRD €8.1 billion, EIB €15.5 billion and WBG €9.6 billion – out of which the 
IBRD delivered €5.2 billion, €2.4 billion the IFC and €2.6 billion MIGA. 
Sluggish economic recovery in many CESEE countries and their trading partners in 
the post-crisis period, as well as intensified cross-border bank deleveraging pressures 
on the backdrop of the European sovereign debt crisis, prompted the need for further 
reassurance of commitment by the IFIs to the CESEE region. In 2012, there had 
been a significant slowdown in economic activities in all CESEE countries, with real 
GDP growth in 8 out of 16 countries falling negative or trembling below 1 percent 
(Figure 3). Weak external environment, countries’ internal vulnerabilities, high 
volumes of non-performing assets in the banking sector and stricter regulatory 
requirements introduced as part of the establishment of the European Banking 
Union fueled the fears of prolonged instability in the region. 
In November 2012, the WBG, EBRD and EIB launched the Joint IFI Action Plan 
for Growth in the CESEE region under Vienna Initiative 2.0. The Joint IFI Action 
Plan for Growth was a second phase of the IFI commitment to provide financing to 
the CESEE region that aimed to restore growth in the crisis-hit region by supporting 
private and public sectors initiatives, including those in infrastructure, corporate 
investment, and the financial sector. Under the Joint IFI Action Plan for Growth, the 
three IFIs committed to provide up to €30 billion in new funding to CESEE over 
the following two years. At the end of 2014, the IFIs delivered €42.7 billion, which 
is significantly higher than was initially planned, of which about €7 billion was 
delivered by EBRD, €28.3 billion by the EIB Group and €7.4 billion by the WBG, 
including €4.9 billion by IBRD, €1.4 billion by IFC and €1.1 billion by MIGA. 
The coordinated and cooperative approach applied by the IFIs proved to be effective 
in preventing a full-scale crisis in CESEE and in maintaining confidence in the 
financial systems in the region in the post-crisis period. The IFIs played a significant 
role in bringing to the table all key players from the EU authorities, home and host 
governments, major banking groups, the IMF and other donors to work out the 
details of a comprehensive, collaborative and effective solution for supporting the 
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CESEE countries in the time of distress. Moreover, the contributions of the WBG, 
together with the EBRD and the EIB, in the form of coordinated financial assistance 
to CESEE helped prevent cross-border bank deleveraging, maintain confidence in 
the financial systems and support the recovery in the region. 
Figure 3.
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Source: IMF WEO database, October 2018.
At the inter-institutional level, as the Joint IFI Action Plan concluded: “… it leaves a 
legacy of much stronger cooperation between the IFIs than ever before, which will continue 
in post-crisis Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe and which is also ready to be 
deployed again and elsewhere as needed”.2 Such cooperation extended beyond the 
completion of the JIFIAP, with the sixth “Full Forum” of the Vienna Initiative 
meeting in Brussels on 21-22 October 2013. That meeting assessed recent trends 
in deleveraging, credit provision and NPLs in the banking sectors of CESEE. It 
discussed the impact of the recently proposed Single Resolution Mechanism for a 
European banking union on CESEE. A special session highlighted the particular 
challenges faced by the non-EU countries of South Eastern Europe (SEE). The Full 
Forum stressed the urgent need to tackle persistently high NPLs in several countries 
in the region – thereby also improving frameworks for new lending. For credit to 
recover, a concerted effort by regulators and banks may be needed to provide the 
incentives and momentum to break the cycle of low growth and high NPLs. The 
Forum welcomed the publication of the new harmonized definitions of NPLs and 
regulatory forbearance by the European Banking Authority (EBA).
2 EBRD, EIB and WBG “Final Report on the Joint IFI Action Plan”, March 2011.
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Implementation of the Vienna Initiative: WBG contribution
The WBG delivered over €17 billion under the two phases of the JIFIAP in 
the course of 2009-14. Most of the delivered financing has been in the form of 
signed IBRD loans. Given the specific nature of the institutions that constitute 
the WB Group, the IBRD’s contributions were mainly policy-based lending 
and technical assistance on deepening reforms to promote competitiveness, 
strengthening and diversifying financial sectors, improving energy efficiency 
and supporting social sector reforms.   
Table 1.
Commitments and Delivery of the WBG under JIFIAP and JIGIAP for 
Growth in billions of euros
Date JIFIAP (2009-2010) JIFIAP for Growth (2013-2014)
Committed Delivered Committed Delivered
WBG 7.5 9.6 6.0 7.4
IBRD 3.5 5.2 /1 4.0 4.9
MIGA 2.0 2.0 1.3 1.4
IFC 2.0 2.4 0.7 1.1
Source: JIFIAP reports.
/1  Including a €1 billion loan to Hungary that was later cancelled at the request of the 
government.
The IFC focused on recapitalizing banks, increasing access to trade finance, 
supporting infrastructure investment and funding for microfinance. It also 
provided significant value through advisory support to local banks, for example 
through an advisory seminar in Kiev with the representatives of Ukrainian banks 
on risk management and on how to manage NPLs. MIGA’s guarantees helped 
support the recapitalization of banks by providing political risk insurance that 
covered the cross-border capital injections made by foreign parent banks. 
A unique way of cooperation within the WBG in the framework of the Vienna 
Initiative has been beneficial. Joint activities conducted by IFC and MIGA led 
to a creation of a joint unit of the IFC and MIGA that specializes in cross-
selling MIGA insurance products to IFC clients across all industries and globally. 
Moreover, IFC and MIGA have jointly developed new products, including 
MIGA’s bestselling “Capital Optimization Product”, which creates synthetic 
capital for international banks having subsidiaries in sub-investment-grade 
emerging markets.  
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The representatives of IBRD, MIGA and IFC have been actively participating 
in the Vienna Initiative 2.0 Full Forum, Steering Committee and brainstorming 
meetings and contributing to the technical discussions on deleveraging, cross-
border supervision, NPL resolution, bank resolution, and the impact of the 
proposed European Banking Union on the CESEE countries.
In accordance with commitments made under the JIFIAPs, the World Bank 
Group greatly increased its financial support to overcome the consequences of 
the global 2008 financial crisis in the CESEE region. The key outcomes of the 
WBG activities in the CESEE region can be summarized as follows:
a) Prevention of a systemic regional crisis by quickly providing liquidity 
(followed by capital increases from parent banks) and helping restore market 
confidence via the countercyclical role played by the IFIs’ lending, unique in 
its scale, under the JIFIAP. Countries in Central and Eastern Europe showed 
earlier signs of recovery from the global crisis than other regions. 
b) Parent banks continued to support their cross-border subsidiaries, branches. 
c) Most viable local banks managed to stay in business.
d) Banking systems in CESEE have been recapitalized, and bank lending is 
exhibiting positive dynamics in most CESEE countries, thereby contributing 
to economic recovery in host countries. However, continued instability in 
Europe poses challenges to sustainability, given the strong presence of major 
European banks in the region.
The multilateral approach to mitigate global crisis effects resulted in effective 
cooperative arrangements to deal with issues beyond the immediate financial 
crisis response. The WBG president at the time, Robert B. Zoellick, emphasized 
the importance of multilateralism as a response to the crisis in several of his 
speeches in 2009 (e.g., “Seizing opportunity from crisis: making multilateralism 
work”, 31 March 2009; and “The World Bank Group beyond the crisis”, 
6 October 2009).  
The activities under the Vienna Initiative and cooperative approach by IFIs, public 
and private entities inspired the creation of a dedicated World Bank unit based in 
Vienna, the Financial Sector Advisory Center (FinSAC) to go beyond the short-
term crisis response and to provide long-term support for strengthening prudential 
regulatory and supervisory frameworks in CESEE. FinSAC was established in 2011 
with funding provided by the Austrian Federal Ministry of Finance to support client 
countries in building more resilient and more stable financial sectors. Thematically, 
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FinSAC’s work is centred around three pillars: macroprudential supervision and 
crisis management; microprudential supervision and NPL resolution; and bank 
recovery. Geographically, FinSAC covers EU candidate and potential candidate 
countries (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Former Yugoslavia Republic of 
Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia); select EU member states (Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Poland and Romania); and EU neighbourhood countries (Belarus, Moldova, 
Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia). 
Bilateral technical assistance (TA) constitutes the backbone of FinSAC’s work 
programme. FinSAC engages with countries through demand-driven, bilateral TA 
projects, the organization of knowledge events and analytical work. In practice, it 
concludes an average of 10-12 TA projects per year, organizes one international 
conference and one workshop and produces at least one analytical piece. Demand 
from central banks, banking regulators and resolution authorities has been robust, as 
illustrated by high client satisfaction scores and the fact that client countries usually 
solicit follow-up support upon conclusion of projects. A distinguishing feature of 
FinSAC is the availability of in-house technical experts that are taking the lead in 
the delivery of FinSAC’s work programme, enabling FinSAC to deliver, with its 
own resources, a core curriculum of financial-stability-related topics. 
FinSAC has been playing an important role in building and maintaining deep and 
continuous engagement with eligible countries on stability-related topics, which, 
more than a decade after the crisis, have remained a high-priority policy area. To 
date, it has delivered around seventy technical assistance assignments in sixteen 
ECA countries, organized ten regional conferences and published nearly ten 
research and policy papers/briefs. FinSAC has helped ensure the implementation 
of wide-reaching reforms in crisis-affected client countries that would probably 
have taken much longer to achieve without this support.
FinSAC has established itself as a knowledge hub on financial-stability-related 
topics for the CESEE region, and it has emerged as a trusted provider for TA to 
eligible client countries. Much of client-country demand, particularly from the 
Western Balkan countries, is motivated by the EU accession process, which requires 
alignment with the corpus of prudential regulation (i.e., the Capital Requirements 
Directive IV and the Capital Requirements Regulation) as well as the Banking 
Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD – see Box 1). At the same time, it is a 
priority for FinSAC to ensure that more generic supervisory and regulatory topics 
receive sufficient attention, particularly in countries further east that are still 
grappling with a challenging financial stability outlook (see box 2). 
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Box 1.
Helping Albania operationalize its new recovery and resolution regime
FinSAC supported the Bank of Albania and other relevant authorities 
in developing a new legal framework for implementing the BRRD. The 
technical assistance involved analysing the existing framework and its 
compliance with international and EU principles and good practice, 
providing advice during drafting and adopting of a revised legislation as 
well as during drafting of secondary legislation, preparing methodological 
documents and providing training to the supervisors and staff from the 
Resolution Department. 
After the new Bank Resolution Law was adopted by the Albanian parliament 
in December 2016, FinSAC helped the Bank of Albania operationalize the 
newly created recovery and resolution framework and advance the assessment 
of banks’ recovery plans. 
Recovery plans 
FinSAC supported the Bank of Albania in communicating new supervisory 
requirements to the banking industry and provided sample calculations and 
templates (adapting European Banking Authority (EBA) and EU Single 
Resolution Board (SRB) information templates to the local framework) 
to assist in completing recovery plans by local banks. FinSAC conducted a 
two-day workshop for supervisors on the assessment methodology, using the 
recovery plans submitted by large Albanian banks. Based on that workshop, 
the methodology has been adjusted and is now fully implemented for the 
current and future assessment of recovery plans. 
Supervisory capacity building
FinSAC organized a workshop to discuss proposals for integration of 
supervisory work for recovery planning into other supervisory tasks. The 
workshop participants have also discussed common features and different 
approaches in individual supervisory tasks, as well as ways of optimizing 
and leveraging efforts and ensuring their compliance with international 
best practices. Based on those discussions, the Bank of Albania has been 
working on improving internal cooperation between its departments. De 
Nederlandsche Bank has also been involved to develop information exchange 
rules between different units within the Bank of Albania. 
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Creation of a resolution unit
FinSAC has been supporting the Bank of Albania in creating a resolution unit 
that will be responsible for developing effective resolution planning, including 
the use of appropriate resolution tools. FinSAC supported the newly created unit 
in developing a resolution manual, detailing the practical aspects of resolution 
planning, including the resolvability assessment and the definition of MREL, 
considering the Bank of Albania’s role as a host country. FinSAC provided an 
opportunity for a staff member of the new resolution unit to spend three weeks 
with the staff of the EU SRB. This provided a great opportunity for Bank of 
Albania staff to obtain insights of work at the SRB, as well as practical learning 
experience of all aspects of resolution planning within the euro area. 
Development of legislation
FinSAC has been working closely with various departments within the Bank 
of Albania to promote coordination and to ensure consistency of resolution 
legislation with the legislation on banking supervision – e.g., that early 
intervention measures in the Resolution Law are in compliance with the existing 
supervisory measures in the Banking Law. FinSAC has also provided advice on 
drafting the required by-laws.
Source: FinSAC 2017 Annual Report.
Box 2.
Supporting Ukraine in tackling NPLs
Ukraine has one the highest NPL ratios in the world, with NPLs representing 
more than 58 percent of gross loans as of end-2018. Contributory factors 
include: the consequences of the global financial crisis and subsequent economic 
recession; currency devaluation that eroded unhedged borrowers’ debt-servicing 
capacity; the collapse of economic activity in parts of the country; and sharp 
negative adjustment in real estate prices. A significant portion of the stock of 
bad loans is concentrated within the corporate sector – the top-20 groups of 
borrowers account for 49 percent of corporate banking loans.
The World Bank and other international financial institutions (including the 
International Monetary Fund and the European Bank of Reconstruction and 
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Development) are providing financial and technical assistance to help address 
the problem. FinSAC, together with the World Bank local office, conducted 
a comprehensive assessment of the NPL resolution framework in Ukraine, 
identifying priority areas for action and thus streamlining the workload of 
national authorities and external advisers. The methodology used was based 
on a gap analysis with euro area peers.
A FinSAC seminar in Kyiv in March considered the study findings and took a 
holistic look at NPLs and the establishment of an effective resolution framework. 
The complexities of NPL resolution, involving a range of different stakeholders, 
make such a holistic approach essential to achieving any meaningful decrease 
in rates. The National Bank of Ukraine responded quickly, enlisting FinSAC 
assistance in three areas identified as requiring substantial further work: 
i) collateral valuation identified as problematic in the NPL assessment; ii) NPL 
write-offs; and iii) NPL governance/workout. 
i) FinSAC assessed collateral valuation practices in the EU and shared the 
findings together with advice on possible improvements for implementation 
in Ukraine. These included: a) regulations on collateral valuation rules for the 
banks (e.g., valuation methods used, frequency, minimum requirements for 
appraisers); b) the construction of a database of real estate appraisals for assets 
used as collaterals; and c) the establishment of regulation (directly or indirectly) 
for appraisers that deliver services in the financial industry. Based on this, the 
Risk Management Department of the National Bank of Ukraine initiated 
construction of a database for collateral values used in the financial sector. 
ii) FinSAC provided a written summary of NPL write-off practices implemented 
in other countries, including European countries. The document advised 
implementing a similar mandatory NPL write-off regulation in Ukraine 
based on quantitative and qualitative parameters.   
iii) FinSAC developed a set of Guidelines for Effective Management and 
Workout of NPLs. This aimed to assist in efforts to issue a binding 
regulation for banks regarding the functioning of NPL resolution units in 
banks. The final guidelines reflect extensive discussions with the National 
Bank and other banks, and World Bank internal review. They cover the 
main aspects of the workout cycle (i.e., early warning system, identification 
of NPLs, organization of workout units in the banks, segmentation and best 
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practice for organizing workouts, including workout strategies) and include 
specific examples of how restructuring could be tackled in Ukraine.
The National Bank of Ukraine also sought FinSAC’s advice on their draft 
regulations on risk management and connected borrowers in the context of 
NPL resolution. The team delivered written comments to the National Bank 
experts, which were incorporated in the draft regulations.
FinSAC’s assistance in close collaboration with other international financial 
institutions will continue into 2018.
Source: FinSAC 2017 Annual Report.
The World Bank Group contributions to Vienna Initiatives 1.0 and 2.0 were built 
on close cooperation with other development partners. During Vienna Initiative 1.0, 
the World Bank Group provided funding support to the governments (IBRD) and 
private sector (IFC, MIGA), engaged in policy dialogue with the client countries, and 
provided technical assistance on a number of pressing issues. The World Bank Group 
has extended funding support and technical advice to the CESEE region during Vienna 
Initiative 2.0 in cooperation with the Austrian government.
Future of the Vienna Initiative: Role of the WBG
The Vienna Initiative is a forum for the exchange of views and for coordination/
joint action on financial sector development by IFIs, central banks from host and 
home countries and commercial banks’ representatives. While Vienna Initiative 
1.0 was focused on western banking groups maintaining exposure to their CESEE 
affiliates and providing capital and liquidity, as needed, Vienna Initiative 2.0 is 
mainly geared towards authorities, encouraging them to cooperate. Beyond an active 
contribution to the preservation of financial stability in participating countries, it 
provides an important forum for the exchange of experience and discussions around 
appropriate actions with a goal of financial sector development. (Importantly, there is 
still no alternative forum where major stakeholders (IFIs, central banks, commercial 
banks, representatives and risk investors) meet and discuss financial and real sector 
volatility and opportunities to strengthen the financial sector.) It also serves well as 
a prevention mechanism through practical monitoring of the deleveraging process 
and by setting up temporary structures where private and public-sector decision 
makers meet to exchange experience and discuss appropriate actions. The latter 
concerns the establishments of different working groups on strategic issues, where 
World Bank Group actively participates and contributes.  
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Looking back at years of continuous fruitful collaboration under the Vienna 
Initiative, the World Bank Group stays committed to working together on future 
financial sector reform challenges. The World Bank Group will continue to 
support the client countries in conducting diagnostic activities to ensure resilient 
financial sectors, and implementing reforms to strengthen financial systems by 
streamlining supervisory and regulatory frameworks in line with best international 
practices and developing tailored approaches to dealing with NPLs. The World 
Bank Group is committed to staying an active member and prominent contributor 
to the Vienna Initiative agenda. In additional to the ongoing work streams, there 
are newly evolving potential areas from that countries could benefit from, such 
as: i) diversification of financial systems; ii) development finance; iii) advances 
in technologies for providing financial services; iv) innovation and increased 
productivity; v) development of green finance; and vi) mitigation of risks created 
by sovereign-bank nexus
Policymakers and regulators in the CESEE region increasingly recognize the 
importance of furthering diversification of financial systems. Diversification 
of financial markets in the region is key when it comes to the provision of term 
financing aimed at fostering investments and ultimately economic growth. In that 
context, the availability of a wider range of financing instruments will be able 
to benefit the varying needs of households and enterprises. Beyond traditional 
lending channels, there is an increasing range of financing options for different 
needs of firms over their life cycle: (i) asset-based finance (asset-based lending, export 
– buyers and suppliers – credit and insurance, factoring, purchase order finance, 
warehouse receipts, leasing), (ii) alternative debt (corporate bonds, securitized debt, 
covered bonds, private placements, crowdfunding (debt)), (iii) hybrid instruments 
(subordinated loans/bonds, mezzanine finance), and (iv) equity instruments (private 
equity, venture capital, business angels, specialized platforms for public listing of 
SMEs, crowdfunding (equity)). Not only the awareness, but also availability of 
these type of finance is limited in CESEE. 
Development finance could also play a more important role in supporting access 
to finance and economic growth by better leveraging available funding resources, 
especially in light of the availability of EU structural funds and IFI support in 
CESEE. Essentially, development banks serve as a vehicle for mobilizing and 
channeling medium- and long-term capital into the economy and addressing 
market failures in the financing of priority sectors. Through this, they can facilitate 
the growth and competitiveness of companies and ultimately the economy under 
the strategic direction of the government. Even though EU integration has 
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circumscribed the ability of governments to directly support national economic 
interests, governments have adapted development banks to indirectly implement 
national economic policy via market-based mechanisms. 
Advances in technology are enabling financial services to reach greater numbers 
of low-income individuals and small firms at lower cost and risk. Recent FinTech 
developments point to a fundamental re-imagining of the processes and business 
models of the financial services industry. In this process of heightened disruption, 
a clear insight emerges – banks and fintech players are naturally interdependent. 
Fintech players have built a bouquet of innovative products and services on the 
strong backbone of the banking and payments infrastructure in the country. Banks, 
on the other hand, have relied on innovative solutions developed by fintech players 
to better address the needs of their existing customer base. Finally, at the center of 
the policy debate is the question how this new area of finance should be regulated 
and supervised. 
CESEE countries will benefit from a new and more balanced growth and financing 
model with a stronger focus on innovation and increased productivity. There are 
still significant gaps in the region’s framework conditions, demand, and supply sides 
of the innovation ecosystem. The Innovation Finance working group concludes that 
risk capital for the region’s companies’ growth stages is a particular constraint. IFIs 
can play a key role in a coordinated effort of all market participants to support the 
growth of innovative firms. 
Mobilizing the required funding for financing sustainable and green economic 
growth, a great proportion of which is expected to come from the private sector, 
calls for re-shaping key parts of the financial system and identifying and setting new 
international standards for investment. To attract capital, growing environmental 
concerns and action on climate change need to be combined with sustainable 
economic returns. Governments around the world are taking steps to encourage 
the development of green finance with a view toward mobilizing the needed 
resources to support economic transformation and maintain competitiveness. While 
green finance is an emerging segment of financial markets, a range of financial 
instruments such as green loans, green bonds, green funds and green index products 
has been developing rapidly. Beyond perhaps energy efficiency and renewable energy 
financing, the supply in CESEE remains weak. 
The sovereign-bank nexus reflects the interconnectedness between the health of 
the sovereign and the banking system, whereby stress in one sector may create and 
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amplify stress in the other. There are two direct channels (bank’s direct exposures 
to the sovereign and the “presumption” of government support to failing banks) 
and two indirect channels (fiscal and bank interactions with the real sector). 
The Basel III capital and liquidity accords, the G20 “too big to fail” reforms, the 
Financial Stability Board’s Key Attributes for effective resolution frameworks for 
financial institutions- and the Basel Committee’s review of the regulatory treatment 
of sovereign exposures all offer relevant measures, but also pose implementation 
challenges in light of institutional capacity constraints and the level of economic 
and financial market development in CESEE. Finally, improving transparency 
and data quality of bank-sovereign linkages and contingent liabilities is critical for 
surveillance and prudential purposes.
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CHAPTER 4
The European Investment Bank 
and the Vienna Initiative
Luca Gattini, Áron Gereben,  
Debora Revoltella and Paolo Munini 
European Investment Bank, Economics Department1
Introduction
The European Investment Bank (EIB) is the bank of the European Union, owned 
by the EU Member States. The EIB provides finance and expertise for sound 
and sustainable investment projects worldwide. The EIB’s particular strategic 
positioning – its cross-border operational perimeter – has allowed it to steer policy 
actions developed either elsewhere (e.g. European Commission) or in conjunction 
with other IFIs. For instance, the capability to finance projects with both parent 
and subsidiary banks has allowed the EIB to operationalize efficiently the policy 
needed to generate a cross-border anchor in times of crisis in the Central, Eastern 
and Southeastern Europe (CESEE) region during the first Joint IFI Action Plan. 
Moreover, the EIB has played a key role in the Vienna Initiative, supporting 
large-scale and operational financial support and providing the largest part of the 
international financial institutions’ (IFIs’) financial involvement.
The EIB was a co-founder of the Vienna Initiative and has been an active participant 
since the beginning. Beyond the crucial co-ordination work aimed at avoiding the 
withdrawal of the international banking groups from the region, the EIB’s support 
in the form of funding helped to maintain a flow of credit into these economies in 
times when private sources of external funding had been suddenly severed. The EIB 
1 The views expressed in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the position of the EIB 
or its shareholders.
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has also contributed to the analytical and policy agenda of the Vienna Initiative, 
being a distinguished thought leader in the CESEE region. The EIB has developed 
a unique Bank Lending Survey for the CESEE region, serving as a public good 
for monitoring and assessing credit developments in the region. Moreover, the 
EIB has been proactively engaged in work streams that have had direct strategic 
and operational impact through its leading role in various working groups of the 
Vienna Initiative.
Investment support during the crisis
The EIB, together with the World Bank Group (WBG) and the European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), launched two Joint IFI Action 
Plans (JIFIAPs) in 2009 and in 2013 respectively. The first JIFIAP committed 
€24.5 billion of resources between 2009 and 2010 to the CESEE region. Roughly 
45 per cent of the total commitment came from the EIB, 25% from the EBRD and 
30% from the WBG. 
During the first JIFIAP, EIB lending fulfilled the dual function of supporting 
both final beneficiaries – small to medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) or small 
infrastructure projects – and the region’s banks, including the majority of large 
Western European banking groups’ subsidiaries in the region.2 The European 
Investment Fund (EIF), the subsidiary of EIB focusing on venture capital 
and guarantees for SMEs, made a wide range of financial products available to 
intermediaries, from equity and equity-like investments to funding products, 
in order to address both capital and liquidity issues, always with the objective of 
stimulating SME financing. One channel of this EIF assistance was the JEREMIE 
initiative, where the establishment of five Holding Funds in the area started to 
successfully address the specific regional requirements, often with the development 
of tailor-made financial instruments. As a result, a number of funded risk-sharing 
agreements were put in place, combining an upfront funding of a new SME loan 
portfolio and a risk-sharing of losses on a loan-by-loan basis. 
Although absorption by banking groups varied by country and by customer type 
under this first JIFIAP, banks drew available resources, which rapidly reached final 
beneficiaries, implying a doubling of pre-crisis absorption rates in some of the most 
affected countries, and effectively complementing the reduced lending from local 
banks as a result of the crisis. This result is considered a notable success, as EIB 
2 Final Report on the Joint IFI Action Plan, March 2011.
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resources made up for the crisis-induced decline in the availability of traditional 
funding sources for local banks. 
The second JIFIAP, launched in 2013, was more focused on supporting growth, 
including convergence of new EU Member States and of the candidate countries 
in the region.3 It sought to ensure that the supply of funding for economic activity 
was maintained, and to finance investment needed to overcome obstacles to the 
longer-run growth. The second JIFIAP entailed a total commitment to the region 
of €30 billion. Roughly 66% of the total commitment came from the EIB, 14% from 
the EBRD and 20% from the WBG. In total, the second JIFIAP over-delivered, 
reaching €42.7 billion by December 2014. Assistance from the IFIs was in the order 
of 1½ percent of the region’s GDP each year and supported around 6 percent of the 
region’s investment. 
The largest share of the EIB’s operations during the period of the second JIFIAP, 
2013-14, 39.4 percent, went to the region’s infrastructure, including strengthening 
its links with trans-European transport networks. Almost as much, 32.6 percent 
of the value of operations, went to finance SMEs and mid-caps, including EIF 
operations to provide equity and guarantees. Some 15.6% went to energy and 
the environment, with the remaining 12.4 percent going for RDI (research, 
development and innovation), manufacturing, health, training and education. 
These operations were supported by the EIB’s capital increase approved in early 
2013, as well as the availability of EU funding for the EIF, with assistance for 
countries in the West Balkans provided under the EU’s external mandate using 
EU budget guarantees.
Given the deleveraging pressures facing the supply of funds to the region’s banks, 
a major objective of the second JIFIAP was to help ensure that the region’s banking 
system remained in a condition to extend credit, especially to SMEs and mid-caps. 
This was achieved through the supply to local banks of a large volume of reliable 
funding to finance such lending, and also by actions to strengthen the local banking 
systems and help cross-border bank groups use their capital more efficiently. To this 
end, the EIB signed a series of credit lines with banks in almost all countries of 
the region. 
Another objective was to help countries use available EU funds for investment 
and growth, and to replenish the pipeline of project funding at a time when most 
3 Final Report on the Joint IFI Action Plan for Growth in Central and South Eastern Europe, April 2015.
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governments in the region were not in a position to expand their investment 
expenditures substantially. Stepping up the absorption of EU funds, to the benefit 
of both the recipient countries and their banking systems, had been the objective 
of an early Vienna Initiative working group. The main thrust of the working 
group’s conclusions was the need to strengthen national procedures for project 
selection. This complemented the work of the IFIs to improve project preparation, 
particularly through the EU’s Joint Assistance to Support Projects in European 
Regions programme, managed by the EIB. Another innovation in this respect was 
EIB lending to co-finance EU funds during 2014-20, and loans were agreed with 
the majority of new Member States for this purpose. 
Besides improving access to finance via the banking sector, the EIF also focused on 
the development of the equity ecosystem in the region, with increasing use in the 
region of its risk-sharing instrument, designed to promote innovation in SMEs and 
mid-caps. These operations have been useful in helping banks conserve capital, in 
that the guarantor takes all or part of the credit risk. The EIB was centrally involved 
in the Vienna Initiative’s Working Group on Credit Guarantee Schemes, which 
examined the availability and regulatory treatment of such schemes in the CESEE 
region. At the end of 2018, EIB’s total lending in the CESEE region amounted to 
€92.5 billion.
Figure 1.
The EIB’s total exposures in CESEE by country, end-2018 (billions of euros, 
and percent of GDP as data labels)
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JIFIAP assistance effectively focused on the needs of the region. Infrastructure 
lending has improved the interconnection of transport, energy and communication 
systems. It has helped establish more reliable energy supplies, improve energy 
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efficiency and increase the supply of renewables, thus contributing to containing 
climate change. Lending has facilitated the more rapid and effective use of EU 
structural funds. JIFIAP assistance helped the banking system strengthen its 
capital position and maintain lending to the region’s economies. The programmes 
of the IFIs have helped meet the deficit of equity and risk finance in the region and 
have promoted the development of capital markets. And operations have served 
to raise productivity and increase the export orientation of countries, creating 
the basis for more productive employment. The JIFIAP has shown that the IFIs 
are among the most reliable partners of the region, capable of responding to its 
specific needs and providing an important element of stability. The EIB Group 
gradually adjusted its product portfolio to the changing demands of the CESEE 
market. At the early stage of the crisis, when funding had dried up, Multiple 
Beneficiary Intermediated Loans supported lending to SMEs and mid-caps of 
the region by alleviating the commercial banks’ shortage of liquidity and allowing 
them to keep on with their corporate lending activity. Later, when capital rather 
than liquidity became the bottleneck for lending due to crisis-related losses and 
tighter regulatory requirements, capital relief products such as credit guarantees 
were offered to support lending to SMEs and innovative firms.
Sustaining growth and convergence in the CESEE region has required 
a strengthening of investment activity, since the per capita capital stock is less than 
half that in the rest of the European Union. This was the objective of the 2015-
17 Investment Plan for Europe (the Juncker Plan), to whose implementation the 
EIB was central. The plan depended on attracting substantial private capital to 
co-finance projects, using the endowment of the European Fund for Structural 
Investments (EFSI) as the bearer of first loss. This use of EU funds as guarantees 
rather than as grants was pioneered in the EIF’s operations in the CESEE region. 
The EIB’s leading participation in the Vienna Initiative working group on IFI 
financial products supporting investment in CESEE has been important in realizing 
the Juncker Plan’s objectives in the region. 
Contribution to the analytical and policy work
One of the key features of the Vienna Initiative is the pooling of institutional 
resources for joint understanding of the economic challenges in the region. In this 
context, the EIB has been contributing actively in the regular monitoring activity 
of the Vienna Initiative. Launched in 2012, the semi-annual EIB CESEE Bank 
Lending Survey (BLS) is a unique information source that assesses both credit 
demand and supply conditions in the region, and also the strategic view of the 
large international banking groups towards the CESEE banking market. The BLS 
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captures banks’ views in a cross-border perspective, thus analysing conjectural 
development from both the home and host banking sectors. It contributes to 
the monitoring of cross-border banking activities and deleveraging in CESEE, 
to a better understanding of the determinants/constraints influencing credit 
growth in CESEE and to gaining some forward-looking insights into cross-border 
banks’ strategies and market expectations regarding local financial conditions.
The BLS key findings feed into the Vienna Initiative Credit and Deleveraging 
Monitor coordinated by the IMF. Moreover, the BLS results are initially 
presented and endorsed by the Vienna Initiative Steering Committee. The BLS 
has become an internationally recognized tool to grasp credit conditions and 
fundamental drivers in the region. Specifically, the BLS investigates international 
banks’ strategies, restructuring plans, access to funding and deleveraging at 
the global and group levels. It also examines the main determinants of local 
banking conditions. Attention is given to credit standards and credit terms and 
conditions, as well as to the various domestic and international factors that may 
be responsible for changes to them. Demand for loans is also explored in great 
detail, including the elements that may affect loan demand. Credit quality and 
the funding conditions for banks in CESEE are also monitored. 
When it comes to the policy agenda of the Vienna Initiative, the EIB has 
been proactively engaging in those work streams that have direct strategic and 
operational impact. Two working groups have been established under the EIB’s 
chairmanship: one focusing on credit guarantee schemes, and one assessing the 
product palette of IFIs operating in the region. 
The credit guarantee working group was launched in October 2013. The aim 
was to explore the possible role of credit guarantee schemes in alleviating the low 
supply of credit in CESEE. The work was based on two unique sets of surveys. 
As part of the policy conclusions, the group called for a uniform treatment of 
the regulatory capital relief for credit guarantees as a key step that may facilitate 
the more widespread use of such instruments.
The working group looking at the product palette of IFIs was established in 2017. 
The main objectives of the work were to identify the market gaps and priority 
policy areas for IFI products, to support the development of instruments to meet 
the investment needs of the region and to contribute to the debate on shaping 
the next generation of IFI products. The key policy conclusions highlighted 
the importance of capital relief products, the potential role of IFIs in helping 
97
 The European Investment Bank and the Vienna Initiative
the banks through the challenges of the MREL regulation, the need for well-
targeted support to venture capital and the need for better data and coordination 
of IFI activity.
In addition, the EIB has launched an initiative and is currently co-chairing a working 
group on financing innovation with EBRD. Established in in 2018, its objectives 
include the mapping of innovation performance and ecosystems in CESEE, the 
analysis of bank and non-bank financing options for innovative companies, the 
identification of gaps in framework conditions and financing and formulating 
policy recommendations, including for the role of IFIs.
Next steps
The example of the Vienna Initiative shows how important coordination is when it 
comes to financial integration.  Home bias is very strong when it comes to banking. 
Mutual trust and strong incentives are needed to prevent suboptimal outcomes. 
Regular and open discussion between host and home country stakeholders (parent 
banks, central banks, regulators) has therefore proven to be crucial for cross-border 
banking to be successful. 
The Vienna Initiative is widely considered an excellent example of policy 
coordination among international institutions, both private and public. The EIB 
remains committed to the Vienna Initiative model, and actively supports its future, 
for instance, by contributing to the financing of the newly established permanent 
Vienna Initiative secretariat. 
The strength of the Vienna Initiative has always been the presence of the large 
commercial banks that are active in the region. Banks are at the core of the Vienna 
Initiative work, and the agenda has to remain bank-focused. However, banking 
is changing, and banks are opening up towards new areas that are particularly 
important for the growth of the CESEE region. In this environment, the role of 
the Vienna Initiative is no longer crisis management; rather, establishing the link 
between the financial sector and the areas that are crucial for the region’s economic 
development, such as financing innovation, the transition towards a green economy, 
digitalisation, etc., are of the essence. The Vienna Initiative is the ideal forum for 
finding pragmatic solutions to these issues, and the EIB stands committed to playing 
a key role in this process.
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CHAPTER 5
The Vienna Initiative: 
how it all started
Herbert Stepic1
1 Dr. Herbert Stepic, born 31.12.1946, CEO of RBI from 2010 to 2013. From 1995, Deputy Chairman of the Managing 
Board of RZB and from 2001 to 2010, CEO of Raiffeisen International Bank-Holding AG.
In early spring 2008, the head of the research division at Raiffeisen Zentralbank 
Österreich AG (RZB, the predecessor of Raiffeisen Bank International (RBI)) 
informed the management board about his expectations and forecasts concerning 
problems in the US real estate sector. He described them as serious, without of 
course being able to quantify their effects on Europe or the European financial 
system. Information received from our New York office painted an even worse 
picture. Consequently, we started to take preparatory measures in the group’s head 
office in Vienna.
By October 2008, it was evident that the seriousness of the problem had turned out 
to be well beyond our expectations, not to mention our fears. And while I could 
well imagine possible future measures by Western European central banks to help 
the region’s financial industry to overcome possible liquidity shortages, I could not 
imagine how this could be done for Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Unlike in 
Western Europe and other countries with well-developed financial markets, the 
liquidity supply in CEE was primarily provided by foreign, i.e., Western European, 
banks. (These banks’ market share in Central Europe and Southeastern Europe 
exceeded 80% at the time, and capital markets barely existed.) As the banking market 
in CEE was expected to double in size every five years, any disruption to lending 
activities would have seriously endangered the region’s transformation process. 
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The two most important groups needing credit, namely small and medium-sized 
companies and households, would have suffered particularly badly if the liquidity 
supply were to come to a sudden stop. A complete breakdown of CEE financial 
markets was also a possible scenario....
At about the same time, several initiatives and actions were developed in Western 
Europe. An “Overall European Framework for Action” was set up, initially at the 
ECOFIN Council in Brussels on 4 November 2008 and then at an extraordinary 
European Council on 7 November. We knew that the European Commission would 
propose raising the capital base of the European Investment Bank (EIB) by doubling 
the current ceiling for euro-denominated bonds. As a matter of fact, such fresh 
money would only be relevant for troubled EU Member States. The Commission 
clearly saw the need for strong support of the financial system from both the European 
Central Bank (ECB) and local central banks.
The financial crisis had by then begun to affect the new EU Member States from 
CEE. In order to meet this threat, the EU considered providing substantial medium-
term financial assistance together with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
However, such funds would generally be lent directly to the countries involved (e.g., 
to offset financial deficits or to meet financial stability parameters) without any 
specific allocation to individual banks. This would also mean that the Western banks 
primarily active in CEE, which carried out the lion’s share of liquidity transformation 
at a time when capital markets were essentially non-existent in the region, would run 
the risk of being excluded from any sort of stabilisation measures from Brussels or 
Western supranational institutions.
In September 2008, I therefore started to liaise with my executive colleagues at the 
largest Western banks in CEE to convince them of the need for concerted action 
focusing on three “targets”:
• Brussels decision makers and the ECB; 
• supranational institutions such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) and the EIB; 
• Central European finance ministers and central bank governors. 
The goals were: to convince Western banks not to reduce refinancing lines for their 
subsidiaries in CEE (initially, this was the wish of the Austrian National Bank, 
among others); the Brussels authorities to stand by with liquidity lines through their 
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institutions; and CEE central bank governors and finance ministers to support the 
money market needs of those of their local institutions not owned by foreign investors.
Under the title “CEE Concerted Action”, representatives of EIB, EBRD, Erste, 
UniCredit and Intesa met at RBI on 6 November 2008 in order to align and coordinate 
actions in Brussels and CEE capitals. Considering major government interventions 
(such as liquidity enhancement profiles in Western Europe and CEE, government 
guarantees and deposit schemes) as well as the interventions of international and 
European authorities (such as the declaration of a concerted European action plan 
on 12 October or the EU’s International Financial Architecture on 28 October), 
a concrete master plan was prepared, discussed, adapted and finally agreed upon.
Each bank or financial institution, including the subsidiaries of Western banks in 
CEE, undertook certain tasks within a specified time frame, such as organising 
meetings with CEE governors and finance ministers. The lobbying activities were 
shared between the Western bank executives, depending on their individual personal 
contacts. In a letter dated 1 December 2008 and signed by Andreas Treichl, Corrado 
Passera, André Bergen, Frédéric Oudéa, Alessandro Profumo and me, we officially 
presented our request for “Stability for the Financial Sector in EU Member States 
and Candidate Countries” to Christine Lagarde, Manuel Barroso, Joaquin Almunia 
and EU Commissioner Charlie McCreevy.
In a follow-up meeting at RBI on 17 December, there was a detailed discussion and 
summing up of all interventions so far by all members of the group. In the meantime, 
I had entrusted six senior RBI staff members with the coordination of the action plan 
in both Eastern and Western Europe. While overall feedback was positive – after 
all, we did make substantial progress – there were severe problems with the ECB’s 
rule at the time that local currency bonds were not eligible as collateral or for repo 
transactions. We thought that the IMF could be supportive in this matter. Time was 
of the essence, so we decided to differentiate CEE countries by their macroeconomic 
status as “fragile” (double-digit current account deficit and inflation, real estate 
bubble), “intermediate” (high inflation and current account deficit) or “somewhat 
stable”.
Some countries, such as Hungary and Serbia (National Bank Governor Radovan 
Jelašić was extremely supportive) had already responded with concrete measures; 
Bulgaria and Poland were about to prepare special packages to stabilise lending. 
The alignment with the Czech Republic was especially important due to their 
upcoming EU Presidency.
102
Ten years of the Vienna Initiative 2009-2019
We also agreed to offer to selected countries a reduction of lending against a gradual 
reduction of reserve requirements. Several other proposals for requests to the central 
banks of the individual banks’ home countries were agreed, such as their accepting 
local currency collateral or providing local currency/euro swap facilities and repo 
transactions. The EBRD offered to provide a coordinated response to the needs 
of all banks in the region, bank by bank and product by product, to be proposed 
to international financial institutions (IFIs), who then could approach the ECB 
and International Finance Corporation (IFC), thus offering coordinated support. 
Discussions took place between banks on the one side and the EBRD, the EIB and 
the IFC on the other to open credit lines for the then 37 banks active in the region 
to the sum of approximately €5 billion. In the meantime, we actively communicated 
with the media. There were several interviews with the Financial Times and other 
leading newspapers to raise awareness of our initiative.
One should not forget that, by the end of January 2009, money markets in Western 
Europe had started to dry up. Banks became terrified because they did not know 
whether, and to what extent, their counterparties might have toxic assets on their 
books. This led to a drastic reduction of credit lines/short-term money market 
lines even between parties with a long historical track record. The worst period was 
between January and March 2009, a time when our action plan, now branded the 
“Vienna Initiative”, had successfully alerted major decision makers in both Eastern 
and Western Europe of the need to counteract the effects of the fall of Lehman 
Brothers with a concerted action safeguarding their financial industries and, in 
some cases, even their countries.
On 23 January 2009, the group – which by this time had been joined by Swedbank, 
Eurobank EFG and Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken – addressed a further letter 
to the ECB, calling on it specifically to support the stability of new EU Member 
and Candidate Countries with concrete measures.
When we started the Initiative, we had yet to learn that no official platform existed 
where regulators of Western and Eastern European countries could informally 
exchange their views, let alone talk about coordinating or jointly designing 
important measures. The “Vienna Initiative” has existed ever since to serve exactly 
this purpose, as a platform where regulators meet with their peers and representatives 
of IFIs, as well as with the active cross-border banks, to coordinate activities in the 
region for the benefit of the financial industry and national economies.
The effectiveness 
of the Vienna Initiative 
during the 2009-11 crisis
PART II
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CHAPTER 6
If you really want to find 
a solution: a personal story of the 
Vienna Initiative from a Hungarian 
eyewitness1
Julia Király2
The post-Lehman liquidity crisis hit some Central and Eastern European (CEE) 
countries brutally hard, especially Hungary, Romania, Serbia, Ukraine and Latvia. 
These countries had to turn to the IMF and the EU for standby credit. Hungary 
was the first, after its financial markets stopped functioning on 9 October 2008. 
The government lost access to international markets, and the banking sector could 
not refinance itself in Swiss francs (a major currency used in foreign exchange 
lending to households at the time) due to the dried-up swap markets. In October, 
parent banks provided the necessary liquidity for their subsidiaries; however, as 
the crisis worsened, their own governments put them under pressure to keep funds 
(liquidity) at home. As the same few parent banks owned most of the local banks 
(their subsidiaries) across Central Europe, the story was much the same in all the 
other CEE countries, and soon, the whole region – irrespective of EU membership – 
was considered the most vulnerable part of the emerging market world. 
And, then a new international initiative of public-private cooperation was born, 
the first of this type: the Vienna Initiative. As an eyewitness, in my personal 
reminiscences I would like to share my impressions of the long process, which finally 
resulted in genuinely broad cooperation among the public and private institutions 
of different nations.
1 The paper is an except from the author’s book: Király Júlia: A tornádó oldalszele. Személyes válságtörténet. Park 
Könyvkiadó, 2019. (Király, J. (2019) The side-wind of the tornado. Personal crisis history. Park Publishing Company).
2 Professor of the International Business School Budapest and external researcher of the Economic Research Institute 
of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. During the crisis (2007-2013), deputy governor of the MNB, the Central 
Bank of Hungary.
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The Global Financial Crisis and Hungary
The first memo summarising the main features of the subprime crisis was prepared 
by the staff of the MNB (Central Bank of Hungary) in the summer of 2007. 
However, it had a rather optimistic conclusion: “In spite of the increase of credit risk 
premium the developments on the American mortgage market will probably exert 
only a marginal impact on risk appetite until they affect other markets or household 
consumption as well, of which there is no indication as yet.”3 The general feeling was 
that this turbulence would exert only a marginal impact, and most central banks 
hoped for a soft landing. This was particularly true of the emerging markets. As 
Guillermo Ortiz, governor of Bank of Mexico said in an oft-cited quote: “This time 
we did not cause it [the crisis].” (Blinder 2013: 171). In 2007, decoupling theories 
popular at the time advocated that on this occasion the crisis stemmed from the 
most developed financial markets, so emerging markets would be less contaminated, 
and would suffer less. Dooley and Hutchison (2009) analysed 16 emerging markets 
including Hungary with event-driven econometrics, and found that the emerging 
markets were indeed enjoying a certain heyday up until the Lehman crisis. Most of 
currencies appreciated against the dollar, these countries had avoided bank crises, 
since their banks (even most of the parent banks of local subsidiaries) had not 
accumulated significant stocks of toxic assets. However, CDS spreads started slowly 
crawling upwards, reflecting deterioration in investor sentiment deteriorated, and 
leading to risks being re-priced (Figure 1). 
We at the central bank did not assume that the turmoil would not affect Hungarian 
markets in some way, since increases of the cost of foreign funds and the shortening 
of maturities appeared as immediate signals of the coming turbulent times. 
My department, the Financial Stability team, was in particular worried about 
accelerating FX lending in the country. In our Financial Stability Report and various 
conference papers, we tried to send messages to the banking sector that it would be 
better to slow down. At that time, unfortunately, we could not do anything more 
than exercise moral suasion, since the regulation was in the hands of the Ministry 
of Finance, while supervision was within the competence of the independent 
Financial Supervisory Authority. Moreover, parent banks were supervised by their 
own (“home”) authorities according to the then prevailing rules and, despite many 
memoranda of understanding, cooperation between “home” and “host” authorities 
was scant. We were more or less impotent. 
3 Minutes of the Monetary Council Meeting on 23 July 2007, page 4.
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Figure 1.









Source: MNB Inflation Report November 2007 and August 2009.
Unfortunately, the warnings did not decelerate the Hungarian FX lending boom. 
In recent years several papers have analyzed various aspects of FX lending (Brzoza-
Brzezina 2010, Király 2018, Király-Simonovits 2016, Király-Banai 2014, Rosenberg-
Tirpák 2008). Now, I would focus on the credit supply, in particular, on the role of 
the banking sector. As Professor Lámfalussy kept saying: “There is no irresponsible 
borrower without an irresponsible lender.”
By the 2000s everywhere in the CEE region, the lion’s share of the banking system 
had been acquired by foreign strategic owners, mainly Austrian, Italian, Belgian and 
French banks as a result of the massive bank privatisation. These banks dominated 
not only the Hungarian but the whole Central European banking market as well. 
Swedish banks were active in the Baltic countries, and Greek banks in the Balkans. 
Due to the high entry costs to the retail market, foreign-owned subsidiaries initially 
focused on the corporate segment. Most of the subsidiaries had not inherited low-
quality corporate portfolios from the pre-transition period and had experience in 
the field of commercial banking, and could thus offer more favourable conditions 
overall to customers than their domestic competitors. 
In the late 1990s in Hungary the profitability of the corporate segment began 
to shrink due to fierce competition, so banks turned towards the retail segment 
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providing unsecured consumer loans and car loans though their leasing companies.4 
EU accession, and disappearing capital controls offered excellent opportunity for 
foreign-owned banks to considerably increase their retail market share. In 2004, 
after the necessary abolition of an ultra-generous government subsidy on mortgage 
loans, mortgage interest rates jumped to 12-14% from the subsidised 4-6%, and 
demand started to promptly fall. The foreign-owned subsidiaries through their 
parent banks had easy access to the international wholesale market, and thanks to 
the plentiful liquidity prevailing at that time, the foreign exchange (FX) funding 
costs were 4-6% lower than the actual Hungarian forint (Ft HUF) funding cost. The 
inflation differential, with Hungary’s CPI rising faster than in home, predominantly 
eurozone member countries, also played some role. Subsidiaries relying on cheap FX 
funds could offer much cheaper FX-denominated mortgage loans than expensive 
Ft HUF loans. Banks omitted to price in the foreign exchange risk of the mainly 
unhedged borrowers. As happened earlier in the corporate sector, the same pattern 
was replicated in the retail sector, especially in the mortgage loan market (Figure 2). 
Figure 2.
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Source: MNB macroprudential indicators.
Not much later the local banks entered the FX denominated mortgage market, too. 
The fast-evolving lending boom had all the characteristics of subprime lending. 
Households with weak scoring could not afford expensive Ft HUF loans, but had 
4 Due to Hungarian tax regulations it was much cheaper to provide auto loans in the form of financial leasing.
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access to cheap FX loans. Others borrowed more than they could have borrowed 
in Ft HUF, and were able to buy larger, more expensive houses. Between 2004 and 
2008 LTVs (loan-to-value ratios) and DSRs (debt-service ratios) of loans significantly 
increased, home equity loans5 had a larger and larger market share and teaser rate 
loans and NINJA (no income no job no asset) loans were no longer an exception. 
The lending bubble with fierce competition exploded the profitability of banks, and 
the average return on equity in the sector exceeded 20%. The smaller part of the 
profit was repatriated by foreign parent banks, while the greater part – 60-70% – 
was reinvested. This not only increased the capital adequacy of subsidiaries, but 
made possible their future growth, as well. 
On the dark side of the credit boom, significant imbalances accumulated not only in 
the household sector, which became chronically over-indebted in foreign currency 
against which they had no hedging, but in the banking sector, too. On the one 
hand, the growth of loans exceeded that of deposits, with the loan-to-deposit ratio 
of banks accelerating to peak at 180% at the end of 2008. On the other hand, since 
the lending boom was financed from the international market, between 2005 and 
October 2008 the share of foreign funds increased from 20% to 35% at subsidiaries, 
and from 10% to 25% in local banks without a foreign owner (Figure 3). Foreign 
bank subsidiaries were in a better position than locals, as they could rely on their 
parent banks: 60-70% of foreign funds were provided by the foreign owners.
After the outbreak of the US subprime crisis, access to wholesale market funds 
became more difficult, and the cost of funds increased. It became difficult to get 
access to unsecured interbank loans, while normally, FX swaps were available. In 
the case of local banks, almost 100% of foreign funding consisted of continuously 
shortening FX swaps (Figure 4).
5  In the special Hungarian terminology: “free utilisation loans”.
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Figure 3.



































































































Source: Banai et al (2010).
Figure 4.
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The imbalances generated by the FX lending bubble threatened the financial 
stability of the country; however, the voice of our Financial Stability department 
was too weak and largely unheard. It was believed inconceivable that any of the 
liquid money markets, and in particular the super-liquid FX swap market, could 
dry up.6 Consequently, neither MNB staff, nor the Monetary Council (MC) saw 
the possibility of contagion from the US-based subprime crisis to the boom in FX 
lending in the CEE countries. Nobody could imagine an FX liquidity crisis. 
The first direct contagion effect of the subprime crisis reached the Hungarian 
money markets in March 2008. Liquidity seemed to disappear from the government 
bond market, bid-ask spreads increased, and other liquidity indicators deteriorated. 
Intervention by the Government Debt Management Agency (ÁKK) and a rapid 
hike of the base rate by 50 basis points by the MC calmed the markets, and during 
the summer the decoupling sentiment returned.
On 15 September 2008, Lehman Brothers famously collapsed. During the following 
days, nothing special happened on the emerging markets. What’s more, the 
evaluation of the CEE region actually improved, and the Czech koruna and Polish 
zloty appreciated. During the Lehman week most analysts stuck to the decoupling 
scenario between advanced country crisis and emerging market invulnerability. 
On 29 September the US Congress rejected the US$700 billion Troubled Asset 
Relief Program (TARP). Although five days later the bill was passed in the end, 
it was too late, as the Lehman tsunami swept over the world’s financial markets. 
Within two weeks of Congress’s refusal, credit default swap (CDS) spreads and 
interest rates rocketed, while stock prices plunged, not only on the US markets 
or other developed country markets, but this time also on the emerging markets. 
There was no more “decoupling”. Financial markets dried up, including the super-
liquid money markets. On the very same day, (29 September) at the rate-setting 
session of the MC, members expressed mild concern only by observing: “Although 
Hungary was no longer among the most vulnerable countries, forint investments were 
not the safest assets for investors and, therefore, a potential worsening of financial 
disruptions might have a more pronounced effect on the prices of forint assets compared 
with other countries of the region.”7 Nevertheless, the MC saw no reason for any 
kind of monetary intervention. Some domestic banks reported serious friction on 
6 In Hungary the daily turnover of the FX swap market was about Ft HUF 750 billion (€3 billion) while that of the 
FX spot market totalled Ft HUF 250 billion (€1 billion).
7 Minutes of the MC meeting on 29 September 2008. 
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the FX swap market, and yet the big picture sketched by the central bank was rather 
optimistic. We had realised that the problems in the fiscal and financial sectors 
reinforced each other after Lehman, but we were convinced that, due to the recent 
fiscal consolidation, Hungary was far from being the most vulnerable country in 
the region. We were wrong: the flow was improving, but the stock was still high. 
Hungary had the highest gross public and net external debt in the region (Figure 5).
Figure 5.






























Source: MNB Financial Stability Report April 2009.
In October, the tsunami hit Europe: in the first week of the month, share prices of 
the big European banks plunged, and their CDS spreads almost exceeded those of 
the big American banks. 
On 8 October we published the MNB’s Financial Stability Report, asserting that 
the Hungarian banking sector was strong, its capital base and profitability solid and 
the Ft HUF and FX liquidity of the banks adequate, and arguing that, although the 
funding conditions had deteriorated, foreign owners would mitigate this negative 
effect. 
On 8 October, the Hungarian money markets were still functioning smoothly. But 
as we know from Winnie-the-Pooh: “They’re funny things, Accidents. You never 
have them till you’re having them.”8 
8 Milne, A.A.: The House at Pooh Corner. Chapter IV. In Which it is Shown That Tiggers Don’t Climb Trees; 
https://www.e-reading.club/chapter.php/71303/6/Milne_-_The_house_at_Pooh_Corner.html 
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On the next day, 9 October, the Hungarian money markets all of a sudden dried 
up entirely:
 - market makers and price quotations disappeared from the government bond 
market, the regular T-bill auction of the ÁKK failed;
 - trade on the Budapest Stock Exchange had to be suspended due to harsh 
price drops, and the share price of OTP Bank, by far the biggest Hungarian 
commercial bank, collapsed;
 - the Ft HUF came under strong depreciation pressure;
 - the FX swap market froze, banks faced a liquidity crisis, there was no FX 
liquidity provider, and Hungarian banks could not roll over expiring swaps 
which funded their FX-denominated loans.
This was really the sinister sudden stop, when funding just disappears from the 
system. Headlines of foreign newspapers suggested that Hungary would be “the 
second Iceland”, and journalists and analysts all envisioned the mother of all crises: 
a bank-exchange rate-balance of payment – and fiscal – crisis. 
The crisis team of the central bank was immediately set up, and in subsequent 
weeks we spent more time within our fortress-like headquarters building, than 
outside.9 Our duty was to overcome the liquidity crisis as soon as possible. 
Workshops, brainstorming, hundreds of e-mails, thousands of different meetings 
and negotiations – and of course a lot of coffee – filled our days. I am sure 2008-09 
was a golden time for coffee producers. 
First, Hungary immediately turned to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and applied for a standby loan. The country’s good policy package was supported 
by what was a truly large – “oversised” – combined IMF standby and EU balance 
of payments loan of €20 billion. This helped calm the markets, restore confidence 
and avert a deep overall crisis. 
Second, parent banks behaved in a responsible way, and by the end of the year 
increased funding in their subsidiaries by more than 20%, providing fresh liquidity 
and substituting the maturing wholesale funds. The MNB provided the rest of the 
required FX swaps backed by the IMF-EU loan. Parent banks (which themselves 
got refinancing from the European Central Bank (ECB)) and the MNB were 
9 We remembered that at the beginning of the 20th century the bank management lived together with their family in 
the building…
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together able to revitalise Hungarian FX money markets and provide the banks 
with sufficient FX liquidity.
Third, we made an agreement with primary dealers and long-term investors to 
revitalise the government securities market, as soon as possible. We intervened on 
the secondary market and provided extra Ft HUF liquidity for other actors, asking 
them to do the same. And they did!
Fourth, we increased the base rate by a massive 300 basis points to stop harsh 
speculation against the Hungarian forint.
By the end of October, the acute liquidity crisis was over. Even The Economist 
admitted: “The Hungarian central bank is impressively well-run.”10 
The Lehman tsunami hit the country with full force but, with the help of the 
IMF and the EU, the responsible behaviour of foreign parent banks and the rapid 
crisis management of the MNB, Hungary was prevented from becoming “the 
second Iceland”.
The East European panic and the birth of the Vienna Initiative
The October 2008 liquidity crisis did not mean the end of the crisis. The stability 
of the banking sector was fragile, and a sudden stop and credit crunch were real 
threats. Over-indebted households and corporates were expected to deleverage, 
which was bound to deepen the approaching recession. The 2009 recession was on 
our heels. In the US, UK, Ireland, Spain, Germany, Belgium, Italy and several other 
developed countries, the financial storm hit the banking sector severely, with more 
than 40 banks bailed out using state aid. Europe spent a cumulative 13% of its GDP 
on bailout programmes (CEPS 2010). First the credit flow slowed down, and then 
it practically stopped. The consequences nicely illustrated the old textbook thesis: 
“When the banks stop – the economy dies”. The slowdown of individual economies 
contributed to the abrupt 11% fall in world trade. The contagion reached almost 
every economy. In the US, GDP fell by 2.4%, in the eurozone by 4.1%, in the UK 
by 4.9%, and so on. Even in China and India the previous double-digit growth 
decelerated to single digit. Black humour dominated the Internet; I received this 
e-mail more than ten times: 
10 ”Who's next” – The Economist, 23 October 2008. http://www.economist.com/node/12465279 
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Subject: Notice from God. ”Due to the current financial crisis facing the world, the 
light at the end of the tunnel will be switched off to save on electricity costs until further 
notice. Sincerely, God”. 
The first reaction of politicians was to save their own economy, and their own 
local banking system. Although, in their speeches after Lehman, they stressed 
the importance of international cooperation, the reality was just the opposite. 
The lack of international collaboration had a particularly negative effect on the CEE 
region as well as the Balkans. The special crisis history of the region is usually left out 
even from the best crisis narratives (an excellent counterexample being Tooze 2018). 
In the pre-crisis years, the region attracted a lot of fresh capital, much more than any 
other developing region of the world. These years were characterised not only by 
green-field investments and reinvestment but by a seemingly unconstrained global 
liquidity that fuelled the credit boom. In 2008, the total debt of these countries 
exceeded that of Latin America – no small feat as many of the countries were 
known for having “debt overhangs”. After the subprime crisis, however, the flow 
of capital slowed down, and after Lehman it was reversed. Due to increased risk 
aversion, capital fled these countries, similarly to what happened in 1997 during 
the Asian Financial Crisis. The recession proved to be much deeper in the CEE 
region than elsewhere, and in several countries (the Baltic countries, Slovakia) the 
earlier double-digit growth turned into a double-digit fall in GDP. 
Governments of EU Member States which bailed out their banks often asked 
them informally (but sometimes even publicly) to focus more on domestic lending, 
instead of funding their Central European subsidiaries. Uncertainty arose as to 
whether multinational banks would keep funding East European customers 
through their local subsidiaries. This increased the threat of an uncoordinated rush 
on banks in the region. “Although most banks confirmed their commitment during 
the early stage of the crisis, there was no formal policy framework or coordination 
mechanism in place to ensure these commitments were credible. The fear was that 
while it would be in the collective interest of banks to roll over debt, the absence of a 
coordination mechanism could lead individual banks to withdraw, ultimately causing 
a ‘run’ on the region. The absence of agreements on how to share the burden of a 
defaulting subsidiary between the fiscal authorities in the home and host countries 
further exacerbated the risk of such a run. The accompanying decline or reversal 
in financial flows would not only have had dire consequences for local firms and 
households but also have led to large exchange-rate fluctuations and balance of 
payments problems.” (De Haas et al. 2012).
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Irrespective of whether or not a CEE country happened to be a member of the 
EU (or in some cases of the Eurozone), the global sentiment did not distinguish 
between them. The countries were uniformly considered as belonging to a crisis-
hit region, which was left out from the umbrella of the Union. Several politicians 
(then European Commission President José Manuel Barroso among them) opposed 
setting up a crisis management fund for the CEE region. 
The ECB refused to provide a swap line for the crisis-hit countries. On 10 October, 
after the collapse of its money markets, the MNB applied for a EUR/Ft HUF swap 
line but was refused. Instead, the ECB offered a repo line, which meant that the 
MNB had access to euro liquidity at the expense of diminishing its international 
reserves. It was never clear why the ECB refused formal FX swap lines to CEE 
countries in the first place.11 The ECB agreed confidentially to provide forint swaps 
(and zloty swaps to Poland), but only in September 2009 when the acute crisis was 
over… . It was a steep learning curve… . What is more, the ECB, while it significantly 
enlarged its list of acceptable collateral, refused to accept the government bonds 
of the region’s non-Eurozone members, discriminating against all the countries of 
the region. 
Despite EU loans provided to some of the countries, “… certain actions, or failures 
to act, on the part of EU institutions and governments, have amplified the effects of the 
crisis on CEE countries. The European Central Bank has given little direct support to 
non-euro-area countries, and the EU has done little for EU neighborhood countries. 
Meanwhile, euro-area membership has shielded from the crisis some countries with 
worse fundamentals than certain CEE countries” (Darvas 2009).
The first cross-border initiative was taken by the parent banks. Austrian, Italian, 
French, Flemish, German, Greek and other international banks, having several 
subsidiaries in the “dangerous” region, had all been caught in a vice from which 
it was very difficult to escape. At the end of November six of them – Raiffeisen 
International, Erste Group, Intesa SP, Société Générale, KBC Group and 
11 “In private conversations, ECB officials mentioned operational risk as a key hurdle, which was in fact a politically 
correct way of saying that they were uncomfortable with accepting forint or zloty on their balance sheets. Although, 
in a currency swap, the main risk that the counterparty takes on is that of currency convertibility, which in the 
case of all EU countries was virtually nil since the EU treaty prevents capital controls and limits convertibility risk 
(Art 64 TFEU). There was also an issue of consistency since the ECB provided formal FX swap lines to two other 
EU countries: Denmark (an ERM2 country) and Sweden (a non-ERM2 country) but refused to do so with Latvia 
(an ERM2 country as well) and other non-ERM2 CEE countries. The policy justification for those choices was and 
remains murky and is based on the untold willingness to give enough euro liquidity to the Swedish Riksbank which 
could eventually swap it back to the Bank of Latvia, or to Swedish commercial banks invested in Latvia without the 
ECB taking direct exposure to the Bank of Latvia.” https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2010/03/30/191041/behind-closed-
doors-at-the-ecb/ 
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UniCredit – sent a letter to EC President Barroso and G20 Chair Christine 
Lagarde, with copies to the presidents of the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (EBRD) and the European Investment Bank (EIB), expressing 
financial stability concerns in emerging Europe and urging actions by host 
governments. However, the joint efforts were not so easy to coordinate, and they 
only focused on what the host country authorities should do, while neglecting what 
their own home authorities (and themselves) could offer. 
The EIB and the International Finance Corporation (IFC), supported by the EBRD, 
put together (and launched at the end of February 2009) what had become a “Joint 
IFI Action Plan” of these institutions along with the World Bank for a total of 
€25 billion. But this needed a policy framework. Erik Berglöf, the chief economist 
of the EBRD, with the Director for Policy, Piroska Nagy-Mohácsi, took on their 
shoulders the first round of discussion. I have known Piroska for a long time: back 
in Budapest we struggled together at university for the rights of students and for a 
better quality of education, which was not always welcome by the party bureaucrats 
in old socialist times. During these actions I learned that Piroska could always 
achieve what she considered to be important; however, in December 2008, when 
she contacted me for the first time to show the draft letter of the foreign banks and 
describing a policy action plan of public and private partners, I was quite sceptical. 
By then I had learned from the crisis: “forget international cooperation, you can rely 
only on yourself!” I tried to dissuade her, describing all the difficulties she would 
meet, but of course, Piroska was not a person who would give up on a dream so easily. 
In December 2008, she met with Thomas Wieser, who was at that time Director 
General for Economic Policy and Financial Markets at the Ministry of Finance 
of Austria and Vice-President of the EU’s Economic and Financial Committee 
(EFC).12 Together they drew up a plan to first mobilise the official sector – home 
and host country authorities, international financial institutions particularly the 
IMF – to establish the “rules of engagement” (who does what in crisis management) 
and in the second phase engaging the parent banks as well. Thomas travelled to key 
countries, and Erik and Piroska, together with EBRD banker colleagues, travelled 
around the region, met with authorities, parent banks, central banks, etc., and 
tried to convince people about the imminent need for cooperation. Theoretically, 
everybody agreed – but practically, there was little common ground. What made 
the difference was the serious support of Wieser. He convened the first meeting of 
the future Vienna Initiative in Vienna on 23 January 2009. 
12 From March 2009 he became president of the EFC, and from October 2011 the full-time president of the European 
Working Group (EWG).
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Representatives of the countries and banks of the region, as well as of the IFIs 
(international financial institutions: EBRD, IMF, WB, EIB, IFC) were seated 
at a big round table in the Ministry of Finance, where the lessons of the crisis 
were reconsidered in order to set up a reliable action plan. Erik Berglöf suggested 
calling it the “Vienna Club”; this was then modified to “Vienna Initiative” to reflect 
the voluntary nature of participation. The MNB13 summarised the Hungarian 
evidence, from fiscal alcoholism (Kopits 2008) to the FX-denominated credit 
bubble, stressing the problem of the lack of a local currency capital market. Since 
foreign banks provided most of the FX liquidity, sudden stop and credit crunch 
was still a threat. In this respect, our presentation highlighted that the region could 
be negatively affected by host country problems; that financial stability should be 
a joint responsibility; that continued support from parent banks is essential; and 
that a level playing field in liquidity provision in and outside the Eurozone is a 
prerequisite for further cooperation. Our presentation was in line with the others.
In February the CEE panic was boosted by a fatal misunderstanding. Some 
analysts misinterpreted cross-border data published by the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS) and broadly exaggerated the exposure of Austria or Italy to the 
region, forecasting total collapse both for home and host countries. The conclusion 
of the analysts was unanimous: these contagious countries should be isolated from 
the West. By the time the misunderstanding had been clarified,14 facts and fictions 
had been separated and bad data had been improved, investors were fleeing from 
this most vulnerable part of the world. All the currencies of the region weakened, 
and CDS spreads broadly increased. In February the panic intensified: in Hungary 
for example, the Ft HUF/EUR rate surpassed the 300 limit, considered at that 
time a “psychological barrier”. The MNB was trapped in the usual crisis dilemma 
of central bankers: the high interest rate should have been reduced because of the 
deepening recession, but a lower interest rate further weakened the Ft HUF and 
threatened the balance sheets and debt service of FX-indebted households and 
corporates. In February we stopped the rate-cutting cycle. The October crisis 
team was reconvened, and we spent days and nights in the MNB, with workshops, 
meetings and brainstorming following each other endlessly. Coffee machines 
functioned at full capacity. 
13 On behalf of the MNB Péter Tabák, head of the Financial Stability Department, took part in this first meeting. In 
2010 Péter joined the EBRD. Not a simple coincidence, as during these meetings he proved his analytical and personal 
abilities. 
14 The major distinction that needs to be made regarding the US$1.7 trillion figure is the fact that it includes both money 
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Fortunately, the Vienna Initiative team was more active than ever. At the 
second Vienna meeting in March, the main principles of burden-sharing were 
outlined, and from the end of March a lot of bilateral and multilateral meetings 
were organised among parent banks, national authorities and IFIs. Parent 
bank commitment letters were signed and published. I remember well the 
heated debates during these meetings and at the Full Forum of the Vienna 
Initiative in London, during the EBRD Annual Meeting in May 2009. By 
that time, the broad outline of the agreements seemed to be more and more 
acceptable to all partners.
The first Full Forum meeting for Hungary was held on 19-20 May, not in 
Vienna, but in Brussels; however, the Vienna name remained and, thanks 
again to the skillful management of Thomas Wieser and his team, was never 
changed, despite suggestions to that effect from the IMF and the EU. Hungary 
was a special case because, unlike the other countries where the IMF (and EU) 
support was negotiated in parallel with Vienna Initiative commitments (e.g., 
Romania or Serbia), it already had a working IMF-EU arrangement. IFI 
had the feeling they had already provided the necessary support through 
the €20 billion IMF-EU loan package, and pressed the parent banks not 
to withdraw their funds from a well performing programme country. The 
parent banks, for their part, stressed that they had done their best during the 
liquidity crisis by increasing their exposure to the country, but now, during 
a harsh recession, asked why they should keep redundant funds here. As the 
head of the Hungarian delegation I emphasised on the threatening credit 
crunch, explaining that the rapidly shrinking credit f low according to our 
empirical analysis was the consequence both of declining credit demand due 
to deleveraging, and of the lack of credit supply due to shrinking banking 
funds. Finally, at the end of a tedious two-day discussion a joint statement 
consisting of eight bullet points was accepted. I will never forget the last two 
hours, when Piroska read, sentence by sentence, the suggested text, and here 
and there we stopped for 15-20 minutes to change and re-change some words 
or expressions. All the major European home banks – Bayerische Landesbank, 
Erste Group, Intesa SP, KBC Group, Raiffeisen International and UniCredit – 
signed the statement, declaring “We entered the Hungarian market as strategic 
investors and key contributors to its transition toward an open, market-based 
economy, based on our assessment of and continued confidence in the country’s 
long-term growth prospects. We have made substantial investments in Hungary 
over a number of years, and we remain committed to doing business in the country. 
We are aware that it is in our collective interest and in the interest of Hungary 
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for all of us to reconfirm, in a coordinated way, our commitment to maintain our 
overall exposure to Hungary.”15 We had taken a big step forward.
The “only” open question left for further discussion was the adequate level of required 
and sustainable exposure: “Mechanisms to specify this effort will be developed in due course, 
taking into account availability of adequate lending opportunities or alternative investment 
instruments in Hungary within boundaries defined by sound risk, capital and liquidity 
management practices.”16 My staff ran several analyses and stress tests concerning the 
future liquidity and solvency of the Hungarian subsidiaries in order to determine the 
required level of exposure. We concluded that the absolute minimum would be around 
94-96 % of the pre-crisis level. 
Meanwhile, the parent banks summarised their standpoint in a joint letter sent to the 
IMF and European Commission asserting “By fixing the exposure, without taking into 
account the local credit demand as well as the existence of adequate alternative investment 
opportunities for liquidity locally, we as parent companies are concerned that we would under 
those circumstances, not be able to fulfil our holding responsibility to efficiently distribute 
liquidity and equity within our respective banking groups. In times of economic downturn 
and inefficient use of capital and liquidity impairs the steering functions of our bank holding 
companies and could also, in the worst case, destabilise bank holding companies themselves 
and possibly negatively impact banking subsidiaries in the region.”17 
The dark day (19 November 2009), when the last moves of the Hungarian coordination 
game were played out in the huge ground floor meeting room of the Charlemagne EU 
building, things did not seem very promising. Two weeks earlier, all the participating 
parties had received the suggested text, to have enough time to polish it. There were not 
too many points to be challenged, except for a tiny little detail: “Our group is committed 
to maintain its overall net exposure to Hungary, as defined in the attachment, at least at 
[90 or 95 – to be discussed] % of its level as of end-September 2008”. Our mandate was 
clear: since we had acknowledged the parent banks’ sacrifice with the reference date (the 
end of September 2008 instead of the end of December), we should achieve the 95 %, or 
even more, if possible. Sitting around the table, all of us were searching for supporting 
arguments in the opening remarks of Sean Berrigan (Acting Director EC/ECFIN) and 
James Morsink (Head of the IMF Hungarian Mission), and then in the consecutive 
15 http://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/28/04/51/cm052009 points 4 and 5.
16 http://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/28/04/51/cm052009 point 5.
17 Letter of Erste Bank Group AG, Intesa Sanpaolo SPA, KBC Group, Raiffeisen International Group AG and UniCredit 
Group to Dominique Strauss-Kahn (Managing Director IMF) and Joaquin Almunia (European Commissioner for 
Economic and Monetary Affairs) of June 2009.
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presentations of Iryna Ivaschenko (IMF Resident Representative to Hungary), Barbara 
Kauffmann (Head of Unit EC/ECFIN), Filip Keereman, (Head of Unit EC/ECFIN), 
Peter Lohmus, (Adviser EC/ECFIN), Olivier Frécaut (Senior Financial Sector Expert, 
IMF/MCM) and others. All had become old friends by that time, so the atmosphere 
of the discussion was really friendly. However, the standpoints of the opposing parties, 
i.e., of the parent banks and the Hungarian authorities, had not changed. We targeted 
97%, but banks did not want to go over 92-93%. It seemed that, despite all the common 
efforts, we would not be able to agree on that tiny detail. The finalisation of the text 
was again the task of Piroska, and she very wisely announced an extra coffee break 
before starting this last stage. The representatives of banks were good old friends as 
well, so, during the break we had our coffee together and continued our debate in a 
more relaxed way. Just 10 minutes before the end of the break, we had finally achieved 
the best compromise possible: banks accepted holding 95% of exposure, including not 
only the funds and capital provided to banks but also the Hungarian treasury bonds 
they held in their portfolios.18 Everybody was a winner: we proved that international 
multilateral cooperation is a possible way to beat the crisis.
Ten years after
The Vienna Initiative had a positive effect not only on the stability of the banking 
system, but on the assessment of the country, and the region as a whole. The message 
was unanimous: none of the countries of the region would be left without protection, 
and international cooperation would extend to all the crisis-hit countries. The East 
European panic slowly faded away.
The Hungarian Vienna Initiative (VI) 1.0 program ended earlier than expected. 
The Fidesz government coming to power in 2010 made a sharp U-turn. “Despite 
the colourful variations, until 2010 the countries [of the region] all moved in the same 
general direction: progress towards a market economy based on the dominance of the 
rule of law and of private ownership. Hungary was the first member of this group of 
15 countries which has performed a sharp U-turn and set off resolutely in the opposite 
direction” (Kornai 2015). The government blamed the banks for the crisis, and put the 
burden on their shoulders: not only was a new, irrationally high special tax levied on 
banks in 2011, but banks suffered huge losses, while wealthy borrowers were allowed 
to reimburse their FX-denominated loans at a preferential exchange rate, much below 
18  I have received very positive feedback about my strong position and sometimes emotional defence of my country’s 
interests, from both IFIs and banks. After my resignation from the MNB, the KBC Group invited me to join them 
as an independent director. Marco Voljč, head of International Markets at that time, highlighted my behaviour 
during the VI as one of the most important arguments during the nomination process. Seven years later, in 2016, 
Sean Berrigan nominated me as the SP member of the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund (HFSF), remembering our 
joint struggle at the VI. So, I consider myself personally a great winner of the VI.
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the actual market rate. Since, in 2010 the government broke the loan agreement with 
the IMF and the EU, the VI programme agreement was formally exited. The paralysed 
banks slowly started to withdraw their funds from Hungary, but the outflow speeded 
up only in 2012 when the Eurozone crisis hit. On the other hand, banks increased 
the capital base of their subsidiaries, stood by them and did not let them go bankrupt. 
The result of the new government policy was nevertheless catastrophic: the credit flow 
in the country slowed down, and its recovery was the worst in the region (Figure 6).
Figure 6.
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Source:  MNB Growth Report 2018 (Figure 4.2.) https://www.mnb.hu/kiadvanyok/jelentesek/
novekedesi-jelentes/2018-11-08-novekedesi-jelentes-2018-november
Notes:   The Report has not been published in English
The Vienna Initiative 1.0 was then followed by VI plus, VI 2.0 and so on, but this is 
already another story. 
The “Vienna Initiative” has become the international trademark of cross-border 
public–private cooperation: when German chancellor Angela Merkel and French 
president Nicolas Sarkozy worked on the Greek crisis, they agreed the best would 
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Lessons from the global financial 
crisis in the context of 
the Vienna Initiative
Vizhdan Boranova, Jörg Decressin,  
Sylwia Nowak and Emil Stavrev
International Monetary Fund
Abstract
Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, Central, Eastern and Southeastern 
Europe experienced a deep recession, yet avoided a financial meltdown. This was 
helped by: (i) swift and decisive policy responses by countries; (ii) large, front-loaded 
financial assistance packages from the IMF/EU; and (iii) continued commitment 
to the region by multinational banks, facilitated by the Vienna Initiative.
Context
Since the onset of transition in the early 1990s, Central, Eastern and Southeastern 
Europe (CESEE) has made impressive progress.1 Following an initial sharp decline 
in output as the region transformed from centrally planned to market principles, it 
grew faster than most emerging market regions and by the end of the decade GDP 
exceeded its pre-transition levels. Until early 2000s, growth was driven largely by 
exports, reflecting its integration into Western European regional value chains. 
Between 2003 and 2008, however, the region experienced a credit-driven domestic 
demand boom, fueled by large capital inflows from Western European banks.2 
1 For a careful historical overview of the crisis – its origins, triggers, policy responses, and the subsequent recovery 
— readers should refer to How Emerging Europe Came Through the 2008/09 Crisis—An Account by the Staff of the 
IMF’s European Department, edited by Bas B. Bakker and Christoph Klingen. Washington, DC: International 
Monetary Fund, 2012.
2 An IMF study on linkages between eastern and Western Europe showed that financing provided by Western European 
banks added 2 percentage points to the region’s annual domestic demand growth, or 1.5 percentage points to GDP 
growth during 2003-8. International Monetary Fund, 2011. Regional Economic Outlook: Europe. Washington, DC, 
October.
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With low margins in Western Europe, large European banks focused on higher 
rates of returns in CESEE and extended funding of about US$560 billion. Western 
banks brought the much-needed know-how, technology and better governance. 
However, large volumes of lending were channelled into consumption and non-
tradeable sectors, resulting in excessive current account deficits, high external debt 
and homegrown asset price bubbles.
The global financial crisis hit the CESEE region exceptionally hard. The prosperous 
pre-crisis years had left most of the region dependent on foreign-financed credit 
growth, making it vulnerable to sudden stops in capital inflows. In the aftermath 
of the Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy in September 2008, capital inflows into 
the region plummeted, global trade collapsed, credit growth suddenly stopped 
and domestic demand plunged. Capital flows from Western European banks to 
the region dried up sharply and local banks came under acute funding pressures. 
This “perfect storm” resulted in a sharp economic contraction, with GDP growth 
declining, on average, by about 6% in 2009. 
While the CESEE experienced a deep recession, the region avoided a contagious 
financial meltdown. Without doubt, the swift and decisive domestic policy 
responses played the main role in staving off even deeper recessions. Policymakers 
were prepared to do whatever it took to preserve their long-standing fixed exchange 
rate regimes and avoid painful currency crises. Monetary, fiscal and financial policy 
responses were nimble and astute. However, the domestic policy efforts would have 
been considerably less successful had it not been for large-scale financial assistance 
packages from the IMF/EU, support from the World Bank, EBRD and EIB as 
well as multinational commercial banks’ commitment to the region, facilitated by 
the Vienna Initiative. 
Solving collective action problems
The Vienna Initiative’s purpose was to prevent a panic-driven en masse exit of 
Western banks from CESEE. In the midst of the global financial crisis, liquidity 
and solvency conditions deteriorated rapidly, prompting Western banks to repair 
their balance sheets and retrench to their home markets. A large-scale deleveraging 
of CESEE exposures would have caused havoc in the region. This meant that, 
individually, the obvious strategy for any parent bank would have been to reduce its 
CESEE exposure as quickly as possible, to benefit from the first-mover advantage 
and minimise losses. However, if all banks had applied such a strategy, this would 
have caused severe financial stress in host countries, which, in turn, would have 
inflicted further damage to bank balance sheets. 
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The Vienna Initiative provided a platform that helped solve collective action 
problems. It facilitated cooperation between Western banks with large CESEE 
exposures, their home- and host-country supervisors and multilateral organisations. 
This helped to avoid an uncoordinated pullout of Western banks from the CESEE 
region. In the context of the Initiative, 17 Western European banks signed voluntary 
country-specific commitment letters pledging to maintain their net exposure to 
their subsidiaries. These banks accounted for almost 90% of foreign banks’ total 
assets in the five signature countries, with their total market share ranging from 
a third of total banking sector assets in Hungary to two-thirds in Romania. No 
parent bank allowed any of its CESEE subsidiaries to fail, and additional liquidity 
and capital were provided as needed.
Five CESEE countries with IMF/EU-supported programmes benefited from 
international coordination in the context of the Vienna Initiative: Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Hungary, Latvia, Romania and Serbia.3 The Western banks present 
in these countries reiterated their commitment to their subsidiaries following each 
programme review for the duration of the IMF/EU-supported programmes. And 
while Western banks’ overall exposure to the region did decline, subsidiaries of 
parent banks that signed commitment letters proved to be more stable sources of 
credit than subsidiaries of banks that did not sign such letters in the same country, 
with credit growth about 10 percentage points higher.4 To some extent, this resulted 
in the five CESEE programme countries experiencing less private sector deleveraging 
than the five advanced European economies most affected by the crisis. At the 
same time, banking sectors in these five CESEE programme countries required 
less government support than their peers in advanced Europe. 
3 In the cases of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Romania, and Serbia, these commitments were an integral part of the negotiations 
of the IMF/EU stabilisation programmes. However, in the cases of Hungary and Latvia, banks’ commitment letters 
were finalised only after the programmes had been put in place.
4 De Haas, R., Y. Korniyenko, A. Pivovarsky, and T. Tsankova, 2015. Taming the herd? Foreign banks, the Vienna 
Initiative and crisis transmission, Journal of Financial Intermediation, 24(3), 325-355.
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Figure 1.
CESEE: Change in External Positions of BIS-reporting Banks, 2008Q3-2011Q4 





















































Sources: BIS; and IMF's World Economic Outlook and staff calculations.
Figure 2.
Private Non-financial Sector Deleveraging
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Households Corporations
CESEE program countries 
supported by the VI 1/
Advanced European countries 
most affected by the crisis 2/
Sources:  IMF's World Economic Outlook; Monetary and Financial Statistics; and staff 
calculations.
1/ Bosnia-Herzegovina, Hungary, Latvia, Romania and Serbia.
2/ Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Portugal and Spain.
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Figure 3.
Government Support of Financial Institutions, 2009-12








CESEE countries supported by the
Vienna Initiative 1/
Advanced European countries most
affected by the crisis 2/
Sources: Eurostat. 
1/ Hungary, Latvia and Romania only. 
2/ Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Portugal and Spain.
The economic outcomes of the five countries with the IMF/EU-supported 
programmes were remarkable. On average, the five CESEE programme countries 
experienced milder recessions than the emerging Asian countries affected by 
the Asian crisis in the late 1990s, even though their required current account 
adjustment was larger. Under the programmes, current account deficits declined 
from 11% of GDP to 2.5% of GDP – an adjustment of 8.5 percentage points. 
This reflected a continued growth of exports, as the countries improved their 
competitiveness, and a significant compression of imports, the growth of which 
declined to about 3% post-crisis from over 15% before the crisis. A similarly 
favourable comparison can be drawn vis-à-vis other emerging markets that 
required IMF financial support in 2008-10.5 These countries achieved a 
significantly smaller current account adjustment than the five CESEE countries, 
and it was much more attributable to import compression.
5 This group includes other emerging markets that required the Fund support as capital f lows dried up at the start of 
the crisis: Armenia (2009), Belarus (2009), Georgia (2008), Kosovo (2010), Mongolia (2009), Sri Lanka (2009) and 
Ukraine (2008 and 2010). Similar grouping was used in IMF, 2015, Crisis Programme Review.
130
Ten years of the Vienna Initiative 2009-2019
Figure 4.
Real GDP Growth Relative to Trend 









CESEE program countries supported Asian crisis economies 3/
by the VI 2/
Sources: IMF's World Economic Outlook and staff calculations.
1/ Trend GDP is calculated over 10 years, starting 2 years before the crisis.
2/ Includes Bosnia-Herzegovina, Hungary, Latvia, Romania and Serbia; t=2009. 
3/ Include Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand; t=1998.
Figure 5.
Change in Current Account Balance





CESEE program countries supported
by the VI 1/
Asian crisis economies 2/
Sources: IMF's World Economic Outlook and staff calculations. 
1/ Bosnia-Herzegovina, Hungary, Latvia, Romania and Serbia. 
2/ Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand. 
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Western bank deleveraging in CESEE after the crisis
The deleveraging of Western banks vis-à-vis CESEE resumed in the second 
half of 2011, as the eurozone sovereign debt crisis worsened. The combination 
of intensifying funding strains in the markets, regulatory and market pressures 
to improve capitalisation and weak credit demand prompted Western banking 
groups to resume the withdrawal of funding from CESEE. Between June 2011 
and December 2015, BIS-reporting banks reduced their external positions by 
US$165 billion, or 6% of the region’s GDP (CESEE excluding Russia and Turkey)—
almost 2.5 times more than in the three years after the crisis. In addition, strategies 
of some cross-border banks devised at the group level paid insufficient attention to 
the implications for host countries, unduly straining some local market segments. 
In some countries, concerns about domestic policies and economic vulnerabilities 
compounded the outflows. While deleveraging has broadly stabilised since 2016, 
foreign bank funding remains significantly below pre-crisis levels in most CESEE 
countries.6 The Initiative remained engaged in the region in its updated 2.0 
reincarnation.
Figure 6.
CESEE excl. Russia and Turkey: Change in External Positions 
of BIS-reporting Banks, 2003Q1–2018Q3
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2008Q3: peak 2011Q2 2015Q4: 
trough
Sources: BIS, Locational and Consolidated Banking Statistics.
6 CESEE Deleveraging and Credit Monitors, various editions.
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The deleveraging of Western banks in CESEE proceeded on the back of significant 
current account adjustments in these countries. Following the global financial 
crisis, current accounts in the region improved significantly, on average, by about 
5% of GDP, from a deficit of around 5% of GDP in 2008 to close to balance in 
2015. This turnaround reflected that national savings replaced foreign savings and 
investment took a hit in the crisis. The size of the improvement varied appreciably 
across countries, ranging from about 2 percentage points of GDP in the Czech 
Republic to around 10 percentage points in the Baltics, and over 20 percentage 
points in Bulgaria.
Figure 7.


























































Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook; and IMF staff calculations.  
1/ Excluding Russia.
With the rise in domestic savings came faster deposit growth, which partially 
cushioned the decline of foreign funding. During the boom years of 2003-8, 
CESEE banks relied heavily on funding from their Western parents. After the 
global financial crisis banking groups emphasised developing local funding sources 
and lowered their loan-to-deposit ratios in CESEE subsidiaries. A good part of this 
rebalancing had occurred by 2015, with the average loan-to-deposit ratio declining 
to around 110% from a pre-crisis peak of 135% (left chart in Figure 8). An expanding 
domestic deposit base allowed foreign banks to contain the contraction of their 
operations in CESEE. Accordingly, during 2008-15, the decline of foreign bank 
exposures to the region (measured by the “foreign claims” in the BIS Consolidated 
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Banking Statistics) was smaller than foreign banks’ funding reductions (measured 
by “external positions” in the BIS Locational Banking Statistics)—about 20% 
compared to about 40% (right chart in Figure 8).
Figure 8.
CESEE: Domestic Loan to  CESEE: External Positions 
Domestic Deposit Ratios and Foreign Claims
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Sources:  IMF, International Finance 
WorldStatistics; and IMF staff 
calculations.
Sources:  BIS; Haver Analytics; IMF, Economic 
Outlook; and IMF staff calculations.
Private sector credit growth in CESEE (excluding Russia and Turkey) remained 
very weak in the aftermath of the global and euro area crises and turned positive 
only in early 2017. In nominal and exchange-rate adjusted terms, credit growth 
declined dramatically after the global financial crisis from over 20% to low single 
digits during 2010-14 and turned negative in 2015-16. Credit growth has been 
recovering gradually since mid-2016.
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Figure 9.
CESEE: Credit to Private Sector
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Weak credit growth reflected a plunge in both supply of and demand for loans in 
the aftermath of the global financial crisis. As the economic outlook deteriorated, 
customers became much more reluctant to take out loans and banks much more 
cautious in extending them. Nonperforming loans (NPLs) increased steeply, 
although CESEE countries typically did not experienced a generalised debt 
overhang. As cross-border banking groups operating in CESEE came under 
market pressure and their fundamentals deteriorated, they reduced credit supply, 
tightened credit conditions and embarked on the rebalancing of funding sources 
toward local deposits. 
Empirical studies confirm the important role of macroeconomic factors in the 
downturn of credit growth. They show that factors on the supply side, such 
as bank fundamentals and funding costs, significantly slowed credit growth. 
Bank lending surveys by central banks showed a substantial tightening of bank 
lending conditions and a sizeable drop of credit demand in the post-crisis years. 
Lending conditions started easing during mid-2010 to mid-2011, but tightening 
resumed following the euro area crisis. Credit conditions eased again starting 
in early 2015, as the recovery of economic activity broadened and strengthened 
across Europe.
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Figure 10.
Credit Conditions: Supply and Demand, April 2012-March 2019
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Sources: EIB, CESEE Bank Lending Survey.
Lessons for the future
New multilateralism: participation in the Vienna Initiative resulted in more ownership 
by the five programme countries and provided greater incentives to cooperate. This 
fits well with the call of the IMF’s Managing Director for the “new multilateralism”, 
whereby governments and the private sector work together to tackle the key challenges 
of the 21st century. The Vienna Initiative could be a part of this “new multilateralism” 
by keeping the firefighter framework ready as we prepare for the next crisis, which 
probably lurks somewhere over the horizon. If the next crisis once again impairs banks, 
we now have more limited room for policy manoeuvre, more limitations to bailouts 
and the new systems for bail-ins are not yet fully funded and remain untested. As a 
result, there may be a need for greater reliance on multilateral responses—including 
the Vienna Initiative—and on the global financial safety net.
The role of the Vienna Initiative beyond crisis times should focus on financial 
surveillance and strengthening cooperation mechanisms.7 Fostering a regular policy 
dialogue between home and host regulators and bank supervisors, parent banks and 
multilateral institutions is critical for upholding Vienna Initiative’s readiness to be 
an effective part of a broader policy response to the next crisis. In the interim, more 
7 The semi-annual CESEE Deleveraging and Credit Monitor, to which the Fund contributes, is a key part of the Vienna 
Initiative’s financial surveillance.
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needs to be done to manage the strategic pull back of selected Western banks from 
the region and support European financial integration. The Initiative should also 
help EU policymakers and bank supervisors understand the spill-overs from the 
changing EU regulatory landscape to CESEE, particularly the non-EU countries, 
as well as prepare their CESEE counterparts for the new regulations. Finally, the 
Initiative should continue to provide smaller non-EU host countries in the Western 
Balkans with a forum to discuss common issues and the opportunity to be heard.
CHAPTER 8
FX-denominated loans in Central, 
Eastern and Southeastern Europe: 
a risky but often unavoidable step 
in the transition
Olivier de Boysson
Chief Economist Emerging Markets, Société Générale
Launched at the height of the financial crisis in January 2009, the Vienna Initiative 
aimed at preventing a "run to the exit" of the EU parent banks operating in Central, 
Eastern and Southeastern Europe, in the various countries severely hit by the crisis 
and benefiting from multilateral financial assistance. At that time, a withdrawal 
strategy by the EU parent banks would have led to capital outflows and to full-blown 
balance of payments crises. While most EU parent banks rapidly reaffirmed their 
long-term commitment to the region, the issues at stake were aggravated by the 
relatively high degree of euroisation of the banking sectors, which were thus very 
exposed to currency depreciation against the euro. Beyond stabilising the balance 
of payments, one unofficial objective of the international financial assistance was 
therefore to avoid sharp depreciation of domestic currencies. In some countries, 
such as Hungary, the use of the Swiss franc introduced an additional dimension 
to the nature of the risks. 
With the benefit of hindsight, this contribution reviews the dilemma for EU parent 
banks regarding their role in the euroisation process of several markets in the region 
prior to 2008, and how the Vienna Initiative was decisive in navigating through 
the resulting challenges.
The lessons of dollarisation
If the circulation of several currencies within a territory is an old phenomenon, 
illustrated by the history of metallism, a process of dollarisation or euroisation 
has usually been the consequence of an acute crisis of confidence in the domestic 
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currency. The alternative for the monetary authorities is then either to impose 
exchange controls and financial repression, or to tolerate a variable degree of 
dollarisation or euroisation. The outcome is rarely a policy choice and more often 
imposed by the political circumstances of the moment. The economic literature, 
referring mostly to dollarisation, is rather laconic as to the practical consequences. 
Dollarisation allows for the expansion of the financial sector but can only be 
described as a second-best solution. It implies a lasting loss of monetary policy 
autonomy. A greater exchange rate risk is embedded in the domestic economy and 
there is an increased responsibility for fiscal policy.
The process of dollarisation is most often measured by the share of US dollar 
loans and deposits in the banking sector, due to the lack of a more refined measure 
(for instance, regarding its use for payments or by industries). Its dangerousness is 
difficult to assess precisely, because it depends on all the factors that can increase 
the embedded exchange rate risk in the economy: the overall balance of funding 
and net external position of the country, the position of the various agents, the 
external environment and the factors determining confidence. The lessons of the 
past are not easy to generalise: some countries have been able to navigate smoothly 
for long periods with a degree of dollarisation above 50 percent (such as Peru) or 
even with full unilateral dollarisation (such as Panama, Ecuador). Others (such 
as Brazil, Russia) have managed to keep dollarisation below 30 percent despite 
acute crises of confidence in the domestic currency. The Argentine experience 
of the 1990s began with the recognition of the benefits of “bi-monetarism” 
before ending up in disaster. Through this diversity, one general lesson can 
nevertheless be learned: a high degree of dollarisation is more sustainable for 
small open economies with strong banking systems, moderate external debt and 
close economic links to the United States, the reverse characteristics being each 
of them sources of fragility. For the countries aiming at regaining monetary 
policy autonomy, the process is always very lengthy, as monetary and supervisory 
authorities have to deliver a comprehensive monetary stabilisation, rebuilding 
confidence in the value of the local currency.
The challenge of rebuilding capitalism without capital 
After the initial shock of the transition, GDP growth in CEE was mainly driven by 
a catch-up process with “old” Europe stimulated by rising commercial and financial 
integration with the EU. The situation of the new or aspiring EU members was for 
this reason quite specific. Their development pattern was often associated with high 
growth and high imbalances such as rapid credit expansion and significant current 
account deficits. The imbalances partly stemmed from the initial choice of rapidly 
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ensuring full convertibility of the currencies (a requirement of EU adhesion) in 
order to attract foreign direct investment (FDI), thus disconnecting investments 
from domestic savings and leading to current account deficits. It was ingrained in 
the need to rebuild capitalism, with a low initial stock of domestic capital at the 
early stage of the transition. This historical juncture, rebuilding capitalism without 
capital, had many consequences.
A regional euroisation trend driven by the catch-up process…
Kick-started in the 1990 by the restructuring and privatisation of the banking 
sectors, credit expansion started from a low base, with loans to households (consumer 
and mortgage loans) often growing more rapidly than loans to the corporate sector. 
Foreign currency lending expanded, including for households. The rationale to take 
out debt in foreign currencies was strong, as agents anticipated the appreciation 
of their local currencies in real terms against the euro, as well as rising incomes in 
the local currency. As an anecdote reflecting this mood, high-ranking officials in 
the region often privately highlighted that they were personally indebted in euros, 
confident that they would be winners over the long term. The euroisation process 
was further fostered by the desire to save in euros and by the lower interest rates for 
borrowers in euros. The perception that exchange rates should on average continue 
to appreciate in real terms in the long term was supported by the Balassa-Samuelson 
effect linked to the catch-up process: high productivity gains associated with FDI 
were expected in the tradeable sector. 
Table 1.
Loans in foreign currency (percent of total loans)
1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
Slovenia 77 84 90 90
Estonia 76 79 83 80 78 86
Latvia 51 53 66 70 85
Lithuania 56 58 49 59 53 65
Hungary 55 49 37 40 43 61
Poland 21 21 27 25 27 34
Czech Rep. 20 16 15 11 10 9
Romania 45 50 58 49 58
Bulgaria 39 36 42 48 57
Croatia* 91 86 88 77
Serbia* 85 71
* FX and FX-indexed loans
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In 2008, rapid credit growth had been registered for several years. Since 2003, 
credit to the private sector had grown annually in real terms by around 5% in 
Poland and Slovakia, 10 percent in the Czech Republic, about 15% in Hungary 
and Slovenia and between 30 and 50 percent in the Baltics and the Balkans. In 
some countries, the bulk of domestic credit was denominated in or indexed to 
foreign currencies (see Table 1, sourced from central banks). The share of loans in 
foreign currencies did increase through the region, except in the Czech Republic, 
which managed to avoid the trend, thanks to early monetary stabilisation and 
a well-calibrated subsidy program for domestic savings in local currency. At the 
other end of the spectrum, former Yugoslavian countries were already deeply 
euroised after the crises and wars of the 1990, with few benchmarks in local 
currencies. These foreign currency loans were predominantly in euros, but Swiss 
francs and Japanese yen were also popular in Hungary and Poland.
…and by powerful microeconomic forces
Large sectors of the domestic economies were more significantly euroised. This 
was notably the case for the real estate sector, both commercial and residential, 
where contracts, transaction prices, rents and values for collateral were most 
often calculated and settled in euros. The action of large foreign investors whose 
business models were connected to the more mature markets of the euro area had 
the effect of pushing the trend further. This was true also in the automobile sector, 
with input costs incorporating imported spare parts, and in the distribution sector, 
with contracts for imported brands and shopping centre rents denominated in 
euros. Large European players were at the time powerfully reshaping these sectors 
and had the ability to impose price targets in euros on their local subcontractors, 
with an objective to control costs and reduce the exchange risk. Many tariffs for 
utilities were also de facto linked to costs in euros. Only the more local activities 
and the public sector escaped this trend.
This tended to create an illusion of deeper “de facto” euroisation of the economy 
that also responded to the psychological needs of hoarding. But real revenues 
in euros were of course only coming from exports and expatriate transfers 
that represented a significantly lower share of the economy. This illusion was 
undoubtedly a risk factor in the event of a deep crisis. Other types of income, 
including wages, while sometimes denominated in euros, did not have the same 
quality. In the event of a balance of payment crisis, they could fall sharply versus 
the euro. While informal revenue was often cited as a factor of the resilience 
of the economies, this type of income was clearly not always available to repay 
debts in euros.
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The dilemma faced by commercial banks 
As previously examined, the euroisation process in the region was shaped by 
powerful micro- and macroeconomic forces. Domestic banks were of course 
key players in this process. As credit demand in foreign currency exceeded 
deposit accumulation, they started to rely increasingly on external funding in 
euros, sometimes provided by EU parent banks, thus building negative external 
positions. EU parent banks could also book some loan portfolios at their head 
office, pushing the trend further. It was a way to respond rapidly to the new 
market opportunities. 
While the financial deepening process was occurring at high speed, in some 
countries it was nurturing a worrying combination of features such as a widening 
current account deficit, a negative net external position of the domestic banking 
sector and a rising share of foreign currency denominated loans. Some countries 
displayed all these features (the Baltics, countries in South Eastern Europe), others 
only some of them. Various academic papers started to underline these concerns,1 
raising the question of the resilience of banking sectors to the risk of an exchange 
rate shock or a prolonged economic downturn. Central banks in the region had 
already started to enact a panel of measures to try to slow the pace of foreign 
currency lending, mainly through increases in reserve requirements, tighter loan 
classifications and higher risk weights for these types of lending, albeit with very 
limited results. It was very much like trying to lean against a dominant wind. 
They were also wary of introducing too many competitiveness handicaps versus 
non-resident financial players who were not subject to the same restrictions.
For commercial banks riding the optimistic wave, the financial deepening was 
rational. The client base was expanding from a low level and included selectively 
the most solvent borrowers in the countries. A degree of comfort was also provided 
by specific regional factors seen as mitigating the risks.
Specific factors were seen as mitigating the risks
For most countries, the prospect of joining the euro area sooner or later mitigated 
the perceived currency risks by providing a credible exit strategy out of the danger 
zone. Euro adoption was not an option but was compulsory for new and aspiring 
EU members. In Slovenia, once the country entered Exchange Rate Mechanism II, 
1 “Too much of a good thing?”, IMF Working paper May 2005; “The foreign currency gamble”, S&P, August 2006; 
“What do the sources of fund tell us of credit growth in Central and Eastern Europe “, EU occasional paper 
November 2006 ; “Credit expansion in Emerging Europe, a cause for concern ?”, World Bank , January 2007.
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foreign currency lending increased rapidly as the corporate sector seized the 
opportunity to finance acquisitions abroad. Entering the euro area as of January 
2007 led to the conversion of local currency in euros, which eliminated the risks 
associated with the currency mismatches. In 2008, the prospect of euro adoption 
by 2010 for Baltic countries, and early in the next decade for many other countries, 
was estimated to be quite likely.
Specific microeconomic features were also expected to mitigate the risks. Banks 
in the region were overwhelmingly foreign-owned, by a supposedly strong pair 
of hands, and thus enjoying strong financial backing from their Western parent 
institutions. Strong capital ratios provided a cushion that seemed to make a 
homegrown systemic crisis unlikely. The traditional channels of contagion (asset 
bubbles, short-term liabilities, high public external borrowing requirements) were 
not spotted through the region, and strong parent banks were expected to play a 
stabilising role in the event of a crisis of confidence.
Past banking crises in emerging markets had often been preceded by rapid growth 
of credit in the context of semi-fixed exchange rate regimes. The question remained 
whether excessive imbalances could derail the process of joining the euro area and 
hurt the banking sectors in countries where it was a more distant prospect. The 
view at that time was that this risk could be assessed through a stress test scenario 
that would entail significantly weaker growth and a 20-30% currency depreciation 
in real terms for a period of up to two years, somewhat like what Poland had been 
through at the beginning of the decade, which had dented bank’s profits for two 
years but had not been long lasting. A more severe stress was considered extreme, 
requiring a mechanism of contagion, deep doubts on the long-term catch-up process 
or wide-ranging euro-scepticism. 
Indeed, the impression prevailed that new and aspiring EU members were going 
through an exceptional historical period. Even sceptical observers were not ready 
to question the long-term catch-up perspective. Only the speed of catch up seemed 
questionable, not its direction, nor its duration (likely to continue for 10 to 15 years), 
nor the continuation of the microeconomic transformation allowed by the accession 
process to the EU. 
To the test of the great financial crisis 
With the benefit of hindsight, we have learned that some of these assumptions 
were far less robust than we believed. Some were even destroyed by the great 
financial crisis. 
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• EU parent banks were significantly weakened by the global financial crisis and 
the subsequent euro area crisis. Some of them, not only limited to Greek and 
Irish banks, could no longer be considered as “strong pair of hands”. For a period, 
the exposure of EU parent banks to the region was seen more as a liability than 
an asset. 
• The catch-up process came to a sudden halt for several years, except in Poland. 
It restarted regionally at a much lower speed only after 2013. In parallel, the 
crisis of the euro area periphery also showed that, for older EU members, the 
productivity catch-up had not been steady but had stalled at a fraction of the 
productivity of the core euro area.
• While Slovakia joined the euro area in 2009 and the exit strategy eventually 
worked for the Baltic states in the following years, the agenda of euro adoption 
was postponed for other countries, sometimes without new dates, with a growing 
mood of euro-scepticism. The EU enlargement process was also more or less 
stopped after the joining of Croatia.
In the years before the crisis, the real-term appreciation of currencies versus the 
euro, pushed by the foreign capital inflows, had been more rapid than suggested 
by the Balassa-Samuelson effect linked to the catch-up process. Productivity gains 
in the real world had been slower than credit and currency markets had been 
anticipating. When capital inflows stopped in 2009, a rebalancing was needed, 
and some currencies appeared to be overvalued while the prospects of joining the 
euro area were delayed. In this new context, the need to reduce the foreign exchange 
risk embedded in the economies came to the fore. 
The response of the Vienna Initiative 
While previously the sole concern of some central banks in the region, the need to 
reduce the foreign exchange risk embedded in the economies became more widely 
shared by the other institutions. The Vienna forum played a decisive role in that 
matter. As macroeconomic forces were no longer pushing for further euroisation, 
the action of regional central banks started to bite much more powerfully. Time 
was needed for an orderly rebalancing, and the Vienna Initiative was crucial in 
providing this time. The process of de-euroisation required attracting savings 
in local currency. Beyond the action of regional central banks, this was made 
progressively possible by the successful external rebalancing of the economies 
and the macroeconomic and currency stabilisation that followed. The spreads 
between the instruments labelled in local currency versus the euro started to 
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collapse, diminishing greatly any previous incentive to support a foreign exchange 
risk. Euroisation in the region diminished progressively as shown by Table 2.
Table 2.
Loans in foreign currency (percent of total loans)
2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018
Slovenia
Estonia 86 89
Latvia 85 89 87
Lithuania 65 75 73 73
Hungary 61 62 55 51 22 21
Poland 34 33 32 29 27 21
Czech Rep. 9 8 8 10 11 13
Romania 58 63 62 55 43 34
Bulgaria 61 64 64 57 45 40
Croatia* 77 73 75 74 66 60
Serbia* 71 69 72 69 69 67
* FX and FX-indexed loans
Some issues were more confrontational. Swiss franc loans were rightly spotted as 
very risky, as was illustrated in 2015 when the Swiss unpegged the franc from the 
euro. Hungary implemented forced conversion of these loans in to local currency 
and was later followed by Croatia, while Poland and Romania contemplated 
schemes that were not eventually enforced. Hungary, followed later by Poland and 
other countries, started to tax more foreign capital and to question its role in their 
economies. While these debates have left some scars, it is also clear that no major 
player has chosen to exit the region for this reason. 
The Vienna Initiative is a case study of successful cooperative behaviour, being 
built on a strong basis. The fact that the same commercial banks were both large 
domestic players and the main external creditors did crucially help in that regard. 
Market funding was not prevalent in most cases, and the relatively low level of 
public debt ratios in the region was a strength. A systemic banking crisis in the 
region was thus avoided, to the benefit of all players. The orderly rebalancing of 
banks’ business models reduced the levels of risk and facilitated the de-euroisation 
process where it was necessary. The region now appears to be on a much more solid 
footing to weather future crises.
CHAPTER 9
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The start, in 1989, of emerging Europe’s transition from communism to capitalism 
opened the region to the large-scale entry of foreign banks. Eastern Europe quickly 
became one of the financially most integrated parts of the world as foreign direct 
investment (FDI) fostered strong links between Western European parent banks 
and Eastern European subsidiaries and branches. The empirical evidence that 
emerged over the next two decades shows that – at least until the outbreak of the 
global financial crisis – the large-scale entry of foreign banks was, by and large, a 
force for good. Local investment was boosted by firms’ improved access to foreign 
savings; foreign financial institutions stimulated banking-sector competition 
(Havrylchyk and Jurzyk, 2011); and – relying on their strong parents – foreign 
bank subsidiaries also contributed to stability during episodes of local financial 
turmoil (De Haas and Van Lelyveld, 2006; 2010; 2014).
The global financial crisis put this model of intense cross-border banking to 
the test. The crisis was unique in that it originated in the home markets of the 
banking groups operating in emerging Europe. Although few of these large banks 
had direct U.S. sub-prime exposures, many of them were affected by the sharp 
reduction in interbank liquidity as of the second half of 2007. Banks started to 
deleverage both at home and abroad, a process that accelerated after the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers in September 2008 (De Haas and Van Horen, 2013). It became 
increasingly uncertain whether multinational banks, now battered by problems 
elsewhere, would keep funding Eastern European customers through their local 
subsidiaries.
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In response to these mounting pressures, Western governments supported various 
banks with guarantees, capital and liquidity towards the end of 2008. This 
alleviated concerns about a credit crunch “at home” but did not mitigate worries 
about a retrenchment of banks from emerging Europe. On the contrary, concerns 
were raised that government support came with strings attached. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that many banks were indeed asked to focus on domestic lending.
Tightening funding constraints and biased government interventions raised concerns 
about the possibility of an uncoordinated rush of banks out of emerging Europe. 
Although many banks confirmed their commitment to the region during the early 
stage of the crisis, there was no formal policy framework or coordination mechanism 
in place to ensure these commitments were credible. The concern was that this lack 
of coordination could lead individual banks to withdraw, thus causing a “run” on 
the region, even though it would be in their collective interest to roll over debt. The 
absence of agreements on how to share the burden of a defaulting subsidiary between 
the fiscal authorities in the home and host countries further exacerbated the risk of 
such a run. The accompanying reversal in financial flows could not only have had 
dire consequences for local firms and households but also have led to disruptive 
exchange-rate fluctuations and balance of payments problems.
In response to this emerging institutional vacuum, the Vienna Initiative (VI) 
was born. At its most basic level, the objective of the VI was to avoid collective 
action problems (Pistor, 2012) and to guarantee macroeconomic stability in 
emerging Europe. In February 2009, the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD), European Investment Bank (EIB) and the World Bank 
Group launched within the context of the VI a Joint IFI Action Plan in support of 
banking systems and lending to the real economy in Central and Eastern Europe. 
The goal was to mobilise resources from these institutions to avert a banking crisis 
and support bank lending in the region. This support was integrated with IMF and 
European Union macro-financial support programmes to Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Hungary, Latvia, Serbia and Romania. In return for financial support under the 
Joint IFI Action Plan and countries’ commitment to keep support programmes 
on track, several multinational banks signed country-specific commitment letters 
in which they pledged to maintain exposures and to continue to provide credit 
to firms and households in that country. Parent banks confirmed that they 
would keep subsidiaries adequately capitalised and provide them with enough 
liquidity. The VI thus developed into a public-private partnership that combined 
macro financial support by the IMF and the EU (a “bailout”) with funding by 
development institutions and a coordinated ‘bail in’ of private lenders.
147
The Vienna Initiative: from short-term impact to long-term solutions
The other chapters in this volume describe the genesis and politics of the VI in 
considerably more detail. The goal of this chapter is to summarise some empirical 
evidence on its effectiveness. Did the VI really succeed in stabilising cross-border 
flows? Of course, over the past decade it has become clear that the complete and 
uncoordinated withdrawal of banks from emerging Europe did not materialise. 
Divestitures of foreign subsidiaries have been limited and, in many cases, involved 
sales from one foreign bank to another (De Haas and Van Horen, 2016). Crisis-
affected parent banks typically also consolidated their foreign operations by selling 
smaller and more distant acquisitions (Claessens and Van Horen, 2015). In short, 
as most multinational banking groups continued to see emerging Europe as a 
strategic growth market, they decided to stay put. And in that broad sense, the 
VI can be considered a success.
Yet, it is of interest to delve a bit deeper into the data to uncover the mechanisms 
through which the VI managed to stabilise cross-border banking and, later on, to 
somewhat decelerate the reduction in funding from Western parent banks to their 
Eastern subsidiaries. To this end, this chapter, which draws heavily on De Haas, 
Korniyenko, Pivovarsky and Tsankova (2015), aims to answer three questions. 
First, were there observable differences in the lending behaviour of banks that 
were part of the VI versus those that were not, keeping all else equal? Second, for 
those multinational banks that were part of the VI, did their lending differ in 
countries where they signed commitment letters as compared with countries where 
they did not sign such letters? And third, did signing commitment letters lead to 
negative spill-overs to other countries (as many feared at the time)? We finish this 
chapter on a forward-looking note as we assess how increasing the availability of 
local-currency funding may help to stabilise bank lending in emerging Europe 
going forward.
The impact of the Vienna Initiative
The Vienna Initiative in a nutshell
As part of the VI, a total of 17 parent banks pledged, via so-called ‘commitment 
letters’, to maintain their exposures and to recapitalise subsidiaries for the duration 
of the IMF/EU programmes in five countries – Bosnia-Herzegovina, Hungary, 
Latvia, Romania and Serbia.1 On average the banks that signed up had a joint 
1 Commitment letters were signed for Romania and Serbia in March 2009, Hungary in May 2009, Bosnia-Herzegovina 
in June 2009 and Latvia in September 2009. Belarus and the Ukraine had IMF programmes but no commitment 
letters were signed.
148
Ten years of the Vienna Initiative 2009-2019
market share in the host country of about 63%. Importantly, the banks that signed 
differed by country, as did the exact nature of the commitments. In the case of 
Latvia, the assumption was that foreign banks would roll over at least 80% of their 
lending to the country, the majority of which was to their own subsidiaries. In 
the case of Hungary, banks promised to ensure a “prudent capitalisation of their 
subsidiaries” and to maintain at least 95% of their September 2008 exposure. 
In Romania, the pledges were most concrete, as banks promised to “increase 
the minimum capital adequacy ratio for each subsidiary from 8 to 10%” and to 
fully maintain their March 2009 exposure for the time of the IMF programme. 
In Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Serbia too, banks committed to roll over 100% 
of their exposure (as of December 2008) and to recapitalise subsidiaries if and 
when needed. Some of these commitments were reaffirmed in 2009.2 As the crisis 
subsided, pressure to maintain cross-border exposures was reduced, and some 
rollover commitments were lowered by early 2010.
Importantly, concerns were expressed at the time that the focus of the commitment 
letters on five specific countries could tempt multinational banks to support their 
subsidiaries in these countries by withdrawing funds from countries without 
exposure commitments, such as Poland or the Czech Republic. Such negative spill-
overs could have contributed to the further cross-border transmission of the crisis. 
These concerns were only partially alleviated by a number of so-called ‘horizontal 
meetings’ with multinational banks and the relevant national and international 
authorities that were held in September 2009 and March 2010. The focus of these 
meetings was on lending to the whole region rather than the five countries with 
an IMF/EU programme and explicit exposure commitments.
Data
To assess the impact of the VI, the analysis in this chapter draws on detailed 
balance-sheet and income statement data for over 350 banks in emerging Europe 
during 1999-2011.3 This time window includes the global financial crisis as well 
as the (partially overlapping) euro area crisis of 2009-11. The source is Bureau 
van Dijk’s BankScope database and all data are denominated in US dollars to 
ensure comparability across banks. These data are combined with macroeconomic 
information from the IMF International Financial Statistics. In addition, hand-
2 In Romania, parent banks ultimately did not maintain full exposures. Except for three banking groups, parent bank 
financing declined before the commitments were reaffirmed (see IMF, Romania: Letter of Intent and Technical 
Memorandum of Understanding, February 2010).
3 The country sample includes Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovak Republic and Slovenia.
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collected information on crisis-related government support to banks in both home 
and host countries is used. This includes support in the form of capital injections, 
bank-specific guarantees and asset sales to the government.
The main variable of interest is annual gross nominal credit growth. We define 
gross nominal credit as net loans plus loan loss reserves. Thus, our dependent 
variable reflects changes in banks’ output of new loans, but not loan loss provisions 
and write-offs. If certain banks provisioned more during the crisis than others, this 
should therefore not bias our dependent variable. A quick eyeballing of these data 
reveals that, before the outbreak of the crisis (1999-2007) both domestic and foreign 
banks grew rapidly at an average pace of just over 40% per year. Credit growth 
was even somewhat higher among foreign banks, especially among subsidiaries 
whose parent banks would sign VI commitment letters in 2009. Foreign-bank 
subsidiaries typically had easier access to foreign wholesale funding – either from 
international capital markets or from their parent banks – and were less constrained 
by the availability of local funding.
Bank lending started to slow markedly towards the end of 2008, and this was true 
for both domestic and foreign banks. Interestingly, relative to banks that would 
not end up in the VI, VI banks reduced their lending significantly more in 2008. 
However, in 2009 – once the VI had come into force – the two groups of foreign 
banks displayed a similar nominal growth rate of about 1%. In the same year, 
foreign subsidiaries in the less-affected countries outside of the VI still grew on 
average by 10%. While credit growth decelerated substantially during the period 
2008-09, persistent negative growth only started occurring in 2010-11 when the 
euro area crisis intensified.
Importantly, in each of the five VI countries there were two groups of foreign-bank 
subsidiaries: those with parent banks that signed a VI commitment letter in that 
country and those with parents that did not. For instance, in Hungary UniCredit 
and Raiffeisen Bank signed commitment letters whereas Commerzbank and 
Deutsche Bank did not. There was also variation among foreign-bank subsidiaries 
regarding whether their parent banks received government support or not. For 
instance, Commerzbank received capital support from the German government 
whereas Deutsche Bank did not. Moreover, parent banks signed commitment letters 
in some countries but not in others. Erste Bank signed a letter in Hungary but not 
in Serbia. Similarly, NLB Bank committed to rollovers in Bosnia & Herzegovina 
but not in Serbia. These are the exactly the sources of within-country and within-
bank variation that are exploited in the remainder of this chapter.
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Empirical analysis
This section briefly discusses the mechanics of the analysis of the VI impact. The 
interested reader is referred to the more technical discussion in De Haas et al. 
(2015) for more details. The analysis will consist of three main parts.
First, the chapter discusses panel-data regressions for the period 1999-2011 to 
analyse whether foreign-bank subsidiaries continued to be relatively stable lenders, 
as they had been during earlier local crises, or whether they were fickler during the 
global financial crisis. These panel data are also used to zoom in on the sub-sample 
of foreign banks and to differentiate these by VI participation status. Here we 
differentiate between countries that were and were not one of the five VI countries 
and, second, whether a parent bank of subsidiary i in country j signed one or more 
VI commitment letters (in country j or elsewhere). Because VI participation was 
not randomly allocated over the banking population, it is important to control 
for other bank characteristics. The analysis therefore consistently controls for a 
battery of other bank characteristics such as their profitability, size, loan-to-deposit 
ratio, solvency, liquidity and loan quality.
Second, we collapse our panel data to estimate so-called difference-in-differences 
regressions to detect the effect of foreign ownership and participation in the Vienna 
Initiative on average credit growth. Here the variable of interest is a bank’s average 
credit growth during the three-year crisis period (2009-11) relative to a pre-crisis 
window of equivalent length (2005-07).
Third, we run a set of cross-sectional regressions where the dependent variable is 
either bank-specific credit growth in 2009; average credit growth in 2009-11; or a 
variable that is ‘1’ in case of non-negative credit growth in 2009 and zero otherwise. 
Here the sample is limited to the five countries that participated in the VI and the 
focus is on foreign-bank subsidiaries only. Since each of these countries contains 
several subsidiaries, we can include country fixed effects to control for credit 
demand at the country level. Country fixed effects allow us to compare, within 
the same country, how lending by banks that signed a commitment letter differed 
from banks that did not sign a letter. To the extent that we adequately control for 
confounding factors, we expect that banks that signed a letter in a country, were 
relatively stable credit sources compared to other foreign banks.
Main findings on the effectiveness of the Vienna Initiative
This section brief ly summarises the main findings of the analysis. First, the 
patterns in the data clearly confirm that foreign banks reduced credit growth 
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significantly more than private domestic banks during the whole crisis period. For 
instance, compared to average annual pre-crisis growth of 41.0%, private domestic 
banks in 2010 reduced credit growth by 21.1 percentage points (to an average of 
19.9%) whereas foreign banks shrank lending by an additional 14.7 percentage 
points (to 5.2%) during that year. This holds when controlling for a battery of 
other (lagged) bank characteristics. In line with expectations, these controls show 
that large banks, banks with an already high loan-to-deposit ratio, and banks 
with high loan loss reserves (i.e., worse loan quality) grew slower on average. More 
liquid and profitable banks were able to continue to expand credit more quickly. 
There is also weaker evidence that state banks reduced credit growth less in 2009. 
This may reflect that in some countries governments used state-owned banks 
to smooth aggregate lending when privately owned banks started to deleverage. 
None of these results is particularly surprising and they are in line with a broad 
literature on the role of foreign-bank ownership during crises.
Second, we can now start our investigation of the impact of the Vienna Initiative 
on bank lending. We use the same panel data structure as before but limit 
ourselves to foreign banks. We run separate analyses for a sample consisting of 
all of emerging Europe, the non-VI countries, and the five VI countries. We 
focus on the growth of gross credit as well as the VI impact on banks’ asset 
growth. We consider both because when banks signed VI letters, they committed 
themselves to roll over their total exposure in a country, not just their outstanding 
loan portfolio. The data show that overall – when compared to pre-crisis rates 
of expansion – the reduction in foreign-bank lending during 2008-11 was not 
different in VI and non-VI countries. However, that asset growth was reduced 
significantly more by banks in those countries that would need to be supported 
by the IMF and EU. We find that in the year before the VI was put in place, there 
were no significant differences in credit growth adjustments between subsidiaries 
of parent banks that would become part of the VI and subsidiaries of parent banks 
that would stay out of the VI. However, once the VI was in place in 2009, we start 
to observe differences between these two groups of foreign-bank subsidiaries. On 
average, subsidiaries of VI parent banks now grow about 15 percentage points 
faster compared to subsidiaries of non-participant banks.
Interestingly, this positive relationship between VI status and credit growth during 
2009-11 appears to extend to non-VI countries. That is, we find that participation 
in the VI did not lead to negative spill-over effects. VI banks did not support their 
lending in VI countries – as per the signed commitment letters – by reducing their 
lending elsewhere in emerging Europe. If anything, there are positive externalities 
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involved as subsidiaries of VI parent banks also grew faster in non-VI countries, 
i.e., in those countries where their parent banks faced no commitment to maintain 
exposures. Similar results emerge for asset growth.
One can also focus on VI countries only, and that allows for a comparison of 
three distinct types of foreign banks in these countries. As a benchmark group we 
consider the subsidiaries of parent banks that were nowhere involved in the VI. 
We compare this group to two types of VI subsidiaries: those for whom the parent 
bank signed a letter in the country of the subsidiary itself and those with a parent 
bank that signed a letter in another country.
This analysis shows that there was a positive VI impact in 2009 of local signings 
on credit and asset growth of about 10.1 and 15.0 percentage points, respectively, 
when compared to non-VI banks. We do not, however, find evidence of additional 
positive effects of VI parents that signed elsewhere. For example, Raiffeisen Bank 
signed commitment letters in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Hungary, Romania and Serbia, 
but did not commit in Latvia. Our results suggest that participation by Raiffeisen 
in the VI stabilised lending by its subsidiaries in those countries where it signed 
(such as Hungary and Romania) but not in those VI countries where it did not sign 
(Latvia). Importantly, spill-over effects to ‘third’ countries – such as Raiffeisen 
Poland – were positive in nature. We can also confirm these results for asset 
growth. This suggests that the VI – and especially the Joint IFI Action Plan that 
focused on bank lending to firms and households –did not push banks to continue 
lending while shortening their local balance sheets in other ways.
In a next step, we can estimate a so-called difference-in-differences regression 
framework. In these regressions the dependent variable is average annual credit 
growth during 2005-07 (pre-treatment) or 2009-11 (treatment).4 This analysis 
confirms that while both domestic and foreign banks substantially reduced credit 
growth during the crisis, the average annual adjustment was almost 10 percentage 
points stronger for foreign banks. This effect is driven by the VI countries. 
When we focus on foreign banks only, the data show that in these five countries, 
subsidiaries of VI parent banks were relatively stable lenders. This effect is driven – 
in line with our earlier results – by those subsidiaries for which a letter was signed. 
Lastly, the data again return no evidence for spill-over effects to non-VI countries. 
4 We thus leave out the early-crisis year 2008 when Lehman Brothers had not yet collapsed and the VI was not yet in 
place. This allows for a clean comparison between the most severe part of the crisis and the pre-crisis period. Including 
2008 – and separately interacting it with the treatment variable – yields very similar (and slightly more significant) 
results for the 2009-11 treatment effect.
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That is, any cross-country spill-overs that may have occurred were positive rather 
than negative.
In a third and final step, we move the analysis to a pure cross-sectional approach 
in which we focus exclusively on foreign-bank subsidiaries in VI countries. In 
this case, we compare, within the same host country, subsidiaries of banks that 
signed a commitment letter in that country versus those that did not. The results 
indicate that within VI countries, signing a commitment letter had a positive 
incremental effect on bank-level growth. The magnitude of this effect is 23.7 
and 21.0% for credit and asset growth, respectively. Relative to subsidiaries of 
non-VI parent banks the effect is also positive but less pronounced: around 9% 
for both credit and asset growth.
We then test whether the VI impact persisted in 2010 and 2011. In both cases 
we indeed find a positive average impact during the years 2009-11. When we 
next estimate a model to predict the likelihood that a subsidiary fully rolled 
over its 2008 exposure in 2009 (implying a credit growth rate of at least zero 
per cent) we find that this probability is 42.2 per cent higher for subsidiaries 
for which the parent bank had signed a commitment letter as compared to 
subsidiaries of non-participating parents. Importantly, the analysis does not 
point towards a separate, general impact of government support – in the form 
of capital injections, bank-specific guarantees, or asset sales – on either credit 
or asset growth.
We end the analysis with a concise counterfactual exercise to assess what 
aggregate credit growth would have been if – in the five VI countries – the 
foreign-bank subsidiaries that signed commitment letters had not signed. Such 
a counterfactual calculation is a useful back-of-the-envelope assessment of the 
overall magnitude of the VI impact. An important assumption is that the VI 
did not impact the credit growth of other types of banks (domestic banks and 
foreign banks outside the VI) so that one can keep their growth rates constant. 
This back-of-the-envelope calculation shows that, in the absence of the VI, credit 
growth of these subsidiaries would on average have been lower by between 7 and 
12 percentage points. Since these VI banks were relatively large players in their 
respective host countries, their lower credit growth would have translated into 
substantial aggregate impacts. Instead of an aggregate nominal credit growth 
rate of 7% in 2009, lending would have grown by only 2% or even shrunk by 
1%. It goes without saying that such a severe credit crunch would have entailed 
a substantially more negative impact on firms and households too.
154
Ten years of the Vienna Initiative 2009-2019
Moving forward: rebalancing bank funding across  
emerging Europe
In the wake of the global financial crisis, a substantial academic literature has 
pointed out that banks that, pre-crisis, were heavily dependent on wholesale (as 
opposed to deposit) funding were extra vulnerable to funding shocks and, as a 
result, had to reduce their domestic and cross-border lending more when the crisis 
hit (De Haas and Van Lelyveld, 2014). Ongena, Peydró, and Van Horen (2012) 
focus specifically on emerging Europe and find that not only foreign but also 
domestic banks that borrowed in the international wholesale markets had to cut 
back lending more during the crisis.
Indeed, the average bank in emerging Europe had substantially increased its 
reliance on non-deposit funding in the run up to the crisis. Banks’ loan-to-deposit 
ratios, an often-used proxy for banks’ dependence on wholesale funding, increased 
from on average 0.80 in 2005 to 1.16 in 2008 (EBRD, 2015; De Haas and Van 
Horen, 2018). Much of this wholesale funding was denominated in (or swapped 
into) a foreign currency, typically the euro. In the wake of the crisis, these loan-
to-deposit ratios have declined for three main reasons. First, various European 
banks, especially those that relied heavily on short-term wholesale funding, had to 
reduce new lending and dispose of non-core assets. Second, partly due to regulatory 
pressure, some banks made substantial efforts to increase their deposit base. Third, 
weaker demand for loans due to recessions in many European countries contributed 
to the downwards trend in loan-to-deposit ratios as well.
Recognising the role of excessive wholesale, short-term and foreign exchange (FX) 
denominated funding as a source of bank-lending instability, the VI has started 
to focus on addressing this root cause of financial instability in emerging Europe. 
After all, the strong reliance of parent banks on foreign currency funding had also 
been a key driving force of the widespread household lending in foreign currencies, 
mainly in euros but in some countries (Hungary, Poland) also in Swiss francs. 
Such foreign currency lending was historically widespread in former Yugoslav 
countries, due to the history of hyperinflation in the 1990 and early 2000 but 
became prevalent in Central Eastern Europe countries throughout the 2000 as 
well. Various factors contributed to this expansion of FX lending. In addition to 
parents ‘pushing’ cheap euro funding to their subsidiaries, these factors included: 
the large interest differential between local and foreign currencies (especially the 
Swiss franc); the experience of Austrian parent banks with Swiss franc mortgage 
lending; relative exchange rate stability; and a climate of persistent strong economic 
growth. Moreover, central banks’ toolkit to contain the proliferation of foreign 
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currency lending and its negative effects was limited, while political pressures to 
keep up FX lending in many countries were strong.
When the global financial crisis hit, the large-scale foreign currency lending 
to (often unhedged borrowers), combined with the substantial depreciation 
of local currencies (and, especially, the strong appreciation of the Swiss franc), 
made it difficult or impossible for many borrowers to keep servicing their debt. 
This led to a surge in defaults and a rapid accumulation on non performing 
loans.
In order to address these issues, a public-private sector working group involving 
international (financial) institutions (EBRD, European Commission, IMF, World 
Bank and the ECB as observer), home and host authorities, as well as parent and 
subsidiary banks, was set up within the Vienna Initiative in March 2010. The 
EBRD also launched the Local Currency and Capital Markets (LC2) Initiative 
in May 2010, including a specialised unit to coordinate and spearhead work on 
financial market development within the EBRD. Both the WG and the LC2 
Initiative applied a holistic approach in order to tackle the root causes of foreign 
currency use. The focus was and continues to be on:
• building stable and sustainable macroeconomic policy frameworks; 
• improving the legal and regulatory environment to support capital market 
activity; 
• developing financial market infrastructure including clearing and settlement; 
• developing an institutional investor base; and
• promoting a more efficient transaction environment and expanding product 
range.
The activities under the Initiative have been wide-ranging, including the following.
• Country legal and financial market assessments on the key needs to support 
local currency use and financial market development, including in the area of 
macroeconomic policy, financial sector regulation, market structure, market 
infrastructure and the legal and regulatory framework. The assessments were 
made by EBRD, usually in cooperation with IMF and World Bank experts.
• Policy dialogue supporting local currency use and capital market development.
• Technical assistance focusing on supporting financial market development.
• Funding and lending activities such as local currency bond issuances in several 
currencies and countries (for example, Armenia, Georgia, Poland, Russia, 
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Serbia) as well as local currency lending/financing (SME Local Currency 
Lending Programme, supporting bond issuance by a Kyrgyz financial 
institution, mortgage bond programmes in several countries) by EBRD.
The VI public-private sector working group also published several key 
recommendations aimed at addressing the root causes of foreign currency 
lending as well as the underdevelopment of capital markets:
• the need for a country-specific approach to tackle foreign exchange lending;
• improving coordination of policies among home and host authorities in 
order to avoid unwanted effects from regulatory actions;
• addressing higher risks of foreign currency lending through supervisory 
measures (e.g., higher risk weights and appropriate liquidity requirements, 
stricter lending standards, enhanced consumer protection measures);
• a stronger focus on developing financial markets (e.g. foreign currency swap, 
mortgage and covered bond markets).
Importantly, the local currency – lending related – activities under the Vienna 
Initiative gave impetus to home and host regulators to restrict foreign currency 
(especially non-euro) lending and led to the issuance of recommendations on 
lending in foreign currencies by the European Systemic Board in September 
2011.
In a similar vein, a Vienna Initiative Capital Markets Union working group was 
established with the following aims: to remove barriers to cross-border capital 
raising and investments; to increase capital market-based finance; to build a 
stronger equity culture; and to stimulate long-term finance for investments in 
infrastructure and SMEs. The establishment of this working group reflects the 
fact that emerging European companies remain primarily financed by bank 
loans and still relatively rarely access the debt or stock markets for financing. 
Additionally, the financial assets under management by institutional investors 
in the region are small, as are the local private equity and venture capital markets. 
The Capital Markets Union working group published its report and associated 
policy recommendations in March 2018, which resulted in the implementation 
by EBRD of the proposed policy actions in selected countries. These initiatives 
include the development of national capital market development strategies, 
increasing the number of institutional investors, strengthening capital market 
infrastructures and extending the locally available product range. 
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Conclusions
The strong and manifold linkages that developed between Western banking 
groups and their emerging European subsidiaries have not been accompanied 
by equally intense supervisory cooperation and integration. When the parent 
banks of these subsidiaries were being increasingly affected by the global crisis, 
this void had to be filled by an ad hoc coordination mechanism: the Vienna 
Initiative. The evidence that we present in this chapter suggests that, by and 
large, the VI has been successful. In particular, subsidiaries of parent banks that 
signed commitment letters were significantly more stable sources of credit than 
subsidiaries of banks that did not sign such letters in the same country. Moreover, 
there is no evidence that VI banks withdrew from non-VI countries in order 
to maintain exposures to countries where they signed commitment letters. If 
anything, VI participation had positive rather than negative spill-over effects. 
The implications of these findings go beyond emerging Europe and the latest 
financial crisis. They reinforce recent evidence to suggest that IMF support and 
public bail-outs may be successful, especially when private sector resources are 
effectively crowded in (Papi, Presbitero, and Zazzaro, 2015). In the case of the 
Vienna Initiative, such a coordinated (but non-coercive) bail-in of private lenders 
helped countries not only to close external funding gaps but also to soften and 
delay the inevitable deleveraging process.
A more sustainable solution to the current governance void in emerging Europe 
may, of course, lie in better coordination and cooperation between home and 
host country supervisors. This is necessary not only to prevent spill-overs of 
financial shocks, but also because the alternative – forcing highly integrated pan-
European banking groups to hold more capital and liquidity in each individual 
subsidiary – could be costly. Effectively cutting up multinational banks into 
strings of independent banks (‘ring-fencing’) would be a second-best option 
that reflects the inability of national supervisors to reach a satisfactory level of 
cross-border cooperation and burden-sharing. It bears repeating that the growth 
losses due to increased fragmentation of European banking markets are likely 
to be substantial (Schnabel and Seckinger, 2015). Further cross-border bank 
deleveraging risks undoing the very tangible benefits that banking integration 
has had in terms of speeding up the economic convergence of Europe’s eastern 
with its western half (Friedrich, Schnabel, and Zettelmeyer, 2013).
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changes since the crisis 
and the Vienna Initiative
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Abstract1
Since the global financial crisis, the regulatory and supervisory landscape has evolved 
significantly, and the Vienna Initiative adapted accordingly by focusing on a number of 
issues of particular relevance for Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe (CESEE) 
countries. This type of activity is not new. Even during Vienna 1.0, when the focus was on 
crisis management, the Initiative had already broadened its scope, assessed the absorption 
of EU funds in the region and explored ways to involve commercial banks in this process. 
Against the background of the emerging Banking Union, the Vienna Initiative became 
a platform for formulating and sharing with key EU decision makers observations on 
supervision and resolution from the perspective of host countries, while taking account 
of the specific situation of the banks operating in the region. These discussions led to the 
signature of a Memorandum of Understanding between the European Banking Authority 
(EBA) and the Southeastern European (SEE) countries. The Vienna Initiative supported 
the comprehensive banking sector reform programme launched in Ukraine in 2014. 
Furthermore, attention was drawn to the implications of the non-zero risk weighting of 
government bonds issued in foreign currencies from January 2018. The CMU Working 
Group explored options for improving the access to finance, in particular to local capital 
markets, of smaller companies in CESEE. A related discussion took place on how banks 
in the region could fulfil their minimum requirement of own funds and eligible liabilities 
(MREL) targets, given the small size of their capital markets.
1 The views expressed in this publication are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the 
views of the European Commission. Comments by Sebastijan Hrovatin, Kai Fahnenbruck, Massimo Zaffiro, Marie 
Donnay and Audrius Pranckevičius are gratefully acknowledged.
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Introduction
In January 2012, the Vienna Initiative was re-launched as a coordination platform 
for home-host banking issues in emerging Europe (European Commission, 2017). 
According to its mission statement,2 the objectives of the Vienna Initiative 2.0 were 
to help avoid disorderly deleveraging, ensure that potential cross-border financial 
stability issues are resolved and achieve policy actions, notably in the supervisory 
area, taken in the best joint interest of home and host countries. Subsequently, 
the Vienna Initiative has provided advice on all key regulatory and supervisory 
developments in the EU. However, Vienna Initiative 1.0 has already dealt with 
some projects of this kind.
Regulatory and supervisory issues tackled under  
Vienna Initiative 1.0 
Report of the Working Group on absorption of EU funds
In order to facilitate compliance with the exposure commitments made by the euro 
area parent banks operating in the Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe (CESEE) 
region during the first phase of the Vienna Initiative, the Full Forum in Athens on 
19 March 2010 decided to set up a working group mandated to focus on enhancing the 
role of commercial banks in the process of EU fund absorption. EU structural funds, the 
second most important budgetary instrument of the EU, were underutilised in many 
new EU Member States, even while lending activity was sluggish during the financial 
and economic crisis. The working group, coordinated by the European Commission, 
noted that commercial banks could potentially play a significant role in the selection, 
implementation and financing of projects consistent with present EU regulations on 
structural funds in order to improve the absorption of EU funds in the CESEE region. 
Private financial actors can contribute to leveraging EU funds through their knowledge 
of local corporate sectors and their on-going search for innovative entrepreneurial 
concepts. The involvement of commercial banks may alleviate constraints regarding 
the co-financing of EU funds, which the official sector has experienced, particularly 
in times of economic downturn and budgetary consolidation.
Between August and December 2010, the working group studied the options available to 
foster the involvement of banks in the absorption of EU funds, based on the experiences 
of several EU Member States (Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia and Romania). The 
working group concluded its research with a report endorsed by the Full Forum meeting 
2 Available at www.vienna-initiative.com
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organised in Brussels on 16-17 March 2011.3 The report on the role of the commercial 
banks in the absorption of EU funds included key conclusions and recommendations 
of the working group for a closer involvement of banks in EU fund absorption, in 
particular in Bulgaria and Romania, within the EU regulatory framework. At the time 
when the report was finalised, the involvement of commercial banks as intermediary 
bodies in the process of EU absorption was an option in the medium term rather than 
the short run. The services that banks could provide included administrative functions 
(e.g., receiving applications and examining viability of projects), the associated financing 
relationships as projects progress and certain monitoring functions on behalf of the 
Managing Authorities for EU funds.
Report of the Working Group on developing local currency markets
As the global financial crisis highlighted some of the risks associated with foreign 
currency lending to borrowers without foreign currency income (“unhedged 
borrowers”), the Full Forum of the Vienna Initiative in Athens on 19 March 2010 
decided to set up a working group focusing on developing local currency markets 
in the CESEE region. Foreign currency lending was one of salient features of the 
majority of CESEE economies, particularly before the onset of the global financial 
crisis in 2008. Whereas foreign currency lending contributed to the convergence 
in the CESEE region in recent decades, it also took place in the context of the pre-
crisis large capital inflows, which contributed to overheating and the build-up of 
sizeable macroeconomic imbalances, and underdeveloped capital markets. 
The working group on local currency and capital market development concluded 
its work with a report endorsed by the Full Forum meeting in Brussels on 
16-17 March 2011.4 The report found that the increase in foreign currency lending in 
the CESEE region was supported inter alia by the lack of credibility of macroeconomic 
policies, weak institutions, insufficient domestic savings, lower cost of foreign versus 
domestic funding of banking systems, etc. Policy initiatives to reduce foreign currency 
lending to unhedged borrowers included regulatory and supervisory measures as well 
as measures to develop local currency markets. In this respect, the report included 
several recommendations addressed to national authorities, commercial banks and 
international financial institutions (IFIs). Over time, appropriate macroprudential 
policies and a lower flow in foreign currency lending can also gradually help reduce 
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Assisting the creation of the Banking Union: the perspective of 
countries in Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe
Observations on bank supervision and resolution 
One of the first areas of interest of the Vienna Initiative 2.0 was the implications 
of the emerging Banking Union for the countries in CESEE. In the first stage, the 
Steering Committee of the Vienna Initiative discussed cross-border supervision 
and resolution in Europe and shared its observations with the key EU institutions. 
Thereafter, it decided to establish a dedicated working group on the Banking Union 
with a broader participation, which prepared reports on two pillars of the Banking 
Union: the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution 
Mechanism (SRM), as they were shaping up. 
In September 2012, the Vienna Initiative organised a High-Level Workshop in London 
on the observations on home-host supervisory practices and the observations on bank 
recovery and resolution. Discussions focused on the new EU proposals for establishing 
the Banking Union, in particular the SSM5, just proposed by the Commission at 
the time of the Workshop and for the framework for bank recovery and resolution6 
proposed by the European Commission in June that year. 
Work on the observations advanced after the Workshop, involving frequent 
exchanges between the international financial institutions, national authorities 
and private banks. The observations on enhancements in cross-border supervision 
were ready by October 20127. Their aim was to provide input for the design of the 
supervisory framework in the EU and to communicate the key systemic concerns 
of host countries. The observations reflected the Steering Committee’s views on 
cooperation between national home and host authorities during the crisis. Marek 
Belka, the chairman of the Steering Committee, sent the observations to the main 
EU authorities: the European Commission, the European Central Bank (ECB) and 
the EBA. The European Commission, as a member of the Steering Committee, 
inserted a disclaimer regarding these observations in which it noted that it might 
have different views on some of the issues addressed in the document.
5 Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank 
concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and Regulation (EU) No. 1022/2013 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 amending Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010 
establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority) as regards the conferral of specific 
tasks on the European Central Bank pursuant to Council Regulation (EU) No. 1024/2013.
6 Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for 
the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms … .
7 http://vienna-initiative.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/Supervisory-Practices-Oct-18-FINAL_sent2.pdf
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In his reply to Marek Belka’s letter, Olli Rehn, vice-president of the European 
Commission and Commissioner for Economic and Financial Affairs, emphasised 
his appreciation for the contribution of the Vienna Initiative 2.0 to the debate 
underpinning the reform of the European banking sector. In his view, the 
observations put forward a number of valid remarks on the functioning of the 
supervisory colleges and the implications of the Banking Union on the countries 
in CESEE outside the euro area. In his keynote speech at the Vienna Initiative 
Full Forum in Brussels on 9 November 2012, Olli Rehn said: “We are turning 
the lessons we have learnt from the crisis into practical solutions. The necessary 
measures, in the area of bank recovery and crisis management and the Banking 
Union, impact the relations between home and host country authorities. This is 
where the Vienna Initiative provides support – by offering a coordination platform 
and strengthening the voice of host countries.”
The second set of observations – on cross-border bank resolution – was submitted 
to the EU institutions in January 20138. These observations focused on critical 
aspects of home-host cooperation, which were of particular importance for the 
CESEE countries. Some specific features made the cross-border resolution process 
particularly challenging in this region. These included the systemic importance 
of subsidiaries (or branches) of euro area parent banks for host countries, and the 
fact that those subsidiaries in many cases relied on the parent bank not only for 
funding support but also for all major strategic and financial decisions. Based on 
the principle that actions taken by authorities in one country should not lead to 
financial instability in another country, the note raised several points on involving 
host countries in the decision-making process concerning recovery plans and 
resolution procedures, participation in resolution colleges and the mediating role 
of EBA, as well as burden-sharing and bail-in arrangements. The observations on 
cross-border resolution were shared with the European Commission, ECB, EBA 
and the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB).
Working Group on the Banking Union 
In the context of the EU moving further towards a full Banking Union, the Steering 
Committee meeting in Vienna in January 2013 decided to set up a public-private 
working group (WG) on the impact of the proposal for a European Banking Union 
on the countries of emerging Europe. Lars Nyberg, adviser at EBRD and former 
vice-governor of the Central Bank of Sweden, collected views and recommendations 
from the WG members, moderated the discussions and drafted the reports. The 
8 http://vienna-initiative.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Resolution-note-01-09-2013-to-Gov-Belka.pdf
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WG analysed more closely the impact of the Banking Union on host countries, 
covering specific issues that affected emerging EU countries inside and outside of 
the euro area, as well as non-EU countries. The European Commission and the 
European Investment Bank (EIB), while being members of the Vienna Initiative, 
did not participate in this working group. Therefore, the WG reports included a 
disclaimer stating that these institutions might have different views on the issues 
addressed therein.
In April 2013, Marek Belka, chair of the Steering Committee, submitted the report on 
the evolving Banking Union to the leaders of European institutions. The document9 
focused on the project’s impact on host countries in emerging Europe, analyzing in 
particular the possible sequencing issues and the opt-in conditions, i.e., conditions 
for countries outside the euro area that want to become members of the Banking 
Union. It stressed that a geographically inclusive and fully fledged Banking Union, 
with appropriate conditions for participation, was in the interest of all cross-border 
banking stakeholders in Europe's deeply integrated financial markets.
In July 2013, the European Commission adopted the proposals to establish the 
SRM, a second pillar of the Banking Union. The SRM was subsequently enacted 
through a Regulation10 and an Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA).11 At its 
July meeting in Luxembourg, the Steering Committee discussed the proposed 
EU resolution framework and decided that it would further assess its potential 
implications for emerging European countries. The EU proposal also featured on 
the agenda of the Full Forum in Brussels in October 2013. The Forum called for 
strong incentives for opt-in to ensure as inclusive a membership as possible and 
to develop an effective interface with host countries outside the Banking Union, 
including non-EU members. 
The Working Group on the Banking Union concluded its activity by delivering 
its report on the new European bank resolution framework12 in November 2013. 
The report included considerations on the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive 
(BRRD) and the SRM, separately for non-opt in and non-EU countries, SSM 
9 http://vienna-initiative.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/VI2-BU-WG-April-2013_final.pdf
10 Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for 
the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism 
and a Single Bank Resolution Fund.
11 The Intergovernmental Agreement on the transfer and mutualisation of contributions to the Single Resolution 
Fund. The details of some aspects of the functioning of the SRF, including the transfer and mutualisation of funds 
from national authorities to the centralised fund, was split off from the Regulation into the IGA due to concerns, 
especially by Germany, that they were incompatible with current EU treaties.
12 http://vienna-initiative.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/VI-BU-WG-Report-on-BRRD-and-SRM.pdf
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countries and opt-ins. It emphasised the need for developing clearer conditions 
for the use of the bail-in tool by national authorities, for having credible fiscal 
backstops (including for opt-in countries) and for preparing local recovery plans 
for cross-border banking groups. The report also raised some questions concerning 
the operational capacity of the Single Resolution Board, particularly in the areas of 
transparency, independence, voting powers and decision-making in urgent cases. It 
recommended concluding agreements between SRM and non-SRM countries to 
ensure early participation of non-SRM national authorities in resolution procedures. 
Finally, it called for the completion of all three pillars of the Banking Union, namely 
supervision, resolution and deposit insurance.
Discussions on resolution strategies and Minimum Requirement for own 
funds and Eligible Liabilities (MREL)
The experience during the financial turmoil in 2007-8, when bailout packages 
were designed by the governments in the home countries of parent banks, led 
to nervousness by national authorities in CESEE, as public aid was limited to 
banks subject to a country’s own jurisdiction, including foreign branches but not 
subsidiaries. It illustrated the national character of governance structures, while 
financial contagion has become transnational (Pistor, 2012). As a reaction, host 
country supervisors ring-fenced activities of banks operating on their territory by 
imposing increased reserve requirements or limiting liquidity by the Central Bank. 
This was not an optimal policy response, either for the home country or for the host 
country, and the Vienna Initiative, with its unique composition of stakeholders, 
attempted to remedy the situation.
The main concern expressed by host countries was the insufficient involvement of 
host supervisors and fiscal authorities in the decision-making process regarding bank 
resolution, where decisions rested mainly with the home countries, following the 
principle of consolidated supervision. This was legally very clear in the case of branches, 
of which some are of systemic relevance in CESEE, but it applied also to subsidiaries. 
Related was the debate on whether the resolution strategy should adopt a Single Point 
of Entry (SPE), generally the preferred approach at EU level, or Multiple Points of 
Entry (MPE). The latter strategy is favoured by the Austrian banks with international 
activities and their home supervisor, which argue that the subsidiaries’ activities in 
Central and Eastern Europe are decentralised and easily separable.
A call was made to strengthen the role of host country supervisors in the supervisory 
and resolution colleges and ensure a timely exchange of information, as well as early 
involvement in drawing up recovery and resolution plans. Attention should be paid 
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to the appropriate intra-group support in crisis situations. Host countries also feared 
an unfair burden-sharing of fiscal costs, when they were not adequately represented 
in resolution decisions. Finally, in order to minimise the use of taxpayers’ money, 
the new framework included a bail-in tool. A plea was made to take into account 
the simple funding structure of local banks heavily relying on deposits and the 
thin domestic capital markets, which need to be developed further to allow for the 
issuance of bail-inable instruments. 
Through amendments to the Capital Requirements Directive and Regulation 
framework, the BRRD and Single Resolution Mechanism Regulation, these 
concerns were reflected in the political agreement reached on 4 December 201813 
between the European Parliament and Council of the European Union in an effort 
to balance the interests of home and host countries. Following the agreement 
reached in mid-February 2019 regarding risk reduction measures in the banking 
sector, all the amendments to the above-mentioned directive and regulations were 
scheduled to be voted on by the European Parliament before the European elections 
in May 2019. 
In order to avoid the down-streaming of losses towards the subsidiary, intra-group 
liabilities are excluded from the bail-in of the parent bank. Also, the use of internal 
MREL waivers and its replacement by collateralised guarantees is limited to the 
same country, while in a cross-border context prepositioning of MREL is the 
norm. All in all, host countries have an important say in the joint determination 
of MREL, as the so-called “rule of the sum”, or the coherence check between the 
sum of internal MREL and the total consolidated external MREL at group level, 
was deleted. Furthermore, the introduction of a “safe harbour” clause will provide 
host authorities with the possibility of topping up the internal MREL calibration 
outside of the mediation powers of EBA.
Facilitating home-host cooperation with non-EU countries
Memorandum of Understanding between the European Banking Authority 
and supervisors in South-Eastern Europe 
After the launch of the Banking Union in the EU, the Vienna Initiative advocated 
common concerns and coordinated actions of non-EU countries in the Western 
Balkans, leading to the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between those 
countries and EBA in October 2015.
13 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-6659_en.htm
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The Vienna Initiative Full Forum in Brussels in October 2013 included a session 
dedicated to SEE as a region significantly affected by the EU financial sector 
reform. However, this region still remained mostly outside the reach of the 
EU’s supervisory coordination mechanisms. The Full Forum welcomed EBA’s 
decision to re-engage with non-EU countries for supervisory confidentiality 
assessments. Given the euro area banks’ systemic importance in these countries, 
it also called for a special regional arrangement of non-EU members on the path 
towards EU membership with the SSM and EBA.
The operational launch of the SSM on 4 November 2014 was a milestone for moving 
towards an effective cross-border supervisory framework in the EU. The Vienna 
Initiative Full Forum in Brussels on 13 November 2014 discussed the collaboration 
between the SSM and SEE countries. The Forum acknowledged the EBA’s work 
to enhance the information sharing between the SSM and non-EU member SEE 
countries and proposed a possible Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on 
cooperation between the SSM and SEE countries for the consideration of the 
European authorities, including the EBA and the ECB. 
On 23 October 2015, the EBA and representatives of the supervisory authorities 
of Albania, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republika Srpska, North 
Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia signed a Memorandum on Cooperation 
(MoC) at the EBA premises in London. The involved parties negotiated the 
MoC for almost two years with the mediation of the EBRD under the auspices 
of the Vienna Initiative.
The MoC constitutes a major achievement for home-host banking relations between 
the EU and its neighbouring countries. It was the first MoC signed by the EBA, 
setting out a framework for cooperation and information exchange, covering inter 
alia the EU single rulebook, financial stability issues and equivalence assessments. 
In addition, EBA committed itself to facilitating the participation of the signatory 
authorities in the relevant colleges of supervisors and to opening its regular training 
activities to the staff of the signatory authorities. The MoC was open to adherence 
by other countries if the EBA completed an assessment of their confidentiality 
regimes with a positive result. 
Ukraine Financial Forum 
In 2014-16, Vienna Initiative 2.0 assisted the reforms of the banking sector in 
Ukraine through the multilateral Ukraine Financial Forum, which included 
local bank subsidiaries, authorities and international institutions. The forum 
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was based on the model of host-country cross-border banking fora, organised 
previously in Hungary, Croatia, Serbia, Albania, Montenegro and Slovenia. 
On 15 May 2014, the Vienna Initiative Steering Committee met in Warsaw 
in the margins of the EBRD annual meeting, chaired by Marek Belka. The 
Steering Committee proposed to organise a Vienna Initiative forum in Kiev, 
co-organised by the IMF, EBRD and the National Bank of Ukraine, in order 
to build additional confidence in the IMF programme. The National Bank of 
Ukraine supported this initiative. 
The first Ukraine Financial Forum, organised under the aegis of the Vienna 
Initiative, took place in Kiev on 5 June 2014, benefiting from a high level of 
participation from both the international and the Ukrainian sides. National 
Bank of Ukraine Governor Kubiv and Deputy Minister of Finance Lisovenko 
presented a comprehensive strategy and declared a strong commitment to 
reform the Ukrainian banking sector. International and EU institutions offered 
unprecedented levels of financial and technical assistance. Domestic banks and 
Ukrainian subsidiaries of European banks, however, raised questions on multiple 
risks to the success of the reform agenda, pointing to endemic corruption, banking 
sector fragmentation and the shortage of creditworthy borrowers. The National 
Bank of Ukraine highlighted the important role the international financial 
institutions and Western banks could play in the Ukrainian financial sector in 
terms of promoting reforms, supporting financial stability, instilling best practices 
in corporate governance and bringing know-how.
The second Ukraine Financial Forum was organised adjacent to the Full Forum 
in Brussels in November 2014. The commercial banks appreciated the authorities’ 
continued commitment to the banking sector reform. Discussions focused on the 
key challenges facing the banking sector, including the implications of volatile 
foreign exchange rates and of the deteriorated quality of banking assets and 
capital adequacy ratios, as well as the disruption to banks’ business resulting from 
the war in Eastern Ukraine and the occupation of Crimea. Johannes Hahn, EU 
Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, 
said: “Today's Financial Forum on Ukraine provided an excellent opportunity for a 
frank and productive discussion among policy makers, supervisors, commercial banks 
and international financial institutions… . Events like this one make a valuable 
contribution to identifying the key actions and reforms needed to address these 
challenges, and ways to support them through enhanced cooperation with the EU 
and international financial institutions.”
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The third – and last – Ukraine Financial Forum met in Kiev on Wednesday, 
15 March 2016, to take stock of the key reforms in the banking sector. In her 
opening speech, Valeria Gontareva, Governor of National Bank of Ukraine, 
highlighted that a stronger financial sector had emerged in the wake of 
restructuring and reforms. Jan Tombinski, Ambassador of the EU delegation 
to Ukraine, said: “The European Union hopes that the comprehensive programme 
of financial sector reform until 2020 outlined by the National Bank of Ukraine 
with other Ukrainian authorities will continue on track in 2016… . The Vienna 
Initiative is a perfect platform for discussing and addressing numerous challenges 
such as the high NPL [nonperforming loan] level, related party lending and 
banking sector effectiveness.” Participants welcomed the opportunity to engage 
in a constructive dialogue and noted the importance of regular consultations 
between authorities, regulators, banks and international financial institutions 
to ensure effective design and implementation of reform measures.
Implications of the non-zero risk weighting of government bonds issued in 
foreign currencies
Another issue where the Vienna Initiative was very active on the regulatory front 
was with respect to Article 114 of the Capital Requirements Regulation setting the 
risk weights for exposures to central banks and central governments. Exposures 
to central banks and to sovereign debt in the EU benefit from a zero risk weight, 
but, from January 2018, only when denominated in domestic currency or when 
the credit rating is sufficiently good (e.g., credit quality step 1). This regime is also 
applicable to third countries for which the regulatory and supervisory frameworks 
are considered equivalent to those in the EU. 
This regime impacts, in particular, the Western Balkans, which includes some 
candidate countries (Albania, North Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia) with 
a systemic presence of subsidiaries of EU banks and whose governments and 
central banks issue regularly in euros. These countries have raised a number of 
concerns in this context. They highlighted that a non-zero risk weighting on their 
sovereign or central bank exposure might reduce the profitability of these banks. 
It also constrains fiscal policy, as the reduced appetite of local banks may prompt 
governments to tap foreign investors, with an increased reliance on inherently more 
volatile cross-border flows as a consequence. Monetary policy may be hampered, 
as an increased reserve requirement subject to a non-zero risk weight to mop up 
liquidity could be counteracted by banks selling bonds, which would offset the 
desired objective of tightening monetary policy. The exchange rate could also come 
under pressure as banks sell government bonds in local currency. 
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Aware of these concerns and of the political angle in view of the EU candidate 
status, the European Commission and the EBA continue to monitor the 
regulatory and supervisory developments in these countries, particularly in 
the light of potential future equivalence determinations. 
Improving access to finance: development of local  
capital markets
Since 2015, the Capital Markets Union (CMU) has been one of the EU's 
priority initiatives in the area of financial services, aiming to mobilise capital 
in Europe and channel it to companies and infrastructure projects. The Vienna 
Initiative CMU Working Group established in 2017 explored how local capital 
markets and smaller companies' access to finance could be fostered in CESEE.
Following the adoption of the CMU Action Plan in September 2015 (European 
Commission, 2015), the Vienna Initiative Full Forum in Warsaw in November 
2015 encouraged CESEE authorities to identify areas where technical assistance 
from the European Commission could support the implementation of the CMU 
priorities. The Vienna Initiative has been a good platform for an exchange of 
views in this area, as the EU Member States from CESEE have been among the 
main potential beneficiaries. Economic analysis showed that countries from 
CESEE lagged behind their EU peers in terms of capital markets development, 
leading to reduced options for financing business start-ups and expansion. 
Consequently, companies in those countries relied heavily on bank financing 
and were reluctant to use equity, bonds or risk capital instruments.
Following a proposal from the European Commission, the Vienna Initiative 
Full Forum in Luxembourg on 6 March 2017 decided to set up a Working 
Group on Capital Markets Union. The objective of the Working Group was to 
provide an overview of the challenges faced by capital markets in CESEE and 
to identify the measures necessary to enhance local capital markets that could 
be implemented at national, regional (cross-border) and European level. To 
this end, the Working Group carried out a country survey among its members. 
The Working Group included about forty representatives of both public and 
private institutions from CESEE countries as well as international institutions 
(i.e., EIB, EBRD and the World Bank Group). The European Commission 
coordinated the work, chaired the meetings and provided the secretariat of the 
Working Group. Three full-day meetings of the Working Group took place in 
Brussels on 4 April, 30 June and 3 October 2017.
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The report of the Working Group14, endorsed by the Full Forum in London on 
12 March 2018, listed policy actions aimed at the development of local capital 
markets. The proposed measures were of both legislative and non-legislative 
nature. They included new initiatives and work already underway. Initiatives 
at national level were considered crucial for capital market development. These 
included the development of capital market strategies, modernisation of the business 
environment, using public financial support for capital markets, e.g. listing of SMEs, 
privatisation of state-owned companies through the stock exchange, facilitating 
conditions for institutional investors, enhancing capital market supervision and 
increasing financial literacy. Further measures could be taken at the regional level to 
strengthen cross-border cooperation. This included facilitating foreign listing and 
market access, promoting cooperation between stock exchanges and the creation 
of cross-border links between local market infrastructures (central securities 
depositories, central counterparties) and harmonising legislation at regional level.
At the EU level, issues revolved around better regulation and a greater use of the 
available financing instruments. Further work was warranted on the observance 
of the proportionality principle in EU law (i.e., by review of selected capital 
market directives), on the better implementation of EU law (e.g., by technical 
support) and further harmonisation of legislation at EU level (e.g., in the area 
of crowd-funding or fintech). The deployment of financial support instruments 
(e.g,. by the European Structural Investment Funds, EIB, EBRD or the World 
Bank Group) would help to overcome market failures and increase the funding 
pool for investments.
Concluding remarks 
In the last ten years, the Vienna Initiative has played a role in the stabilisation of 
the financial sectors in CESEE by balancing the interests of the banking sector 
and those of home and host supervisors. In the post-crisis era of regulatory and 
supervisory reforms in the EU, it has amplified the voice of the host countries 
on the European scene. The Vienna Initiative has contributed to the discussions 
surrounding the historical process of creating a Banking Union and Capital Markets 
Union in the EU. At the same time, it has continuously observed the concerns of 
non-EU countries in the region, leading to some tangible achievements such as the 
2015 Memorandum of Cooperation with EBA. 
14 http://vienna-initiative.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/VI-CMU-Working-Group-Final-Report-March-2018.pdf
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Cross-border banking in Central, 
Eastern and Southeastern Europe 
through the lens of the 
EIB's Bank Lending Survey
Luca Gattini, Áron Gereben 
and Debora Revoltella
European Investment Bank, Economics Department1
Abstract1
We revisit cross-border banking in Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe (CESEE) 
from a historical perspective. Using information from the European Investment Bank 
(EIB) CESEE Bank Lending Survey (BLS), combining its results with other data 
sources, we demonstrate how the model of cross-border banking changed in the region 
after the global financial crisis. We argue that cross-border funding flows declined 
significantly, whilst equity exposures remained as important as before. On the one 
hand, international banking groups are maintaining their commitment to the region; 
on the other, the decline of external funding has led to a lending strategy based on 
domestic funding. This strategy appears to result in more cautious – less dynamic, but 
also safer – credit developments in the region. 
Introduction
There is a broad consensus that the economic benefits of “balanced” cross-border 
banking outweigh the potential costs. Cross-border banking can stabilise output 
through risk diversification and reduce the likelihood of bank failures and credit 
crunches for the same reason. It can also lead to stronger competition, faster technology 
transfer and more rapid spread of best banking practices, thus further enhancing 
financial stability. Foreign capital, however, comes at a cost. Foreign funds are likely 
to be more mobile than domestic ones. They can also expose the domestic economy to 
foreign shocks. Yet, unless it generates undue concentration, cross-border banking is 
1 The views expressed in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the position of the EIB 
or its shareholders.
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thought to bring an overall net increase in welfare (Allen et al., 2015). Strengthening 
cross-border banking to reap these benefits is high on the EU political agenda: these 
economic benefits are a key argument supporting the Banking Union.
CESEE has often been regarded as the “poster child” of cross-border banking. The 
last twenty years have seen an impressive development of the banking market in 
the CESEE region. Starting from the mid-1990s, a process of deep transformation 
allowed banks to become real intermediaries of resources, with access to finance 
substantially increased in both the retail and the corporate sectors. A privatisation 
process allowed several international players to enter the region and to engage in 
regional growth strategies. These large players became market leaders in almost 
all countries in the region, carrying fresh capital and new banking practices. 
Large market potential and banks’ access to funding from parents fuelled strong 
credit growth before 2008/9. Domestic regional demand accelerated, with both 
consumption and investment growing fast. 
The 2008/9 crisis changed the picture. External demand collapsed and the correction 
of capital inflows was rather sharp, leading to negative economic growth all over the 
region. Concerns about potential spill-overs, via the parent/subsidiary channel, from 
the international financial crisis to the region increased. In this environment the Vienna 
Initiative has functioned as an anchor, strengthening confidence in financial markets 
and preserving banking activities. The European Commission and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) provided financial support to countries in need, while the 
European Investment Bank (EIB), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD) and the World Bank guaranteed enhanced support to productive investment, 
including liquidity lines for small to medium-sized enterprise (SME) financing. At the 
same time, international banks active in the region committed themselves to continuing 
to support their subsidiaries, providing capital and funding. Ultimately, international 
financial institutions engaged in a Joint Action Plan. The initiative strategically 
contributed to preserving financial stability in the overall CESEE region. Indeed, tail 
risks disappeared, and fully fledged bank runs were avoided.
The recovery from the crisis was long and painful in many countries in the region. 
In general, the higher the pre-crisis imbalances, the longer economic activity took 
to recover. Potential growth in the region has been reassessed and linked more 
closely to the underlying country fundamentals – i.e., productivity and export 
performance capacity, while nonperforming loans (NPLs) have been weighing 
on banks' portfolios. At the same time, the post-crisis domestic environment, the 
emerging changes in the regulatory environment and a reassessment of local market 
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opportunities have been leading to a rethinking of the operational strategies for 
the cross-border banks active in the CESEE region. 
All in all, foreign-owned banks fostered convergence and economic growth in CESEE: 
they contributed to raising living standards, supported increasing investment levels – 
yet also possibly generated imbalances and contagion.2 Today, the share of foreign 
ownership of banks in CESEE is high compared with other regions, and many 
subsidiary banks are also systemically important at a local level (host country). 
Nevertheless, the global financial crisis brought some important lessons and changes in 
the nature of cross-border banking flows. First, it showed that shocks can propagate from 
home to host countries, possibly threatening host countries’ financial stability. Second, 
the experience of the crisis triggered a re-evaluation of the strategies of international 
banks towards the region. Some financial institutions left the region altogether, while 
those who stayed changed their strategies. Third, credit flows in the CESEE region in 
the aftermath of the crisis stalled for an extended period between 2011 and 2015. While 
positive credit developments resumed subsequently, lending growth has remained at a 
lower level than ten years before. This may represent an impediment to medium-term 
economic performance. Therefore, understanding the determinants of credit growth 
and fundamental credit market conditions is key for effective policy actions.
Against this backdrop, we revisit the state of cross-border banking in CESEE ten 
years after the crisis. We attempt to identify how the nature of cross-border banking 
has been changing, and whether these changes had an impact on aggregate credit 
developments (and if so, how). First, we sketch the key developments in cross-border 
lending. Then we describe international banks’ attitudes and positioning in the 
CESEE region using the EIB CESEE Bank Lending Survey.3 Next we deal with credit 
development and the fundamental factors behind it before offering our conclusions.
2 The transmission channels between parent and subsidiary banks have been extensively investigated in several studies focusing 
on different geographical areas, including CESEE. The effect of parent conditions on the lending performance of subsidiaries 
has been thoroughly analysed. For example, the existence of internal capital markets within international banking groups 
(Houston and James, 1998; De Haas and Van Lelyveld, 2010; Jeon et al., 2013) was found to be a fundamental vehicle 
spurring growth throughout a network of subsidiaries, as well as possibly transmitting financial weaknesses. Other studies 
have connected lending performance to parent banks’ balance sheet positions. (e.g. Cull and Martinez Peria, 2013; Dinger, 
2009; De Haas and Van Lelyveld, 2006; Jeon et al., 2013; Gattini and Zagorisiou, 2016; Temesvary and Banai, 2017).
3 In October 2012, under the umbrella of the revived Vienna Initiative 2.0, the EIB designed, and now manages, the 
Bank Lending Survey (BLS) for the CESEE region, to disentangle demand and supply factors as well as the underlying 
domestic and international components affecting lending activity in the region. Taking into account the unique nature 
of the regional banking sector, with a large proportion of banks being foreign-owned, the survey investigates both the 
strategies of international banks active in CESEE and the market conditions and market expectations as perceived by 
the local subsidiaries/local banks. To that end, the survey covers the major international banks operating in CESEE 
and their subsidiaries in the region. At the same time, to gain a full understanding of local market conditions, an effort 
has been made to also include in the survey the relevant domestic players in a specific local market. For more details on 
the survey and data please refer to the following link: http://www.eib.org/en/about/economic-research/surveys.htm
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Bank capital remained largely cross-border, bank funding less so
When looking at total cross-border banking exposures vis-à-vis CESEE, there has 
been at a steady decline since 2009. The external position of Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS)-reporting banks is currently down at levels comparable to early 
2007. Figure 1 documents the boom in cross-border lending in the run-up to the 
2008/9 financial crisis, and the subsequent decline in external positions.4 It also 
shows two major events that triggered significant contractions in the external 
exposure: they are highlighted with grey bars. First, the global financial crisis of 
2008/9 contributed to a reduction in cross-border exposures. Second, the regional 
eurozone sovereign debt crisis, which reached its peak in mid-2011, also had a 
detrimental effect on cross-border banking exposures. It had a first-round effect, 
generating an immediate reduction in exposures. Then, as the eurozone national 
banking models came under further stress, cross-border banks entered into a 
rebalancing strategy whereby direct funding support to their subsidiaries has been 
gradually reduced over time.
Figure 1.












































Source: Authors calculation based on BIS data.
Note:  Index 100=2007Q1 based on billions of US$, exchange-rate adjusted, vis-à-vis all sectors; 
grey bars correspond to the global financial crisis and the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis.
4 The figure is based on cross-border claims of BIS-reporting banks on counterparties listed in the CESEE region. The 
series have been normalised to equal 100 in 2007 Q1.
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Figure 2.



















































































Source: Authors’ calculation based on EIB – CESEE Bank Lending Survey.
Note:  Cross-border operations involving CESEE countries – Net percentages: positive (negative) 
figures refer to increasing (decreasing) exposure. Question from the survey: Group’s 
exposure to CESEE: Concerning cross-border operations to CESEE countries, your 
group did/intends to increase/decrease/maintain the exposure compared to the previous 
six months.
The aggregate net balance of self-reported exposures in the BLS is consistent 
with the BIS data. International banks reported on average that they had been 
decreasing their exposure to the CESEE region in the past few years, including 
over the second half of 2018 (Figure 2). The last observation shows a significant 
turnaround compared to the positive outcome recorded for the first time in early 
2018. Interestingly, the trend of total exposure to the CESEE region has plunged into 
negative territory because the number of banks declaring an increase in exposure 
was significantly lower than in the second half of 2017. This rather substantial 
reversal squares with the significantly higher volatility recorded in global financial 
markets, and especially emerging market economies. 
Nevertheless, the reduction in exposures is specific to debt funding. While many 
banking groups operating in the CESEE region have reduced their regional 
exposure over the past six years, most of the enduring negative contributions to 
the CESEE exposures stemmed from reduced intra-group funding to subsidiaries. 
International banking groups reducing their intra-group funding exposures have 
significantly outnumbered banking groups expanding their intra-group funding 
to CESEE subsidiaries (Figure 3). 
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Figure 3. 






















































































Source: Authors’ calculation based on EIB – CESEE Bank Lending Survey.
Note:  Cross-border operations involving CESEE countries – Net percentages: positive (negative) 
figures refer to increasing (decreasing) exposure in the specific category. “Other” refers to an 
average of direct cross border lending to domestic clients nd funding to banks not part of 
the group. Question from the survey: Group’s exposure to CESEE: Concerning cross-border 
operations to CESEE countries, your group did/intends to increase/decrease/maintain the 
intra-group/capital/other) exposure compared to the previous six months.
Figure 4. 
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Source: Raiffeisenbank International.
Note: Data refer to 2017 and represent foreign-owned assets as a share of total assets.
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At the same time, most parent banks reported consistently that they have maintained 
their capital exposure to their subsidiaries. Data from the BLS confirms that, on 
average, international banks contributed positively to their capital position in the 
CESEE – in stark contrast to the dynamics of intra-group funding.
The stability of equity-type banking flows is also reflected in the stable share of 
foreign bank ownership in the region, which remains exceptionally high by global 
standards (Figure 4). While there have been some exits from the region, and minor 
declines in the share of foreign ownership in certain countries, the overall picture 
has not changed: international banks continue to play a pivotal, determining role in 
the financial landscape of CESEE. 
It appears that cross-border banking is still alive, but the model has changed somewhat. 
The strategic commitment of international banks to the region does not seem to be at 
stake. Yet, a progressive reduction of parent/subsidiary funding has been taking place. 
The emerging focus on self-sustainability as a fundamental driver of global banks’ 
strategic decisions reflects their experience of the crisis. Cross-border lending flows 
intermediated by the banking system may indeed have contributed to some extent to 
pre-crisis imbalances and, as a consequence, to the amplitude of the boom-bust cycles 
in credit and growth. International banks operating in CESEE have adapted to this 
lesson by calling on their subsidiaries to implement a more self-sustained financing 
model, with lending financed mostly via domestic funding – e.g., deposits.
Figure 5. 
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Range (25 & 75 percentile) Average
Source:  Authors’ calculation based on National authorities; BIS; ECB; EBRD; and IMF, 
Monetary and Financial Statistics.
Note: Average values represent the (unweighted) mean across countries in the region.
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This strategy can be observed in the development of loan-to-deposit ratios 
(LTDs), which went through a significant rebalancing in recent years. The 
average regional LTD was relatively high between 2007 and 2014, averaging above 
110%, albeit improving over time. By 2016 the average LTD was already close to 
100% (Figure 5). The LTD improved further between 2017 and 2018, ultimately 
stabilising at around 100%. This means that some of the past vulnerabilities have 
been addressed, and the banking sector in the region is currently in a better shape 
to sustain present and future growth, being currently more reliant on domestic 
sources of funding. These developments go hand-in-hand with the strategy of most 
international groups operating in the region: a gradual reduction in intra-group 
funding to their subsidiaries in favour of a rebalanced organic growth strategy 
strongly focused on domestic funding sources.
We can conclude that, despite the decline in total bank exposure, cross-border 
banking is alive and well in CESEE. While adapting their funding strategies to 
the key lessons from the crisis, foreign-owned banks continue to play a key role 
in the financial system of the region, and they remain committed to doing so. In 
the following section we look at this commitment more closely.
International banks maintained their commitment  
to the CESEE region
Figure 6. 
International banking groups’ strategic operations to increase capital ratio 







































































Yes No Yes 2013/2014
Source: Authors’ calculation based on EIB – CESEE Bank Lending Survey.
Note:  “Yes 2013/2014” refers to the average percentage positive responses for 2013 and 2014. 
Question from the survey: Has your group conducted strategic operations to increase the 
capital ratio and/or will conduct strategic operations? If yes, which type? 
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Figure 7. 
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Source: Authors’ calculation based on EIB – CESEE Bank Lending Survey.
Note:  Question from the survey: Deleveraging – over the next six months, do you expect the loan-
to-deposit ratio of your group to increase/decrease/remain stable.
The commitment of international banking groups to the CESEE region can be 
assessed through various questions from the CESEE BLS. These are answered 
at the parent level, and cover various areas within the banking group’s strategic 
operations, such as deleveraging in general, capital increases and decreases 
and funding positions, as well as the banking group’s view about the region’s 
market, its attractiveness, profitability and riskiness relative to the group’s overall 
operations, etc. 
About 30% of the banking groups operating in CESEE still continued their 
restructuring activities at a global level in 2018. This value is nevertheless below 
the 2013-14 average. Capital increases have been achieved exclusively via sales of 
assets and branches. The relevance of these types of activities remained largely 
the same between 2013 and 2018 (Figure 6). 
Around 50% of the banking groups signal intentions to continue to conduct 
sales of assets. This is a broad concept that can includes sales of loan portfolios, 
security holding, physical assets, etc. These strategic trades cannot be seen as ad 
hoc adjustments to balance sheets; rather they should be interpreted as a structural 
feature of doing business for some international groups.
A smaller number of international groups signal sales of branches of activities. 
This is probably part of on-going structural adjustments to the business 
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strategy of international banking groups, as well as a response to regulatory and 
recapitalisation requirements in some cases.5
No public contribution to bank capital has been reported recently or is expected in 
the near future. However, the state had been an active source of capital increases 
in some cases between 2014 and 2015. In 2013 and 2014, banks had also been 
raising capital on the market, but this source has not been used recently according 
to the latest rounds of the survey. 
The survey also indicates that the deleveraging has ended. Only about 20% of 
banking groups – less than in 2013-14 – have continued to decrease their LTD, 
whilst an equal number of banking groups have been re-leveraging. Deleveraging 
at the group level (Figure 7) has slowed significantly compared to 2013 and 2014, 
and compared to the already improved conditions in 2015 and 2016. Overall, the 
even distribution between increases and decreases in groups’ LTDs shows that the 
earlier trend of unequivocal deleveraging has stopped, and banks are considering 














































































































Source: Authors’ calculation based on EIB – CESEE Bank Lending Survey.
Note:  Net percentages; positive values indicate increased access to funding; Question from the 
survey: in terms of funding: has access to funding of your subsidiary/branch/local bank 
changed over the past six months? Possible answers: increased/decreased/unchanged.
5 For example, some banks headquartered in Greece had mandated provisions to sell part of their non-domestic assets 
under the recapitalisation plans executed within the framework of the third macroeconomic adjustment programme.
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Funding conditions at the group level have broadly eased in past years and have 
continued to ease over the past six months (Figure 8). Corporate and retail deposits 
made a significant positive contribution to total access to funding. The global access 
to funding of the banking groups continued to ease in the recent past. Following a 
contraction during 2015, access to funding resumed an easing trend in the first half 
of 2016 and accelerated further in 2017. The contraction in access to funding in 
2015 was a temporary event, which coincided with the long-tail effects generated by 
the Greek crisis of spring/summer 2015. The 2018 developments can be described 
as broadly in line with 2017 outcomes. The developments detected in aggregate 
access to funding reflect prolonged improvements in retail and corporate funding, 
and positive contributions from wholesale debt issuance. Notably, the interbank 
market continued to play a positive role, and banking groups have continued to rely 
less and less on central bank liquidity. This is a further positive signal of a more 
stable and self-supporting funding environment. 
The majority of banking groups are planning to maintain or selectively expand their 
CESEE operations. This commitment is supported by the profitability of CESEE 
operations: the overall return on assets on operations in the region is reported to be 
higher than that of the overall group. While this is true for the majority of the banks 
present, some 20% of banking groups report a combination of diminishing regional 
returns and intentions to reduce operations. Overall, the assessment of market 
prospects shows a continued stabilisation in the region, with diversified potential 
and profitability across countries (Figure 9). Cross-border banking groups signal an 
intention to expand operations selectively in the region (Figure 10). Nevertheless, 
they continue to discriminate in terms of countries of operation as they reassess 
their country-by-country strategies. Around 35% of the groups have a medium- 
to long-term strategy of selective expansion of operations, whilst about 45% of 
groups intend to maintain the same level of operations in the region. Around 20% 
of banking groups – predominantly, but not exclusively those based in Greece – 
indicated that they may reduce operations in the long term.
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Figure 9. 
ROA of your CESEE operations - percent of responses with ROA lower than 


















Source: Authors’ calculation based on EIB – CESEE Bank Lending Survey.
Note:  Question from the survey: profitability of the strategy in the CESEE region: is ROA of 
your CESEE operations higher/lower/equal to that for the overall group?
Figure 10. 























Source: Authors’ calculation based on EIB – CESEE Bank Lending Survey.
Note:  Question from the survey: longer-term strategic approach (beyond 12 months): looking at 
operations via subsidiaries in CESEE, your group intends to…
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Credit to the private sector: lower but safer
Overall credit growth in the CESEE region has been positive since late 2016, after 
a period of heightened volatility characterised by fluctuations. In the post-crisis 
period credit demand contracted significantly, and supply conditions tightened in 
parallel. Demand for credit first started to accelerate in late 2014 in some countries. 
This positive trend solidified further in 2015-16. Heightened demand was the 
main precursor of credit growth. Figure 11 depicts demand and supply drivers 
underpinning regional credit developments in CESEE, using measures derived 
from the BLS. According to these, demand conditions became self-sustained in 
2017 and 2018, thus leading credit growth to accelerate further. 
Demand for loans and credit lines continued to increase robustly (Figure 11). The 
latest results from the BLS mark the eleventh consecutive half-year of increased 
aggregate demand for credit. The positive and increasing demand is now present in 
all client segments, product types and maturities, but somewhat less so for foreign 
currency loans. This is a very different situation from 2013, when demand for loans 
was decreasing across the board, except for a mild positive development on short-
term maturities. Towards the end of 2014, demand started to turn around in some 
segments, notably in local currency from SMEs and for consumer credit. Ultimately, 
demand for foreign-currency-denominated loans turned positive in 2017, when all 
other components of demand were already largely in positive territory.
Supply conditions eased only marginally in past years. Supply conditions eased 
slightly in 2015 and 2016 (Figure 11). A mild easing was also recorded in the second 
half of 2017 and early 2018. Across the client spectrum, credit standards eased on 
SME lending and consumer credit, whilst they continued to tighten on mortgages. 
Supply conditions eased on short-term loans, and only slightly on long-term loans, 
primarily those in local currency. The general terms and conditions of loan supply 
to the corporate segment loosened recently, with easier collateral requirements, 
longer maturities and markedly larger average sizes. 
However, improvements in supply have been lagging behind the increase in 
demand. The increasing optimism on the demand side was still met with cautious 
improvements in supply-side conditions, leaving a noticeable perceived gap between 
demand and supply, given the strong economic growth recorded recently in CESEE.
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Figure 11. 
























































Supply Demand Credit extensions*
Source:  Authors’ calculation based on EIB – CESEE Bank Lending Survey and WIIW data for 
credit extensions.
Note:  * Credit growth is computed using a semi-annual window, and the reference period is 
the previous six months to match it with the survey releases and survey information set 
and the perimeter reflects the BLS country coverage; **net percentages: positive values 
indicate increased (easing) demand (supply); the credit aggregate is constructed based 
on growth rates aggregated via country-specific GDP weights and the country perimeter 
reflects the BLS country coverage. Questions from the survey: Credit Supply: bank's 
(local subsidiary’s) credit standards applied when assessing credit applications (eased, 
unchanged, tightened); Credit Demand: demand for loans or credit lines to enterprises 
and households (increased, stable, decreased). Net percentages; positive figures refer to 
increasing (easing) demand (supply).
Almost all the individual factors behind credit demand show significant 
improvements. Unlike 2013-14, all factors influencing demand made a positive 
contribution (Figure 12). Working capital accounted for a large share of the 
demand stemming from enterprises. Contributions to demand from investment 
exerted a significant positive impact, scoring increasingly higher over time. This 
indicates a stronger economic cycle and an improved macroeconomic and financial 
environment more conducive to investment. Corporate and debt restructuring, as 
well as mergers and acquisitions, have been less and less important factors behind 
demand, and all currently stand near zero. This also indicates a shift of demand from 
less to more productive sources. Housing- and non-housing-related consumption 
also continued to make robust and positive contributions to demand, and consumer 
confidence continues to exert a positive effect. 
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Figure 12. 






































































































Source: Authors’ calculation based on EIB – CESEE Bank Lending Survey.
Note:  Net percentages; positive values indicate a positive contribution to demand; Question from 
the survey: Factors affecting clients’ demand for loan applications – how have they changed 
over the past six months? (options: contributed to lower/unchanged/higher demand).
The number of domestic and international factors limiting supply has decreased 
substantially over time (Figures 13 and 14). Until end-2014, essentially all factors 
had constrained supply conditions. In 2015, some elements started to be supportive. 
Lately only few components are still considered a binding constraint to supply. 
Specifically, EU regulation, group capital constraints, group outlook and group NPL 
figures were the core international factors constraining supply until end-2015. Group 
capital position and EU regulation shifted from a constraining position to a rather 
neutral contribution from early 2016 onwards. Generally, group outlook played a 
supportive role, whilst group NPLs are still perceived today as a constraining factor.
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Figure 13. 
Domestic factors contributing to 
supply conditions – net percentages
Figure 14. 
International factors contributing to 





















































































Local bank capital constraints



























































































Source:  Authors’ calculation based on EIB – 
CESEE Bank Lending Survey.
Note:  Net percentages; positive values 
indicate a positive contribution to 
an easing of supply/credit standards; 
Question from the survey: Factors 
affecting your bank’s credit standards 
(credit supply). Have the following 
domestic and international factors 
contributed to tighten (ease) your 
credit standards over the past six 
months? Options: tightening/easing/
neutral contribution to supply 
conditions.
Source:  Authors’ calculation based on EIB – 
CESEE Bank Lending Survey.
Note: See Note to Figure 13.
On the domestic side, local market outlook was the first factor to contribute to 
an easing of supply during the second half of 2015. By mid-2017, domestic NPLs 
had also ceased to be a constraining factor. In 2018, local capital became more 
of a neutral contributor rather than a tightening factor. Finally, changes in local 
regulation are still perceived as a limiting element to an easing of supply.
It appears that the more cautious strategy of the banks has contributed to the 
improvement in the quality of credit portfolios. Originally, the crisis led to a 
marked deterioration in the ratio of NPLs. However, 2015 was a turning point, 
and NPLs at an aggregate level have been improving ever since (Figure 15). By 
mid-2018, regional aggregate NPL ratios had normalised substantially and reached 
levels that are broadly in line with the pre-crisis ones. The commercial banks’ 
efforts to eliminate the NPL legacy of the crisis was supported by a substantial 
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set of reforms by domestic regulators. These measures helped to incentivise 
the banks to clean these legacy assets, which had been acting as a drag on new 
lending, from their balance sheets. The Vienna Initiative played an active role 
in the coordination and implementation of this reform agenda in the region (see 
EBCI, 2018).
Figure 15. 








Source: Authors’ calculation based on WIIW and national central banks.
Note:  Regional average computed using EUR based GDP weights (average 2012-2018) and 
based on Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Slovenia.
Safer bank lending practices are also ref lected in the declining role of loans 
denominated foreign currency (Figure 16). These loans represented a significant 
vulnerability in some countries of the region during the crisis. The role of such 
loans has been diminishing at a steady pace, again as a result of the banks’ own 
strategy, relying chiefly on domestic funding, combined with decisive regulatory 
disincentives in many of the countries that were heavily affected by the issue 
during the crisis. As a result, the role of foreign-exchange-denominated loans has 
been typically restricted to those segments of the corporate sector that obtain 
revenues in foreign currencies and therefore have a natural hedge against the 
exchange rate risk.
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Figure 16.
Foreign currency loans to non-financial private sector in CESEE  








































































































FX as % of total loans (RHS) y/y growth
Source: Authors’ calculation based on WIIW and National Central Banks.
Note:  Regional average for shares and growth rates computed using EUR based GDP weights 
(average 2012-2018) and based on Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Slovenia.
All in all, the experience so far suggests that the post-crisis model of cross-border 
banking leads to lower, but possibly safer, credit growth in CESEE. On the one 
hand, credit dynamics finally turned into positive territory after a long period of 
contraction after the crisis. On the other hand, the positive growth of credit is not 
comparable with the seemingly excessive dynamics that characterised the period 
leading up to 2008. The fact that credit growth is driven by demand factors rather 
than by the ease of supply factors suggests that credit dynamics are not procyclical 
but, on the contrary, are more likely to be in line with the underlying economic 
developments. Although good portfolio quality during a cyclical upswing provides 
limited information about resilience during a crisis, the continuous improvement 
in NPLs indicates that the portfolios are relatively safe, and that the banks in 
CESEE could overcome the legacy of the crisis. Furthermore, the significantly 
lower prevalence of foreign-exchange-denominated loans also indicate a more 
cautious and prudent lending strategy by the international banking groups present 
in the region.
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Conclusions
In this chapter we looked at the status of cross-border banking in CESEE in the 
post-crisis period. Our analysis points to cross-border banking being as important 
in the region as it was before. However, the way international banking groups 
operate has changed substantially, and the banks’ approach to the region has 
incorporated some lessons from the crisis and the post-crisis period.
Substantial foreign inflows into bank equity has remained an important feature 
of the CESEE region, and the level of foreign bank ownership is still particularly 
high. International banking groups reinforced their commitment to the region 
and look at their local operations as strategic assets that bring profitability and 
risk reduction through diversification.
Nevertheless, when it comes to debt-type foreign inflows, the region experienced 
significant outf lows. International banks implement a more self-sustained 
financing model for their subsidiaries in the region, with lending financed mostly 
by domestic funding – e.g., deposits. This is reflected in the substantial reduction 
in LTD.
Reliance on domestic funding allows for less, but safer credit in the region. Total 
credit growth in the region has been positive again since 2016. This credit growth 
is driven primarily by demand, with the supply-side developments lagging. This 
cautious approach of banks is reflected in the fact that, so far, credit growth has 
been accompanied by a parallel decline in the share of NPLs. Dependence on 
domestic deposits for lending may also limit the procyclicality of credit dynamics, 
and could help to avoid overheating and bubbles while tying credit f lows more 
closely to potential growth. The presence of additional safeguards and a more 
cautious approach are also reflected in the very limited role of foreign-currency 
lending in recent credit growth.
Is there a role for more cross-border banking in CESEE? In principle, stronger 
cross-border capital f lows could foster more rapid convergence of the CESEE 
economies and would also strengthen international risk sharing. However, the 
crisis showed that cross-border capital f lows can have a detrimental impact, 
especially if the institutional framework is not prepared. If the countries of CESEE 
have the ambition to reap the benefits of even higher levels of cross-border capital 
flows, the preconditions and safeguards need to be laid down. This is particularly 
true when it comes to the regulation of the financial sector: large international 
capital f lows should come hand-in-hand with a high level of coordination of 
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banking regulation, supervision and resolution policies – just as envisaged by 
the ambitious Banking Union project of the EU. While the seeds of CESEE-
level coordination are present, for instance, within the Vienna Initiative, a much 
stronger regulatory integration is needed for the region to successfully handle the 
challenges stemming from large-volume cross-border capital flows intermediated 
through international banking groups.
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CHAPTER 12
The Non-Performing Loans 
Initiative: progress 
since its launch in 2014
Bojan Marković, Eric Cloutier and Jure Jerić 
European Bank for Reconstruction  
and Development (EBRD)
Executive Summary
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008-9, the Central, Eastern 
and Southeastern Europe (CESEE,1 or the region) rapidly became burdened with 
the accumulation of Nonperforming loans (NPLs) in the banking systems. This 
threatened financial stability nationally, but also introduced contagion between 
countries, particularly where larger banking groups had a presence across the 
region. Gaps between countries in tackling their growing NPL problems also 
became apparent. 
The Vienna Initiative2 has long recognised NPLs as a key impediment for a revival 
in credit markets, and created the NPL Initiative workstream in 2014 to build 
greater transparency of the NPL resolution framework, support country reforms 
in the area and improve restructuring environments. The work has been focused 
on five “Partner Countries” (Albania, Croatia, Hungary, Montenegro and Serbia), 
whilst many other CESEE countries also benefited from the Initiative, as did Cyprus 
and Greece3. A broad range of technical assistance has been provided to the region 
under the framework to solve the most pressing impediments to NPL resolution 
and to support the development of sound markets.  
1 CESEE countries refers to Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Kosovo, Latvia, Lithuania, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia.
2 The “Vienna Initiative” is a framework for safeguarding the financial stability of emerging Europe. It brings together 
all the relevant public and private sector stakeholders of EU-based cross-border banks active in emerging Europe, 
which own much of the banking sectors in that region.
3 Cyprus and Greece are not formally included within CESEE region definition of this paper.
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While challenges remain, the CESEE NPL situation has improved considerably 
since the launch of the NPL Initiative. The gross NPL ratio in the region more 
than halved from its peak of 9.8% in 2014 Q1 to 4.0% in 2018 Q3. In Partner 
Countries, the improvement was particularly striking, with the ratio falling from 
17.4% to 6.2% in the same period. NPL volumes in CESEE also decreased to €38.0 
billion in 2018 Q3 from €68.1 billion in 2013 Q3. Moreover, in the period 2015 
H1 to 2018 H1 an estimated €13.7 billion4 of market NPL sales were realised 
in CESEE, with over 20 companies now providing NPL management and/or 
recovery services across the region. These developments are at least partly a direct 
result of the efforts provided by multiple institutions and stakeholders through 
the NPL Initiative. 
Background of the NPL Initiative
The extent of the NPL challenge in the CESEE region at its peak
The very high credit growth in the CESEE during the period 2003-8 led to 
an unsustainable boom which ended abruptly with the global financial crisis 
of 2008/9.5 This resulted in economic downturns and even recessions in many 
jurisdictions across CESEE. The banking systems ultimately suffered, leading to 
the rapid accumulation of NPLs in the following years6. 
The volume of NPLs7 in the CESEE peaked at €68.1 billion in Q3 2013.8,9 The 
significant undercapitalisation of the banking system accentuated the challenge, 
contributing to further credit contraction in the economies, and itself accentuating 
the problem. NPL ratios10 continued to rise to reach 9.8%in CESEE in 2014 Q1.11 
These levels were unsustainable for local economies and the broader financial 
stability of the region. 
4 This transaction value is sourced from public sources only, but it is expected that a number of confidential transactions 
have also been realised across the region.
5 European Banking Coordination “Vienna Initiative“: Working Group on NPLs in CESEE, March 2012.
6 For more details see “Non-Performing Loans in CESEE: Determinants and Impact on Macroeconomic Performance” 
(March 2013), by Klein, Nir (IMF Working Paper), https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2016/12/31/
Non-Performing-Loans-in-CESEE-Determinants-and-Impact-on-Macroeconomic-Performance-40413 
7 Unless stated otherwise, NPL refers to Gross NPL throughout the publication.
8 Unless stated otherwise, all data are sourced from the IMF Financial Soundness Indicators (IMF FSI), available at 
http://data.imf.org/regular.aspx?key=61404590, accessed on 1 March 2019. For individual country definitions and 
to allow more precise comparisons, it is advised to consult the IMF FSI metadata. In addition, data on Montenegro 
and Serbia are obtained from respective central banks, as they are not available in the IMF FSI database.
9 All data were sourced in local currency and converted to US dollar and then Euro, using IMF exchange rates available at 
the following link: National Currency per US Dollar, end of period http://data.imf.org/regular.aspx?key=61545862.
10 The NPL ratio is calculated by taking the NPL volume as the numerator, and the total gross value of the loan portfolio 
(including gross NPLs, i.e. before the deduction of specific loan-loss provisions) as the denominator.
11 Weighted average.
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As a large portion of the distressed assets were on the balance sheets of subsidiaries 
of the cross-border banks that dominated the region’s banking sectors, there was a 
growing risk that bank failures would have systemic consequences with contagion 
between jurisdictions, even beyond the CESEE region. 
Structural changes were required to resolve NPLs, as most CESEE countries did 
have not have adequate market infrastructures and the institutional prerequisites to 
support efficient and effective debt restructuring, enforcement or liquidation in the 
non-financial corporate sector. Common categories of market impediments included 
the inadequacy of the legal framework and infrastructures, weaknesses in banking 
supervision, opacity (or absence) of information and counter-effective tax regimes. In 
addition, the regional market for loan sales remained under-developed, with banks 
having limited external options to deleverage their NPL risks. However, banks were 
also ill-equipped to manage such loans internally, with insufficient skills and resources 
to deal with the mounting problem. This combination of factors led to amplification 
of the NPL problem and value erosion in the banks’ distressed loan books.
Rapid measures were therefore required to improve the situation and avoid a 
downward spiral in the banking systems, both on a regional and country-specific level.
Figure 1.
Evolution of gross NPL volumes (€ billion) and NPL/GDP, gross NPL, and net 
NPL ratios in CESEE, 2008-2018
Source: NPL Monitor and associated EBRD database.a
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Figure 2.
Evolution of gross NPL volumes (€ billion) and net NPL/capital ratio in CESEE 
2008-2018
Source: NPL Monitor and associated EBRD database.
Figure 3.
Latest NPL ratios available across CESEE (blue) with five Partner Countries in 
green (Albania, Croatia, Hungary, Montenegro, and Serbia
Source: NPL Monitor and associated EBRD database.
The roots of the NPL problem 
CESEE region
The reasons for the rise of NPLs varied between countries, depending on the specific 
local circumstances. There were, however, some region-wide commonalities to the 
initial rapid rise in NPLs. Most notably, a considerable portion of increases in NPLs 
were triggered by currency depreciation, as many household and corporate loans 
were denominated in foreign currencies (such as US dollars, euros or Swiss francs) 
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while borrowers’ incomes were in local currencies, leading to the inability to meet 
their loan obligations.  
As confirmed empirically12, there is a robust relation between high NPLs and weaker 
credit and GDP growth, with two-way causality. High NPLs can depress credit 
activity, growth and ultimately job creation, which in turn perpetuates private-
sector debt difficulties and leads to further increases in NPLs, potentially leading 
to a downward spiral. This was the situation of many CESEE countries, posing 
considerable systemic risks for the region. Some regulators were initially reluctant to 
allow banks to write off unrecoverable NPLs, fearing that this would further weaken 
banks’ capital and lead to broader strains in the financial system. This contributed 
to the accumulation of the NPL stock in the banks of these jurisdictions. 
The five Partner Countries of the NPL Initiative
While there were many region-wide commonalities, there were also a variety of 
specific issues leading to the accumulation of NPLs across countries.  For example, 
the five countries which collaborated closely with the Vienna Initiative institutions 
under the NPL Initiative workstream (the “Partner Countries”), all presented some 
specificities at the root of their NPL growth and/or in the challenges they faced 
in reducing them.
• Hungary was principally impacted by the significant exchange rate depreciation 
that increased the debt service burden of FX loans (52% Hungarian forint 
(HUF) depreciation against the US dollar  in the period 2008 H1 to 2012 
H1) in combination with the weak labour market.13 While the core of the 
NPLs came from the household segment, there were also a considerable 
number of corporate NPLs linked to project financing in the real estate market 
(accentuated by declining real estate collateral values). Furthermore, a decreased 
level of demand (due to increasing unemployment) forced corporations to reduce 
production/product prices and lower rental fees, which served as the primary 
sources of instalment payments. Moreover, many real estate related projects 
were not finished or could not be sold post completion, pushing debtors into 
nonperforming status.
12 For the overview of the literature see Balgova et al., ‘The economic impact of reducing non-performing loans”, EBRD 
Working Papers Series (2016) and Navaretti et al. (eds.) “European Economy: Banks, Regulation, and the Real 
Sector – Non-Performing Loans” (2017).
13 For more details, see: “Analysis of Corporate Restructuring and Insolvency in Hungary” (February 2015), published 
by EBRD, EY and White & Case.
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• Albania was also particularly impacted by foreign currency loans, principally 
in the corporate segment. Over-lending and financing of speculative assets in 
combination with a large number of moral hazard cases were some of the key 
drivers of unsustainable NPL volumes. The situation resulted in two large 
corporate bankruptcies in 2016 (an oil refinery and a commodity exporter).
• Croatia had become heavily exposed by the unsustainable credit boom of 
2001-8. Given a relatively stable exchange rate between Croatian kuna (HRK) 
and the euro, in 2013 the proportion of nonperforming housing loans indexed 
to the Swiss franc was about two and a half times greater than those that 
were euro-indexed. The corporate NPL ratio reached nearly double the size 
of the household NPL ratio, with the construction and commerce sectors 
contributing the most to the NPL problem.14 In addition, the country suffered 
the administration procedure of the largest Croatian conglomerate, Agrokor 
Group,15 in 2017. 
• Serbia, as with Croatia, experienced an increase in its corporate debt burden to 
almost three times the size of its household NPLs.16 The majority of corporate 
debt was accumulated either by large conglomerates (holdings) originating from 
earlier privatisations of state-owned enterprises or by businesses that developed 
organically from small family companies, whose growth was accompanied by 
increased indebtedness. In addition, the 50 most indebted companies held 
between 50% and 60% of total corporate excessive debt.17
• Montenegro was mostly challenged by its corporate indebtedness. The economic 
downturn decreased corporate profits and made many companies run losses, 
which impaired their ability to pay the monthly instalments. Furthermore, 
the decrease in corporate liabilities to domestic banks was largely offset by 
rising indebtedness to non-residents, which can be partly explained through 
the transfer of NPLs from bank balance sheets to asset management companies 
belonging to parent banks.18
14 For more details see ‘Financial Stability No 11’ (July 2013), published by Croatian Central Banks (HNB) 
https://www.hnb.hr/documents/20182/122362/e-fs-11-2013.pdf/c3976160-548d-4e41-a0f1-1fc18006800b
15 For more details look at ‘Financial Stability No 19’ (May 2018), published by Croatian Central Banks (HNB) 
https://www.hnb.hr/documents/20182/2502358/e-fs-19-2018.pdf/96fd21fc-d4af-4f45-9588-c3eae0e3d6c6
16 For original data look at: http://nbs.rs/internet/cirilica/90/ioi_arhiva.html 
17 For more details look at ‘Corporate NPL portfolios in CESEE countries: impact of corporate leverage and debt 
spillovers on firm performance’ (August 2016), published by Damijan, Joze. P. (EBRD Working Paper) http://npl.
vienna-initiative.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2016/09/NPL-impact-of-corporate-leverage-and-debt-spillovers-
on-firm-performance.pdf
18 For more details, see IMF Country Report No.16/79 (March 2016) http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2016/
cr1679.pdf
205
The Non-Performing Loans Initiative: progress since its launch in 2014
Regional technical assistance through the NPL Initiative   
The significant stock of NPLs in the region was considered a systemic challenge, 
as it imposed significant pressure on financial stability, banks’ profitability and 
the overall economy. A key issue in tackling the NPLs was a “collective action” 
problem, in which individual payoffs to NPL resolution were limited in the absence 
of a system-wide coordinated approach. Such coordination support and technical 
assistance were necessary in CESEE, both at the individual jurisdiction level and 
for the region as a whole. 
The Vienna Initiative, launched in 2009, has long recognised NPLs as a key 
impediment for a revival in credit markets. The European Banking Coordination 
“Vienna Initiative” report published in March 2012 highlighted19 the key issues in 
the CESEE and the need for more robust actions from IFIs to support and help 
accelerating NPL resolution in the region. In order to tackle the issue, the NPL 
Initiative was born in 2014 as a dedicated workstream, building upon the successful 
private-public sector coordination platform of the Vienna Initiative. 
The NPL Initiative is a broad International Financial Institutions’ (IFIs) NPL 
project. It draws on the work within the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
the World Bank Group, the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European 
Commission (EC) and is managed by a small group of experts within the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). Each of these IFIs supports 
individual countries’ efforts in their particular area of expertise, fully coordinating 
their help and initiatives for maximum impact. 
While most CESEE countries have benefited from the Initiative, the work has 
been focused on the five Partner Countries which have a more formal collaboration 
agreement, namely Albania, Croatia, Hungary, Montenegro and Serbia. Numerous 
activities have been implemented since the start of the NPL initiative (see Section 2) 
and important progress has been made in the region in reducing the lagging stock 
of NPLs and preventing new accumulation (see section 3). 
Key objectives and achievements of the NPL Initiative
The NPL Initiative aims to increase the speed and effectiveness of NPL resolution 
and support the development of sound NPL transaction (sales) markets in the 
region. It provides a structured framework in which IFIs and National Competent 
19 For more details look at ‘European Banking Coordination Vienna Initiative’ (March 2012) https://www.imf.org/
external/region/eur/pdf/2012/030112.pdf
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Authorities (NCAs) ¬– in consultation with banks, investors and industry experts – 
can work together to define and implement solutions to individual countries’ NPL 
challenges.  
The NPL Initiative has three overlapping objectives: 
1) enhancing the transparency of restructuring frameworks 
2) capacity building through technical assistance
3) knowledge sharing
The extent to which these objectives have been reached through the IFIs’ 
commitment to tackling NPLs is best illustrated by three recent and tangible 
achievements. 
• Creation of the NPL Initiative website (npl.vienna-initiative.com) by the 
EBRD. In line with the objectives of enhancing transparency of restructuring 
frameworks and disseminating knowledge, the website has become an industry 
reference as a “one-stop shop” for intelligence and information on the best ways 
to resolve NPLs.  
• Publication of a semi-annual NPL Monitor (six editions published since May 
2016). The publication adds value to the existing NPL analyses by tracking 
distressed debt transactions and national reform measures. Each publication is 
authored by EBRD NPL specialists in consultation with other IFIs and national 
partners.
• Capacity building, which includes among other things technical assistance 
coordinated between the principal international organisations and EU bodies. 
Training in modern restructuring principles has also been provided in various 
jurisdictions to build local skills. Such capacity building has been provided 
through organising conferences, workshops and training. For example, the 
EBRD has led (i) three regional conferences on NPLs (Vienna in June 2015 
and September 2014, and Kiev in April 2018), (ii) four regional trainings on 
NPL restructuring (Vienna in November 2015 and October 2016, and Athens 
in November 2017 and May 2018) and (iii) various local workshops (Budapest 
in October 2016, Zagreb in November 2016, Nicosia in May 2017, Sofia in 
September 2017 and Skopje in October 2018).
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In addition to work performed in the partner countries of the NPL Initiative, 
further technical assistance has been provided to other countries on an ad hoc basis. 
Overall, the EBRD has provided technical assistance on NPLs to eleven countries 
since the start of the NPL Initiative in 2015, and other IFIs have reached out to 
even more countries.
In addition, in November 2017 the EBRD launched an investment framework 
to mobilise up to €1.5 billion to help further reduce the high levels of NPLs in its 
countries of operation. Under this framework, the EBRD can commit to minority 
investments up to a total of  €300 million, which is to be complemented by external 
financing of up to €1.2 billion from approved commercial partners. This comes 
in addition to the International Finance Corporation’s (IFC’s) distressed asset 
programme, which has a more global reach.
Cross-institutional cooperation and coordination
Regulators, IFIs and the banking industry worked together to assess, define and 
implement solutions to the reduction of the high stock of NPLs in the CESEE. 
While no “one-size-fits-all” model can be applied, a broad consensus exists in terms 
of prerequisites for supporting efficient and effective NPL resolution. But specific 
frameworks and remediating measures must be tailored on a country-specific basis 
to ensure that the right solutions are identified and that the solutions are adapted 
to the local specificities and needs. The broader IFI work on NPLs was therefore 
complemented by specific in-country dialogues and technical assessment by the 
IFI members of the NPL Initiative for the Partner Countries. This resulted in 
the development, together with the NCAs, of series of country-specific activities. 
For example, the EBRD sponsored in-depth impediment assessments in countries 
such as Hungary and Serbia to support the development of multi-year action 
plans. The World Bank led on a similar work in Albania. 
In addition to the IFIs’ work, a broad range of initiatives have also been adopted 
in the European Union, as it also faced (and still faces) important challenges 
with an accumulation of NPLs in the banks of its member countries. As part 
of the NPL Initiative, the EBRD was a permanent contributor to the European 
Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) expert group on NPLs, whose report contributed 
to the development of the European Action Plan on NPLs.  In July 2017, the 
European Council adopted a detailed “Action Plan on Reducing NPLs in Europe”, 
which calls upon various EU regulators to take appropriate measures to address 
the challenges of high NPLs in Europe. This led to a broad range of European 
regulations both to tackle the stock of NPLs and to prevent the creation and 
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accumulation of new NPLs, further contributing to NPL resolution in both the 
EU and arguably non-EU CESEE countries.
Building on international best practices 
The work performed under the NPL Initiative has leveraged international best 
practices, including through the impediment assessments performed by the IMF 
and the World Bank, as well as the broad range of NPL-related regulatory measures 
implemented in the EU in recent years.  
For example, in September 2015 the IMF published a study on the “Strategy 
for Resolving Europe’s Problem Loans”, which analysed structural obstacles 
that discourage European banks from addressing their problem loans. It offers 
actionable policy recommendations across three key areas: (1) enhancing prudential 
oversight, (2) reforming debt enforcement regimes and insolvency frameworks and 
(3) developing distressed debt markets. This has been the cornerstone of the NPL 
Initiative approach. 
The World Bank Group also publishes, on an annual basis, its Global Doing 
Business Report20, which assesses objective measures of business regulation and 
their enforcement across 190 countries and cities. The reports identify, amongst 
other things, impediments in the legal and judicial systems. In the context of 
NPLs, the World Bank Group reports pay particular attention to the strength 
of credit reporting systems and the effectiveness of collateral and bankruptcy 
laws in facilitating lending, as well as time, cost and outcome of insolvency 
proceedings involving domestic legal entities and broader quality and efficiency 
of the court system.
The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) published a policy paper on the 
resolution of nonperforming loans21 in October 2017, which analyses a broad 
range of countries that suffered financial crises (including those from Asia, 
the Nordic region and the United States) to provide practical insights into the 
feasibility and success factors behind different NPL resolution strategies. The 
BIS also analyses how country-specific characteristics can affect the applicability 
and effective of measures.  
20 The most recent reports and relevant methodology available at http://www.doingbusiness.org/en/doingbusiness.
21 BIS, Financial Stability Institute Insights, Resolution of non-performing loans – policy options, October 2017, 
https://www.bis.org/fsi/publ/insights3.pdf 
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In addition, European Union regulators have developed and implemented a broad range 
of initiatives in recent years to increase the speed and effectiveness of NPL resolution. 
In July 2017 the Council of the EU announced an action plan to reduce NPLs22, which 
was further enhanced in October 2017 by the EC’s “communication on completing 
the Banking Union”. As background to the Council of the EU’s action plan and 
subsequent regulatory initiatives, the reader may refer to the European Commission’s 
reflection paper of the European Council’s NPL Action Plan,23 the findings of the 
subgroup on NPLs of the European Council’s Financial Services Committee (FSC),24 
the report of the ESRB Expert Group on NPLs25 and the ECB second stocktake on 
the range of practices relating to NPL workout in all 19 Single Supervisory Mechanism 
countries.26 All of the aforementioned studies have shaped the assistance provided to 
Partner Countries by the NPL Initiative. 
The NPL Initiative as a catalyst to reforms
The structural approach of the NPL Initiative to identifying impediments to 
NPL resolution has its roots in the IMF report Strategy for Resolving Europe’s 
Problem Loans.27 The IMF classifies the most important impediments for tackling 
NPLs into five broad categories: informational obstacles, inadequate supervisory 
framework, inadequate legal framework, a lack of a distressed debt market and 
tax regime implications. Deficiencies in the legal framework and underdeveloped 
NPL markets tend to be the major obstacles; nevertheless, all types of obstacles are 
interconnected and their effects compound.
22 Council of the EU, Council conclusions on Action plan to tackle non-performing loans in Europe, July 2017, https://
www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/07/11/conclusions-non-performing-loans/ 
23 EU Commission, Reflection Paper on the Deepening of the Economic and Monetary Union, May 2017, https://
ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/reflection-paper-emu_en.pdf 
24 Council of the EU, Report of the FSC Subgroup on Non-Performing Loans, May 2017, http://data.consilium.europa.
eu/doc/document/ST-9854-2017-INIT/en/pdf
25 ESRB Expert Group on NPLs, Resolving Non-Performing Loans in Europe, July 2017, http://npl.vienna-initiative.
com/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2017/07/ESRB-Report-on-NPLs.pdf
26 ECB, second stocktake of national supervisory practices and legal frameworks related to NPLs, June 2017 (https://
www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/ecb/pub/pdf/ssm.stock_taking2017.en.pdf
27 For more details look at “A Strategy for Resolving Europe’s Problem Loans” (Main Discussion Note and Technical 
Background) (September 2015) https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2015/sdn1519.pdf
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Table 1.
Key impediment categories identified by the IMF for NPL resolution
IMF Category Description 
Legal framework
Inadequate bankruptcy laws, particularly for household insolvencies, lack of legal 
enforcement mechanisms and inadequate (or absence of) out-of-court debt 
restructuring (OOCR) procedures, and institutional deficiencies (such as prolonged 
enforcement procedures and lack of transparency or training of the judiciary).
Supervision Inadequate supervisory efforts in enforcing bank provisioning and timely resolution 
of NPLs.
Information Lack of transparency in public registers and asymmetry of information.
NPL market
The market largely non-existent without any interest from investors and servicing 
capabilities (see below), in addition to limited domestic know-how capabilities (both 
from the private and public stakeholders). 
Tax regime Primarily disincentivising tax rules for NPL resolutions.
Source: NPL Monitor and associated EBRD database.
The IFIs under the NPL initiative have taken a similar approach, in collaboration 
with the NCAs, to identify the impediments to NPL resolution and sales specific 
to each of the Partner Countries. Action plans were developed with the local 
authorities (formally or informally), involving the local banking industry and other 
relevant stakeholders (such as banking associations) to ensure the completeness and 
relevance of the impediments identified and to develop policy measures and other 
initiatives which are fit for purpose.
Progress with reforms undertaken in the Partner Countries since the start of 
the NPL Initiative
A broad range of reforms have been implemented for tackling the main categories 
of impediments to NPL resolution in the Partner Countries since the start of 
the NPL Initiative. We have observed particular progress in improving the 
legal framework of most individual countries, with the implementation of 
multiple creditors’ out-of-court restructuring (OOCR) frameworks, progress 
with insolvency/bankruptcy laws and enforcement mechanisms, strengthening 
of the judicial frameworks (including the training of judges) and information 
transparency and availability (although important work in this regard remains 
to be done).
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Below is a summary of the main reforms implemented in Partner Countries since 
the launching of the NPL Initiative.
Table 2.
Albania
Category Main reforms undertaken since the start of the NPL Initiative 
Legal framework
• 2013: Guidelines on OOCR for individuals were issued by the Bank of Albania to guide 
banks with OOCR in view of accelerating the reduction of NPLs.
• 2014: Guidelines on loan restructuring for individuals and guidelines for the 
preparation of real estate appraisals.
• 2015: The new legislation on obligatory write-offs for lost loans older than three 
years.
• 2016: Bankruptcy Law approved by Parliament, incorporating best international 
practices and simplifying existing procedures.
• 2016: Amendment to the Civil Code approved, aimed at harmonising the Civil 
Code with the Law on Bankruptcy regarding the ranking of preferred creditors in 
bankruptcy proceedings.
• 2016: Amendment to the Civil Procedure Code with the main objective of increasing 
the efficiency of litigation and foreclosure procedures.
• 2016: Amendment to Private Bailiffs Law and Law on Judicial Bailiff Service 
approved, with the aims of increasing the efficiency of foreclosure procedures and 
debt collection and improving the structure of fees for Bailiff Services (i.e., base tariff 
plus success fee).
• 2018: Two additional decisions by the Council of Ministers to strengthen the 
Bankruptcy law from 2016; (1) the formation of the National Bankruptcy Agency – 
the competent state authority entrusted with the supervision, training, and 
licensing of insolvency administrators, and (2) the promulgation of the Insolvency 
Administrator Code of Ethics.
Information
• 2016: The Bank of Albania’s credit register was upgraded to include loans 
undergoing court proceedings, restructured loans, and loans sold to third parties.
• 2018: The Albanian Association of Banks (AAB) has undertaken the initiative 
of establishing a new comprehensive Credit Bureau. In October 2018, the EBRD 
engaged an international expert and local legal firm to prepare a roadmap on the 
legal and operational framework necessary to set up the Bureau.
Source: NPL Monitor and associated EBRD database.
212
Ten years of the Vienna Initiative 2009-2019
Table 3.
Croatia
Category Main reforms undertaken since the start of the NPL Initiative 
Legal framework
• 2015: The Ministry of Justice (MoJ) introduced non-binding “Guidelines on 
Corporate Debt Restructuring by Means of Out-of-Court Agreement” which aim at 
the timely resolution of insolvency-related disputes.
• 2015: New Bankruptcy Law aimed at shortening long bankruptcy procedures and 
strengthening creditors’ control over the process. The new legislation enforces these 
procedures within eight days if a company’s bank accounts are blocked for more 
than 120 days. 
• 2016: Consumer Bankruptcy Act introduced the legal concept of consumer 
bankruptcy into the legal system for the first time.
• 2017: The MoJ launched a process to eliminate inconsistencies or unclear provisions 
from the new Bankruptcy Act.
Tax regime
• 2017: New tax reform which includes changes to a set of several tax regulations, 
including the efforts to help banks reduce their NPLs. In addition, there was a one-
off measure, valid for 2017 only, which allowed banks to treat provisions related to 
NPLs as tax-deductible expenses.
Source: NPL Monitor and associated EBRD database.
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Table 4.
Hungary
Category Main reforms undertaken since the start of the NPL Initiative 
Legal framework
• 2015: Amendment to the Personal Bankruptcy Act aimed at simplifying the existing 
framework and creating an efficient personal bankruptcy system to provide a relief 
to qualifying debtors. The new Personal Insolvency Law is mainly intended for NPLs 
in the housing sector.
• 2017: Law on enforcement procedure was introduced with the intention of 
increasing the minimum sale price of a residential property in the enforcement 
procedure from 70 percent to 100 percent of the market value.
• 2017: The Hungarian National Bank (MNB) recommendation sets out best practice 
guidelines on OOCR and consensual settlement of NPLs in the corporate sector. 
Although the recommendation is non-binding, it adds power of persuasion and 
constitutes an important tool for NPL resolution.
• 2017: The MNB introduced an additional capital buffer for banks with large 
portfolios of commercial real estate (CRE) NPLs. As part of its annual review, the 
MNB Financial Stability Board decided to maintain the countercyclical capital buffer 
rate applicable from 1 January 2018 at zero percent, with a view to supporting 
lending. The capital buffer rates, ranging from 0.125 percent to 2 percent, will 
gradually increase until 2020. 
Legal framework
• 2018: The MoJ organised the first meeting of the cross-stakeholder working group, 
which has been set up to overhaul Hungary’s 1991 Bankruptcy Law. The objectives 
of the new legislation include a controlled reorganisation of the working group, 
viable enterprises and fast liquidation of non-viable businesses, greater protection 
of creditors’ interests in insolvency, and improving the efficiency of court-led 
insolvency processes. The timetable for the proposed reform is fairly tight, as the 
law is set for adoption by the Parliament in Q4 2019.
Other
• 2015: The Electronic Sales System (EÉR) was created as an online platform for selling 
the assets of debtors in liquidation.
Source: NPL Monitor and associated EBRD database.
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Table 5.
Montenegro
Category Main reforms undertaken since the start of the NPL Initiative 
Legal framework
• 2015: Although the application of the Law on Voluntary Financial Restructuring was 
initially envisioned for only two years (May 2015-2017), the law has been extended 
to May 2019, with a broader coverage of assets under restructuring.
• 2017: To address remaining supervisory shortcomings, and in particular extend 
the Central Bank of Montenegro’s (CBCG) supervisory remit to factoring, leasing, 
and credit and guarantee operations, six new laws and related directives were 
introduced: (i) Central Bank Act; (ii) Law on Financial Institutions to expedite the 
resolution of NPLs offloaded from banks’ balance sheets into factoring companies; 
(iii) Law on Voluntary Financial Restructuring; (iv) Deposit Insurance Law; 
(v) Banking Law; and (vi) Law on Recovery and Resolution of Banks, the latter two 
being related to Montenegro’s alignment with EU regulation.
• 2018: The CBCG adopted a set of by-laws which further regulate the operation of 
non-banking financial institutions, following the adoption of the all-encompassing 
Law covering factoring, leasing, micro-crediting and credit guarantee operations. 
Information
• 2018: The Council of the CBCG adopted a new Decision on the Credit Registry 
(opened in January 2019) with the aim of further improving the Credit Registry by 
providing enhanced individual and aggregated data from the Credit Registry. In 
accordance to the new non-banking FI legislation, data from the leasing, factoring 
and receivable repurchase companies will be included in the Credit Registry.
Source: NPL Monitor and associated EBRD database.
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Table 6.
Serbia
Category Main reforms undertaken since the start of the NPL Initiative 
Legal framework
• 2015: Amendments to the Law on Agency for Bankruptcy Administrators 
have strengthened the Agency’s authority over all bankruptcy procedures and 
administration for the state-owned company bankruptcy cases.
• 2015: Supervisory Guidance for Loan Loss Provisioning (LLP)
• 2015: Amendments to the Mortgage Act. One of the most prominent changes was 
the possibility of any creditor regardless of the ranking of its claim to initiate the 
foreclosure procedure.
• 2016: Law on Real Estate Appraisers was adopted with the aim of regulating 
the profession of real estate appraisers and is intended to help ensure that 
collateral valuations are sufficiently conservative, and thus contribute to adequate 
provisioning.
• 2017: Bankruptcy Law amendments aimed at improving in-court debt resolution 
and mortgage framework and enhancing the insolvency regulatory framework.
• 2017: The National Bank of Serbia (NBS) adopted a number of regulations to support 
the implementation of IFRS9, including in the fields of accounting and financial 
reporting and with strengthening its own analytical and supervisory capacity. A 
particularly effective measure was the introduction of mandatory write-off of fully 
provisioned NPLs.
• 2017: The NBS published an official interpretation of the banking secrecy rules with 
the aim of enabling comprehensive due diligence for NPL sales.
• 2017: Amendments to the Corporate Income Tax Law and the Personal Income Tax 
Law introducing tax incentives for financial institutions (i.e., recognition of banks’ 
corporate loan write-offs as expenditures for tax purposes) and individuals (i.e., 
banks’ obligation to pay on a withholding basis the personal income tax for debt 
write-offs to private individuals). 
• 2018: Amendments to the Civil Procedure Law grant an unconditional right to the 
new creditor (acquirer of an NPL) to take over an ongoing dispute without additional 
consent from the counterparty.
• 2018: The Government adopted an NPL Resolution Program that represents a natural 
continuation of the efforts and activities undertaken under the NPL Resolution 
Strategy. The Program focuses primarily on prevention of new NPL accumulation 
and on secondary market development.
Other
• 2018: The Deposit Insurance Agency (DIA) announced its first auction for the sale 
of the NPL portfolio of €240 million. This is the first auction in the process of the 
planned resolution of the DIA NPL portfolio of circa €1 billion.
• 2018: Serbia introduced an E-Cadaster. The Law on the Registration Procedure with 
the Cadaster of Real Estate and Utilities simplifies the registration procedure and is 
expected to increase the efficiency of the Cadaster.
Source: NPL Monitor and associated EBRD database.
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Progress with developing a sound NPL market in the CESEE 
Despite the initial challenges in developing a sound NPL market in the region, 
NPL transactions in CESEE have grown considerably in the last few years, 
attracted a broad range of international investors and demonstrated an appetite 
for NPL transactions and their dynamism. This can be largely attributed to the 
reforms implemented in many of these countries, reducing disincentives to NPL 
purchasing and providing further comfort to buyers of distressed debt that the local 
laws and regulations allow them to adequately manage the NPLs and recover their 
investments. In addition, better requirements for banks to provision their NPLs 
more accurately had the effect of encouraging banks to sell their NPLs to the market, 
providing sufficiently sizeable portfolios to attract international investors. While 
the CESEE NPL market remains small, fragmented and imperfect, it functions 
well overall.
Results to date and next steps 
Steady decrease of the NPLs stock in the CESEE region 
Since the start of the NPL initiative, the gross and net NPL ratios for CESEE 
decreased from 9.8% and 3.5%, respectively, in 2014 to 4.0% and 1.5% in 2018 Q3. 
Furthermore, NPL volumes shrank from €68.1 billion in 2013 Q3 to €38.0 billion 
as of 30 September 2018.
Such significant progress in the reduction of NPL volumes was the result of a 
broad range of factors. Nonetheless, the identification of national impediments, 
the development of country-specific NPL action plans and the implementation of 
concrete reforms supported by the NPL Initiative were important contributors to the 
speed and extent of the improvements in some countries in the region. Improvement 
to national legal, judicial and tax systems, combined with more transparent and 
accessible information, provided not only banks with more options (and incentives) 
to cope with their distressed borrowers, but also further comfort to foreign investors 
to acquire NPL portfolios and develop local servicing capabilities. The IFIs, under 
the NPL Initiative, worked closely with the NCAs and the banking sectors of the 
five Partner Countries to support the implementation of such measures.
In terms of results observed since the start of the NPL Initiative in 2014, the 
five Partner Countries significantly outperformed the average CESEE region in 
NPL reduction. The NPL ratios in Serbia, Hungary, and Albania saw double-
digit percentage point reductions between 2014 Q1 and 2018 Q3 (15.9, 13.7 
and 11.1 percentage points, respectively). The reduction in Montenegro (9.9%) 
217
The Non-Performing Loans Initiative: progress since its launch in 2014
and Croatia (5.7%) was above the CESEE average of 5.5%. Similarly, with the 
exception of Albania, NPL coverage ratios have increased by more than the average 
in the CESEE region.
Table 7.
Evolution of NPL ratio, coverage ratio, and NPL volume
(percent, € billion), Q1 2014 versus Q3 201828
Country Q3 - 2018 Q3 - 2018 Q3 - 2018 Δ(pp)
Albania (AL) 0.6 q -37.8 12.9 q -11.1 65.4 p 0.9
Croatia (HR) 3.5 q -41.1 10.2 q -5.7 69.4 p 22.4
Hungary (HU) 1.5 q -82.4 2.9 q -13.7 70.3 p 15.7
Montenegro (ME) 0.2 q -49.2 7.0 q -9.9 67.6 p 22.2
Serbia (RS) 1.2 q -65.8 6.4 q -15.9 61.3 p 9.9
5 Partner Countries 7.0 q -63.9 6.2 q -11.2 67.9 p 15.9
CESEE 38.0 q -40.8 4.0 q -5.5 61.9 p 3.0
NPL volume (€ bn) NPL ratio (%) NPL coverage ratio
Variation(%) Δ(pp)
Figure 5.
Evolution Gross NPL ratio in CESEE 1Q 2014 – 3Q 2018
28 CESEE and 5 Partner Countries averages are based on Q3 2018 IMF FSI values for all countries, except Montenegro 
and Serbia (obtained from central banks directly), although the latest available figures for Montenegro, Slovenia and 
Lithuania are as of Q2 2018.
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Figure 6.
Evolution of Net NPL ratio in CESEE 1Q 2014 – 3Q 2018
NPL sales to the secondary market as part of the medium-term solution
Since 2015 H1, the NPL transactions in the CESEE region have amounted to 
€13.7 billion. Although Albania and Montenegro are yet to develop an NPL 
market, Croatia and Hungary (and to some extent Serbia) have recorded a large 
number of significant transactions. As shown in Figure 8, Croatia had at least to 
€2.27 billion of NPL sales between 2015 H1 and 2018 H1, while Hungary and 
Serbia saw €1.63 billion and €500 million of NPL transactions, respectively. 
The CESEE region’s distressed debt market has mostly consisted of outright 
sales to non-bank participants, but also included some joint ventures between 
banks, specialist firms and investors. While some countries (Slovenia, Latvia and 
Hungary) have established public asset management companies (AMCs) as part of 
a comprehensive strategy to address banking system problems, the transfer of NPLs 
by banks to private or public AMCs has been used less frequently than anticipated 
and has yielded mixed results. 
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Figure 7.
Evolution of NPL transaction volumes in CESEE 
(€ billion) 1H2015 – 1H2018
Figure 8.
Evolution of NPL deal volume in CESEE with the key focus on Partner Countries 
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The growth of NPL servicers in the region
Alongside numerous NPL sales realised in recent years, we observed considerable 
increases in servicing capabilities in the region. While cross-border servicing remains 
challenging, the number of multi-asset firms operating in the region increased. As 
banks outsourced collection to local agencies, and foreign investors acquired NPL 
portfolios needing servicing, the servicing capacity grew steadily. 
Specialised servicing is particularly important for resolving the corporate NPL 
segment, as it involves the complex and lengthy process of corporate restructurings 
and wind-downs. The limited skills available in most CESEE economies meant 
that larger investors had to invest in their own servicing capabilities (including 
by importing skills and know-how) when buying large NPL portfolios. This also 
contributed to the rise in the number of servicers.   
There are now more than 20 servicers and collection agencies operating in at least 
one of the CESEE countries, and some have cross-border activities. The expertise 
also varies across retail, small to medium-sized enterprise, corporate and residential 
asset classes. However, the extent of capabilities, service offerings and asset classes 
covered differs between countries, and some servicers only manage their own assets.
From firefighting to embedding NPL solutions 
Important reforms have been implemented in the region to improve the resolution 
of NPLs, and the conditions for a sound secondary NPL market (although still not 
perfect) contributed greatly to the ability of banks to deleverage a large part of their 
stocks. As of early 2019, the work is still not completed. Recent progress has in large 
part been driven by firefighting needs to tackle the NPL stock, but more needs to 
be done to embed changes within the banks themselves for sustainable long-term 
NPL prevention and management. 
Large stocks of NPLs still remains in many countries in the region, and 
fundamental structural challenges still exist within a number of banks, particularly 
the smaller local banks that have not felt the same pressures to change as have their 
peers, the subsidiaries of European or international groups. Local restructuring 
skills remain limited, poor and incomplete data still characterise many banks 
and inadequacies in credit underwriting practices and NPL management can be 
observed across the region. 
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CESEE countries can further build on the best international practices to prevent 
new flows of NPLs and ensure that any stock will not reach the same unsustainable 
levels in the future. For example, the broad range of measures implemented in the 
European Union (EU) for the management of NPLs and for improving overall 
credit-risk management in EU banks can also be used in non-EU CESEE countries, 
tailoring the best practices to local particularities and needs. 
The next phase of the NPL Initiative is to improve the region’s banking systems, 
coordinate the joint IFI support and work closely together with NCAs in promoting 
and supporting further implementation of best practices in the areas of credit 
underwriting and NPL management within the banks under their supervision. 
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CHAPTER 13
Ten years of the Vienna Initiative: 
the future from 
a banking group’s perspective
Christine Würfel and Barbara Atroszczak 
(with contributions by Martin Lee-Warner 
and Daniela Tsoneva)
 Raiffeisen Bank International AG (March 2019) 
Austrian contribution to containing the Global Financial Crisis 
in CESEE
It all started in Vienna… with a phone call
It was mid-November 2008 when the Raiffeisen Bank CEO initiated telephone 
discussions with the respective CEOs of Erste Group Bank AG and Bank Austria 
(UniCredit Group) to propose a collective representation of leading European banks 
operating throughout Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) to implement appropriate 
measures to increase the resilience of the respective financial systems. This followed on 
from critical issues highlighted at the October 2008 International Monetary Fund/
World Bank meetings in Washington, DC, and indeed from the European Commission’s 
subsequent focus on stability of the overall financial sector throughout the EU New 
Member States (NMS). Time was of the essence, and within two weeks a meeting had 
been called at Raiffeisen’s Vienna Head Office, attended by six leading European banks 
with CEE exposure, together with “informal attendance” by the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and European Investment Bank (EIB). As 
a result of this well-addressed initiative, a letter to the European Commission was duly 
drafted and the text agreed by these banks. Together with proposed measures to enhance 
the soundness and stability of the banking systems in CEE countries, it was delivered 
on 1 December 2008. The “kick-off” letter and proposed measures are set out below.1
1 See Annex 2: Exhibit 1.
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Over the ensuing weeks, with a fast unfolding credit crisis, it was clear that 
market and funding liquidity was rapidly drying up in the CEE region. There 
was an acute awareness amongst all potential stakeholders that there must be a 
cohesive approach, and not just one driven by these leading Western European 
banks. Stable credit was critically needed for the various NMS economies, and 
in this regard it was deemed necessary that these banks express their concerns to 
all relevant national authorities and to those international financial institution 
(IFI) that were demonstrating their own support for such initiatives. Several 
CEE central banks (CBs) were attempting to restore confidence through a range 
of measures, but isolated measures at a national level were clearly not sufficient. 
At a time when neither a Single Supervisory Mechanism nor a Banking Union 
existed in Europe, key actions needed to be taken in a coordinated way at an 
international level. By the end of January 2009, nine of the leading European 
banks operating in the CEE region jointly signed a comprehensive letter to 
Jean-Claude Trichet, ECB Chair, which was also duly copied to the respective 
CB Governors of those countries where the banks were headquartered (six 
EU countries) – and indeed this letter was subsequently made available to the 
CB Governors of the NMS. At this point the Central Banks were becoming 
increasingly uniform in their response.
This letter dated 23 January 2009, and proposals therein – set out below2 – 
prompted swift actions by, inter alia, the EBRD, EIB, EU Commission, 
International Monetary Fund and World Bank, and within a few weeks Vienna 
Initiative 1.0 was formulated. The EBRD speedily proffered an effective 
secretariat, and this evolved into a very meaningful framework focusing on and 
addressing the pertinent key issues throughout the CESEE region.
Measured against the original objectives, Vienna Initiative 1.0 was successful. Since 
2007/8, cross-border banking exposures had been modestly declining vis-à-vis the 
core CESEE countries where major European cross-border banks were operating. 
Moreover, larger parts of this moderate contraction had not been driven by region-
specific developments per se but by several international trends with an impact on 
the CEE region (e.g., changes in regulatory ratios, international banks revisiting 
their cross-border business strategies). Furthermore, no substantive banking sector 
rescue packages had been needed in the CESEE region.
2 See Annex 2: Exhibit 2.
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Future topics driving the financial services industry in CESEE 
and the need for action
But the story doesn’t end there: leveraging the existing format of a private-public 
sector platform, the Initiative was reformulated as Vienna Initiative 2.0, so it could 
continue making the financial sector in emerging Europe more resilient in the 
longer term.
One of the Initiative’s goals arose from a lesson learned from the eurozone crisis, 
which highlighted the risk of disorderly deleveraging of western parent banks vis-
à-vis their affiliates in Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe (CESEE) and of 
difficulties in cooperation between home and host country authorities. Additionally, 
along with three EU-driven programmes – the Banking Union,3 the Capital Markets 
Union4 and the Digital Single Market5 – that form an umbrella for long-term policy 
development of the financial sector in Europe, further strengthening the conditions 
for stable and well-functioning cross-border banking has been a major driver of the 
Working Groups of Vienna Initiative 2.0.
Fostering Capital Markets in CEE
Capital markets need clear and reliable rules to ensure the trust of market 
participants. This prerequisite is even more important for smaller and less-
developed markets lacking local institutional investors and which are thus 
dependent on cross-border investments. Therefore, CEE countries, to which 
these circumstances apply, must take care to provide such a stable environment. 
The Vienna Initiative has, since its beginning, continuously been directed at these 
features and has asked local governments and supervisors to enable an appropriate, 
reliable framework to develop their capital markets for a more diversified financed 
economy. The envisaged merits of the Capital Markets Union heavily depend on 
stable and trustworthy (common European) rules and harmonised supervisory 
practices throughout the Union.
The new rules on bank recovery and resolution6 require every bank to provide 
sufficient bail-in-able capital to be prepared for stress situations. Additionally, the 
3 European Commission, Banking Union, European Commission, Banking Union, https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-
economy-euro/banking-and-finance/banking-union_en
4 European Commission, Capital Markets Union, https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/growth-and-
investment/capital-markets-union_en
5 European Commission, Digital Single Market Strategy, https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/digital-
single-market-strategy-europe-com2015-192-final
6 European Commission, Review of the bank recovery and resolution directive, https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/bank-
recovery-and-resolution-directive-2014-59-eu/upcoming_en
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provisions limit considerably the distribution of such instruments (e.g., bail-in-able 
bonds) to retail investors. These provisions are suitable for markets facing a strong 
demand by institutional investors but challenging for smaller markets lacking that 
kind of investor and at the same time not being members of the eurozone (having 
their own local currencies). Several CEE countries belong to such markets and are 
now confronted with the dilemma of ensuring their banks have sufficient bail-in-
able capital, while lacking the appropriate demand of local institutional investors 
to invest in them. The Vienna Initiative has repeatedly pointed out this problem 
and promoted the need for a doorkeeper or gatekeeper role of IFIs to engage more 
heavily in these kinds of instruments in these markets to make them more attractive 
for cross-border investing institutional investors. 
Sustainable Finance – what is needed from a bank’s perspective
Since March 2018, when the EU Commission published an action plan on 
“sustainable growth”,7 the trend has become a key future topic driving the financial 
industry (including banks, asset managers, insurance companies and pension funds). 
One of the reasons why this proposed legislative initiative will heavily impact market 
players is the planned use of the capabilities of the financial sector to fill the gap 
of around €180 billion p.a. in investments in sustainable projects. Consequently, 
these provisions should contribute to enabling the EU to reach the goals of the 2015 
Paris Agreement on climate.8
While the application of the proposed action plan might offer interesting additional 
business and the possibility to develop reliable strategic positioning in the market, 
there is still the need for further clarification on the side of the regulators. A clear first 
step is the development of the agreed international taxonomy, which will define what 
is considered a “sustainable economic activity”. This can be further used as a basis for 
all other legislative proposals in this context. Additional disclosure rules should avoid 
any unnecessary administrative burdens, and the new provisions should allow for 
sufficient time to adapt respective business models and internal processes accordingly. 
A further key point, which must be kept in mind in this respect, is the avoidance of a 
gold-plated mechanism. In particular, legally harmonised certainty should be created 
for feed-in-tariffs and Green Certificates for renewable energy.
7 European Commission, Sustainable Finance, https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/banking-and-finance/
sustainable-finance_en
8 United Nations Climate Change, The Paris Agreement, https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/
the-paris-agreement
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Aside from the need for further legal clarifications, a well-considered incentive 
system is needed for financial market participants. Similar to the success story of 
the SME supporting factor, which allows banks to reduce capital requirements 
for credit risk on exposures to small and medium-sized firms, a “green supporting 
factor” with regards to capital relief for sustainable finance would leverage bank 
lending in this area and support sustainable growth. And, to be very clear, it is 
not about unjustifiably minimising risks. It is in the interest of the bank to make 
correct risk provisions in any case. But, in our opinion, such a “green supporting 
factor” clearly leads to a prioritisation and preference of a bank to finance more 
sustainable activities rather than to support non-sustainable businesses. Therefore, 
the new mandate of the European Banking Authority (EBA) to assess whether a 
dedicated prudential treatment of exposures related to assets or activities associated 
substantially with environmental and/or social objectives is really justified (Art. 501 
Capital Requirements Regulation new). But the long timeframe – six years – of its 
assessment might be a difficulty given the urgency of the topic.  
Additionally, risk-sharing-products from IFIs which act as market makers for 
sustainable/green loans are another very effective instrument, especially in those 
countries where such instruments are in short supply.
In the context of the Vienna Initiative, this important topic of sustainable finance 
should also be highlighted in its future work in CESEE by setting up structures 
where private and public decision makers meet to exchange experience and discuss 
appropriate actions for the economies of the region.
New ways of financing innovation 
History has shown that successive waves of technological change have transformed 
human societies and economies, with long-term benefits for both economic growth 
and quality of life. The current digital revolution has the power to do so again.9 
Therefore, investments in innovation have nowadays become more crucial than ever 
before, especially for the financial sector, which has been the largest user of digital 
technologies. On top of that, relevant indicators of Europe’s digital performance 
(e.g., Digital Economy and Society Index, Innovation Scorecard or Europe's Digital 
Progress Report), which track the evolution of EU Member States, show a clear 
gap between CESEE and Western economies. As clearly seen in the chart below, 
9 European Commission, Mid-Term Review on the implementation of the Digital Single Market Strategy, Brussels, 
10.5.2017.
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the former, with some remarkable exceptions, still lag behind in their digital and 
innovation competitiveness.10
Figure 1.
Digital Economy and Society Index (DESI) 2018 ranking
Source: European Commission. 
Beyond debt - expanding different forms of financing
While reviewing their business models, banks, which represent a major driver in 
the digital transformation of the economy and society, are increasingly considering 
different forms of financing for innovation. The banks active in CESEE try to 
position themselves in a niche role, filling the gap left by the relative scarcity 
of  venture capital or private equity funds in that region. While the suitability 
and even the role of banks in debt/equity funding is still under discussion, their 
participation in the  broader ecosystem of start-up or fintech companies, for 
example, is inevitable. 
This participation is not only at the behest of the regulator, but since banks are at 
the forefront of new technologies and new markets, they have a wider insight and 
early access to a broad array of innovations and new business fields. Subsequently, 
by acquiring venture management skills and by launching corporate venture 
capital (CVC) focused on direct investments in later-stage fintechs, banks foster 
knowledge and innovation transfer on the market. Their engagement with the 
innovation ecosystem is mainly driven by their desire to stimulate innovation 
within their own core operations, gain early insights into new technologies 
and develop VC and venture management networks. Large banking groups are 
10 European Commission, Digital Economy and Society Index Report, 2018.
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developing in-house units which can invest directly in innovative companies. 
These tend to focus on fintech and/or other technology companies of strategic 
value to the bank’s operations. Examples of the latter include companies with 
products and services that improve or complement banks’ existing operating 
systems, processes and capabilities, e.g., cybersecurity, big data analysis, cloud 
computing and biometrics. As seen in the figure below, European corporate VC 




































Source: KPMG International (2017).
This new approach, together with other well-known forms of financing all stages 
of a firm’s life cycle (e.g., direct bank loans), is a major topic on the Agenda of the 
Working Group on Financing for Innovation. The Vienna Initiative aims to play 
an active role in helping cooperating banks and FinTechs expand into this dynamic 
region, thus closing the gap between CESEE and western economies.
Tightening post-crisis regulation vs. innovation
All in all, there is still a big question mark over the future involvement of 
the banks in supporting fintech and other technology-intensive SMEs via 
CVC. The reason is the capital treatment of bank CVCs, which is similar o 
the treat ent f VC exposure. Taking the Raiffeisen example, since Elevator 
Ventures CVC is a 100% subsidiary of Raiffeisen Bank International (RBI), its 
current regulatory framework is given by Basel III (implemented in the EU via 
the Capital Requirements Regulation). Thus, Elevator Ventures has to meet the 
capital requirements according to the Capital Requirements Regulation, which 
11 KPMG, The Pulse of FinTech 2018.
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will depend on the investments carried out by the company and on the amount 
of the investment. Currently, this would result in a risk weight of up to 250% of 
book value – this can increase up to 400% with full implementation of Basel IV 
rules. This rule appears very strict, and a lower capital consumption (i.e., lower 
risk weights) for such investments would foster or at least incentivise banks 
to make such investments. Under Basel III, exposures to VC funds, whether 
through the look-through or fallback approach, carry between 250 and 1250% 
implications for capital.12 Furthermore, CVC investments also require specialist 
skills and operational agility, which are difficult and costly for banks to attract 
and build upon. 
Funding is not enough
Apart from money, banks’ CVCs offer participating fintechs significant operational 
support by portfolio companies, including advice and services in business 
development, corporate development, hiring, fund-raising and internationalisation. 
Very often former fintech founders and financial services experts will act as 
consultants and mentors to founders and help them achieve scale.
Taking again the example of Elevator Ventures, experience from both rounds of the 
virtual accelerator programme “Elevator Lab” has shown that cooperation between 
the start-ups and RBI benefits both sides. Within a few months, pilot projects were 
developed with the five participating start-ups, which are now in their extended 
testing or implementation phases. RBI regards the start-ups as equal partners and 
deliberately forgoes equity participation during this phase. In addition, the RBI 
can offer fintech founders access to its innovative network in fourteen markets in 
CEE and its 16.6 million customers. 
Closing the gap in the CESEE
Coming back to the level of digital maturity in Europe that was discussed before 
from the financing perspective, CEE banking markets are still characterised by a 
moderate degree of financial intermediation. In some SEE banking markets, the 
ratio of assets to GDP stands at only around 40-50%, while in more developed CE 
countries this is 139% (and in the euro area about 235%). And a similar picture 
emerges regarding the use of digital channels to make payments. In some SEE 
banking markets only 20-30% of the population have made digital payments, 
12 Bank of International Settlements, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: High-level summary of Basel III 
reforms, https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d424_hlsummary.pdf
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while in more developed CE countries this is 70-80% (in the euro area levels are 
90% or more). It is precisely these that need to be increased. 
Empirical studies show a very clear connection between the degree of market 
penetration in conventional banking (account management, debit card ownership, 
credit card ownership, savings products) and market penetration via digital 
channels (in most cases, an account and/or credit card is the basic prerequisite 
for digital participation). Moreover, increasing digital development in less 
mature CEE banking markets also brings interesting opportunities in terms of 
institutional development (e.g., digital banking may help to increase financial 
inclusion or may help to increase the degree of formality in the economy, i.e., it 
may help to combat corruption). However, some selected banking markets in 
Central Europe (such as Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Poland) and Eastern 
Europe (Russia) are also among the most innovative European banking markets 
in the field of digital banking. In this respect, knowledge gained in these leading 
markets and proven digital products, distribution ideas or digital features can 
then be transferred to less developed markets in CEE. 
In this respect, the basic idea of extending the product life cycle through 
international expansion continues to exist in this region, even in the digital age. 
The large cross-border CEE banks will increasingly have to become internal 
learning platforms and, of course, the exchange will no longer only take place 
from West to East, but also from East to West, especially since customers expect 
smart solutions from cross-border banks in CEE with regard to cross-border 
instant payments or even a uniform and customer-friendly market presence in 
many countries. Such technical cross-border integration across many markets 
with varying degrees of maturity may well entail increased risks of cybercrime. 
Therefore, cross-border banks operating in CEE will have to invest a lot in the 
technological area going forward, going well beyond front-end solutions.
A coordinated approach on the Highway towards Big Data
The Digital Single Market (DSM) strategy for Europe mentioned in the 
opening section of this chapter and that has been driving policy initiatives since 
2015, aims inter alia at unifying Europe’s rules on data from many different 
perspectives. One of them is data protection, which has been achieved by the 
implementation of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Another 
one is ensuring the cyber resilience of the financial sector. Finding the right 
policy mix between these two that would neither hinder innovation nor cause 
administrative burdens has been one of the main challenges for regulators after 
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the crisis. The harmonised incident reporting framework, which is currently 
lacking common taxonomy across regulations, jurisdictions and sectors, should 
ease the understanding of multi-country and multi-sector cyberattacks and 
eventually lead to efficient responses.
The financial sector is increasingly dependent on digital technology and is most 
subject to high-profile cyberattack. Therefore, cybersecurity has moved from 
being a technical issue to a political and boardroom issue.13 Especially with the 
increasing trend of outsourcing of data to the “cloud” (meaning nothing more than 
that geographical location no longer plays a role in data storage), implementing 
the same highest standards for data security across the whole of Europe plays a 
crucial role in cyber resilience. Here again, the Vienna Initiative is welcome to 
take over the coordinator role leveraging on its existing platform and committed 
stakeholders. 
The need for harmonization of data-reporting rules and templates is apparent. 
Taking as an example the new requirements that are needed for resolution purposes, 
as well as their higher complexity due to an increase in granularity, e.g., AnaCredit, 
the technical and personnel burden on banks to deal with additional information 
demand from the regulators is set to increase in the near future. (For example, in 
2018 RBI submitted no less than 1,200 regulatory reports.)
Lessons learned from the "Vienna Initiative" and future 
challenges for cross-border banking in CESEE
The public-private coordination partnership was always helpful for dialogue on 
financial services  in the region – being at the table on a par with all financial 
stakeholders constitutes quite a unique model. The biggest value of this dialogue is 
the holistic discussion and connection of topics in the forum where all stakeholders, 
IFIs, public sector and private banks are debating with each other. Combining the 
topics of the different workshops and making the ideas operational would underline 
the success of the Vienna Initiative. In times of agile and innovative workarounds, 
it should also be possible for such a diversified group of stakeholders to develop 
practical and tangible success stories.
Therefore, a lot of potential lies with the Vienna Initiative, which is more needed 
than ever in the context of nationalistic developments towards the unifying idea 
of a harmonised Europe – especially in the financial services sector. The more 
13 Cybersecurity in Finance. Getting the policy mix right! Report of a CEPS-ECRI Task Force, June 2018.
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strongly the cross-border banking business develops in CEE, the more successful 
the fundamental rights of the European Union, especially the freedom of 
movement of capital – a prominent pillar of the European internal market which 
supports financial stability – can be defended.  Cross-border capital and liquidity 
f lows can strengthen resilience by reducing fragmentation. They are necessary 
for the efficient allocation of resources across the EU economy and will facilitate 
private risk-sharing. During the financial crisis, cross-border banking business and 
banks’ commitment to the region explicitly helped support CEE economies and 
fostered investors’ trust in the region. This thesis is prominently demonstrated by 
the achievements of Vienna Initiative 1.0. For this reason, enabling and supporting 
a strong cross-border financial services sector should also be one of the important 
future goals of the Vienna Initiative. 
 “Do more of the same”, as a closing remark for the Vienna Initiative at a time 
of even stronger isolationist politics in Europe seems to be the right takeaway 
for the future.  A further harmonisation of what has already been achieved and 
thought through on the European level by joining forces, experiences and ideas 
from East to West and West to East is the key to a better future. The same counts 
for stepping in when cross-border banking has to rethink its business model, not 
(fortunately) because of the crisis facing it but driven by the sustainable, digital 
and agile world around it. For everyone who contributed to the Initiative, the 
past 10 years have proved that you cannot achieve anything on your own in life, 
and this will remain true in the future.
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Annex 1: Abbreviations
CB  Central Bank
CEE  Central and Eastern Europe
CESEE Central, Eastern and South-eastern Europe
CVC   Corporate Venture Capital
CRR  Capital Requirements Regulation
DESI  Digital Economy and Society Index
DSM  Digital Single Market
EBRD  European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ECB  European Central Bank
EIB  European Investment Bank
GDPR  General Data Protection Regulation
GFC  Global Financial Crisis
GSF  Green Supporting Factor
IFI  International Financial Institution
IMF  International Monetary Fund
MREL  Minimum Requirement for Own Funds and Eligible Liabilities
NMS  New Member States
NPL  Non-performing Loans
RBI  Raiffeisen Bank International AG
RWA  Risk-weighted asset
SEE  South East Europe
SME   Small and Medium Size Enterprises
VC   Venture Capital
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Annex 2: Exhibits
Exhibit 1
“Stability for the Financial Sector in EU New Member States  
and Candidate Countries”
Letter from Andreas Treichl (Chairman and CEO, Erste Group Bank AG), 
Corrado Passera (Managing Director and CEO, Intesa Sanpaolo SpA), Andre 
Bergen (Chief Executive Officer, KBC), Herbert Stepic (Chairman of the Board 
of Management, Raiffeisen International Bank Holding AG), Frederic Oeda (Chief 
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Exhibit 2
“Proposal of potential measures by the ECB to support the stability  
of the EU New Member States (NWS) and Candidate Countries (CC)”
Letter from Michael Kemmer (Chairman of the Board of Management, Bayerische 
Landesbank), Andreas Treichl (Chairman and CEO, Erste Group Bank AG), Nicholas 
Nanopoulos (Chief Executive Officer, EFG Eurobank Ergasias SA), Corrado Passera 
(Managing Director and CEO, Intesa Sanpaolo Spa), Herbert Stepic (Chairman of 
the Board of Management, Raiffeisen International Bank Holding AG), Annika 
Falkengren (Chief Executive Officer, Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AG), Frederic 
Oudea (Chief Executive Officer, Societé Générale), Jan Liden (President and CEO, 




in North Macedonia: 
a country perspective
Anita Angelovska Bezhoska, Ana Mitreska,  
Frosina Celeska and Ljupka Georgievska
National Bank of the Republic of North Macedonia
Abstract
Extensive foreign presence has been a common feature of the banking systems 
across countries in the Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe (CESEE) region, 
including North Macedonia. This chapter will shed some light on the main benefits 
of the presence of foreign banks, such as easier access to finance, the introduction of 
modern banking practices and corporate governance and overall risk diversification. 
But it will also discuss the risks involved in cross-border banking, which came 
to the fore with the global financial crisis, when foreign financing retreated and 
banks’ activities were scaled down. The note frames the experience in Macedonia, 
as a country where foreign funding is limited and banks are involved in more 
conventional banking, all of which shielded it from the crisis and moderated the 
amplitude of the credit cycle. This chapter will discuss the main challenges for 
effective cross-border banking, related to the need for a more balanced approach 
to the financing of banks and the avoidance of excessive cross-border exposures, 
the need for more effective cross-border cooperation arrangements, with a focus 
on the coordination between home and host regulators, as well the impact that 
post-crisis regulatory changes may have on the region, with a particular emphasis 
on those that may have unintended adverse effects. 
The role of foreign banks 
The role played by foreign banks in the CESEE region since the onset of the 
transition has been immense. The transformation of the banking systems in CESEE 
countries brought in foreign banks as strategic investors, thus raising the extent of 
foreign ownership, which became dominant in most of the countries in the region. 
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This expansion of foreign ownership has facilitated the provision of financing by 
increasing access to foreign savings while domestic savings were low, especially 
during the early years of transition. Banks in foreign ownership have also probably 
played a role in channelling savings hidden under mattresses into official financial 
channels, thus supporting increased financial intermediation. Equally importantly, 
such banks introduced modern banking practices, improved corporate governance, 
diversified financial services and products to the benefit of consumers and corporate 
clients and increased access to the financial system, thus contributing to greater 
financial inclusion. In fact, the benefits of the presence of foreign banks in the 
region, as assessed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF 2013a,b), were visible 
in the sharp drop in the incidence of banking crises,1 improved banking practices, 
greater capacity for absorbing local shocks and improved access to finance. An 
important benefit of cross-border banking relates to risk diversification, both for 
the foreign banking groups and for host countries’ banking systems. For the first 
group, the allocation of their activities across different countries can markedly 
reduce their risk profile. For the second group, the risk exposure to local shocks 
could be significantly reduced when foreign groups are present. 
Figure 1. 
Foreign presence in the banking systems (Assets share of foreign banks, in %)
Source:  IMF (2013a,b) Financing Future Growth: The Evolving Role of the Banking Systems in 
CESEE: Technical note; BSCEE Reviews and central banks' website.
1 According to IMF research (IMF 2013a,b), the incidence of banking crises in CESEE countries (Albania, 
Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, North 
Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkey and Ukraine) dropped significantly during the 
2000s, registering only six systemic crises (five of which were related to the global crisis) as compared to the 1990s, 
when almost all CESEE countries experienced some form of banking crisis. The entrance of strategic foreign 
investors that operationally restructured domestic banks is considered a critical contributor to the stability of 
the banking sectors, along with the process of macroeconomic stabilisation in the region and tightened entry 
conditions and supervision of banks.
241
Cross-border banking in North Macedonia: a country perspective
From the beginning of transition until the global financial crisis, the amount of 
assets of foreign banks as a share of the total assets of the banking systems in the 
CESEE region has seen a significant increase. This is observed across all CESEE 
economies, with the highest share reached in the Baltic States at more than 90% 
of the total assets just before the global crisis. In Central Europe (CEE) and 
Southeastern Europe (SEE) it amounted to about 85% in 2007.
In line with the pattern in other countries of the region, foreign banks entered 
North Macedonia as well, mainly through the acquisition of already established 
banks, and in most cases through banks headquartered in the EU. The 
predominance of the latter, in North Macedonia as in other countries, presumably 
reflected geographic proximity, trade linkages and the EU integration process as 
an economic and political anchor. Both pull and push factors played significant 
roles. “Push” factors included saturated domestic markets in Western Europe, the 
need for cross-border expansion and the search for higher earnings. The initially 
small local banking systems, the EU perspective and the real and institutional 
convergence of the countries in the region were important “pull” factors for the 
entrance of foreign capital in the banking system. 
Although foreign investors were present in the Macedonian banking system 
from the early 1990s, the major breakthrough started in 2000. The process of 
acquisition of domestic banks by foreign investors had mostly ended by the time of 
the outbreak of the global crisis in 2008, with no major acquisition or green-field 
investment occurring afterwards. The number of foreign-owned banks increased 
gradually, currently (2019) standing at eleven out of fifteen banks in the system. 
An important feature of the foreign banks is the presence of subsidiaries of foreign 
banks (foreign subsidiaries), of which there are six,2 and which have a large share 
in the capital and the assets of the overall banking system. In fact, compared to 
some other Western Balkan (WB) countries, the number of subsidiaries as a share 
of the total number of foreign banks is smaller (55%, compared to 90% in WB), 
but their share of total assets and capital is rather comparable, at around 90% of 
total assets and capital of foreign-owned banks. The prevalence of subsidiaries, 
as well as the fact that in most of the banks standalone strategic investors entered 
the system, ensured a strategic approach would be taken, focusing on modernising 
systems, improving overall corporate governance and increasing market share on 
a sustainable basis.
2 The remaining five foreign-owned banks are controlled by non-banking financial institutions or other qualified 
investors under the Banking Law.
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Figure 2.
Banking system structure (number of banks) and foreign subsidiaries as a share 
of total assets and total equity and reserves of foreign banks
Source: National supervisory authorities in the Western Balkan countries. 
Note: Data refer to September 2018.
Although the number of foreign banks in the Macedonian banking system rose gradually, 
the size of the entrant banks varied significantly, preventing a smooth rise in foreign 
banks’ share of the total capital and total assets of the system. Over the 1999–2017 period, 
there are two points in the timeline where more pronounced shifts were observed. The 
first one pertains to 2000, when two major banks, NBG (Athens) and NLB (Ljubljana), 
entered the market, leading to marked increase of the share of foreign banks in total 
capital and total assets, from around 11%, to around half of the capital and the assets of 
the banking system. The change in 2007 was also visible, when another international 
banking group entered the market, Societé Générale (Paris).3
Figure 3.
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Source: NBRNM. 
3 The foreign assets share of the total assets declined sharply in 2013 to 68%, reflecting the reduced share of a foreign 
strategic investor in one bank. This does not change the overall picture of international banking group dominance 
in North Macedonia.
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One of the important benefits that foreign banking presence brought was enhanced access 
to cross–border financing, as an additional source for boosting bank resources. Hence, 
after the initial entry through equity, additional funding was provided subsequently across 
almost all countries in CESEE as debt financing. The inflows significantly accelerated in 
the period prior to the crisis (2000-8), in particular in the Baltics, where annual inflows 
reached on average around 9% of gross domestic product (GDP). The inflows into the 
banking systems of the CEE and SEE countries also accelerated, but at a more moderate 
pace in comparison with the Baltics (3.3% and 2% of GDP, respectively). Different patterns 
across countries reflect country-specific factors, and the data on external financial flows 
in the banking system show different patterns among country groups. 
In this context, the Macedonian case fits into the pattern of most of the CEE and SEE 
economies, with limited cross–border linkages and negligible dependence on parent-bank 
funding. Despite the rising foreign presence in the banking system, foreign funding was 
not important for the domestic banking system. Sufficient local funding, together with 
the rather conservative business models of the banks, as well as prudential regulation, 
probably contributed to this. Although some cyclical upturn was visible in the external 
debt position of domestic banks prior to the crisis, it was rather modest, and reached its 
peak in 2010. It subsequently adjusted in a slow and orderly manner, without indications 
of abrupt capital flight, reflecting the overall slowdown in the growth of credit, while 
available local funding remained strong. More or less the same inferences can be drawn 
by observing only the interconnectedness with parent banks. Funding from this source 
remained rather low, currently standing at around 3% of total assets.
Figure 4. 

























Portfolio and debt inflows in the banking system, average for the period in % of GDP
1995-2000 2001-2008 2009-2017
Source: IMF Balance of payments statistics.
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Figure 5. 
North Macedonia – Banking sector liabilities to non-residents 
(as % of total assets) 
Source: NBRNM.
Chart 6. 
North Macedonia – Subsidiaries liabilities to parent banks
(as % of total assets, maximum, average and minimum %)
Source: NBRNM.
The rather low dependence of the Macedonian banking system on cross-border 
financing proved to be one of the important buffers that helped the banking 
system and the economy in general to weather the crisis well. The whole cycle was 
moderate, with no “sudden stop” episodes, thus preventing a boom-bust episode 
in the economy. Bank-level data show some differences across banks, with some 
banks relying more on parent funding than others. The share of parent-bank 
financing ranges from almost no financing at all at some banks to more than one-
third of total assets at others, reaching a peak of 45% at one bank in 2009. For 
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the post-crisis period (2013-18) the maximum level of parent funding averaged 
15% of total assets, while the minimum stood at 1%. This may reflect differences 
in banks’ business models with respect to financing, as well as parent banks’ 
commitment to supporting the funding needs of their subsidiaries during the 
early years of acquisition in order to gain market share. Stronger parent funding is 
more common for smaller banks, which perhaps face a greater need for additional 
funding to boost their growth.
The rising foreign presence, in ownership or funding or both, contributed to faster 
financial deepening. As the post-transition restructuring was reaching its final 
stages, the environment was becoming conducive for an expansion of the credit 
market. The credit-to-GDP ratio started to increase across the board, with notable 
acceleration in the 2003-8 period, before the outbreak of the global crisis. It was a 
period of abundant global liquidity; foreign banks were competing for market share, 
the initial debt level was rather low and the propensity for taking on debt was high. 
The confluence of all these forces enabled strong credit flows, which underpinned 
overall growth. As growth increased, a self-reinforcing mechanism started to work, 
boosting assets prices and provoking additional capital inflows. 
Figure 7. 
Credit to GDP




































MKD -CEE -SEE -Baltics 
Source: Central banks’ websites and IMF WEO database.
Note: Gaps are calculated as actual minus HP filter of GDP growth rates.
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Figure 8.
GDP gap, in percentage points




































MKD -CEE -SEE -Baltics 
Source: Central banks’ websites and IMF WEO database.
Note: Gaps are calculated as actual minus HP filter of GDP growth rates.
Compared to some other countries in the regional context, the financial 
deepening in North Macedonia occurred somewhat later, and did not coincide 
with the exact timing of foreign entry into the banking system. Given country-
specific circumstances related to political uncertainty, and also the time needed 
to restore the confidence in the banking system, the more intensive process 
of financial convergence occurred as the global financial crisis was breaking. 
Credit-to-GDP was hovering below 20% of GDP until 2004, when it started 
to grow rapidly, and by the end of 2008 it rose to about 42% of GDP. Although 
at the time it was assessed mostly as a catching-up process in a rather conducive 
domestic and international environment, preventive measures were taken on 
the macroprudential front to avert potential risks. These measures – the low 
dependence on cross-border funding and the strong prudential regulation – 
prevented a credit boom prior to the crisis, as well as a subsequent credit bust 
in the period following the crisis. In fact, North Macedonia is one of the 
rare countries in which only moderate credit growth was observed. Since the 
beginning of the crisis until now, credit has continued to grow at a rather steady 
rate, reaching around 50% of GDP at end-2018. 
Aside from the increased access to additional financing, the presence of foreign 
banks in the region also brought non-financial benefits, equally important to 
a stronger banking system and the provision of credit finance to the economy. 
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A recent survey4 conducted by the National Bank of the Republic of North 
Macedonia (NBRNM) among foreign subsidiaries in the country acknowledged 
the important role of the parent in shaping strategies and policies of the domestic 
subsidiaries and transferring managerial and operational practices from the home 
to the host country. Yet the influence is stronger in some areas than in others. 
The leading area where all of the surveyed banks report substantial influence 
by the parent is the definition of strategic objectives and action plans for their 
fulfilment, suggesting a strong parent-subsidiary relationship. 
Figure 9.
Parent banks’ influence on domestic banks
Source:  NBRNM survey on the effects from foreign banks entrance into the domestic banking 
sector, January 2019.
The second area is the corporate governance arrangements, which are perceived by 
86% of the respondent banks to be substantially influenced by the parent. These 
results are generally comparable with the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development’s  “Banking Environment and Performance Survey II” (EBRD 2011), 
which reveals corporate governance as important business area influenced by parent 
banks according to 100% of banks surveyed in SEE, CEE and the Baltics. Given the 
importance of corporate governance for the overall organisational infrastructure 
of a bank, and hence for the achievement of its goals, the involvement of a well-
established parent bank with a long tradition in the industry is highly beneficial for 
4 The NBRNM conducted a survey of foreign bank subsidiaries in North Macedonia in order to get banks’ views 
on the effects of foreign bank entry into the domestic banking sector. The survey was conducted in January 2019 
and included six foreign bank subsidiaries in the country and one bank belonging to an international financial 
holding company. The survey consisted of 15 questions. The results presented in this chapter are in aggregated 
graphical form, showing the share of surveyed banks in percent. Charts showing the results of all of the questions 
from the survey can be found in Appendix II. The NBRNM wishes to thank the banks for their contribution and 
their participation in the survey.
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the overall capacity building and performance of the domestic banks. In addition, 
areas that 80-100% of the banks in the SEE region pinpointed as impacted domains 
were credit risk portfolio management, credit risk assessment and IT systems. The 
NBRNM survey shows a similar stance by banks in North Macedonia, though with 
a lesser weight being put on these domains. The majority of the banks (57%) perceive 
a moderate influence of their parents with respect to risk-management policies (for 
liquidity-risk management, 71% of banks) and IT infrastructure, while only 29% 
cited no influence at all in the areas of interest rate and currency risk management. 
Another important inference from the NBRNM survey is the relatively high 
financial independence of domestic subsidiaries from their parents, which is in 
accordance with their business models. The majority of banks report parent funding 
makes up less than 10% of total sources of financing, with certain fluctuations in 
the period during and after the crisis. Only 33% of Macedonian banks report the 
existence of a centralised liquidity model, which is another argument in support of 
subsidiaries’ independence in managing liquidity and funding. Moreover, only 43% 
of banks use parent funding for liquidity purposes, such as smoothing unexpected 
shocks to the deposit base, while the majority predominant share channel it to meet 
credit growth targets or to take advantage of new opportunities. 
Figure 10. 
Average parent funding share of total sources of financing  
(excluding equity and reserves)
Source:  NBRNM survey on the effects from foreign banks entrance into the domestic banking 
sector, January 2019.
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Figure 11. 
Main reasons for parent funding
Source:  NBRNM survey on the effects from foreign banks entrance into the domestic banking 
sector, January 2019.
The majority of the banks agree that being a subsidiary of an international banking 
group strengthens their resilience to domestic and international shocks due to the 
parental support in funding that can be easily accessed in case of liquidity shortages. 
In the banks’ view, the entry of foreign banks has brought many benefits that 
considerably outweigh the costs (Figures 13 and 14 in Appendix II). All of the banks 
report improved corporate governance and risk management as “very to extremely 
important” benefits associated with foreign bank parents. A large majority (86%) 
report “very to extremely important” spillover effects in increasing access to finance, 
improving competition and efficiency of the banking system and strengthening 
financial stability in the country. At the same time, 71% of surveyed banks link 
the entry of foreign banks to the improved quality of financial intermediation and 
the building of shock absorption capacities. In terms of costs, 43% of banks report 
moderate adverse effects from internal rules of the parent that are non-compliant 
with the characteristics of the Macedonian banking sector and economy, with 
increased dependence on group policies weighing on efficiency in decision-making. 
Changed landscape after the global crisis?
Cross-border banking has certainly brought many benefits for CESEE countries, 
but growing financial linkages also entail risks, as a large foreign presence might 
propagate foreign shocks and amplify cycles. These costs partly materialised with 
the emergence of the global crisis, particularly in countries where foreign ownership 
was allied with substantial foreign funding. The structure of cross-border banking 
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played a role in the transmission of shocks. Although the foreign bank presence in 
the region is predominantly in the form of subsidiaries, the prevailing dominance 
of EU-headquartered banks with systemic importance at local level has accentuated 
concentration risks arising from concentrated foreign exposure to a single geographic 
area, i.e., the EU.
With the occurrence of the crisis, overall capital f lows, including those in the 
banking system of the CESEE region, slowed down or even reversed, thus depressing 
the activity of domestic banks. In those countries where foreign funding prior to 
the crisis was buoyant and financing constraints were limited, the credit cycle was 
considerably amplified. While before the crisis this model enabled strong support 
to the overall leverage of the economies, with the outbreak of the crisis it led to a 
“hard landing”. The larger the inflows, the larger the reversal, and the more severe 
the financial and economic downturn. This pattern was visible in the Baltic States, 
in particular – a region where, prior to the crisis, foreign debt flows into the banking 
system in certain years reached almost 20% of GDP. The subsequent adjustment was 
severe, with foreign funding outflows over the three-year period 2009-11 totalling 
22% of GDP. On the other hand, the overall pre/post crisis financial cycle, in terms 
of both external indebtedness of the banking system and credit growth in CEE and 
SEE countries, including North Macedonia, as discussed above, was more moderate, 
though country differences are visible.
Figure 12. Figure 13.
Customer deposits, percentage Deposit-to-credit ratio in 2008
share of total liabilities, in 2008
Source: IMF FSI database and central banks websites.
The traditional banking model and the dominance of local funding, similar to some 
other CEE and SEE countries, were important factors shielding the Macedonian 
banking system from the crisis. Macedonian banks recorded a deposit-to-credit ratio 
of 108% prior to the crisis, the second highest among observed CESEE countries 
after the Czech Republic. Even in the pre-crisis period, CESEE banks, including 
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Macedonian banks, predominantly employed retail-based funding from customers’ 
deposits at home, which proved to be a more stable source of funding during stress 
periods (IMF, 2015). The share of residents’ deposits in CESEE banks amounted 
nearly 60% of their total liabilities on average in the years prior to the crisis. The 
deposit-to-credit ratio was at a comfortable level of 90% in 2008 as compared to 
60% in the Baltics. 
The pre-crisis fundamentals of Macedonian banks were sufficiently strong to act 
as a buffer against potential disruptions, and remained well in place post-crisis. 
The liquidity ratio of the system was in line with the CESEE average at 32% for 
2006-8.5  Banks maintained sound capital buffers slightly above the CESEE 
average at 17.2%6, and the adequate solvency ratio was maintained after the crisis. 
Profitability moved in line with the business cycle and declined moderately in the 
wake of the crisis, but remained positive. Post-crisis recovery was generally faster 
than the CESEE average, with return on equity and return on assets approaching 
their pre-crisis levels in recent years. Foreign and domestic banks showed similar 
trends in terms of their profitability during and after the crisis, although foreign 
bank subsidiaries seem to perform much better in the post-crisis period. Outliers 
are “other” foreign banks, whose profitability indicators were improving up to 
2015 and started to deteriorate afterwards, mostly due to their lower market shares 
and limited ability to improve their efficiency. The poor quality of bank assets 
was a major drag on credit growth in the CESEE post-crisis. Yet this was not 
the case for North Macedonia. The nonperforming loan (NPL) ratio stabilised 
reasonably soon, to about 10% in 2012, below the SEE average. Underpinned by 
the NBRNM’s 2015 measures for mandatory write-offs of NPLs which have been 
fully provisioned for more than two years, the NPL ratio was brought down to 
5.2% in 2018, which is even below the pre-crisis level.
5 Data refer to liquidity ratio at system level.
6 Data refer to the capital adequacy ratio at system level.
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Figure 14. Figure 15.
Capital adequacy ratio Liquidity ratio
Figure 16. Figure 17.
Profitability NPL ratio
Source: NBRNM.
Note: Figures refer to Macedonian banking sector.
With the system in sound shape, the National Bank took a pre-emptive stance and 
undertook a number of measures to further support banking system resilience 
and strengthen financial stability in the country. In late 2008, well before the 
introduction of Basel III liquidity requirements, stricter liquidity buffers were 
introduced, calling on banks to maintain a certain minimum level of liquid assets for 
covering the liabilities falling due in the following 30 and 180 days. The NBRNM 
used a combination of monetary, supervisory and macroprudential measures to 
contain risks from rapid credit growth in the years before the crisis, including 
prevention of induced credit risk related to foreign exchange lending and credit 
controls on households’ lending.7 These measures helped to reduce the vulnerability 
of the banking sector and enhance its resilience to shocks.  
7 For more details on the macroprudential policies of the NBRNM in the period before and during the global crisis, 
see Celeska, Gligorova and Krstevska “Macroprudential Regulation of Credit Booms and Busts: The Experience of 
the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia”, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 5770.
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Despite the low dependence on foreign financing, rather conservative business 
models and prudent regulation, threats of parent banks’ deleveraging could not 
be ignored in Macedonia, or in other CESEE countries. Though funding risk 
was not a particular issue, the possible sale of the subsidiaries or divestment by 
large international banking groups remained open. With the escalation of the 
European sovereign debt crisis around mid-2011, European banks came under 
renewed pressures leading to a second wave of deleveraging. Several cases at that 
time of forced divestment, two of which related to international groups present in 
Macedonia, brought to the fore the possibility of foreign banks’ exit, which could 
arise regardless of the underlying profitability of the bank subsidiaries in question 
or their dependence or lack of dependence on parent funding. The most rigorous 
deleveraging occurred during the European debt crisis, reinforced by stricter 
financial regulation under Basel III and EU legislation.
Figure 18. Figure 19.
Liabilities to EU parent banks, Credit to non-financial sector,
as a percentage of total liabilities year-on-year, in %, 2013-17 average
Source: Central banks’ websites. 
Some parent banks of key subsidiaries in North Macedonia experienced losses 
during the financial crisis that were so significant as to qualify for state aid within 
restructuring plans agreed with the European Commission. Restructuring plans, 
inter alia, envisaged substantial cost-cutting, including sizeable scaling back of banks’ 
activities abroad. This threatened to destabilise Macedonian subsidiaries through 
the confidence and reputation channel. The 2015 financial turbulence in Greece 
triggered some deposit withdrawals, but their impact was moderate and short-lived. 
Banks effectively managed the liquidity pressures that accompanied the measures 
taken, and more stringent surveillance by the NBRNM has swiftly restored trust 
and normalised the situation. More precisely, in mid-2015 the NBRNM adopted 
capital flow measures against Greece that were time-bound (valid for a maximum 
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of 6 months), forward-looking and targeted towards capital transactions. The aim 
was to prevent possible contagion from the Greek crisis that could undermine 
the stability of the Macedonian banking sector or potentially cause balance of 
payments distress, given the sizeable presence of Greek banks and businesses in 
North Macedonia. Macedonian subsidiaries suffered some consequences from 
the stresses on parent banks via pressures to consolidate capital at parent level and 
group-level restrictions on credit growth. Still, this was of rather limited extent. 
This can also be observed implicitly from Figure 19, where North Macedonia stands 
as an outlier, with no large discrepancies in post-crisis growth between EU-owned 
banks and the rest of the system. Parent banks stayed broadly committed to the 
Macedonian market and continued to maintain their operations in the country. 
Figure 20.
North Macedonia – Capital allocations, system-level (flows, in MKD million)
Source: NBRNM.
Figure 21.
North Macedonia – Profits distribution, share in profit after tax, at group level
in % (2013-17 average)
Source: NBRNM.
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The latest EIB CESEE Lending Survey shows all the surveyed parent banks 
reported a higher return on equity of their Macedonian subsidiaries compared 
to the overall group level, while a large majority also reported a higher return on 
assets. Foreign banks’ subsidiaries captured around 77% of the profits earned 
at the system level in 2013-17. Profits earned in this period were almost equally 
distributed between dividends and retained earnings, which subsidiaries largely 
used to support investments in future growth. Subsidiaries’ growth prospects 
were further enhanced by the capital support that parent banks provided during 
and after the crisis, mainly through the issuance of subordinated debt. Some of 
the banks have strengthened their capital positions using new issuance of equity, 
although, on average, the post-crisis period was marked by lower levels of new 
issuance of equity or subordinated and hybrid instruments (with most of the 
increases in banks’ own funds coming from retained earnings and issuance of 
subordinated debt). This is attributable to some extent to the already sound capital 
positions of Macedonian subsidiaries that, along with their solid profitability, 
continued to sustain their ability to grow without any additional capital 
injections. In addition, if needed, these banks have easier access to tier 1 and tier 
2 instruments from their parent.
Figure 22.
Parents bank assessment for Macedonian subsidiaries (% of surveyed banks)
 
Source: EIB CESEE Lending Surve, H2 2018.
Although the banking system came through the crisis quite well and the overall 
behaviour of foreign banks in Macedonia did not cause disruption, the crisis 
has slowed the process of entry of new foreign capital in North Macedonia and 
the region as a whole. Faced with severe impairments on their balance sheets as 
legacy of the crisis, international banks have put their expansion plans on hold 
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and even reduced some of their activities abroad. In the Western Balkans region, 
the non-EU foreign groups have filled the gap left by EU banks, entering the 
market through a number of mergers and acquisitions. This has resulted in an 
increased share of assets owned by non-EU foreign banks. In North Macedonia 
there was only one exit of an EU bank headquartered in Greece, which has 
sold its Macedonian subsidiary, belonging to the group of small banks, to an 
investor from Switzerland. Despite the post-crisis restructuring, EU banks still 
remain dominant foreign investors in the region and have retained their systemic 
importance for the host jurisdictions.
Figure 23.
Distribution of banking sector assets in Western Balkans
Source: National supervisory authorities in the Western Balkan countries.
Note: Data refer to September 2018.
Looking ahead, foreign banks can be expected to continue to play an important 
role in the further development of CESEE financial systems. Despite the progress 
achieved in convergence towards advanced economies, the convergence gap for 
many countries in the region remains wide, underlining the need to step up 
structural reforms in different segments of their economies. These efforts need 
to be underpinned by adequate funding sources and an efficient and developed 
financial infrastructure. Having proper access to domestic and external finance 
is a main precondition for unleashing the growth potential and achieving faster 
income convergence. 
It seems that countries in the region cannot count on sizeable capital inflows, 
including inflows through the banking system, as in the period preceding the 
crisis, which clearly underlines the need for more focus on domestic resources. 
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A new financing model for economic growth will most probably be more balanced 
between external and domestic sources. Many of the countries were able to offset the 
drag in foreign funding via deposit growth. Resident deposits in SEE increased by 
nearly 7 percentage points of GDP during the acute phase of EU bank deleveraging 
(2011-14) and continued to grow afterwards, providing the banks with sufficient 
funding to extend new lending. The deposit-to-credit ratio broadly improved across 
the region to about 120% on average in 2017.
Figure 24. 
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Nevertheless, many CESEE countries suffer from low levels of domestic saving, 
suggesting that deposit funding on its own may not be sufficient to support stronger 
financial deepening in the period ahead. This holds in particular for the SEE region 
where domestic saving rate ranks from 7.8% of GDP in Albania to 23.3% of GDP in 
Serbia. In 2017, North Macedonia had saving rate of about 17% of GDP, comparable 
to the regional average but lower than in CEE countries (28% of GDP). These 
rates of savings are not adequate to support investments that have plunged in the 
post-crisis period and, despite some recovery in the recent period, remain low, even 
below some traditional benchmarks for faster convergence. Thus, attracting fresh 
capital from abroad remains an important complement to low domestic savings. 
However, foreign banking groups see limited prospects in the region. The EIB 
CESEE Lending Survey shows that banking groups essentially assess market 
potential in the CESEE region as medium and their market positioning as 
satisfactory, but with differences across countries. In Croatia, for instance, 
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assessments are dispersed between medium and low potential, likewise in Poland, 
and in Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina to some extent. In North Macedonia and 
Kosovo, all of the surveyed banks report medium market potential. In terms of 
long-term strategies, the majority of banks intend to maintain the same level of 
operations or selectively expand activities in the region.
Figure 26. 
Parent banks’ assessment for CESEE
Market potential Market positioning
Source:  EIB CESEE Lending Survey. 
Slower growth prospects as compared to the pre-crisis period are an important factor 
behind foreign investors’ hesitance following the crisis. Some countries face additional 
constraints related to their overbanked systems. According to IMF (2017) analysis, 
all of the Western Balkans countries have fragmented banking systems in terms of 
the number of banks per capita that may be discouraging new entrants by deterring 
competition and hampering efficiency. The problem of overbanking is particularly 
pronounced in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro, but Albania, North Macedonia 
and Serbia are not exempt. In such an environment, encouraging consolidation through 
bank mergers and acquisitions may contribute considerably to improving the structure 
and efficiency of the banking sector and attract new investors from abroad. 
In this process, policymakers should not forget the lesson from the latest crisis, which 
provided evidence that the benefits of foreign banking presence can be maximised, 
and costs can be minimised, when moderate, but not excessive, levels of cross-border 
finance are in place. In essence, one of the main challenges ahead is related to the need 
in some countries for transiting from a centralised funding model to a more balanced 
approach to funding sources. This approach could enhance the resilience of domestic 
subsidiaries to any shock which the parent bank might be faced with. Of course, the 
impact of a shock might not be related solely to the funding model. The characteristics 
of parent banks, in terms of their solvency, liquidity and funding costs, are highly 
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important as well. Any major shock to parent bank solvency and its access to funding 
and funding costs easily translates to the subsidiary. IMF (2013) explored this issue in 
an attempt to disentangle the main causes for the different post-crisis credit growth 
patterns (2008-11) between domestic and foreign-owned banks in CESEE countries. 
The main determinant of the difference in growth of credit detected was parent bank 
funding costs, which deteriorated markedly after the crisis. This again confirms the 
previous point, that high exposure to cross-border funding could severely amplify 
any foreign shock that might occur. Thus, less centralised funding could provide for 
buffers and room for manoeuvre and prevent severe vulnerabilities.  
Challenges for host supervisors
Apart from the inferences listed in the previous section, the substantial presence of 
foreign banking groups on the domestic market inevitably draws attention to the 
importance of cross-border cooperation arrangements as a tool for ensuring efficient 
information exchange and smooth data flows. The recent history and the lessons learnt 
stress the necessity for strong home-host supervisory cooperation and involvement of all 
concerned parties when major decisions are made, which is an important precondition 
for effective supervision. This matter is even more relevant given the fact that foreign 
banks in North Macedonia, as well as in the region, are large and systemically important 
for the host countries, while on the group level they are less important. Apart from two 
EU subsidiaries, all other subsidiaries have insignificant shares in the total assets of their 
groups while being extremely important for the region’s banking systems. 
Figure 27.
Share of foreign banks’ subsidiaries in total WB assets and in total group assets8 
Source:  Bankscope and NBRNM calculations.
8 It should be highlighted that there were certain divestment activities in the region after September 2018, which might 
change the data presented in these charts.
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Figure 28.
Structure of the systemically important banks
Source:  National supervisory authorities in the Western Balkan countries.
The importance of the foreign banks is even more pronounced in the structure 
of the systemically important banks,9 accounting for more than 87% of their 
total assets. The numbers highlight the importance of a sound platform for 
cooperation between the regulators, especially during the aftermath of the global 
financial crisis, when parts of the European banking sector underwent a process 
of deleveraging and even divestment from the CESEE countries, including the 
Western Balkan countries. 
Although the restructuring of global activities in 2018 was less intense than in 
past periods,10 there are still examples of group-level strategies tilted towards a 
reduction in operations. Around 80% of the EU banking groups have a long-term 
strategy of maintaining the same level of operations or selectively increasing their 
operations in certain countries. Still, the percentage of EU banking groups which 
plan to reduce their operations in the CESEE countries has substantially increased 
in the last two years and, more importantly, this percentage remained quite steady 
during this two-year period (around 13%, compared to just around 1% in 2013-
15). Having in mind the impact that the withdrawal of the EU banks from the 
region might have on the local banking systems, strong cooperation between the 
home and host supervisors is of utmost importance to ensure mutually beneficial 
outcomes. The European Central Bank, the European Banking Authority, the 
9 As determined by the national authorities of the Western Balkan countries in accordance with their local 
methodologies, which follow Basel III principles and recommendations.
10 According to the latest CESEE Deleveraging and Credit Monitor from November 2018, there are few signs of 
deleveraging of western banks in the region in the first half of 2018.
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Single Resolution Board, as well as the national supervisory authorities acting 
as home supervisor of the banks in the region, remain major counterparties of 
the host supervisors from the region. The share of EU banking groups ranges 
from 48.2% in North Macedonia to 81.6% in Bosnia-Herzegovina. On average, 
local supervisors in the Western Balkan countries are the home supervisor for 
only 28% of total bank assets, while the ECB and other EU national supervisors 
are “responsible”, as home supervisors, for more than 63% of banks’ assets, loans 
and equity. 
Figure 29.
CESEE: Group-level 12-month strategies 
Source:  EIB-CESEE Bank Lending Surveys.
Figure 30.
Home supervisor of banks in the Western Balkan countries
Source:  National supervisory authorities in the Western Balkan countries.
During the past few years, through joint activities and under the auspices of 
the Vienna Initiative, the Western Balkan countries have managed to intensify 
their cooperation with the relevant EU bodies. In October 2015, six supervisory 
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authorities from this region11 signed a Memorandum of Cooperation with the 
EBA,12  as a platform for a harmonised approach to solving any future challenges. 
By the end of 2018, the NBRNM, as a banking supervisor in North Macedonia, 
had signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the European Central 
Bank,13 which has enabled the NBRNM to continue its participation in the 
established supervisory colleges for two eurozone banks present on the Macedonian 
banking market. Even though the NBRNM can participate in the supervisory 
colleges only as an observer, the colleges provide a valuable insight into the groups’ 
operations and major risk exposures. 
However, there is a room for further improvement. First, the NBRNM does not 
participate in the supervisory colleges of all EU banks present on the domestic 
market. Second, experience shows that information from home authorities 
(including the Single Supervisory Mechanism) has sometimes been difficult to 
obtain, especially regarding issues such as capital planning and recovery plans. In 
addition, there has been limited interaction with the home supervisor concerning 
measures undertaken or actions required that focus on achieving the stability 
and orderly operation of the EU banks (such as the restructuring plans agreed 
with the EU Commission), which can have adverse impacts on the host country’s 
banking system and financial stability. Usually, the home authorities undertake 
these measures without fully considering the spillover effects of their actions on 
other banking systems. 
When accounting for the influence that the presence of EU banks has on the 
host countries, special attention should be paid to the “pressure” to achieve 
greater compliance with EU standards and requirements in the regulatory and 
supervisory area. Harmonisation with EU standards reduces the regulatory and 
supervisory burden on the local subsidiaries, as both the parent bank and the 
subsidiary are required to comply with only one common regulatory framework. 
In addition, it provides further enhancement of host supervisory practices, which 
enhances banks’ ability to tackle potential shocks and ultimately leads to more 
stable and sound banking and financial systems. However, though harmonisation 
strengthens the soundness of the system and puts banks in a position to compete 
with their peers on the EU market, if not tailored to the specifics of the host 
countries, it may distort their business models and their ability to grow.
11 Supervisory authorities from Albania, Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Republika 
Srpska and Serbia.
12 Later on, the Bank of Kosovo and Bank of Moldova also joined the MoC with the EBA.
13 All other supervisory authorities in the region have also signed similar MoUs with the ECB on a bilateral basis.
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Two particular issues arise in this context – the impact of the differential treatment 
of home and host government securities in the risk-weighting of assets by parent 
banks and the implementation of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive 
(BRRD)14 and related minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities 
(MREL). 
According to the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR),15 EU banks can apply 
lower risk weights on exposures to central governments and central banks of third 
countries only if the EU Commission adopts a decision determining that these third 
countries apply supervisory and regulatory arrangements at least equivalent to those 
applied in the EU. This provision requires full implementation of all requirements 
prescribed in the CRR. Without the decision of the EU Commission, the risk 
weights for this type of exposure are assigned in accordance with the third country’s 
sovereign rating, i.e., in most cases, the EU parent banks (on a consolidated basis) are 
required to apply 100% risk weights to host government and central bank exposures 
of their CESEE subsidiaries. The effects of this provision are two-fold. First, third 
countries with a large presence of EU banks are forced to harmonise in full their 
banking regulation and supervisory practice with the EU, without leaving any room 
for adjustments or gradual implementation that might be needed because of the 
features of the third country’s banking system. Lack of full implementation of EU 
standards does not mean that certain risks are not covered with the appropriate 
level of capital. As an example, the existing Macedonian capital adequacy regulation 
does not encompass the securitisation framework, as banking and capital markets 
lack such sophisticated financial instruments, but the risks arising from investing 
and trading in these instruments are appropriately captured with the capital 
requirements for credit and market risk. Thus, the lack of full harmonisation should 
not necessarily mean non-equivalence with the EU standards. 
Second, in order to comply with already stringent capital rules, the CRR provision 
places additional pressure on the EU parent banks to reduce their investments 
in central bank and government securities of the host countries, by limiting the 
maximum amount of sovereign exposure of their subsidiaries. According to the 
National Bank’s survey, 42.9% of the surveyed banks cited the introduction of 
new or tightening of the existing limits for exposures in government securities and 
central bank bills as an instrument employed by their parents to adjust to post-crisis 
14 Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for 
the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms.
15 Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential 
requirements for credit institutions and investment firms.
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regulation (Basel II and/or EU regulation). The imposed internal limits may pose 
limitations for policy making in the host country, reducing the effectiveness of 
monetary policy, as well as fiscal policy, given that government securities are an 
important source of government financing, with domestic banks holding around 
one-third of total issued amount of government securities.  
Similar challenges arise for the countries in the region from their effort to adopt the 
recovery and resolution framework established under the BRRD. Most of the banks 
in the region have traditional and conservative business models. Deposits, covering 
on average 70% of the banking sector assets, are the predominant form of bank 
finance. Banks operate with a liquidity surplus, which results in underdeveloped 
markets for senior unsecured debt. In compliance with their conservative model, 
banks are focused on lending to domestic retail and corporate clients, with only 
limited cross-border exposures, and this contributes to their stability. Loans to 
nonfinancial entities represent more than 50% of the banks’ assets in the region, 
while the loans-to-deposit ratio is more than 80%. All banking systems are highly 
capitalised, with equity and reserves of more than 14% of the total assets.
If we consider the case of North Macedonia, banks operate with high Common 
Equity Tier 1 (CET1) ratio of 14.9% on average, where the CET1 instruments 
represent more than 91% of the banks' own funds. The total Pillar 1 and Pillar 2 
capital requirements for Macedonian banks range from 9.6% to 17.5%. Starting from 
March 2017, banks are required to implement the capital conservation buffer (2.5%), 
while the banks identified as systematically important are required to implement 
additional capital buffers. Thus, the total amount of capital requirements (Pillar 1, 
Pillar 2 and capital buffers) for the banks in the country ranges from 13.1% to 
20.0%, which is an indicator of their relatively high loss-absorbency capacity. 
This indicates that, while bigger EU banks rely more on the financing from 
the wholesale market,16 banks in North Macedonia (as well as in the region as 
a whole) hardly issue  any senior unsecured bonds, while the level of long-term 
deposits of large corporate clients is marginal. The lack of a developed market for 
senior unsecured debt implies it would require a long time to build an investor 
base. Even if banks try to comply and decide to issue such debt, they would 
16 According to the latest EBA Report on funding plans from September 2018 (https://eba.europa.eu/
documents/10180/2357155/EBA+Report+on+Funding+Plans.pdf), 159 reporting banks from all EU jurisdictions 
forecast a broad-based growth in the volumes of subordinated debt in the following three years, which suggests that 
banks plan to focus on bail-in-able instruments to comply with their total loss-absorbing capacity/MREL requirements 
and are preparing for the transition from central bank funding to market-based funding.
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be challenged not only by the pricing (investors will demand high returns to 
account for the risk they might never get their initial investment back) but also 
by the availability of investors willing to assess and accept the risks associated 
with these instruments.
The compliance with MREL requirements, applied in a prudent way by the 
resolution authorities in these countries, might have unintended consequences. 
Namely, the BRRD requires banks to have enough liabilities eligible for bail-in, i.e., 
bank creditors will be written down or converted into shareholders, meaning that 
banks will be rescued internally without public money. Additional debt issued by 
the banks in order to comply with MREL requirements will result in an increase or 
restructuring of their balance sheets. Complying with the requirements by raising 
most of the funding in foreign currencies will bring unnecessary foreign exchange 
risk onto their balance sheets. This will have an adverse effect on countries' de-
euroisation initiatives, one of the pillars for managing systemic risks. Given the 
characteristics of these instruments, price of funding will increase, and it would 
be practically impossible for banks to continue with their conservative investment 
policies. They might be forced to invest in riskier assets or cross–border markets, 
which would increase the riskiness of the whole banking sector. Such a shift in 
investment policy does not correspond with the traditional focus of these banks 
on the local market and their low risk appetite, which has so far contributed to 
their overall stability. Therefore, having in mind the structure, size and sources of 
funding of these banks, provision of loss-absorbing capacity by the parent might be 
the only available form of MREL at this stage of development of capital markets – 
in the form of either capital or bail-in-able debt.
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Conclusion
The foreign presence in the banking systems of the countries in the CESEE region 
brought many benefits, increasing access to cross–border financing and providing 
for more efficient and competitive banks.  Nevertheless, rising financial linkages 
also entail certain risks, as they allow for stronger propagation of external shocks 
and amplification of cycles. In some countries in the region, part of these risks 
materialised with the outbreak of the global financial crisis, when a sudden stop 
of cross-border financing occurred and parent banks faced deleveraging pressures 
which were transmitted to the host countries. Observing our country experience, 
one could conclude that North Macedonia fits into the pattern of countries with 
strong foreign ownership of the banking system but rather low dependence on parent 
banks and overall cross-border financing, given the sufficiency of local funding. The 
foreign presence strongly influenced the strategic profile of domestic subsidiaries and 
their corporate governance, as well the overall infrastructure and risk management 
practices. The low dependence on external financing, rather conservative business 
models, prudent regulation and the strong pre-crisis fundamentals of the banking 
system allowed us to withstand the global shock with no severe consequences. 
However, although no funding risk was present, some pressures, mainly in the 
form of risks of possible divestment of the large European banks, were felt and 
called for vigilance. This, together with the major regulatory overhaul at the global 
and European level, called for a thorough examination of their potential impact on 
the domestic banking system. 
Guided by the experience from the last crisis, a few lessons  can be learned for the 
future. First, inevitably, additional cross-border financing will be needed to support 
convergence in some of the countries in the region, including North Macedonia. 
Some of this finance will probably be channelled through the banking system, and 
in this context the consensus of having “balanced” cross-border banking should 
be respected, so as to maximise benefits and minimise costs. Second, the larger the 
presence of foreign international banking groups in smaller countries, the higher 
the probability that some of the group-level decisions might have an adverse impact 
on domestic subsidiaries. Recent history shows the necessity for strong home-host 
cooperation and involvement of all stakeholders when major decisions are made, 
so as to preclude possible negative consequences. Third, harmonising regulatory 
and supervisory standards is crucial, as it strengthens the soundness of the system 
and puts banks in a position to compete with their peers on the EU market, for 
instance. However, if some aspects of the regulatory framework do not fit with the 
specifics of the host countries, banks’ business models may be distorted and their 
ability to grow compromised. 
267
Cross-border banking in North Macedonia: a country perspective
References
Allen, F., T. Beck, E. Carletti, R. P. Lane, D. Schoenmaker, and W. Wagner, 
2011. Cross-Border Banking in Europe: Implications for Financial Stability and 
Macroeconomic Policies, Centre for Economic Policy Research, London.
Arakeylan M., 2018. Foreign Banks and Credit Dynamics in CESEE, IMF Working 
Paper WP/18/3.
Celeska, F., V. Gligorova, and A. Krstevska, 2011, Macroprudential Regulation of 
Credit Booms and Busts: The Experience of the National Bank of the Republic of 
Macedonia, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 5770.
Claessens, S. and N. Van Horen, 2013. Impact of Foreign Banks, De Nederlandsche 
Bank Working Paper No. 370.
Clarke, G., R. Cull, and M. S. Peria Martinez, 2002. Does Foreign Bank Penetration 
Reduce Access to Credit in Developing Countries? Evidence from Asking Borrowers, 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2716.
Cull, R., and M. S. Martinez Peria, 2010, Foreign Bank Participation in Developing 
Countries: What Do We Know about the Drivers and Consequences of this 
Phenomenon? Policy Research Working Paper No. 5398, World Bank Group, 
Washington, DC.
De Haas, R., 2014. The Dark and Bright Side of Global Banking: A (Somewhat) 
Cautionary Tale from Emerging Europe, EBRD Working Paper No. 170.
De Haas, R., and I. Van Lelyveld, 2003. Foreign banks and Credit Stability in 
Central and Eastern Europe: Friends or Foes?, De Nederlandsche Bank, MEB 
Series no. 2003-04, Research Series Supervision no. 58.
Demirgüç-Kunt, A., and H. Huizinga, 2000. Determinants of commercial bank 
interest margins and profitability: some international evidence, World Bank 
Economic Review, 13(2), 379-408.
EBA,  2018., Report on Funding Plans, September.
EBRD, 2011, Banking Environment and Performance Survey II.
268
Ten years of the Vienna Initiative 2009-2019
IMF, 2013a. Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe: Regional Economic Issues, 
Report, April.
IMF, 2013b. Financing Future Growth: The Evolving Role of the Banking System 
in CESEE: Technical Notes.
IMF, 2015. Global Financial Stability Report: Navigating Monetary Policy 
Challenges and Managing Risks, Report, April.
IMF, 2017. IMF Regional Economic Outlook Europe: Europe Hitting Its Stride, 
Report, November.
Impavido, G., H. Rudolph, and L. Ruggerone, 2013. Bank Funding in Central, 
Eastern and South Eastern Europe Post Lehman: A “New Normal”?, IMF Working 
Paper WP/13/148.
Peek, L., and E. S. Rosengren, 2000. Collateral damage: effects of the Japanese bank 
crisis on real activity in the United States, American Economic Review, 90(1), 30-45.
269
Cross-border banking in North Macedonia: a country perspective
Appendix I: Foreign presence in the banking systems in the 
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CESEE: Technical note; BSCEE Reviews and central banks websites. 
270
Ten years of the Vienna Initiative 2009-2019
Appendix II: Results from the NBRNM survey on effects from 
foreign banks entrance into the domestic banking sector 
Figure 1.
Parent bank influence on domestic bank
Figure 2.
Types of parent bank funding
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Figure 3. 
Average share of parent bank funding in total sources of financing
(excluding equity and reserves)
Figure 4.
Main reasons for parent bank funding
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Figure 5. 
Parent bank funding is a cheaper source of financing  
(compared to retail and wholesale financing on domestic market) 
Figure 6. 
Parent bank treasury desk
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Figure 7. 
Parent bank made changes in the financing model following the crisis
Figure 8.
Domestic bank approved credit to parent bank
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Figure 9. 
Parent bank adjustment to post-crisis regulation 
(Basel III and EU regulation), effects on domestic banks 
Figure 10. Figure 11.
Other reasons for parent bank Parent bank fundamentals affect
deleveraging besides post-crisis domestic bank
regulation
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Figure 12. 
Being a subsidiary of an international banking group, domestic bank sees as 
advantage or pitfall to more easily  bridge:  
international shocks domestic shocks
Figure 13.
Main benefits from the entrance of the foreign banking groups into the domestic 
banking sector 
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Figure 14. 
Main pitfalls/costs from the entrance of the foreign banking groups 
into the domestic banking sector 
Source:  NBRNM survey on the effects from foreign banks entrance into the domestic banking 
sector, January 2019.  
Note: The Figures show the share of surveyed banks in percent. 
CHAPTER 15
Reforming the banking sector 
in Albania in the light 
of the Vienna Initiative
Gent Sejko
(Governor, Bank of Albania)
Abstract
This chapter reviews the main developments in the Albanian banking sector during 
the boom-and-bust cycle of the past 15 years and shares the experience of how 
local authorities led the banking sector through necessary reforms to overcome 
the crisis and post-crisis challenges and to adapt to the new financial environment. 
While going through the timeline of these events, we pay special attention to the 
important coordinating role played by the European Bank Coordination “Vienna” 
Initiative (1.0 and 2.0) in dealing with the deleveraging by EU banks in the Central, 
Eastern and Southeastern Europe (CESEE) region, and the resolution of high 
nonperforming loan (NPL) levels. While it can be intuitively seen that, in the case 
of Albania, Vienna 1.0 had some indirect positive spill-over  effects on the lending 
behaviour of local EU subsidiaries during the crisis, the effect of Vienna 2.0 was 
much more direct. The platform played an important guiding role in helping local 
authorities to address the issue of NPL resolution and undertake the necessary 
reforms. It is still contributing today through information and experience sharing, 
as well as coordinating the interests of the public and private stakeholders, while 
adopting a new growth model for the financial industry focused on innovation 
and productivity. 
Introduction
The liberalisation of the financial system in Eastern European countries as part of 
their transition process from communism to capitalism in the early 1990s attracted 
the large-scale entry of foreign banks into the region. These newly liberalised 
markets with high growth potential became the hosts of affiliates of multinational 
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Western European banks looking for profitable opportunities in the region. Their 
presence increased significantly during the 2000s and was shown to be beneficial for 
the economic and financial development of Eastern European countries, since they 
provided abundant funding and increased efficiency, and brought useful know-how 
to the new markets.  It is widely acknowledged that the entry of foreign banks in the 
CESEE region contributed to mitigating the effects of local crises and increasing 
financial stability in local markets (De Haas et al. 2015).
Once the global financial crisis broke out and started to spread towards Europe, the 
model of intense cross-border banking was put to the test, and the once beneficial 
economic and financial interconnectedness among Eastern and Western European 
countries became a source of panic and uncertainty in the crisis situation.  Despite 
being little exposed to US sub-prime problems, multinational EU banks operating 
in Eastern Europe became seriously affected by the growing financial market distress 
after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, suffering a sharp reduction 
in interbank liquidity. Banks therefore started to deleverage both at home and abroad, 
increasing concerns about whether they would continue to fund their local subsidiaries 
in emerging Europe. This risk was considered to be high because of the significant 
asymmetry in the relative importance of cross-border exposure between banks’ home 
and host countries, which became very evident at the time of the crisis. The funding 
received by foreign banks (usually in the form of parent funding of subsidiaries, direct 
lending or banks’ holding of securities) was very important for the Eastern European 
countries, while for the originating banks such exposures were minimal. A massive 
and uncoordinated reversal of financial flows would have endangered macrofinancial 
stability throughout the region, since it would have not only had negative consequences 
on local firms and households, but also exposed these countries to disruptive exchange 
rate fluctuations and major balance of payment problems. Moreover, the absence of 
agreement between the fiscal authorities in the home and host countries on how to 
share the burden of a defaulting subsidiary increased the risk of a run on funds from 
the region.
This situation highlighted the absence of a coordination mechanism to ensure banks’ 
commitment to the region. The European Bank Coordination “Vienna” Initiative, 
launched in January 2009, came as the response to the institutional vacuum. Gathering 
relevant authorities (such as central banks and ministries of finance) from host and 
home countries, representatives of multinational EU banks and international financial 
institutions (IFIs), this platform aimed to introduce a coordinating framework between 
the public and private sectors, in order to mitigate possible adverse collective action of 
banks and to guarantee macrofinancial stability in emerging Europe. 
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A month later, the heads of European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD), European Investment Bank (EIB) and the World Bank Group (WBG) 
launched a Joint IFI Action Plan, offering at least €24.5 billion to support banking 
systems and lending to the real economy in Central and Eastern Europe. This 
support was integrated with International Monetary Fund (IMF) and European 
Union macrofinancial support programmes to five countries: Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Hungary, Latvia, Serbia and Romania. In return, the parent banks of the largest 
foreign-owned EU banks operating in these countries signed bilateral and country-
specific commitment letters in which they pledged to maintain their exposure to 
these countries and provide capital for their subsidiaries as needed. At the same 
time, host country authorities had to commit themselves to continuing the efforts 
of macroeconomic stabilisation, while home country authorities had to support the 
operations of their cross-border banks. This way, the Vienna Initiative developed 
into a public-private partnership that combined macrofinancial support by the IMF 
and EU with funding by development institutions and the coordinated “bail-in” of 
private lenders (De Haas et al., 2012).
The sovereign debt crisis in the euro area and a general economic slowdown provoked 
a second wave of EU bank deleveraging from emerging Europe during summer 2011. 
The need was felt once more to step up the coordination between banks and their 
home and host country authorities. In this context, in January 2012 the Vienna 
Initiative was relaunched as Vienna Initiative 2.0. According to its mission statement, 
the objectives of Vienna Initiative 2.0 were: (i) to help avoid disorderly deleveraging, 
which could jeopardise financial stability in host and home countries, (ii) to ensure 
that potential cross-border financial stability issues are resolved and (iii) achieve 
policy actions, notably in the supervisory area, that are taken in the best joint interest 
of home and host countries. Unlike Vienna 1.0, the new platform had a more formal 
institutional structure. A Steering Committee was formed, including the EBRD, 
EIB, IMF, WBG and the European Commission, as well as representatives of home 
and host country authorities and commercial banks (European Commission, 2017) 
. From the outset, Vienna 2.0 expanded the scope of its involvement beyond the 
monitoring of credit and deleveraging trends between the Western parent banks 
and their Eastern subsidiaries. During this second phase, the initiative advocated 
interests and coordinated actions of non-EU countries in the Western Balkans. As 
the crisis left most countries in the region with a large stock of NPLs, impeding 
banks’ ability to lend and economic recovery more generally, in September 2014 the 
Vienna Initiative launched a regional action plan to coordinate national approaches 
for addressing the NPL problem. Hungary, Croatia, Serbia, Albania and Montenegro 
participated in this initiative, later joined by North Macedonia. 
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This chapter shares the Albanian experience in dealing with the issue of EU 
bank deleveraging and the high NPL legacy as the two major spill-over  effects 
of the crisis. After going through the timeline of the crisis and post-crisis 
developments and challenges in the Albanian banking sector and the needed 
reforms undertaken by the country’s authorities to address them, we also analyse 
the role and contribution of the Vienna Initiative in this process. While during the 
crisis and post-crisis period, the Vienna Initiative helped local authorities in the 
region to mitigate the effects of the crisis and cope with the remaining challenges 
(such as NPL resolution), nowadays this platform is being transformed into a 
knowledge and experience-sharing forum. Faced with the reality of EU banks 
consolidating at parent level and the risk of insufficient local funding resources, 
the new approach of the Vienna framework is guiding the region towards a new 
growth model while focusing on boosting innovation and productivity in the 
financial industry.
Weathering the effects of global financial crisis in Albania  
and the role of Vienna Initiative
Most of the challenges faced today by the banking sectors in Albania and other 
Western Balkans countries are a legacy of the boom and bust cycle of the past 
15 years. Similar to that in most Eastern European countries, the banking sector 
in Albania went through a gradual privatisation process after the 1990s, which was 
completed in 2004 with the selling of the largest state-owned bank to Raiffeisen 
Bank, Austria. The liberalisation of the banking sector allowed some major 
international banking groups to enter the market. They were mostly branches or 
subsidiaries of multinational European banking groups and were able to provide 
adequate funding and know-how. Their importance increased substantially after 
2004-5 (see Figure 1) expanding credit to the private sector and improving the 
overall efficiency, performance and profitability of the banking sector. 
Average annual credit growth during the pre-crisis years was 40% (the highest 
rates recorded between 2004-8 reaching 57% on average), reflecting both demand 
and supply factors, but also owing to a very low starting base. This expansion 
of funding led to a jump in credit penetration, and the ratio of credit to GDP 
increased by some 30 percentage points between 2001 and the end of 2008. 
Albania stood somewhat in the middle of its regional neighbours, where the 
credit-to-GDP jump ranged from 20 percentage points in Serbia to 70 percentage 
points in Montenegro (see Figure 2). The credit boom contributed to rapid 
economic growth, but also led to rising imbalances and increasing risks to 
financial stability.
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Figure 1. 
Private credit-to-GDP in Western 
Balkans prior to the crisis
Figure 2. 
Credit growth and credit-to-GDP 
ratio development in Albania during 
2003-8 
Source: IMF. Source: Bank of Albania.
At the onset of the global financial crisis (2007/8), Albania and other Western 
Balkan countries seemed unaffected by it, mostly due to their very small exposure 
to the US sub-prime issue and low financial integration, and therefore their banking 
sector assets kept expanding.1 In addition, lending was mostly domestically financed 
as, in contrast to some regional neighbours, the banks’ reliance on parent funding 
had traditionally been low. By this time (2008 Q1), foreign banks almost totally 
dominated the financial sector in Albania, owning about 94% of total sector assets 
and providing 92% of total credit. About 73% of the total credit portfolio was 
denominated in foreign currency (mostly euro), and banks’ loan portfolios were 
mostly dominated by corporate lending (65% of the total portfolio). 
However, as the global crisis escalated and tightened financial constraints on most 
multinational EU banks, Western Balkan countries also experienced a reversal in 
external funding, though less severely than the rest of the CESEE region (such 
as Romania, Bulgaria and Latvia), mostly due to less leveraged banking sectors. 
As most EU countries entered a period of economic stagnation, various negative 
spill-over effects were transmitted to the region through financial and trade 
channels, unwinding the structural vulnerabilities and macroeconomic imbalances 
accumulated during the pre-crisis boom years.  
1  During 2008, the Albanian banking sector increased its assets by 12.3% compared to the previous year, reaching 
about 86% of the country’s GDP  
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In case of Albania, the first spill-over effects of the global crisis were felt by the 
end of 2008, initially in the form of a deterioration in the balance of payments, 
mainly reflecting a decrease in exports and remittances from emigrants living in 
EU countries. On the other hand, increasing concerns regarding the escalation of 
the crisis heightened Albanian depositors’ sensitiveness, leading to a withdrawal 
of deposits by the end of the year. The good capitalisation state of the banks 
(overall system capital adequacy ratio about 17%) and the swift actions taken by 
the Bank of Albania, such as liquidity injections through open market operations 
and amendments to the Law on Deposit Insurance, increasing the insurance 
premium and deposit compensation level, helped to some extent to overcome the 
liquidity stress. Nevertheless, the unstable performance of deposits and the ongoing 
deleveraging trend of EU parent banks affected the banking sector’s lending activity. 
The combined effect of these developments was transmitted to the real-estate sector, 
harming the financial situation of corporates and households, which later translated 
into a deterioration in bank asset quality. 
Credit growth in Albania therefore started to slow down from the high rates of 
the boom years, a result of both demand and supply factors. The shrinking of 
activity was more pronounced in the case of foreign banks, especially EU banks, 
compared to domestic banks or other foreign non-EU banks. Initially, Albania was 
not directly involved in the Vienna Initiative, since it did not face a major funding 
risk and banking activity was mostly domestically funded and less dependent on 
external funds. However, the country was host to six subsidiaries of EU banks that 
had become part of the Initiative and had committed themselves to maintaining 
their exposures to the CESEE region: Raiffeisen Bank, Intesa Sanpaolo, National 
Bank of Greece, Alpha Bank, Piraeus Bank and Société Générale. By the end of 
2008, these banks owned, in total, 72% of the banking sector’s assets, while their 
credit portfolio share accounted for 71% of the total lending portfolio of the system. 
Overall, they constituted a large share of the Albanian banking sector, making 
the country particularly dependent on their credit behaviour. Nevertheless, at the 
consolidated level, these subsidiaries had very small shares on their parents’ balance 
sheets (usually not more than 2%), increasing the particular risk of a potential 
withdrawal of funds in case of consolidation actions at parent level. 
In fact, these banks were the first to reduce their lending activity in Albania (from 
the end of 2008-9), compared with other foreign (EU and non-EU banks) and 
domestic banks, and were probably affected by the risk-averse behaviour towards the 
CESEE region of their parent banks under the growing pressure by EU authorities 
to consolidate their balance sheets in the light of the funding constraints in 
283
Reforming the banking sector in Albania in the light of the Vienna Initiative
financial markets. To maintain the new capital levels set by European Central 
Bank (ECB) regulations, EU parent banks (large banking groups) also asked their 
local subsidiaries in Albania to reduce such activities as investment in government 
securities or low risk-weighted credit as part of the deleveraging process. As a result, 
the market share of these banks in terms of total assets diminished by 4-5% annually, 
falling to only 65% of banking system assets.
As the crisis fully hit the country (and the whole Western Balkan region) and bank 
deleveraging activity intensified during 2009-10, this trend was more contained in 
the case of EU banks following the commitments of their parent banks under the 
Vienna Initiative, compared with the other ownership groups operating in Albania 
(Figure 3). Faced with liquidity constraints due to low deposit growth in the country 
and the lack of access to alternative funding sources, domestically owned banks 
experienced the sharpest decrease in their lending activity.
Figure 3. 
Annual change of the share of total loans/total assets (in percentage points)
Source: Bank of Albania.
Considering the complexity of the situation, it is difficult to isolate the effect of 
the Vienna Initiative in the lending behaviour of the “Vienna” banks in Albania 
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from other effects, such as of Bank of Albania policy actions or banks’ managerial 
decisions to cope with the crisis. Nevertheless, looking at the lending behaviour 
of banks in Figure 3, it can easily be seen that, while both foreign and domestic 
banks sharply curbed credit growth during the crisis, the banks whose parents 
took part in the Initiative remained relatively stable lenders, maintaining their 
leading position in the market. On the other hand, despite initial concerns that 
the focus of the commitment letters signed with five specific countries could tempt 
the committed multinational banks to support their subsidiaries in these countries 
by withdrawing funds from countries without exposure commitments, such as 
Albania, such negative spill-overs did not materialise. Several so-called “horizontal 
meetings” between multinational banks and relevant national and international 
authorities, coordinated under the Vienna Initiative between September 2009 and 
March 2010, helped to address such potential shifting of funds. Therefore, it can be 
intuitively seen that, in the case of Albania, this coordinating framework had some 
indirect positive spill-over  effect on the lending behaviour of local subsidiaries of 
the “Vienna” parents, and that without such an effect the fall in credit growth in 
the country might have been much sharper. 
The relaunch of the Vienna Initiative (known as “Vienna 2.0”) in January 2012, 
to address the risk of a second wave of deleveraging of the EU parent banks in 
CESEE countries, expanded its coordination focus from preserving the presence 
of Western banking groups in CESEE region by providing capital and liquidity to 
their local affiliates as needed (the main focus of Vienna 1.0) to encouraging the 
authorities to cooperate in overcoming the situation. The mission statement clearly 
defined the objectives of Vienna 2.0 as being to help avoid disorderly deleveraging, 
ensure that cross-border financial stability issues were resolved and achieve policy 
actions, specifically in the supervision area. The renewed platform also established 
a more formal institutional structure and extended its geographical coverage to 
include other CESEE countries with a substantial Western bank presence. Non-
EU countries could join the Steering Committee and participate in the dialogue 
between the relevant stakeholders.  The Bank of Albania joined the Steering 
Committee in April 2013.
Since its launch, Vienna 2.0 has held several general policy and country-specific 
meetings and events in pursuit of its aims. The platform put effort into coordinating 
the discussion on issues arising from the crisis and also coordinated solutions, thus 
avoiding a unilateral crisis response. Several useful analytical tools (such as the 
CESEE Deleveraging and Credit Monitor and Bank Lending Survey) were also 
developed under Vienna 2.0 to provide strict monitoring of credit and deleveraging 
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trends as well as assessments of future trends between Western parent banks 
and their Eastern subsidiaries. Such information has been useful in providing 
a wider picture of the situation, and domestic authorities, such as the Bank of 
Albania, include them in their own assessments of the banking sector and regional 
comparisons. 
NPL resolution and the role of Vienna 2.0
In the years following the crisis, the Albanian economy entered a spiral of decreasing 
lending activity and stagnating economic growth. EU banking groups also kept 
deleveraging and gradually shrinking their activity due to their balance sheet 
consolidation under more conservative capital requirements from the EBA and 
as part of their overall exit strategies. Despite individual heterogeneities, similar 
developments characterised the whole Western Balkan region. Notwithstanding 
cross-country specifics, the negative feedback loop between low and decreasing 
credit growth and weak economic growth materialised in a sharp deterioration of 
banks’ asset quality during 2009-14. Peak NPL ratios were the highest (above 20%) 
in Albania, Montenegro and Serbia. In some cases, increases in the volume of NPLs 
were reinforced by currency depreciation, as many household and corporate loans 
were denominated in foreign currency (mostly in euros for Albania) while borrowers’ 
incomes were in local currencies. In the case of Albania, the NPL problem mostly 
affected the corporate sector; however, the rapid rise of consumer and housing 
loans in the run-up to the crisis increased the share of household NPLs in the total 
portfolio of problematic assets. Despite banks’ increasing efforts to reduce NPLs by 
setting up dedicated internal units to deal with this matter, the result was minimal.
The growing volume of NPLs on banks’ balance sheets in most Western Balkan 
countries created uncertainty and became a drag on credit growth due to their 
adverse effects on funding costs and profitability. This situation raised concerns 
not only from the financial stability point of view, but also from the perspective 
of monetary policy and ultimately economic growth. Various factors beyond the 
banking sector, such as legal and regulatory framework issues regarding collateral 
execution, hampered the process of NPL resolution. Less expensive ways to achieve 
debt settlements, such as out-of-court restructurings, were little used in the region. 
Despite various actions from domestic authorities to address this issue, NPL ratios 
remained at high levels until 2014. In the case of Albania, between 2011 and 2013 
two working groups were established under the lead of the Bank of Albania and 
with the participation of other relevant authorities (such as the Ministry of Finance 
and Ministry of Justice), which aimed to address different problems related to NPL 
clean-up. The Bank of Albania introduced a package of countercyclical measures 
286
Ten years of the Vienna Initiative 2009-2019
aiming to encourage lending in the domestic economy while discouraging banking 
sector investment in foreign assets.2 
Nevertheless, considering that the presence of many structural obstacles that 
impeded NPL resolution in the region hampered the banks’ ability to lend, there 
was an urgent need for concrete action. This required designing coordinated 
and comprehensive strategies needing effective collaboration between relevant 
authorities and private stakeholders.  As a result, in September 2014, the Vienna 
Initiative launched a regional action plan to address the NPL problem under the 
framework of Vienna 2.0, and drawing on the output of the previously established 
Working Group on Non-performing Loans. Albania participated in this initiative, 
alongside Hungary, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro and, later, North Macedonia. 
Since the clean-up of NPLs was a multi-dimensional problem, it required multi-
pronged strategies tailored to country-specific conditions. Therefore, under the 
coordination and following the recommendations of the platform, the authorities 
in the participating countries increased their efforts in designing comprehensive and 
effective measures to alleviate the sizeable burden of NPLs on banks’ portfolios. In 
this regard, the Albanian authorities launched a comprehensive national strategy 
in November 2015, with the aim of integrating and advancing the work on various 
reforms of supervision, enforcement, debt restructuring and insolvency.3 
In brief, the whole package of policy actions and measures carried out by the 
Albanian authorities to address the two main post-crisis challenges – the high 
NPL levels and weak credit growth – resulted in a series of important amendments 
and reforms in relevant areas, including the following.
Amendments in the legal framework affecting NPLs, including amendments to the 
Civil Procedure Code to simplify and shorten collateral enforcement procedures, 
revision of the Bankruptcy Law to incorporate the best international practices, 
simplify the existing framework and protect economic and governance rights of 
secured and unsecured creditors, amendments to the Private Bailiffs Law and 
the Law on the Juridical Bailiff Service, in order to increase the efficiency of the 
foreclosure procedures and debt collection, amendment to the Law on registration 
of immovable properties, etc.
2 To stimulate domestic lending, lower capital requirements were applied to banks that increased their domestic lending 
by 4-10% on annual basis (this measure was abolished in 2016). On the other hand, higher capital requirements were 
applied to banks increasing their level of non-resident investment in foreign currency (this measure was abolished in 
2018). 
3 A timeline of these measures is shown in Annex 1. 
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Amendments to the existing NPL resolution framework, targeting three areas: 
(i) clean-up of banks’ balance sheets through the compulsory write-off of all loans 
classified as “lost” for more than three years in a row; (ii) regulatory amendments 
to encourage bank policies on loan restructuring; (iii) guidelines by the Bank of 
Albania for commercial banks regarding out-of-court (debt) restructuring (OOCR) 
for corporates and households, in order to facilitate and accelerate NPL clean-up.
Regulatory changes introduced by the Bank of Albania regarding the management 
of banks’ large exposures, management of credit risk from banks and branches 
of foreign banks, defining loan restructuring conditions, etc.
Amendments to the tax law, with the aim of removing some of the legal and 
technical issues impeding loan write-offs, especially regarding the classification 
of write-offs as a deductible item from banks’ net income.
Other important actions included guidelines published by the Bank of Albania 
regarding real estate appraisals, OOCR for corporates and households, upgrade 
of the Credit Registry and the establishment of a credit bureau commissioned 
by the EBRD, etc.  
While the aggregate results and effects of such structural reforms are difficult to 
quantify, and many of their effects will only manifest in the future, the enforced 
write-offs had a direct and immediate impact in lowering the overall NPL 
level in the Albanian banking sector. The Bank of Albania has estimated that, 
without these measures, the actual NPL level would have remained above 20% 
(see Figure 5). 
Judging from the developments in NPL ratios in the Vienna Initiative NPL partner 
countries (see Figure 5), as well as other NPL indicators shown and analysed in the 
NLP Monitor, one can conclude that the platform has been generally successful 
in guiding and coordinating the efforts in addressing the NPL issue. Despite 
country-specific factors, all partner countries managed to achieve a sustainable and 
consistent clean-up of banks’ balance sheets, as well as important reforms in various 
areas contributing to the high levels of NPLs. Nevertheless, most of the reforms 
are still under way and their results are only expected to be seen in the medium 
and long term. On the other hand, important challenges (legal, regulatory, tax, 
structural, etc.) preventing banks from resolving their NPLs and from attracting 
secondary market investors still remain to be tackled, highlighting the need for a 
continuous collaboration and knowledge-sharing about NPL solutions.
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Figure 4. 
Developments in the NPL ratio and 
write-offs (in %)
Figure 5. 
NPL developments in Initiative 
Partner Countries (2015-18)
Source: Bank of Albania. Source:  NPL Monitor for CESEE region 2016 
H1, H2; 2017, H1, H2; 2018, H1, H2.
Post-crisis trends and challenges for the Albanian banking sector: 
adapting to the “new banking reality” 
The Albanian banking sector successfully managed the crisis and post-crisis periods. 
Despite large NPL write-offs (up to 6% of GDP) and significant decreases in bank 
profitability, banks remained liquid and well capitalised, and thus no outside 
intervention was needed. Since the onset of the crisis, the Bank of Albania has 
worked intensively towards adapting the existing regulatory and supervisory 
framework with the aim of increasing banking sector resilience to external and 
internal shocks and to encourage the banking industry to adopt a more balanced 
and self-funded model in the medium and long term. Although foreign subsidiaries 
operating in Albania have traditionally been less dependent on parent funding than 
some regional neighbours, policy measures and regulatory changes have aimed at 
minimising the banking sector’s reliance on foreign funding and at developing a 
banking model more based on deposits and domestic funding. It is important that 
the banking sector utilise existing opportunities and keeps carrying out its financial 
intermediation role and fostering economic growth at home, within the parameters 
of safe banking activity and in line with the requirements of the regulatory and 
supervisory framework.
As the economy gradually recovered from the crisis, domestic credit demand 
somehow bounced back.4 Bank profitability has improved in recent years, mainly 
4 Based on the results of the Bank of Albania Lending Survey conducted during 2018.
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due to lower loss-loan provisions associated with NPLs, while capitalisation and 
liquidity buffers are well above regulatory minima. Nevertheless, credit growth 
has remained weak, lagging behind regional neighbours.5 On the other hand, the 
low loan-to-deposit ratio (about 50%), by far the lowest in the region, suggests low 
funding risk but also less access to finance. 
Some key post-crisis developments are judged to be a drag on credit growth, affecting 
the future prospects of the banking sector and the country’s economic recovery in 
general. They relate mainly to supply factors, such as asset quality and the need to 
reinforce banks’ balance sheets, as well as indirect credit risk. Despite the sizable 
reduction of non-performing loans on banks’ balance sheets, the aggregate NPL 
ratio still remains above pre-crisis levels and the highest in the region. Moreover, 
the effects of the measures taken by Albanian authorities to facilitate collateral 
enforcement (described in the previous section) have not yet fully materialised, and 
various non–bank structural factors (of a regulatory/legal nature, etc.) continue to 
constrain the clearing up of bank balance sheets, putting pressure on their ability 
to lend.
The high share of foreign currency loans in banks’ lending portfolios, and especially 
loans to unhedged foreign currency borrowers (as a legacy of the boom years), 
constitutes a tail risk to banking sector stability, since it exposes the system to 
adverse exchange rate movements. Addressing this issue has been a crucial part 
of post-crisis policies. The Bank of Albania has worked on various measures to 
encourage lending in domestic currency and reduce the high level of euroisation 
in the country.6 Banks for their part have been following more prudent lending 
strategies to minimise the exchange rate risk and indirect credit risk from unhedged 
borrowers. This has resulted in a gradual rebalancing of banks’ foreign currency 
loans from the high levels of the pre-crisis period (Figure 6).  
Similar to that of other Western Balkan countries, the Albanian banking sector 
has also undergone some important structural changes in recent years. The gradual 
deleveraging, and the ongoing process of EU banks selling, merging and acquiring, 
has resulted in a continuous shrinking of their market share against other foreign-
owned banks and domestic banks (Figure 7). This has particularly been the case of 
the Greek banks that faced stress in the past and had to consolidate capital at parent 
5 By 2018 Q3, the stock of bank credit to private sector had decreased at an annual rate of 0.7%.
6 During 2018, Bank of Albania designed a comprehensive de-euroisation strategy, including the country’s public 
and private stakeholders (Ministry of Finance, Financial Supervisory Authority, banks and non-bank financial 
institutions), to promote the use of the national currency in financial sector activity and the economy in general. 
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level as part of their bailout restructuring plans. They were the first to significantly 
downsize their activity in Albania and the Western Balkan region in general, and 
some of them have already been sold or are in the process of being sold. Despite 
the deleveraging trend from EU parent banks seeming to have come to an end in 
the region, they still see limited prospects, and many of them are following global 
trends towards self-funded subsidiaries (IMF, 2017). 
Figure 6. 
Currency-based loan structure of the 
Albanian banking sector
Figure 7. 
Changes in the structure of Albanian 
banking sector assets
Source: Bank of Albania.
The approach of the Bank of Albania is to lead the banking sector towards a gradual 
consolidation, through encouraging the takeover of existing banks by banks already 
operating in the country, while preserving the credit growth and safeguarding 
financial stability. Such consolidation has reduced the number of banks from 16 
at the beginning of 2018 to 14, which is still considered to be high in the light of 
the size of the market, but is also expected to strengthen the balance sheets of the 
remaining players.
Given the deleveraging trend and lower activity of EU banks, funding risk might 
become a challenge in the long run. Despite the abundance of local funding resources 
up to now, these might become insufficient in the future once credit demand picks 
up. The potential for domestic deposits to fully offset the reduction in foreign 
funding remains a common challenge for most Western Balkan countries. Moreover, 
the possibility of a return to more EU parent funding is low, as these parents see 
limited prospects in the whole region and are gradually implementing exit strategies, 
while pressures from EU regulatory authorities to reinforce balance sheets at the 
parent level remain high. Looking towards the medium term, the design of effective 
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policy measures to diversify bank funding through the development of domestic 
capital markets, as well as expanding domestic savings, might meet this challenge. 
Despite their shrinking activity, the subsidiaries of the EU banking groups are 
still important systemic players in the financial systems of Albania (accounting 
for over 50% of total banking sector assets) and other Western Balkan countries. 
Therefore, the authorities in the region have been closely monitoring the banks 
and communicating with parent banks to maintain an adequate funding base and 
avoid potentially disruptive episodes. In this context, the Vienna Initiative plays a 
crucial role, encouraging and coordinating the dialogue between parties, especially 
after the establishment in 2015 of the two pillars of European Banking Union, the 
Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), 
which were expected to bring significant changes to the domestic supervisory 
framework in host countries of EU banks’ affiliates. This is because a significant 
part of total bank assets in the region are assessed on a consolidated basis under 
ECB supervision. Although the establishment of the SSM and SRM was considered 
beneficial to host countries, since it increased financial stability and reinforced 
home-host supervisory coordination, some concerns were raised, mainly relating 
to the significant asymmetry in the importance of the EU banks’ subsidiaries to 
the host countries compared to their small size as part of their parent banking 
groups. It was therefore in the interest of both domestic and foreign supervisory 
authorities to develop effective cooperation mechanisms, exchanging information 
and knowledge to facilitate the banking industry’s adaptation to a new reality while 
safeguarding financial stability in the region. The Vienna Initiative played an 
important role in this matter by advocating countries’ interests and coordinating the 
collaboration between the European Banking Authority (EBA) and six Southeastern 
Europe countries,7 including Albania, leading to the signing of a Memorandum 
of Cooperation in October 2015.
This agreement established a framework for cross-border cooperation and 
information exchange between the EBA and the participating countries’ 
supervisory authorities. It has helped by setting up a dedicated forum with the aim 
of strengthening banking regulation and supervision in the signatory countries, 
as well as aligning their regulatory and supervisory standards and institutional 
arrangements towards those of the EU. So far, it has facilitated information sharing 
7 The Signatory Supervisory Authorities were the Bank of Albania, the Banking Agency of the Federation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, the Banking Agency of the Republika Srpska, the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia, 
the Central Bank of Montenegro and the National Bank of Serbia. 
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by both parties on the main developments and changes in supervisory practices 
and college activities, as well as on the main risks and vulnerabilities affecting the 
domestic banking sector in the participating counties. As Marek Belka commented 
in the Vienna Initiative Steering Committee, this Memorandum “is one of the 
visible effects of the works of Vienna Initiative and may serve as a model for future 
coordination”.
While expanding and reinforcing its coordination focus, the Vienna Initiative has 
gradually grown into a wide, high-level network and a virtual thinktank that, time 
after time, brings together public and private stakeholders who share a common 
interest in financial stability and developmental issues in the region. Both the risk 
of insufficient funding sources and reduced competitiveness and productivity in 
the banking sector due to EU bank consolidation at parent level are becoming 
serious growth challenges in Eastern European countries. The new approach of 
the platform therefore aims to guide the region towards a new and more balanced 
growth and financing model, with a stronger focus on increased productivity and 
innovation in the banking industry. Its presence and continuous collaboration 
with the domestic public and private stakeholders will thus be crucial in helping 
the adoption of the latest technologies that are new to local markets and in coping 
with the challenges related to them. 
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Annex 1
Timeline of reforms and measures implemented in Albania to address the NPL issue. 
Publishing/Approval Date Type of Measure Explanation of the measure
2013 Out-of-Court Debt 
Restructuring (OOCR):
Guidelines on “corporate OOCR” and “OOCR 
for individuals” were issued by the Bank of 
Albania in 2013 to guide banks with OOCR aim 
of accelerating the reduction of NPLs. In 2016, 
in further consultation with banks, the Bank of 
Albania unified and revised the guidelines and 
prepared the final draft of the new Framework 
for OOCR.
October 2013 Improved collateral execution Changes in the law in progress. Amendments 
to the Civil Procedure Code became effective in 
October 2013 to help simplify and shorten the 
collateral enforcement procedures.
January 2014 Published guidelines The Bank of Albania published (1) the guidelines 
on loan restructuring for individuals and 
(2) guidelines for the preparation of real estate 
appraisals used for the purpose of obtaining a 
loan from financial institutions. 
April 2014 Amendment to the tax law Albania, Letter of intent, Memorandum of 
economic and financial policies and technical 
memorandum of understanding, 27 January 
2015. In effect since April 2014 and with the 
aim of removing some of the legal and technical 
issues impeding loan write-offs.
July 2015 Management of Large 
Exposures 
A regulation was issued by the Bank of Albania in 
July 2015 to enhance the responsibility of Board 
of Directors and setting out rules and criteria for 
calculating, supervising and reporting a bank’s 
large exposures to a person/client or group of 
persons/clients connected between them or with 
the bank. 
Early 2015 Write off Bank of Albania regulation came into force in 
early 2015 to mandate the write-offs of loans 
that have spent more than 3 years in the lost 
category. 
November 2015 NPL Working Group and action 
plan
A comprehensive strategy to address the 
NPL issues was developed and published. It 
integrates and sequences reforms in the areas of 
supervision, enforcement, debt restructuring and 
insolvency. The plan is monitored and revised 
periodically. 
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Publishing/Approval Date Type of Measure Explanation of the measure
February 2016 New Law and amendments 
to the Law on registration of 
immovable properties
Approved by the Parliament in February 
2016. The law and amendments improve the 
registration process for incomplete real estate 
developments, strengthening creditors’ security 
over such collaterals and regulating conflicts 
following an enforcement procedure. Transfer of 
development rights to the bank are facilitated, 
thus allowing emancipation from the insolvent 
developer. 
April 2016 Upgrade of Credit Register and 
establishment of a credit bureau
In April 2016, the Bank of Albania’s credit register 
was upgraded to include loans undergoing court 
proceedings, restructured loans and loans sold 
to third parties. The EBRD commissioned a study 
on the feasibility of a Consumer Credit Bureau 
in Albania. In 2017, the Albanian Association of 
Banks undertook the initiative of establishing a 
new comprehensive Credit Bureau. 
26 October 2016 Bankruptcy law Prepared by the Albanian government in 
collaboration with International Finance 
Corporation (World Bank Group) and approved 
by the Parliament on 26 October 2016. The law 
incorporates the best international practices, 
simplifies the existing framework, allows for 
expedited approval of reorganisation plans 
and protects economic and governance rights 
of secured and unsecured creditors (incl. the 
ranking of preferred creditors in bankruptcy 
proceedings). 
October 2016 Amendment to Private Bailiffs 
Law and Law on Juridical Bailiff 
Service
Approved in October 2016. Aims to increase the 
efficiency of foreclosure procedures and debt 
collection and improve the structure of fees for 
Bailiff Services (i.e., base tariff plus success fee).
October 2016 Amendment to the Law on 
Securing Charges
Approved by the Parliament in October 2016. 
The amendment reinstated definitions for 
“intangible property”, “instrument”, “securities” 
and “accounts” that were removed from the Law 
in 2013 (causing insecurity for legal professionals, 
banks and businesses).
November 2016 Amendment to the Civil Code Approved in November 2016. Aims to harmonise 
the Civil Code with the new Law on Bankruptcy 
with regard to the ranking of preferred creditors 
in bankruptcy proceedings.
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Publishing/Approval Date Type of Measure Explanation of the measure
November 2016 Amendment to the Civil 
Procedure Code
Approved in November 2016. Aims to harmonise 
the Civil Code with the new Law on Bankruptcy 
with regard to the ranking of preferred creditors 
in bankruptcy proceedings. 
June 2018 Financial health assessment of 
top Albanian corporates
The International Finance Corporation and 
Financial Sector Advisory Center sponsored 
a study conducted by Deloitte of the financial 
health of top Albanian corporates. The report 
analyses different financial ratios across 
industries, covering the period from 2014 
to 2016.
CHAPTER 16
European cross-border banking 
after the crisis
Michael Teig and Erik F. Nielsen
UniCredit Group
Why more consolidation is needed, particularly cross-border mergers
Persistently low profitability of EU banks
The European banking landscape recovered from the global financial crisis with 
banks well under way in their reform process, including dealing with legacy issues 
such as nonperforming loans (NPLs), and better capitalised. They have also made 
significant progress towards resolving litigation issues. The average profitability of 
European Union (EU) banks remains low, however, particularly compared to the 
large US banks. For financial year 2018, the largest 15 eurozone banks reported, 
on average, a return on equity of only 7.3%, compared with 12.3% for the largest 
15 US banks. Higher profitability is one explanation for the higher stock market 
valuation of US banks, which have a price-to-book value of above one, while the 
stocks of EU banks are still trading at a significant discount to their book value.
US banks are more profitable than EU banks, leading to a higher  
equity valuation
Figure 1.
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Figure 2.
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Drivers of the low profitability of EU banks
The underlying drivers of this difference in profitability are manifold, including both 
cyclical and structural ones. The low interest rate environment and low margins are 
cyclical factors. Structural components include increasing competition (e.g., in the form 
of new players or challenges to market position from other banks), higher regulatory 
costs, changing customer behaviour, digitalisation and an increasing share of capital 
market borrowing by corporate customers taking the place of traditional bank loans. 
US banks’ better performance has also been boosted by the stronger GDP growth in the 
US than in Europe, the difference in monetary policy cycles (leading to different interest 
rate levels) and the increasingly dominant role of US banks in investment banking.
Furthermore, one important structural component of EU banks’ inadequate 
profitability is linked to the fact that the European banking landscape remains 
fragmented and overbanked. The average share of assets of the EU’s five largest 
banks at a national level is 48%, varying from 30% in Germany to 97% in Greece, 
according to 2017 European Central Bank (ECB) data, the latest available. This 
level of concentration in the financial sector in Europe is well below that of other 
highly industrialised economies.
There is clear empirical evidence that concentration of banking is positively 
correlated with profitability. In general, fewer banks might not necessarily lead 
to less competition, as domestic banks might face more competition from foreign 
players in a functioning single market. However, larger banks can provide banking 
services at lower costs, as they bring to bear economies of scale for expenses related 
to regulation and digitalisation. 
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Concentration matters, but focus on domestic mergers
Figure 3.
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Cross-border mergers and financial stability
Cross-border banking increases the geographical diversification of a bank’s 
loan book and deposit base, thereby increasing its ability to absorb country-
specific economic shocks. In the case of banks located in Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE) countries, for instance, the dominance of foreign ownership has 
proven to be supportive for financial stability. Foreign banks initially brought 
extensive bank management expertise to less mature markets. This helped 
banks in CEE countries to catch up with Western European countries. As 
illustrated in the left-hand graph below, the outflow of funds from banks in 
core eurozone countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany and the 
Netherlands) during the sovereign debt crisis was more limited in CEE than 
it was in Europe’s periphery, including Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain. Foreign banks had a strategic interest in remaining invested in foreign 
banking markets. 
The biggest contribution of foreign banks to CEE was an inf low of cheap 
capital that allowed growth to pick up and asset prices to rise in CEE. The 
fastest catch-up to EU per capita GDP levels happened at a time when markets 
were liberalised, progress in reforms was fast before EU accession and banks 
expanded quickly in the region. Fund outflows were limited right after the crisis 
by the first Vienna Agreement, helping to smooth the recession in CEE. While 
negotiations were tense, foreign banks followed the International Monetary 
Fund’s call and kept most of their exposure to CEE markets intact. Only when 
the ECB loosened the conditions in the second Vienna Agreement, did eurozone 
banks start to reduce exposure to CEE at a faster pace (see the fall for 2014-15 
in the chart). By then, the recession was over, savings rates were high and private 
sector deleveraging was proceeding at a fast pace throughout CEE (allowing 
eurozone banks to cancel some of the funding lines granted to CEE daughters 
without affecting business). 
Moreover, regarding cross-border banking, the accompanying increases in 
efficiency would lead to higher profitability, which acts as a first line of defence 
against potential shocks, and would support organic capital growth capacity. 
An additional benefit of cross-border mergers is that they reduce the so-called 
doom loop between banks and sovereigns. There is a large home bias in sovereign-
debt holdings (see right-hand chart below). If two banks were to merge across 
borders, the share of a single country’s sovereign exposure relative to its equity 
would almost certainly decline. 
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Core eurozone banks’ exposures to Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal,  
and Spain (GIIPS) and CEE countries and home bias in sovereign holdings
Figure 5.
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Figure 6.
Home bias: banks’ holdings of domestic general government debt to total general 











IE FI NL BE AT SL DE PT ES FR IT SK
Source: BIS, ECB, UniCredit Research.
302
Ten years of the Vienna Initiative 2009-2019
The various forms of cross-border banking
Cross-border banking can take different forms, from cooperation in certain 
areas up to cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A), but to harvest the 
full benefits in terms of profitability and risk reduction, full mergers would need 
to be pursued.
Bank cooperation: Examples of cooperation include the joint back-office and IT 
systems of UBS and Credit Suisse, which includes shared operations in the areas 
of compliance, settlements and trade processing and the sharing of databases and 
servers. Another example is Nordic KYC Utility, a joint venture by the five largest 
Nordic banks to develop a shared know-your-customer (KYC) infrastructure. 
Both projects are in the early evaluation stage and the latter might face headwinds 
from recent anti-money-laundering issues, but these examples demonstrate that 
cooperation among banks can take various forms. 
Bank M&A: The frequency and size of bank-related M&A deals declined after the 
financial crisis, when banks faced litigation, weak profitability in a low-interest-
rate environment, deteriorating asset quality and new regulatory requirements. 
These factors distracted EU banks from exploring consolidation opportunities. 
Amid this overall decline in bank M&A deals, the share of domestic mergers 
increased while the proportion of cross-border mergers decreased. The share of 
domestic M&A deals among European banks increased from 50% before 2009 
to 73% after 2009. 
Strategic options to increase consolidation in the European banking sector 
will increasingly be evaluated
European banks have made good progress with regard to internal restructuring and 
to reducing stocks of NPLs, although cost levels remain elevated in many banks, 
particularly in Germany. The healthier banks’ focus is now, therefore, increasingly 
shifting towards exploring strategic options for the future to secure adequate 
profitability and risk management, including non-organic growth opportunities. 
More consolidation in Europe is therefore both likely and desirable over the next 
few years. In the following, we evaluate the main obstacles to an increase in cross-
border banking in the EU. 
Existing obstacles to cross-border banking
In general, cross-border bank mergers within the EU have been hampered by the 
lack of a fully f ledged European banking union, which would provide not only 
common regulation, resolution and supervision but also a European deposit-
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insurance scheme (EDIS), accompanied by a common and coordinated decision-
making processes among the different competent authorities. Amid the lack of 
a truly common banking union, eurozone banks have broadly been separated 
into two categories. 
Banks headquartered in the EU core countries have benefited in general from fewer 
legacy issues and a more stable macroeconomic environment. This has kept credit 
losses low and afforded banks low risk premiums on home sovereign bonds, which, 
in general, has translated into low wholesale-market refinancing costs. Therefore, 
these banks have faced little pressure to reform and adjust their operations or their 
cost-to-income ratios. As a result, their profitability has remained poor, and their 
price-to-book ratio well below par, leaving them very little currency with which to 
acquire banks in other countries. 
Meanwhile, banks in the EU periphery have made generally impressive progress in 
adjusting costs and dealing with legacy NPL issues, but being located in countries 
with higher sovereign spreads compared to the core euro area has taken its toll. 
Hence, banks located in the EU periphery have faced considerably higher wholesale 
funding costs and somewhat more political risk compared to banks in the EU 
core. Concerns related to these issues are reflected in these banks’ stock market 
valuations, which have also left them little currency with which to acquire banks 
in other countries.
On top of this, there is a risk that political pressure, sometimes exercised via direct 
shareholding and sometimes indirectly, is used to prevent potential cross-border 
mergers. Governments do not seem open to give up whatever national control they 
perceive they have over their banks in favour of creating larger European players. In 
addition, in core EU countries, resistance to cross-border bank mergers on the part 
of politicians and national regulators may also reflect worries that “their” banks 
could increase exposure to peripheral countries.
In more detail, the low proportion of cross-border mergers among banks in Europe 
can be explained by several factors: (1) supervisory barriers, including national 
favouritism on the part of regulators with regard to establishing capital, liquidity and 
resolution requirements; (2) ownership structure (less than 50% of European banks 
have a dispersed ownership structure); (3) variation in NPL levels and political risks; 
(4) a wide variation in legal frameworks in Europe (e.g., differences in insolvency 
procedures, labour laws, tax laws); (5) the third pillar of an EU banking union – an 
EDIS – has yet to be established. 
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Regulatory and supervisory barriers 
Unfortunately, in spite of the impressive progress on a banking union, there are 
still supervisory hurdles to cross-border mergers. For a long time, the avoidance 
of “too big to fail” was a regulatory mantra. Since then, European regulators have 
seemingly become more open to forming larger banking groups, including those 
formed as a result of cross-border mergers. This change in sentiment has been driven 
by a greater appreciation of the fact that strong profitability represents a first line 
of defence against shocks to the banking sector. 
At the level of the national regulators, there is, however, still a substantial degree of 
national discretion with regard to establishing liquidity requirements. The Capital 
Requirements Regulation (CRR) allows liquidity waivers to be granted to facilitate 
compliance with the liquidity requirements of the liquidity coverage ratio and the 
net stable funding ratio. However, several EU countries apply national exposure 
limits on intra-group exposure and these limits prevent these waivers from being 
used. This is not a surprise, as the responsibility to supervise banking has been 
centralised at the ECB (at least for the EU’s larger banks). Nevertheless, the authority 
to regulate national deposit-insurance schemes still remains with individual Member 
States. The CRR does not envisage capital waivers.
The national ring-fencing of capital and liquidity is one key obstacle to more cross-
border concentration. National regulators play an important role in regulating 
non-ECB-supervised banks. However, banks under ECB supervision should not 
be subject to additional restrictions on the part of national regulators regarding 
liquidity in a functioning single market. The free movement of capital should also 
be allowed for banks under ECB supervision, as long as the bank fulfils its capital 
requirements at an aggregated level. Addressing this remaining national prerogative 
would improve the fungibility of capital and liquidity within single pan-European 
banking groups. 
Regarding the global regulatory landscape, the framework regulating global 
systemically important banks (G-SIBs) assigns a higher systemic risk score to those 
banks that form larger cross-border entities. This also reduces incentives for cross-
border transactions and geographical diversification. 
The ownership structure of banks
The ownership structure of European banks plays an important role as well. Less than 
50% (weighted by total assets) of ECB-supervised European banks have a dispersed 
ownership structure. Several EU countries boast a mix of public-sector banks, 
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cooperative banks and private banks. Mergers among these banks are unlikely due 
to variations in their history and backgrounds, and for political reasons. Mergers are 
impeded by such an ownership structure. Also, a considerable 7% of banks (weighted 
by total assets) still remain nationalised following the financial market crisis and its 
aftermath. This is particularly surprising in an era where the political mantra is one of 
protecting taxpayers from risk in the financial system. Actual ownership surely exposes 
taxpayers to a considerably larger extent than any other relationship.
Figure 7.
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Dispersed Minority influence Private control Cooperative Public control/ nationalised
93 Banks 93 banks / assets EUR 21tn
Source: Company data, ECB, Bloomberg, UniCredit Research.
Heterogeneous levels of NPLs 
The risks on the balance sheets of European banks are still heterogeneous for various 
reasons. Ireland and Spain, for instance, suffered from a real-estate bubble, which 
created large stocks of nonperforming housing loans after these bubbles burst. With 
the macroeconomic recovery, housing prices recovered in both states. This enabled 
banks to reduce outstanding NPLs quickly, either via an improvement in the market 
prices of underlying assets (which facilitated the sale of NPLs) or as the result of an 
increase in the proportion of NPLs that were able to be re-categorised as performing 
loans. The situation is different in Italy. Some 80% of Italy’s NPLs are corporate 
loans, which are partly related to the structural decline of the manufacturing sector 
in Italy. This makes the NPL-workout process in Italy more complex and time 
consuming. The fact that Italy did not seek recourse under any of the European 
Stability Mechanism’s support programmes (as Ireland and Spain did) in order to 
support the banking sector and offload NPLs into national NPL asset vehicles has 
further slowed down the clean-up process.
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Figure 8.
2018 Q4 NPL levels among European banking markets
Gross and net NPL ratios among Year-on-year change in net
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Variations in NPL stocks across the EU represent one obstacle facing cross-border 
mergers. The reasons for this are twofold. First, variations in NPL levels have 
led to discounted stock market valuations. This has made shareholders resistant 
to agreeing to a deal at current valuation levels. Second, if a bank with a low 
number of NPLs were to merge with a bank with a higher number of NPLs, 
national regulators might be concerned by the risks that would end up being 
their responsibility. 
The rapid decline in NPLs in all European countries is clearly positive and means 
that this obstacle is likely to recede in the coming years. 
Political factors
While rarely visible, political factors play an important role in cross-border merger 
considerations. First, a merger can only be successful if the combined entity can 
cut costs, including a reduction in the combined workforce. Political support for 
a cross-border merger plays an important role in determining whether planned 
cost reductions succeed. Second, politicians determine national politics and, to 
some extent, European politics and therefore represent an important driver of 
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economic growth, investment and fiscal positions, all of which are important 
to bank performance. Stable and reform-friendly governments therefore reduce 
the political-risk premium for cross-border mergers, making the outcomes of 
takeovers more predictable. Third, political willingness to support larger European 
institutions will have to replace thinking that has traditionally been limited by 
national barriers and that protects national players from forming larger entities with 
EU-wide competitors. Third, several national measures in recent years have had a 
negative impact on the functioning of the banking system and were not justified, 
including the taxation of bank assets and the forced conversion of foreign-currency-
denominated loans. The unpredictability of the national regulatory environment 
lowers a country’s attractiveness for cross-border banks.
Variation in the legal frameworks in Europe 
The legal landscape within Europe differs from country to country with regard to 
the legal areas that are important to banks, such as labour law, tax law and insolvency 
procedures. The harmonisation of laws in these areas is, however, more of a long-
term project, and it is uncertain whether there will be much more harmonisation 
in these areas. First, it seems that the EU currently has other priorities. Second, 
further harmonisation in these areas is a politically sensitive topic – one that requires 
strong commitment on the part of all stakeholders. Differences in national legal 
frameworks, however, partly explain why there have been more domestic mergers 
recently. 
The EU’s lack of an EDIS
The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), the first pillar of an EU banking 
union, took effect in November 2014, and the Single Resolution Mechanism 
(SRM), the second pillar of an EU banking union, entered into force in January 
2015. European banks are also subject to a single European rulebook. However, 
the third pillar of an EU banking union, an EDIS, has still not been implemented. 
The EDIS comprises a discussed scheme to protect retail deposits in the EU 
banking union. It was proposed by the European Commission in November 2015 
but has not yet received political approval due to differing views on the progress 
on risk reduction in the European banking sector. Establishing an EDIS would 
strengthen deposit-insurance coverage and improve the confidence of depositors 
into Europe’s banking system by establishing a European, rather than a national, 
recourse if a lender were to fail. If an EDIS were to be implemented, the reliability 
of retail deposits would improve, and the risk of deposit-based refinancing would 
decline. This would make the projections with regard to cross-border mergers 
more predictable. 
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Conclusions
More cross-border consolidation of European banking will both increase banks’ 
profitability and reduce risk in the banking system. In order to promote such 
consolidation, politicians, regulators and banks should take steps to proactively 
address the obstacles summarised above. 
Politicians and regulators have recently become more open towards mergers and have 
openly addressed the topic. Yet, politicians could do more, for example, to reduce 
government stakes in rescued banks and in making progress towards establishing 
a system of further risk sharing in Europe (EDIS). Politicians could also foster 
the establishment of a level playing field by smoothly re-privatising nationalised 
lenders and by working towards more harmonisation with regard to taxation and 
insolvency proceedings. 
Regulators at the European level worked very efficiently and established a remarkable 
process to set up a working European SSM in a short time frame. For banks directly 
supervised by the ECB, the role of national regulators should be limited, however, 
and there should be no national restrictions on liquidity and capital if a banking 
group fulfils all such requirements at the group level, which is monitored by the 
ECB’s SSM. More harmonisation would support the reduction of obstacles, with 
the requisite prudential safeguards in place to address the potential concerns of 
national regulators. International regulators, mainly the Bank for International 
Settlements, should reconsider their G-SIB scoring models and examine whether 
or not these hinder cross-border concentration. One should acknowledge, though, 
that changes have been implemented at the EU level in the recent banking package, 
although the revised methodology would not allow a bank to be disqualified as a 
G-SIB but could lead to a lower final G-SIB score.
Meanwhile, banks should continue to improve efficiency and to address NPLs 
and other legacy issues proactively. This would bolster the ongoing balance sheet 
de-risking trend among European banks and would help dispel the concerns of 
regulators and politicians with regard to the formation of larger banks. Moreover, 
digitalisation has changed customer behaviour. This presents a challenge – but also 
an opportunity – for banks. If banks use these opportunities and become geared 
more towards digitalisation, mergers will be easier to implement than they would 
be if they involve more costly, less agile and branch-focused business models. 
If properly managed and supervised, larger banks would be more resilient to 
macroeconomic shocks. An improvement in geographical diversification would 
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mitigate national economic shocks, and improved profitability would serve as a 
first line of defence (as a shock absorber) and would support organic capital growth. 
Only sufficiently profitable banks will be able to attract, over the medium term, 
sufficient own-equity investors willing to put their money into bank equity 
and thereby willing to show their preference for banking over other sectors. All 
stakeholders therefore have an interest in making the European banking sector 
more efficient and in working towards reducing the obstacles it faces.
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Conclusions on  
the achievement  
of the Vienna Initiative
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CHAPTER 17
Success and failure of the 
Vienna Initiative mechanism 
and similar arrangements
Filip Keereman, Daniel Kosicki 
and Corina Weidinger Sosdean
European Commission1
Abstract1
As a flanking measure to the financial assistance programmes for some countries 
in Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe, the Vienna Initiative helped to 
avert contagion to neighbouring countries via the EU parent banks with cross-
border activities and operations in the region. This success is based on a mixture 
of: (i) a cooperative approach, involving the private sector and concretised in a 
series of bilateral country-specific meetings and “Full Forums”; (ii) bilateral or 
general commitment letters by EU parent banks; (iii) involvement of European 
institutions (European Commission, European Central Bank – as observer) 
as well as international financial institutions (International Monetary Fund, 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, European Investment Bank 
and World Bank Group) and finally (iv) the institutional/governance setting of a 
banking group creating a strong link between parent banks and their subsidiaries. 
These aspects are highlighted and compared with the Nordic model of supervisory 
cooperation, which served as a source of inspiration for the Vienna Initiative. 
During the Greek crisis, an attempt was made to set up a similar arrangement, 
and it will be explained why this did not work at that time.
1 The views expressed in this publication are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the 
views of the European Commission. Statistical assistance from Rajko Vodovnik for charts and tables is gratefully 
acknowledged.
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Introduction
When the financial crisis broke out in late 2008 in Central, Eastern and Southeastern 
Europe (CESEE), a specific feature of the banking sector in that region was its high 
dependence on foreign banking groups, in particular from the European Union 
(EU). It was feared that financial turmoil in one country could spill over to another 
via these interbank links. There was a conflict between the individual interest of the 
bank and financial stability for the system at large if all banks were to behave in the 
same way. Downscaling financial activity could affect both home countries, where 
the parent banks are located, and host countries, where their subsidiaries or branches 
are operating. Mistrust and the first mover advantage had to be overcome. This is 
a typical collective action problem, where the individual and common benefits are 
not aligned. A solution to the conflict may be sought in a multilateral setting, but 
success is not guaranteed. A solution, however, is facilitated when some conditions 
are fulfilled and incentives provided. The Vienna Initiative provided a framework 
which helped to bridge initially divergent interests. 
First, we explain one of the key factors for success, namely arriving at a common 
understanding of the issues at stake. Second, we discuss the joint declarations and 
concrete actions specified in bilateral commitment letters, in order to go beyond 
good intentions. Third, we present the equally important financial support 
provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the EU and the international 
financial institutions to the crisis-hit countries. Fourth, we highlight the strong 
intra-bank cross-border relations between parent and subsidiaries. What the 
Vienna Initiative achieved in its second phase, namely a controlled deleveraging, is 
put into perspective, by comparing it with similar arrangements elsewhere. Finally, 
we draw some conclusions.
Mutual understanding of the issues at stake and the cooperative 
approach
One of the salient features of the exposure of the EU banking groups to the CESEE 
region is its asymmetry, depending on whether the analysis focuses on the home or 
host country of these banking groups. Before the outbreak of the financial crisis, 
the claims of the EU parent banks represented a 60-120% share of the GDP of the 
host countries in CESEE (Figure 1), while they accounted for less than 2% of GDP 
of the home countries of the respective banking groups. As a result, the exposure 
of the EU parent banks has been very important for host countries in CESEE, but 
negligible for the home countries of these banking groups. Due to high importance 
of the exposure of the EU banking groups for the host countries in the CESEE 
region, a “run to the exit” of the EU parent banks operating in the countries in 
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CESEE benefitting from multilateral financial assistance had to be prevented. 
Sudden capital outflows because of the uncoordinated withdrawal strategies by the 
EU parent banks would have led to a full-blown balance-of-payments crisis with 
severe consequences for these countries. The retrenchment of the EU parent banks 
would have also put at risk the macroeconomic and fiscal stabilisation programmes 
supported by the EU, the IMF and other international financial institutions (IFIs). 
In this respect, the Vienna Initiative played a key role in ensuring that the EU parent 
banks remained committed to the CESEE region. 
Figure 1.




















































Source: Bank for International Settlements.
The interaction between the public sector (EU institutions, IFIs, national central 
banks, home and host county supervisors, ministries of finance) and the EU parent 
banks operating in the CESEE region followed a cooperative approach, which 
entailed a series of multilateral/horizontal (Full Forum) meetings and specific 
meetings (bilateral country meetings). The Full Forum meetings (Table 1), which 
were organised at least once a year and benefitted from a large participation of 
both the official and private sector: i) assessed the outcome of the commitments of 
the EU parent towards the countries in the CESEE region; ii) discussed relevant 
supervisory and regulatory development at national and EU level; iii) endorsed the 
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work of the various working groups set up by the Vienna Initiative; and iv) provided 
guidance on the strategic orientation of the Initiative and its future work streams. 
The main issues discussed and the decisions taken during each Full Forum meeting 
were made public through press releases published after the conclusion of the 
respective meetings. 
Table 1.
Overview of country-specific exposure commitments and bilateral country 
meetings
Kick-off meetings          
(press release)
Number of 
banks Date Place Date Place




Hungary 6 20.5.2009 Brussels 19.11.2009 Brussels Sep-08 95%
Latvia 4 14.9.209 Stockholm no (but vaguer letters of comfort were signed)
Romania 9 26.3.2009 Vienna 19.5.2009 Brussels Mar-09 100%
Bosnia Herzegovina 6 22.6.2009 Vienna na Dec-08 100%
Serbia 10 27.3.2009 Vienna na Dec-08 100%




Date Place Main results roll-over 
rate
Romania 9 18.11.2009 Brussels No change in commitments 100%
Bosnia Herzegovina 6 26.2.2010 Vienna No change in commitments 100%
Serbia 10 26.2.2010 Vienna 80%
Hungary* 6 22.07.2010 Brussels No change in commitments 95%
Romania 9 22.07.2010 Brussels 95%
Romania 9 16.3.2011 Brussels
none
Change in exposure commitment from 1.10.2010 
(reference date unchanged)
In line with precautionary programme, looser 
exposure commitment
Joint declaration Bilateral letters (not public)
Change in exposure commitment from 1.4.2010 
(reference date unchanged)
Source: European Commission.
Notes: *The Hungarian programme and also the exposure ended in November 2010.
The bilateral country meetings organised during the first phase of the Vienna 
Initiative provided a platform for assessing the fulfilment of exposure commitments 
by the EU parent banks towards Hungary, Romania, Latvia, Serbia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina (Table 1). These meetings enabled discussion on the measure taken 
or envisaged by the national authorities to facilitate the maintenance of exposure 
commitments by commercial banks. All relevant public sector representatives, IFIs 
and EU parent banks of systemic relevance for the individual countries participated 
in these meetings. Before the bilateral country meetings, informal discussions 
between the IFIs and international banks took place. 
Joint declarations and bilateral commitment letters
The EU parent banks operating in the countries receiving financial assistance 
agreed through joint declarations as well as general or bilateral commitments to 
maintain their exposure to these five countries and provide capital support to 
their affiliates, as needed. For Latvia, the EU parent banks did not sign bilateral 
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commitment letters, but only a general commitment to maintain exposure to the 
country and promote financial stability in the Baltic region. In the absence of 
bilateral commitment letters, there were no specific reporting requirements for 
the participating banks regarding the maintenance of their exposure to Latvia. 
The Central Bank of Latvia monitored data on the net external liabilities of the 
Latvian subsidiaries to the parent banks2 that signed the general commitment to 
maintain exposure to Latvia. 
The EU parent banks signed bilateral commitment letters3 to maintain their 
exposure to Hungary, Romania, Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina as compared to 
a country-specific reference date.4 The bilateral commitment letters included an 
exposure roll-over rate of 100% as compared to the reference date for Romania, 
Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and, of 95% for Hungary. The participating banks 
provided data on the fulfilment of their exposure commitments on a regular basis, 
closely monitored by the home country banking supervisors. The assessment of 
the maintenance of exposure commitments and the measures adopted by the home 
country authorities to facilitate the fulfilment of these exposure commitments 
took place in the framework of country-specific meetings, at least once a year 
(Table 1), and the Full Forum meetings of the Vienna Initiative 1.0. These 
Full Forum meetings were organised once a year, mainly in Brussels (European 
Commission, 2017). 
According to the bilateral letters signed by the EU parent banks, the exposure and 
capital commitments were supposed to cease at the end of the economic adjustment 
programmes for the assisted countries. In the case of Hungary, parent banks had to 
abide by the exposure and capital commitments only until the end of the balance of 
payments programme in November 2010. As regards Romania, it benefited from a 
first balance-of-payments programme (which ended in May 2011), followed by two 
precautionary programmes (2011-13 and 2013-15) with precautionary/contingent 
financial support. In the absence of exposure commitments under the second and 
2 The four banks were Bank DnB NORD A/S, Nordea Bank Finland Plc, Swedbank AB and Skandinaviska Enskilda 
Banken AB.
3 The EU parent banks, which signed bilateral commitment letters were: Erste Bank Group, Raiffeisen International, 
Volksbank, Hypo Alpe Adria, Unicredit, Intesa Sanpaolo, Société Générale, KBC Group, Bayerische Landesbank, 
NLB, Alpha Bank, National Bank of Greece, EFG Eurobank and Piraeus Bank.
4 In the bilateral commitment letters, the exposure of EU parent banks was defined as: (i) the outstanding balances 
on all loans and other debt instruments owed by entities in these countries minus balances owed by the parent to 
financial institutions in these countries; (ii) the parent’s deposits with financial institutions in these countries, less 
deposits of financial institutions with the parent; and (iii) all forms of capital by the parent to the subsidiary, including 
subordinated debt and hybrid instruments.
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third programmes, EU parent banks committed themselves to maintaining their 
well-capitalised subsidiaries operating in Romania (i.e., solvency levels above 10%). 
The involvement of official bodies
In order to alleviate the impact of the financial and economic crisis and 
coordinate the crisis response, in February 2009 three IFIs (European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), European Investment Bank (EIB), the 
World Bank Group) launched a Joint IFI Action Plan to support the economies in 
CESEE (Table 2). The main objectives of this Plan were to avert a system crisis, 
support banking sector stability and lending to the real economy in the crisis hit 
countries in CESEE. The EBRD, EIB and the World Bank Group (International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), Multilateral Investment 
Guarantee Agency (MIGA), International Finance Corporation (IFC)) agreed a 
financing plan of up to €24.5 billion for the period 2009 10. The IFIs committed 
themselves to deploy rapid assistance in a coordinated manner, according to the 
policy and products of each of the involved institutions. The IFIs involved in the 
Joint IFI Action Plan were also significantly involved in the work of the Vienna 
Initiative. Overall, the IFIs exceeded their initial financing targets, as a response 
to a larger-than-expected impact of the financial crisis in the countries of the 
region. The total amount mobilised under the Joint IFI Action Plan reached 
roughly €33 billion at the end of 2010.
Table 2.
Joint Action Plan of the International Financial Institutions: commitment and 
delivery
Commitments  Available









Source: EBRD, EIB, World Bank Group.
Notes:  The available funds from IBRD as of December 2018 include a €1 billion loan to 
Hungary which was later cancelled at the request of the government.
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The resources made available through the Joint IFI Action Plan complemented the 
multilateral assistance programmes granted by the IMF and the EU to EU and non-
EU countries in the CESEE region most impacted by the crisis, namely to Hungary, 
Latvia, Romania and Serbia, as well as Bosnia-Herzegovina (Table 3). While the 
IMF granted financial assistance through Stand-By Arrangements (SBAs), the 
EU granted financial support to the Member States outside the euro area in the 
framework of balance-of-payments (BOP) programmes. BOP assistance took the 
form of medium-term loans that were conditional on the implementation of policies 
designed to address underlying economic problems. For non-EU countries, the EU 
granted macrofinancial assistance, which is a form of financial aid extended by the 
EU to partner countries (including candidate countries) experiencing a BOP crisis. 
It was only available to countries benefiting from a disbursing IMF programme. 
The total disbursing support committed by the IMF, the EU and the World Bank 
to Hungary, Latvia, Romania, Serbia as well as Bosnia-Herzegovina  at the onset 
of the financial crisis amounted to €52.4 billion.5
Table 3.
Multilateral assistance granted by the EU, IMF and World Bank
Hungary Latvia Romania Bosnia 
Herzegovina
Serbia
EUR billion Nov-08 Dec-08 May-09 Jul-09 Jan-09
Total 20.0 7.5 20.0 1.4 3.5
% of 2009 GDP 21.7 40.5 17.1 11.6 11.3
EU 6.5 3.1 5.0 0.1 0.2
IMF 12.5 1.7 13.0 1.1 2.9
World Bank 1.0 0.4 2.0 0.2 0.3
Source: EU, IMF, World Bank.
Notes:  The table does not include contingent programmes beyond 2011. For Latvia: including 
bilateral resources (€1.9 billion) committed by Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Norway and 
Estonia.
The link between parent and subsidiary
With a saturated home market, major Western banks have seized the opportunity 
to expand in CESEE since the early 1990s, when these countries opened their 
borders after the collapse of the Soviet Union (Figure 2). This took the form of both 
greenfield investment and acquisition of domestic banks. New financial services 
and payment techniques were introduced, and credit grew rapidly to finance the 
development of the economy. This led to a sharp increase in banks’ balances sheets, 
5 Since some of the recipient countries did not draw the entire financial assistance granted by the EU and the IFIs, the 
total disbursements to these five countries amounted to €40.6 billion.
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and in several countries the market share of the foreign banks reached more than 
80%, including in some Baltic countries, Slovakia, Czech Republic, and Romania. 
While the environment has been more volatile than that of the home markets, 
the contribution of these catching-up economies to overall group profits has been 
significant. In addition, the investment in buildings for local headquarters and 
branches, and in the transfer of know-how and staff means there is a strong footprint 
which foreign banks are unlikely to give up easily. Against this background, a 
sustained commitment of the Western banks to the region is understandable. 
Figure 2.
Presence of major international banks in Central and Eastern Europe (as of 2011)
AL BA BG HR CZ EE HU LV LT MK MN PL RO RS SK SI
x x x x x x x x x
x x x x x x x x x x x
Volksbank x x x x x x x x
x x x x x x x x x x x x
x x x x x x x x
x x x x x x x x x x x
x x x x
x x x x
x x x x
x x x




Commerzbank x x x x
Bayerische Landesbank x x
Source: S&P Global.
Impact of the vienna initiative in the light of similar 
arrangements 
Based on mutual understanding and on the tight links between the involved 
stakeholders, the concerted action under the Vienna Initiative helped to stabilise the 
economies of Central and Eastern Europe. As illustrated by similar arrangements, a 
positive outcome could not be taken for granted, since such an outcome depended 
on the presence of some enabling conditions. Nordic-Baltic cooperation, on 
which the Vienna Initiative was modelled, was successful in avoiding financial 
stress in that region because of the strong involvement of authorities. However, 
private sector support during the Greek crisis in 2010 failed in the absence of 
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important foreign bank subsidiaries in Greece and the complexity of the economic 
adjustment programme for Greece. Furthermore, Private Sector Involvement in 
debt restructuring, entailing a haircut on Greek government debt, did not help. 
Vienna Initiative: temporary stabilisation of exposure paves the way for 
orderly deleveraging
Based on exposure data submitted by the banks to the host country supervisors, 
the highest exposure rollover rate compared to the reference data was in Hungary 
(i.e., 125%, data as of March 2011) and the lowest in Latvia (88%). Despite 
sizeable differences concerning the fulfilment of the bilateral or general exposure 
commitments, parent banks broadly maintained their overall exposure to these 
countries in 2009-10 (Figure 3) and provided the necessary funding to their 
subsidiaries throughout the multilateral assistance programmes.
Figure 3.
Vienna Initiative 1.0: maintaining exposure towards subsidiaries and the 
economy
Source: Bank for International Settlements.
The orderly deleveraging of the EU parent banks in CESEE and the reduction in 
intra-group liquidity transfers offered breathing space for mobilising local savings 
and replacing the reduced funding of subsidiaries from their parent banks (Figure 4). 
Furthermore, it contributed to maintaining overall exposure levels to the economies, 
which declined less than the subsidiaries (compare claims on banks and on all sectors 
322
Ten years of the Vienna Initiative 2009-2019
in Figure 3).6 Nevertheless, overall (not only in the countries covered by the Vienna 
Initiative) cross-border flows declined in absolute amounts and as a percentage 
of both creditor countries and recipient countries (Figure 5), but from 2015 the 
situation reversed, without, however, fully regaining the lost ground. 
Figure 4.
Domestic funding replacing parent 
bank funding in some CESEE countries
Figure 5.
Exposure in some EU Member States 
towards their neighbours through the 
crisis
Source:  European Central Bank, International 
Monetary Fund.
Source: Bank for International Settlements
As a public-private cooperative action platform, the Vienna Initiative 1.0 has proved 
to be a useful crisis management tool (De Haas et al., 2015) due to its unique 
composition of European Commission, IFIs, home and host banking sector 
supervisors as well as national authorities (i.e., ministries of finance) and commercial 
banks. In its first phase, the Initiative built relationships that have provided a good 
basis to address macrofinancial stability challenges in the new EU Member States 
and Western Balkan countries receiving multilateral financial assistance. 
6 Supervisory guidance adopted by home country supervisors has also contributed to improvements in the funding model 
of subsidiaries in CESEE. For instance, in March 2012 the Austrian supervisors introduced supervisory guidance 
on strengthening the sustainability of the business models of internationally active banks. The subsidiaries of those 
banks with a loan-to-local-stable funding ratios (LLSFR) in excess of 110% were subject to enhanced monitoring. 
The LLSFR is the ratio of total loans to non-banks (net of provisions) to the sum of deposits from non-banks, funding 
from IFIs, capital from third parties and securities with original maturities of at least one year issued to investors 
outside the bank group.
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The Nordic-Baltic cooperation agreement
Table 4.
Nordic-Baltic cooperation compared to the Vienna Initiative
Semi-formal Informal
Agreement on Financial Stability (2010) Vienna Initiative 2 Mission Statement (2012)
Centralised Multilateral
Nordic-Baltic Stability Group, chaired by one 
country on rotating basis
Ad-hoc cooperation under Vienna Initiative 1
Chairman and Steering Committee under Vienna 
Initiative 2
Regional Regional
Nordic and Baltic countries Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe
Closed Open
Limited to 8 countries signing the Agreement All countries of the region invited
Public sector Public and private sector
Ministries of finance, central banks, financial 
supervisors
Ministries of finance, central banks, financial 
supervisors, commercial banking groups
Financial stability Financial stability and development
Development of a cross-border crisis management 
and resolution framework
Preventing unorderly cross-border deleveraging and 
coordinating various home-host banking issues
Undetermined Undetermined
MoU on resolution updated in 2016 2009-2012: Vienna Initiative 1









Compared to CESEE, financial integration in the Nordic-Baltic region has 
been more advanced. Six financial groups7 dominated the markets of Denmark, 
Sweden, Norway, Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. On the one hand, these 
banks’ foreign exposure to the countries in the region played a major role in their 
balance sheets. On the other hand, they had the status of systemic institutions in 
all the domestic markets. Hence, there were strong advantages from establishing a 
coordinated pan-Nordic financial stability and resolution framework and burden-
sharing arrangement.
The work on the Nordic-Baltic cross-border crisis management and resolution 
framework was based on a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU; Agreement on 
Financial Stability) signed between the ministries of finance, supervisors and central 
banks on 17 August 2010.8 The implementation of the Agreement was entrusted 
to the Nordic-Baltic Stability Group, composed of representatives from all signing 
parties. Several working groups proceeded with practical aspects of implementation 
of the MoU. For example, there was a separate subgroup on ex ante burden sharing 
7 Nordea, SEB, Swedbank, Svenska Handelsbanken (Sweden), Danske Bank (Denmark) and DNB (Norway).
8 Involving authorities of Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway and Sweden.
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arrangements for the Nordea group only. The Nordic-Baltic Macroprudential 
Forum was also established.
Both the Nordic home supervisors and the banks proved their commitment to 
preserving financial stability in the region during the financial crisis in 2008-9. The 
parent banks continued to provide liquidity to their Baltic affiliates throughout the 
recession that impacted the economies of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Cultural 
factors and the encouragement from the home supervisors seem to have played a 
key role. Sometimes, the concept of “extended home market” (Hansson, 2013) was 
used to describe the level of integration achieved in the region in spite of different 
monetary regimes, ownership structures and financial deepening. In the early years 
of the Vienna Initiative, the Nordic-Baltic cooperation in the area of supervision 
and crisis management constituted an example and an inspiration, notwithstanding 
the ultimate differences between the arrangements (Table 4).
The failed attempt at private sector support during the Greek 
crisis
Figure 6.
Private sector support during the Greek crisis 
Source: Bank for International Settlements.
Inspired by the Vienna Initiative, a private sector support arrangement was 
attempted for Greece in 2010, when an international rescue package was arranged 
for the country. The French Banking Association and the German financial sector 
committed themselves to this arrangement (Box 1), but after a promising start it 
was not possible to reach a coordinated approach across the EU. Compared to the 
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Vienna Initiative, overall EU parent banks had fewer subsidiaries in Greece and 
relatively more exposure to the troubled Greek sovereign. Against that background, 
which eventually lead to private sector involvement with a deep haircut on 
government bonds, it appeared difficult for banks to honour their commitments 
of keeping exposure and remaining engaged in the country. At the end of 2012, 
the French banks Crédit Agricole and Société Générale sold at a large loss their 
Greek subsidiaries Emporiki and Geniki to Alpha Bank and Piraeus. Subsequently, 
foreign exposure almost completely dried up in Greece (Figure 6).
Box 1.
Commitments by French banks and the German financial sector towards 
Greece in 2010
Greece: Large French banks maintain their exposures, 5 May 2010
http://www.fbf.fr/fr/espace-presse/communiques/grece---les-grandes-banques-
francaises-maintiennent-leurs-engagements
(Translated from French) Meeting at the beginning of the afternoon in Bercy, 
the main French banks confirmed to Christine Lagarde, the Minister for the 
Economy, Industry and Employment, that they would maintain their exposures 
to Greece for the entire duration of the assistance programme, in the context of 
the discussions with the European Commission, the European Central Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund.
The major French banks welcome the agreement at the European level on the 
support programme for economic and financial stability of Greece, thereby 
helping to maintain their exposures. 
Germany's Financial Sector Joins Bailout of Greece, 7 May 2010
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/cash-from-the-banks-germany-
s-financial-sector-joins-bailout-of-greece-a-693654.html
Leading lenders Deutsche Bank and Commerzbank AG teamed up for the 
coordinated credit line, alongside DZ Bank AG, HVB Group, Allianz and 
Munich Re.
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A statement distributed by the Finance Ministry said banks and insurers will 
provide €4.8 billion… in financing to replace Greek Government bonds by 
purchasing new bonds or providing other forms of financing. In addition, they 
will replace expiring credit lines worth €3.3 billion, thus buying Greece some 
much needed time.
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Concluding remarks
In its first phase, the Vienna Initiative achieved a relative success by roughly 
maintaining the exposure of the involved banks to Hungary, Romania, Latvia, 
Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina at the agreed levels during 2009-10. However, 
when the commitments expired from 2011 onwards against the background of 
the euro area debt crisis, the claims of the EU parent banks on these countries 
declined in the context of an orderly deleveraging. This did not constitute a 
development specific to the region, but was part of a global trend according to 
which international banks retrenched to their domestic markets. Nevertheless, the 
Vienna Initiative allowed the recipient countries to buy some time and in order 
for the deleveraging to be orderly. 
Key factors for success appeared to have been the cooperative approach between 
public and private stakeholders facilitated by the presence of international 
institutions organising a discussion platform. It allowed participants to reach a 
common understanding in the interests of all to engage in some collective action. 
Banks would keep their exposure, and international institutions offer financial 
support, while authorities would ensure economic stability and the reform process. 
Nordic-Baltic cooperation was equally successful, resting on similar principles, 
including strong cross-border interconnectedness of banks. The importance of 
this factor and the stable policy environment is illustrated in the attempt to set 
up private sector support for Greece in 2010. It failed because of the absence of 
a systemic presence of international banks in the country, facilitating a retreat, 
and because public finances were out of control, leading to a haircut of the banks’ 
government bond portfolio in 2011-12. 
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CHAPTER 18
Financing sustainable growth 
in a small economy with large 
cross-border financial links: 
the role of the Vienna Initiative
Paweł Gąsiorowski and Olga Szczepańska1
Narodowy Bank Polski
The quest for the sustainability of growth1
Emerging markets economies require a long-lasting and stable economic growth 
to converge and achieve the level of wealth of the advanced countries. Between 
1995 and 2007 the Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe (CESEE) countries 
grew faster than almost all other emerging markets regions;2 see Figure 1. This 
favourable trend was dramatically broken in the majority of CESEE countries 
by the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2007/8. The long-term sustainability of 
the business model, and thus the growth path in some of those economies, was 
called into question. 
Sustainable growth requires long-term investment in the assets that expand 
the productive capacity of an economy.3 Thus, the contribution of components 
of the GDP: consumption and investment (both public and private), as well 
as net exports, should be properly balanced in time. Until 2003 growth in the 
region was driven mainly by exports. Thereafter the growth structure changed, 
and domestic demand became the main engine of growth.4 The structure of 
1 The views expressed in this chapter are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Narodowy 
Bank Polski. The authors would like to thank Ms. Milena Kabza and Mr. Paweł Smaga for research assistance.
2 Bakker, B. and Ch. Klingen, eds., How Emerging Europe Came through the 2008/09 Crisis. An Account by the Staff 
of the IMF’s European Department, International Monetary Fund, 2012.
3 Group of Thirty, Long-term Finance and Economic Growth, Working Group on Long-Term Finance, Washington, 
D.C., 2013.
4 Bakker and Klingen, op. cit.
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growth determines its stability. On the one hand, high consumption stabilises 
growth during the downturns (see the example of Poland in 2007/8). On the 
other hand, a high share of consumption in relation to investments ultimately 
hinders an increase in potential output. Insufficient investment decreases the 
international competitiveness of the economy, which is particularly important 
for open economies with significant economic links to their neighbours from 
the European Union (EU). 
The factors contributing to GDP growth varied between CESEE countries; see 
Figure 2. While in some countries, such as the Czech Republic and Croatia, the 
contribution of investment was strong and stable until the outbreak of the global 
financial crisis, some other countries, such as Albania, Poland, Romania and 
Ukraine, featured a strong consumption contribution. 
Another view on growth sustainability takes into account experience deriving 
from the global financial crisis. Pre-crisis growth in CESEE was characterised 
by strong domestic demand which inf lated the non-tradeable sector,5 while 
the contribution from net exports was weak. One of the explanations for this 
phenomenon was a higher trade deficit caused by the increase in domestic demand. 
Therefore, until 2010, most of the CESEE countries recorded persistent current 
5 Bakker and Klingen, op. cit.
Figure 1.
Real GDP growth in CESEE countries
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2018.
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Figure 2.
Contribution of consumption, government spending, gross fixed capital 
formation and net exports to GDP growth
Source:  Authors’ own computations, International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook 
Database, October 2018.
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Figure 3.
GDP growth and current account balance
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2018.
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account deficits; see Figure 3. The external imbalance contributed to the build-
up of external debt and made these economies vulnerable to external shocks 
related to the financing of the balance of payments. The concurrent real exchange 
appreciation of national currencies also eroded international competitiveness. 
Such a growth model required continuous external financing and this – as the 
experience of the global financial crisis showed – was not sustainable. Therefore, 
the sustainable growth model – particularly in smaller economies – should rely 
more on a tradeable sector.6 However, too much reliance on external demand 
exposes economies to shifts in global trade trends. This might be particularly 
important in the near future if the global trade tensions intensify and have adverse 
effects on the economic standing of key importers. Additionally, sustainable 
growth requires the availability of a skilled labour force, increases in human and 
real capital, as well as labour and capital productivity and the presence of domestic 
firms on international markets.7
The current account deficits – a mirror image of insufficient domestic savings – 
indicated that the CESEEs, in order to expand, had to rely on external financing. 
Capital flows in Europe (not only CESEE) as a share of GDP were the largest in 
history.8 The flow of external financing occurred in the form of foreign direct 
investment (FDI), including to the banking sector. The gradual liberalisation 
of capital flows and the gradual opening of privatisation opportunities attracted 
foreign investors to purchase local/domestic banks. As a result, the region is 
characterised by a high share of foreign banks as holders of banking systems’ 
assets; see Figure 4. The access to new markets as well as a cheap skilled 
workforce attracted FDI to the corporate sector as well. The FDI brought in 
not only capital but also new technologies and modern management culture and 
practices. The foreign financing in CESEE took also the form of the purchase 
of sovereign debt. Nevertheless, the most important f low occurred through 
the direct financing of banks and the corporate sector from foreign banks (see 
Figure 5), as well as through intercompany loans. Another important source 
of external financing for the new Member States of the EU was the cohesion 
and structural funds. 
6 Bakker and Klingen, op. cit.
7 Błędowski, K., Kiedy Polska przystąpi do Pierwszego Świata?, Dziennik Gazeta Prawna, 28 January 2019.
8 Gill, I. S. et al., Golden Growth: Restoring the Lustre of the European Economic Model, International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, 2012.
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Figure 4.
Share of foreign banks in banking systems’ assets in 2014
Source: Helgi Library, European Central Bank and national central bank data.
Note: For ALB, BIH, MKD, MNE data for 2013. 
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Figure 5.
External positions of BIS-reporting banks, 2003 Q1-2018 Q2
Source: CESEE Deleveraging and Credit Monitor November 20, 2018.
Note: USD billion, exchange-rate adjusted, vis-à-vis all sectors.
A stable financial system supports the sustainability of growth.9 A stable financial 
system promotes the effective and efficient allocation of resources mobilised by 
savers and required by investors. It also supports appropriate pricing and allocation 
of financial risk in the economy. By lowering transaction prices and information 
asymmetry, the development of the financial systems improves the range of 
possibilities for corporations to finance investments and for households to smooth 
consumption. This contributes to better shock absorption in the economy and 
better allocation of capital and risk, which, as a result, has a positive impact on 
long-term growth. The impact of the financial system on growth depends on the 
size of the sector, the pace of growth of the sector, the structure of the sector and 
the degree to which financial resources are used to increase the productive capacity 
and efficiency of the economy, rather than for speculative purposes.10
The experience of the global financial crisis demonstrates that an excessively 
large financial sector increases systemic risk and negatively impacts the economic 
9 Moshirian, F., The global financial crisis and the evolution of markets, institutions and regulation, Journal of Banking 
and Finance 2011, 35(3); Szczepańska, O., Stabilność finansowa jako cel banku centralnego, Scholar, Warszawa, 2008; 
Levine, R., Finance and Growth: Theory and Evidence, NBER Working Paper No. 10766, NBER 2004.
10 See, e.g., Rioja, F., and N. Valev, Does one size fit all? A reexamination of the finance and growth relationship, 
Journal of Development Economics, 74, 2004; Cecchetti, S. G., and E. Kharroubi, Reassessing the Impact of Finance 
on Growth, BIS Working Papers No 381, BIS 2012; Arcand, J. L. et al., Too Much Finance?, IMF Working Paper 
WP/12/161, IMF, 2012.
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performance of the real sector.11 On the other hand, a system that is too small does 
not foster economic growth because it does not provide sufficient resources for the 
economy. However, if financial development12 is too large, the positive effects on 
economic growth decline, while economic and financial volatility rises; see Figure 6. 
A large financial system increases the frequency of booms and busts, after which the 
economy is left with lower real GDP growth. It also leads to a decrease in efficiency 
of investment, as it does not allocate financial resources to the most productive 
activities. Moreover, too much finance diverts talent and human capital away from 
productive sectors and towards the financial sector. 
Figure 6.
Financial development effect on growth
Source:  Sahay R. et al., Rethinking Financial Deepening: Stability and Growth in Emerging 
Markets, International Monetary Fund, SDN/15/08, 2015.
The size of the financial system in the CEESEs is not excessive and the credit is 
mainly provided by the banks; see Figure 7. Thus, there is still possibly scope for 
a growth-enhancing increase in the size of the system. A key question remains, 
however: what is the optimal structure of the financial sector that would best serve 
to support growth? 
11 Sahay R., M. Čihák, P. N’Diaye, A. Barajas, R. Bi, D. Ayala, Y. Gao, A. Kyobe, L. Nguyen, Ch. Saborowski, K. 
Svirydzenka, S. Reza Yousefi, Rethinking Financial Deepening: Stability and Growth in Emerging Markets, 
International Monetary Fund, SDN/15/08, 2015.
12 Financial development can be measured, e.g., as in Sahay et al. 2015, as an index capturing depth, access to and 
efficiency of financial institutions and markets.
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Figure 7.
Banks’ assets as a percentage of GDP, end of 2017
Source: European Central Bank, Raiffeisen Bank International.
It is not only the size of the financial sector that matters, but also the speed of growth 
of the financial system – too rapid growth may lead to greater bank fragility and a 
higher risk of systemic banking crises.13 This is because dynamically growing financial 
13 Barajas A., Th. Beck, E. Dabla-Norris, S. Reza Yousefi, Too Cold, Too Hot, Or Just Right? Assessing Financial Sector 
Development Across the Globe, International Monetary Fund, WP/13/81, 2013.
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institutions take on too much risk and leverage and may not have sufficient capacity 
to properly assess and withstand the risks related to newly obtained exposures. This 
was particularly visible in the CESEE region before the crisis. The economic catch-up 
process led to rapid credit growth, and in some countries the speed of credit growth 
exceeded what could be justified by appropriate financial deepening and jeopardised 
macroeconomic stability. Rapid credit growth fuelled consumption and led to rises in 
house prices. Interestingly, in CESEE, the magnitude of the credit boom was linked 
to the size of the capital inflow from western banks.14
The quest for stable financing of growth
Stable financing of growth requires fulfilling at least the following four criteria.
1. Ensuring the stability of the financial system. The financial system contributes 
to growth if it is properly supervised from both the micro- and macroprudential 
perspectives. In CESEE, where the foreign presence in the banking sector is 
dominant, this requires good cooperation between the home and host authorities. 
This is because the home authorities indirectly (in case of subsidiaries) or directly (in 
case of branches) influence the behaviour of banks. Good supervisory cooperation 
is particularly crucial when credit growth is externally funded, as was the case 
for CESEE, and when the host supervisors have to rely on the monitoring of risk 
profiles by the banks’ home supervisors. Foreign-owned banks can also switch from 
domestic to cross-border lending. Such a supervisory structure creates misaligned 
incentives: it creates supervisory gaps and has been associated with a level of mistrust 
that impedes effective cooperation.15 The home country supervisors may tend to 
focus on ensuring stability of their domestic banking system rather than that of 
the host country. This is particularly important if the host and home countries 
are not members of the EU, where mediation mechanisms for arbitrating between 
home and host supervisors exist. Moreover, even within the EU, a mechanism for 
sharing the cost of liquidity support between the European Central Bank (ECB) 
and non-euro-area central banks does not exist, nor there a mechanism to share 
the costs of bank recapitalisation between the member states. 
2. Ensuring the quality of banks’ assets. The legacy of crisis left some CESEE countries 
with a high level of nonperforming loans (NPLs). The dynamic credit growth during 
2003-8, followed by the global financial crisis, led to an increase in NPLs in some 
CESEE countries to a level which constrained the recovery of credit provision, and 
14 Bakker, and Klingen, op. cit.
15 Gill, I. S. et al., op. cit.
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thus the economic recovery. The high level of NPLs impacted banks’ profitability and 
funding costs: banks with higher NPLs were less profitable and thus had less capacity 
to generate capital. They were also less active in credit provision. High NPLs were 
also a reflection of a high indebtedness of the corporate sector and/or households. 
Such high indebtedness has a negative impact on investment and consumption.
3. Ensuring stable financing through the banking system. The financial systems 
in CEESE are dominated by banks, and the flow of external financing to the 
CESEE region was channelled through the banking sector, mostly foreign-owned, 
rather than through capital markets. The reliance of the corporate sector on bank 
lending, rather than on the market funding, could be – to a large extent – explained 
by history and the fact that most of enterprises in the CESEE region are small or 
medium-sized. These companies rely more on relationship banking and leasing.16 
Banks are also natural credit providers for households. The reliance on banks 
exposes small to medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to variability in access to finance, 
as lending to SMEs in particular becomes more expensive during crises.17
4. Ensuring stable financing for innovative businesses. Banks – due to their 
obligation to return deposits to their clients – are more inclined to finance businesses 
generating stable cash flows with contained risks. However, such businesses might 
not be the most innovative and may not improve the competitive edge of the 
country in the long run. Moreover, bank financing might not be available for 
start-ups, which typically have a short credit history. Therefore, for growth to be 
sustainable, provision of non-bank financing is needed as well. For example, the 
development of stock markets is positive for industries that are at the frontier of 
growth – innovative, high-tech and patent-intensive industries – as well as for 
growth in total factor productivity.18 Such business projects are better financed 
by market-based financiers – venture capital and private equity firms. An efficient 
financial system thus requires complementary components – both an effective and 
resilient banking sector and market-based financing to allocate savings in line with 
the risk profiles of investors. Moreover, the structure of banks’ loan portfolios in 
some CESEE countries, e.g., Poland and Slovakia, may not support sustainable 
growth, since the portfolios are dominated by household loans, while only loans 
for enterprises are positively correlated with GDP growth; see Figure 8. 
16 European Commission, Survey on the access to finance of enterprises (SAFE), November 2018.
17 Holton, S., and F. McCann, Sources of the Small Firm Financing Premium: Evidence from Euro Area Banks, Working 
Paper Series, No 2092, ECB, 2017.
18 Kremer M., and A. Popov, Financial development, financial structure and growth: evidence from Europe, in Financial 
Integration in Europe, European Central Bank, 2018.
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Figure 8.
Loan portfolio structure, end of 2017
Source: Raiffeisen Bank International.
The role of Vienna Initiative in supporting sustainable growth
Vienna Initiative helps in ensuring financial stability in the region by focusing 
on resolving potential cross-border financial stability issues and underscoring 
the need for supervisory policies to be taken in the best joint interest of home 
and host countries. This is achieved through the continuous dialogue within 
the Vienna Initiative meetings and working groups, which is also focused on 
macroprudential issues. One of the key objectives in this dialogue is ensuring 
the involvement of non-EU countries in the region, which do not participate in 
EU cooperation frameworks.
One of the key work streams of the Vienna Initiative is that focused on reducing 
NPLs in CESEE. This has been achieved by identifying obstacles in the legal, 
judicial, tax and regulatory areas to addressing the NPL problem.19 The Vienna 
Initiative also developed a plan for addressing the level of NPLs in countries where 
it was particularly high. The key deliverables included preparation of specific 
country assessments, provision of technical support related to NPLs (regarding, 
for example, restructuring frameworks and principles) and organising industry 
workshops, as well as fostering NPL markets. The Vienna Initiative also regularly 
monitors NPLs in the CESEE. 
19 See Working Group on NPLs in Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe, Report, March 2012.
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The Vienna Initiative helped ensure that CESEE economies maintained access 
to foreign financing. During the first phase of the crisis, for the countries that 
benefited from International Monetary Fund (IMF)/EU-supported programmes, 
the Vienna Initiative coordinated actions of the West European parent bank groups 
and home and host-country financial authorities,20 as well as the international 
financial institutions21 and the European Commission. These actions secured 
commitments from parent banks to maintain their exposure to CESEE and 
recapitalise their local subsidiaries as needed, as well as IFIs’ assistance towards 
the banking sector, which supplemented the financing provided under IMF/EU-
supported programmes. The public support for parent banks was provided by 
home-country authorities in a way that did not discriminate between the groups’ 
domestic and foreign operations. Also, the host country authorities committed 
not to discriminate between domestic and foreign banks.22 Subsequently, under 
Vienna Initiative 2.0, the monitoring of credit and deleveraging activity helped 
ensure that foreign banks continued their engagement in the region. 
The Vienna Initiative has also focused on access to finance by providing a 
comprehensive assessment of credit guarantee schemes available to reduce credit risk 
of SMEs in the region and by helping ensure finance for innovation and investment. 
This second goal is promoted through work on capital market development in the 
CESEE region, which has led to the identification of challenges and obstacles to 
capital market development in several CESEE countries and proposals for solutions 
to address them, as well as policies that might be pursued to help capital markets 
in the CESEE region catch up with those in the rest of Europe.23 The Vienna 
Initiative also focused on supporting the development of IFI instruments to meet 
the investment needs of the CESEE region. 
***
The experience of the Vienna Initiative countries shows that maintaining a stable 
flow of financing in small open economies dominated by foreign banks requires 
good cross-border cooperation between the financial market authorities and banks. 
It also requires further deepening of financial intermediation, mostly through the 
development of market channels. 
20 i.e., supervisors, finance ministries and central banks.
21 International Monetary Fund, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, European Investment Bank, 
World Bank Group (World Bank, International Finance Corporation and Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency).
22 Bakker and Klingen, op. cit.
23 See, e.g., Report by the Working Group on Capital Markets Union http://vienna-initiative.com/wp-content/
uploads/2018/03/VI-CMU-Working-Group-Final-Report-March-2018.pdf
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CHAPTER 19
Forward-looking implications 
of the Vienna Initiative: why did 
Western banks enter the Central, 
Eastern and Southeastern Europe 
region, what went wrong 
and what did we learn?
Gunter Deuber and Rachel A. Epstein
Raiffeisenbank International, University of Denver
The banking sectors in Central Europe (CE) and South Eastern Europe 
(SEE) offered ample growth opportunities in the early 2000s. Following hefty 
restructuring and/or crises in the 1990s, bank balance sheets had been largely 
cleaned up, providing attractive entry points for long-term-oriented private sector 
equity investors. Moreover, macroeconomic stability had returned to the Central, 
Eastern and Southeastern Europe (CESEE) region. From a macrofinancial point 
of view, financial intermediation levels appeared to be very low, offering a lot of 
catching-up potential vis-à-vis financial intermediation levels in West European 
banking sectors. Therefore, European banks made a big push into the ostensibly 
underpenetrated CESEE region. Bank privatisation deals in CESEE were marked 
by robust interest for strategic equity investments by West European lenders.1 It 
is interesting to note that West European lenders chasing growth opportunities 
in the region and CESEE host countries were largely concentrated in a very few 
West European home countries, a fact that contributed to a certain degree of risk 
concentration. Austrian-, Italian- and French-owned international banks dominated 
in CESEE, while German banks also played a certain role in the beginning of the 
regional “CEE banking sector boom”.2
1 For a full account of the process through which Western banks acquired high levels of CESEE banking assets, see 
Rachel A. Epstein, In Pursuit of Liberalism: International Institutions in Postcommunist Europe (Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2008).
2 The large and concentrated ownership of Nordic banks in the Baltic region is not explicitly addressed here, but similar 
conclusions to those drawn here for the CESEE region in this paper seem plausible in that region as well.
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On the back of strong investment activity of Western lenders, foreign ownership 
in the CESEE banking sectors increased to very high levels by international and 
European standards. West European banks operating on the CESEE markets 
developed into large and complex cross-border banking groups. At peak levels, 
foreign-owned banks accumulated a market share of 75% of total assets in CE 
and some 85% in SEE. Therefore, banking sectors in CE and SEE turned into 
very internationally integrated European banking sectors when it came to cross-
border financial flows, backed by deep equity links.  At that time, West European 
banks operating in the CESEE region also met a by and large integration- and 
globalisation-friendly mood on the ground. The strategic push of Western banks 
into the CESEE region and first successes during the market-conquering phase 
supported aggressive mergers and acquisitions and organic growth strategies. From 
2000 until 2008/9, the total assets of the seven largest cross-border banks in the 
CEE region grew from some €70 billion to around €490 billion. The speed of asset 
expansion sketched previously entailed annual balance sheet growth rates in excess 
of 20% year-on-year. On a macro level, the CESEE loan-to-GDP ratio increased 
from some 20% to close to 50%. The average regional ratio masks the fact that 
loan-to-GDP ratios surpassed sustainable levels in several CESEE banking markets. 
The brisk expansion and decisive financial deepening sketched previously are clear 
indications that the CESEE region was characterised by a procyclical, credit-driven 
overheating. The market entry of foreign European Union (EU) banks helped to 
boost the availability of domestic credit in less developed, smaller banking sectors 
in CESEE. Foreign-owned local banks were able to raise local deposits relatively 
cheaply, to borrow from their parent banks or on international markets supported by 
the reputation of their parent banks. Therefore, the market entry of West European 
banks that were previously locked into stagnant home markets (with low interest rate 
margins) and that started to become international banks in the CESEE region only 
in the late 1990s supported a strong regional credit expansion. Moreover, because of 
their initial under-penetration and the relatively small nominal size of the CESEE 
economies and banking sectors, CEESE operations were relatively small compared 
to the domestic operations of West European banks, making a rapid expansion 
easy to finance. In addition, the focus was on expansion and not on optimising 
governance and (risk) management. Some of the Western lenders that made a push 
into the CESEE region were also not very experienced in doing banking business in 
emerging markets. Hence, long-term risks may have been partially underestimated 
during good times and in certain CESEE economies. Widespread lending in foreign 
currencies in the region was based on the optimistic assumption that several CESEE 
countries would join the euro area quickly. Hard currency pegs or soft de facto 
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pegs and the underlying exchange rate stability also fuelled widespread and risky 
lending in foreign currencies. Due to the extrapolation of strong capital inflows, 
a lot of free-floating CEE currencies were expected to appreciate vis-à-vis major 
foreign currencies from a medium- to long-term perspective. The strong expansion 
in CESEE also exposed Western banks to relatively unstable/illiquid local funding 
markets; this held especially true in crisis times.3
All in all, aggressive and parallel lending policies of a few large private sector 
players contributed to the need for coordinated crisis management at a later stage. 
Nevertheless, the strong presence of foreign banks cannot be seen as the only 
driver of the rapid credit growth in CESEE. Overly optimistic long-term growth 
expectations in a lot of banking sectors in the whole of Europe (including the Central 
European economy of Slovenia that never opened up its banking sector to foreign 
investment like other CESEE economies) in combination with a favourable global 
and European economic and financial market backdrop were additional drivers 
of the rapid credit growth in CESEE. High growth expectations were partially 
fuelled by overly optimistic assumptions, i.e., the vision that banking sectors in 
CESEE could easily catch-up with (inflated) euro area financial intermediation 
levels within a limited period of time (e.g., ten years or so). Therefore, one could say 
that a flawed model of thinking as well as an overexpansion in euro area banking 
(that developed into a sort of flawed benchmark) also promoted aggressive growth 
strategies at West European cross-border banks operating in CESEE. 
There had been warnings with regard to the rapid credit growth in certain CESEE 
countries. External observers, such as EU institutions, the European Central Bank 
(ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), had been very critical of the 
rapid credit growth in CESEE (especially in the years 2004-8). During the boom, 
Western cross-border banks were mostly caught up in their “growth momentum” and 
mostly downplayed such fundamental concerns. There were even some indications 
that cross-border Western banks had invested a certain amount of expertise into 
circumventing locally set regulatory growth brakes. However, there was also local 
complacency in the CESEE host countries. In some cases, the growth-supportive 
brisk banking sector expansion was also welcomed by local political elites who 
profited indirectly or even directly from this state of affairs because of the ways in 
which strong credit-driven economic growth supported their electoral prospects. 
Moreover, local economic and political elites also participated in some less sound 
3 For a detailed analysis of the regional (pre- and post-crisis) credit cycle see also Gunter Deuber, 2011. Post-crisis 
Banking Sector Outlook in CEE, Osteuropa-Wirtschaft, 56(3-4).
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business practices (such as the widespread extension of foreign currency loans in 
certain CE/SEE countries).
At peak levels in 2008/9, the leading Western banks in the region were operating 
in 9-12 markets on average and had an average total CEE balance sheet size 
of some €80 100 billion. For comparison: the average size of the CESEE host 
economies ranged from some €35 billion to €55 billion (depending on the method 
of measurement). Therefore, Western banks operating in the region were in many 
cases considered as “too large to fail” by markets. Moreover, international investors 
were also concerned about the very high degree of home market concentration 
(particularly in the case of Austria).  The combination of a rapid expansion and 
a sizeable and complex cross-border footprint of Western private sector banks 
operating in CESEE was a key factor in the need for coordinated private-public 
sector and cross-border crisis-management within the Vienna Initiative (VI) 
framework at a later stage. 
With the benefit of hindsight, it seems clear what went wrong in CESEE banking. 
However, from a forward-looking perspective, procyclical developments in the 
banking and financial sector, such as those that played out in CESEE, certainly 
cannot be reliably prevented or contained in advance, given a long history of 
economic and financial crises. Therefore, it makes sense to have a closer look at 
the question of why the much-needed cross-border private-public sector crisis 
management in the context of the VI was so successful. 
Vienna Initiative: A lot of praise for its positive outcome, 
although some false interpretations still persist; some more 
critical takes emerged as well
The VI framework emerged as an ad hoc and flexible response to a systemic regional 
financial stability problem within a very specific setting of elevated equity-based 
cross-border financial sector integration. Measured by its original objectives, the 
VI achieved its goals. A regional systemic banking sector crisis was avoided and a 
supportive spirit for cross-border crisis management was established. All relevant 
studies suggest that a swift, decisive and damaging deleveraging did not take place, 
contradicting earlier expectations of a devastating “cut and run” episode. This holds 
true for the countries explicitly covered within the VI framework, as well as for the 
broader CESEE region. Therefore, the VI can be seen as a success story.4
4 See also Bakker, Bas, and Christoph Klingen (eds.), How Emerging Europe Came through the 2008/09 Crisis: An 
Account by the Staff of the IMF’s European Department, Washington, DC, 2012.
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In order to draw forward-looking implications from the VI with an eye towards 
replicating its stabilising effects in future crises, it is important to carefully 
specify the sources of the VI’s success. And here we depart, to a certain extent, 
from the conventional interpretation of why and how the VI prevented a rapid, 
precipitous and damaging deleveraging from CESEE. We argue that, while the 
VI certainly contributed to public-private coordination and provided reassuring 
market signals, the VI’s success was nevertheless primarily derivative of the largest 
Western and multinational banking groups’ business strategies and interests as 
equity investors in the region, rather than a consequence of independent public 
sector power.
Much of the literature analysing the VI argues that international organisations, 
including the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the 
World Bank Group and the IMF, independently compelled Western banks to 
maintain their exposures to CESEE through a voluntary bank rollover agreement. 
A recent quotation from Robert Zoellick, former World Bank Group president 
and former US trade representative, is illustrative. Referring to the VI, he argues 
that these organisations “persuaded Western European commercial banks to keep 
capital in eastern European subsidiaries, avoiding a countercyclical contraction.”5 
An auxiliary argument is that Western banks invested in CESEE faced a collective 
action problem as the US and then the global financial crisis unfolded. Given 
traditional market investor incentives to flee a failing market or asset first rather 
than last, this reasoning suggests that Western banks had every reason to cut 
their exposures to their CESEE markets – and to cut them first, in order to avail 
themselves of relatively stronger asset and currency values. From this point of 
view, Western banking exposures appeared potentially volatile indeed, with severe 
contagion among investors probable. Many observers have therefore concluded that 
it was international institutional pressure on private sector banks that helped resolve 
the apparent collective action problem by compelling the largest banks to stay – 
with commitment letters by banks, IMF stabilisation and open communication 
among stakeholders.6
We find several evidentiary problems with this dominant narrative, however. 
Moreover, the differences between the conventional wisdom and our own findings 
are significant enough that the implications for future crisis management would 
5 Robert Zoellick, Whoever runs the World Bank needs an emerging markets plan, Financial Times, 5 February 2019.
6 See, for example, Katherine Pistor, Governing interdependent financial systems: lessons from the Vienna Initiative.” 
Journal of Globalization and Development, 2(2), Article 4 (2011); and the IMF, Regional Economic Outlook: Europe: 
Building Confidence, Washington, D.C. (2010), p. 63.
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vary. To reiterate, correct specification of what worked in the VI is essential to 
sound policy going forward. 
Our counter-interpretation revolves around which actors initiated the VI, the 
timing and scope of the commitment letters signed by banks, banks’ long-term 
business strategies and their own funding difficulties during the crisis.7 Starting 
with the critical actors, it was six of the largest Western banks operating in CESEE 
in autumn 2008 who came together to author a collective letter to the European 
Commission, Christine Lagarde as Chair of the G20 and others pointing out that 
the national approach to bank and funding sustainability that was being pursued 
at the time would disproportionately harm Eastern Europe and violate the spirit 
and undermine the functioning of the European Union’s single market. According 
to the CEO signatories to the letter:
The more national dimension of these measures is going to enlarge 
disparities in credit availability between countries and could be 
ineffective in sustaining the European economy as a whole.8
The coordinated call to action by private sector banks directed at key international 
organisations does not depict a collective problem in which banks were on a 
hair-trigger, ready to leave the region. If the collective action problem has been 
misconstrued, then the coordinated action by banks leaves open the question of 
what role the international institutions did play.
Our second evidentiary concern stems from the substance of the VI itself. We 
think that if the international institutions in question created an independent 
effect, in part through the formulation of bank exposure commitment letters, it 
is likely that there would have had to have been more than five such letters. In 
addition, for those exposure commitments to have traction, we argue that they 
would have had to be agreed to before the crisis had abated. As it was, bank exposure 
commitment letters were signed for only Latvia, Romania, Hungary, Bosnia and 
Serbia, whereas the absence of “cutting and running” extended across the EU’s New 
Member States (NMS) and EU Candidate Countries (CCs) in CESEE (i.e., formal 
exposure commitments only covered 25 30% of all regional banking sector exposures 
7 For a fuller account of these arguments and events, see also Rachel A. Epstein, Banking on Markets: The Transformation 
of Bank-State Ties in Europe and Beyond (Oxford University Press, 2017).
8 The letter was also addressed to Joaquin Almunia, EU Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs, and 
Charlie McCreevy, EU Commissioner for Internal Market and Services. The EBRD and the EIB were both copied 
on the letter. The letter is available at https://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/economics/events/Banks_letter.
pdf. Accessed 10 March 2019.
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at leading Western banks operating in the region). And in Hungary, Latvia and 
Serbia, IMF stabilisation programmes pre-dated bank exposure commitment letters 
by between three and eleven months. This timing suggests that the commitment 
letters – the voluntary bank rollover agreements – had little to do in securing banks’ 
continued exposures compared to other factors.
This brings us to our third and final set of arguments about the ways in which the 
VI process assisted in the crisis, mindful of the primacy of the business strategies 
of the multinational banking groups themselves and their long-term interests in 
the region. Knowing that it was the banks that alerted national and supranational 
authorities to the dangers of a national approach, and knowing also that these 
banks were coming from relatively small home markets and/or markets that were 
completely saturated with low margins, we posit that the last thing these financial 
institutions wanted to do was to “cut and run” from CESEE and to reinvest their 
equity funding in their home markets. Indeed, they had spent the previous one 
to two decades investing overwhelmingly in host-monitored subsidiaries and 
building mass-market share. And many parent banks had lent large volumes to 
their subsidiaries – making potential losses under conditions of market flight very 
large. Unwinding their access to 100 million new and underbanked consumers 
was never a viable option. In addition, the Western banks operating in the region 
had increasingly localised their management within their CESEE network (i.e., 
top management positions were filled with local personalities with a high degree 
of local embedding). In this respect, rapid and reckless deleveraging was practically 
impossible from a governance perspective. Moreover, some of the local management 
teams had very specific crisis management experience, which West European bank 
managers lacked in this form.
Western banks did have a series of problems, however, including waning confidence 
in their commitment to their CESEE operations, ring-fencing by national authorities 
in both Eastern and Western Europe, declining economic outlooks everywhere and 
creditor doubts about these banks’ future prospects. Media reports forecasting 
doom for Eastern Europe, and by extension the euro area, did not help matters. So, 
if multinational banking groups really did not want to cut and run and did not face 
a collective action problem per se, what role did international institutions play, and 
was the VI truly critical to forestalling a worse set of outcomes? 
Our answer is that international institutions played an important role in 
mitigating the crisis, but it was not the role so often imputed. That is, it was not 
so much a question of solving a collective action problem or persuading banks 
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to stay, as Zoellick puts it. It was rather the EBRD, the European Commission 
and international and public actors joining the multinational banking groups 
in, firstly, developing a coordinated response that militated against a purely 
national approach and, secondly, signalling to market actors that the CESEE 
region was not going to fall off an economic cliff. International institutions 
fulfilled the critical signalling function, therefore, of communicating broadly 
multinational banking groups’ intention and capacity to stay – a message that 
the banks themselves had had difficulty in transmitting effectively and credibly 
in times of a global credit crunch.
Emphasising the primacy of West European banks’ interests in CESEE, and 
their long time horizons as strategic equity investors there, is important for 
understanding the difference in apparent success between the VI and other 
voluntary bank rollover agreements – many of which had historically failed.9 
It means also that we need to be clear-eyed about the limits of the independent 
effects that public actors can have on private ones. And it points again to the 
necessity of shared public and private objectives – in this case stabilising funding 
to CESEE for the betterment of economies there and across the EU – in effective 
crisis management. 
Despite its success, the VI was not seen positively by all external and local observers. 
For example, the private sector definitely played a major role in fuelling imbalances 
that required coordinated public-private sector crisis management within the VI 
framework at a later stage. Given the overexpansion in CESEE banking sectors 
pre-crisis, it can be questioned why a resulting over-indebtedness and/or liquidity 
crisis must be mitigated by coordinated public-private sector crisis management 
(including the use of public funds). This holds especially true as private sector 
banks were also calling actively for the introduction of a format like the VI when 
the banking sector situation became shakier in CESEE in late 2008 and early 
2009. A prominent group of regional economists asked whether the VI was more 
of a “clean-wash mechanism”.10 Some observers even labelled the VI as “regulatory 
capture” and/or “policy confusion”.11 However, experience inside the euro area (and 
beyond) has shown that it is beneficial for an economy and its partners if a hefty and 
swift cross-border banking sector deleveraging can be avoided. Some more critical 
9 Nouriel Roubini and Brad Setser, Bailouts or Bail-Ins? Responding to Financial Crises in Emerging Economies 
(Washington, D.C., Institute for International Economics, 2004).
10 De Haas, R., Y. Korniyenko, A. Pivovarsky, and T. Tsankova, 2015. Taming the herd? Foreign banks, the Vienna 
Initiative and crisis transmission, Journal of Financial Intermediation, 24(3), 325-355.
11 See Bankwatch MAIL, Issue 52, May 2012, p. 3.
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observers have also interpreted crisis management within the VI framework as a 
“bail-out” exercise for the private sector. In this context it has to be stressed that 
the VI offered “no blanket bailouts”. The VI was only helpful to put a floor under 
the funding costs of Western banks operating in CESEE and the asset prices of 
their foreign direct investment participations in CESEE, so that they in turn could 
support or recapitalise local subsidiaries if necessary. 
Furthermore, the VI framework provided some plannability for Western CESEE 
banks. The resulting stabilisation of cross-border and foreign-bank exposures 
towards CESEE should be seen as a direct means to support the local banking 
sectors and economies, given the deep integration of the subsidiaries of Western 
banks into the local real economy. By and large the CESEE exposure of leading 
Western banks is about conventional banking sector business with the local 
real economy. Most importantly, all major Western banks operating in CESEE 
were very confident about the long-term business prospects in the region for the 
decades to come. Therefore, for the private sector the VI was also an important 
“signalling device” to the outside world and more short-term oriented financial 
market investors (focused on current imbalances in the real economy and banking 
sector). Therefore, the VI framework also helped to preserve the by and large 
sound business models of large cross-border banking groups, with a focus on 
conventional banking business.12
Vienna Initiative: Lessons learned and implications for the rest 
of Europe
Although the VI can be considered a success story according to its original purpose, 
a rather critical view of foreign bank ownership and the potential risks involved 
in this form of cross-border equity integration have emerged in recent years. This 
holds especially true in the case of Hungary and Poland, but such motives are also 
of relevance in countries such as Romania or the Czech Republic (e.g., with regard 
to sectoral taxes, limitations to dividend outflows).13 Therefore, it seems appropriate 
that the merits of the VI process are actively promoted (as it happens with this 
edited volume). In an optimal scenario, lessons learned from the VI framework 
may even support certain changes to banking market conditions and institutions at 
the broader European level. As shown in this chapter, we identify some important 
12 See Deuber, G.,  and G. Shpilevoy, Foreign-Owned Banks in CEE/CIS, in  Banking in Central and Eastern Europe 
and Turkey, Challenges and Opportunities, European Investment Bank, 2013.
13 See 'Re-Polonisation' puts banks under government scrutiny, Reuters Business News, 26 September 2016; Poland 
seeks to boost state control of economy, EU Observer, 24 February 2016; Hungary deepens control of banking sector, 
Financial Times, 9 February 2015; Czech politicians take aim at banks, Politico, 17 March 2017; Romania’s ‘Greed 
Tax’ Reminds Banks of Eastern Europe’s Risks, Bloomberg, 19 December 2018.
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lessons learned from an institutional and broader European perspective. This holds 
especially true considering limited progress when it comes to the still incomplete 
“Banking Union” (BU) within the euro area (BU refers here to centralised oversight 
and potential resolution at the ECB within the Single Supervisory Mechanism 
(SSM) and Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM)).
Experience within the VI framework has shown that even if actors had divergent 
approaches with regard to banking sector stability in the run-up to the crisis, 
nearly all the relevant private and public sector parties converged rather quickly in 
crisis times (in 2008/9). Prior to 2008/9, some Western banks and Western bank 
managers were significantly less concerned about regional credit overexpansion than 
competent local authorities (e.g., central banks). Therefore, it seems more important 
that all relevant actors can be gathered and coordinated rather quickly, while they 
need not necessarily have shared a certain mind-set pre-crisis. Moreover, active 
private-public sector coordination may help to come quickly to a proper market 
and banking sector risk assessment. In CESEE, private-public sector coordination 
helped in this regard, resulting in an efficient risk assessment. 
Initially, it seemed that some public sector actors were less concerned than private 
sector agents about the financial instability risks in CESEE. This holds true in 
Western Europe and in several CESEE countries. A quick risk assessment as well 
as the following swift response had been crucial for anchoring market expectations 
and prices. Hence, a negative feedback loop between falling regional asset prices 
and further negative market expectations was avoided. Moreover, private-public 
sector coordination helped to increase the leverage of international financial 
institutions (IFIs) with regard to programme implementation in countries under 
explicit VI plus IFI coverage. In other words, a higher stabilisation performance 
can be achieved through cooperation between the public and private sectors, and 
less public money and risk taking may be necessary than in a purely public-sector-
supported stabilisation programme. Therefore, the public sector has an interest 
in such coordination as well. The limited use of public and pre-defined funding 
resources could be of special interest for the set-up within the euro area/BU, where 
a joint and sizeable backstop (e.g., a European Deposit Insurance Scheme) seems 
to be a very distant option. 
Western cross-border banks operating in CESEE were considered to be relatively 
large compared to their home country GDP, the GDP of host countries, as well as 
to the overall regional GDP. Therefore, the absorption of exposure to the CESEE 
region by a few complex cross-border West European banks definitely contributed 
355
Forward-looking implications of the Vienna Initiative: 
why did Western banks enter the Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe region, what went wrong and what did we learn?
to a certain risk concentration (i.e., it contributed to common borrower and 
debtor problems). This might be judged as negative from a regulatory point of 
view. However, counterintuitively, exactly this risk concentration also supported 
effective cross-border crisis management. Firstly, the complexity and risk 
concentration increased the incentives to engage in joint private and public sector 
cross-border crisis management. It is interesting to note that the cross-border 
dimension of crisis management also shielded West European banks operating 
in CESEE – which considered themselves as truly pan-European actors – from 
too much pressure from their home regulator (a very a common phenomenon in 
banking and financial crises). 
Secondly, crisis management could be delivered via the coordination of a very limited 
number of actors. Therefore, a coordinated crisis response transpired within a rather 
short period of time, something that happens rarely in European policymaking. 
Hence, experience within the VI framework definitely supports the rationale for 
more banking sector consolidation in Europe. This holds true on a national level 
and when it comes to cross-border integration in particular. Too many banks are still 
operating inside the European Monetary Union (EMU)/EU and in some member 
countries. Nevertheless, a lot of observers are still more focussed on “too big to fail” 
or “too complex to fail” considerations when it comes to banking sector integration 
in Europe. It is exactly the success of the VI that shows cross-border banking sector 
integration does not necessarily lead to a higher degree of financial instability. 
Hence, a certain market concentration might even be tolerable from a financial 
stability point of view. A much needed banking sector consolidation in the whole 
of Europe may also lead to a similar concentration in terms of home countries and 
actors, as in case of the CESEE region (i.e., that a pan-European banking sector 
consolidation could be driven by, say, 5-8 banks with a sustainable business model 
out of 2-4 countries).
The character of integration and the resulting long-term private sector interests 
matter. The experience of the VI has shown that the degree of international equity 
capital integration in the banking sector is an important factor in generating positive 
cross-border effects for financial stability. Notably, with the exception of CESEE, 
the degree of equity-based cross-border banking integration inside the euro area 
and EU was, and still is, fairly modest. Among West European euro area members, 
and most especially in the four largest euro area states (Germany, France, Italy and 
Spain), “national banking champions” still dominate and levels of foreign ownership 
in banking sectors are very low. To the extent there was financial integration within 
the euro area before the US financial crisis, it was debt-based – and a decade later, 
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this is still mostly the case. However, an effective European BU that limits both 
country-specific as well as systemic risks will require tangible cross-border expansion 
of healthy banks. Recent financial fragmentation and crisis events inside the euro 
area have shown that incentives for banks in crisis times differ considerably in an 
environment of equity- or debt-based cross-border banking integration. Equity-
based integration offers more incentives and possibilities to maintain cross-border 
stability in crisis times. In contrast, debt-based integration increases the risk of 
damaging “cut and run” behaviour.
The arguments above were very clearly confirmed in the global financial crisis, as 
well as during the euro area debt and currency crisis that followed. In the course 
of the euro area debt and banking crisis, cross-border bank financing within the 
euro area and vis-à-vis certain countries was massively and quickly reduced (in the 
range of 60-70%). This deleveraging mainly took place vis-à-vis banks from the so-
called euro area periphery (and the ECB was forced into large-scale substitution of 
this financing). This was mainly due to the fact that these interdependencies were 
generally not backed by a cross-border equity capital injection, so that banks from 
country A (such as Germany and Austria) had only lent money or granted loans 
to other "third-party" banks from country B (e.g., Italy, Spain) at short notice.14 In 
particular, we would point out that, while West European multinational banking 
groups had little to no desire to abandon their CESEE markets, funding in Western 
Europe – where foreign bank ownership levels were low – experienced a devastating 
home bias in lending. In other words, where financial integration had been achieved 
through cross-border borrowing (as in Western Europe), funding was much more 
volatile and prone to retreat than where foreign bank ownership levels were high 
(as in CESEE). The home bias in lending that afflicted Western Europe had far-
reaching consequences. The aggressive retreat of funding behind national borders 
in the euro area meant that the ECB could not implement its monetary policy 
effectively; bank-state doom loops were exacerbated as funding costs for crisis-hit 
governments rose; and economic downturns were compounded by capital scarcity, 
particularly on Europe’s periphery.
Historically, it seems states have been more likely to accept high volumes of cross-
border capital flows than to accept high levels of foreign bank ownership. For the 
purposes of achieving financial stability, however, it could well be that their priorities 
should be reversed. This is because equity-based integration introduced a much higher 
14 See, for example, ECB, 2012. Financial Integration in Europe, Report, April, European Central Bank, Frankfurt am 
Main; available at http://www.ecb.europa.eu.
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level of  “financial resilience” – which is exactly what we witnessed in Eastern Europe 
during the crisis. Precisely because of foreign bank ownership, there was foreign direct 
investment, because Western banks had invested in subsidiaries and because those 
subsidiaries were also beholden to host governments, much of the capital and liquidity 
that had been extended in CESEE could not easily be reversed – quite apart from 
the lack of desire among banks to forsake market share, as we have already argued.
Given these developments, and the admittedly novel scope and character of foreign 
bank investment in CESEE, we take one of the central lessons of the VI to be the 
value of transnational bank ownership in the euro area more broadly – keeping in 
mind that we believe the VI’s salutary effects were strongly driven by a comity of 
public and private sector interests, rather than by international institutional power 
alone. The EU in general may be over-banked, a number of weak institutions have 
long been protected by national authorities and cross-border bank flows went 
into retreat during the crisis. To remedy these vulnerabilities, building banking 
markets in Western Europe that more closely resemble those in Eastern Europe 
– where financial resilience was high and banking markets are competitive because 
of openness to foreign investment – could well bring greater stability to the euro 
area. There are definitely critics of such an approach. In particular, policymakers 
and analysts alike have wondered whether or not banks would continue to come 
under pressure from governments to privilege home markets over foreign ones 
during a crisis.15 The supranationalisation of bank oversight in the ECB through 
the SSM goes a long way in establishing the authority to prevent that – at least in 
the euro area. How the ECB will ultimately exercise that authority is still unknown.
Our larger point is that the recent years of clean-up and increasing resilience in the 
macroeconomic stability inside the euro area and its individual banking sectors 
should be seized on to boost and deepen the cross-border equity integration in the 
financial sector. The deep level of banking sector integration in CESEE was also 
achieved following hefty adjustments in the 1990s, increasing the attractiveness 
for market entries and cross-border equity integration in a subsequent recovery 
and growth phase.
Speaking of a return to expansion and growth in European banking, the experience 
in the CESEE region (or some euro area periphery countries) has shown that it might 
15 See for example Robert Wade, “The Aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis: From ‘Liberalize the Market’ to 
‘Standardize the Market’ and Create a ‘Level Playing Field’.” In B. Muchhala (ed.) Ten Years After: Revisiting the 
Asian Financial Crisis, pp. 73-94/ Washington, D.C., Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars (2007).
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be hard for regulators to stop a self-fulfilling credit boom, one that might finally 
lead to a bust. Crisis management mechanisms are therefore at least as important as 
preventive measures. That said, the BU framework (SRM, Single Resolution Board 
(SRB)) will not shield the euro area and/or the EU from all banking sector instability 
going forward. However, accurate and somewhat more centralised information 
about interlinkages (due to more centralised banking sector oversight at the ECB 
and European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB)) may facilitate crisis management – if 
needed. Hence, coordinated cross-border crisis management inside the euro area/
EU, as in the context of the VI seen back in 2008/9 and involving the private 
plus public sectors, seems to be a more realistic option nowadays. Moreover, the 
success of the VI has shown that crisis management is possibly most effective when a 
limited number of relevant people that share a common vision know and trust each 
other and can be brought together quickly. Therefore, it is positive news that the 
foundation for such structures and networks has been partially established within 
the euro area architecture in recent years. With the ECB as the central institution 
for banking sector oversight for the largest (cross-border) institutions, the ESRB 
framework euro area/EU institutions and competent national authorities can act 
quickly. Moreover, close contacts between supranational regulators and the largest 
European banks have also intensified. 
Experience with the VI framework has also demonstrated that large-scale 
and complex banking sector risks in an integrated financial market cannot be 
insured at the national level and by the public sector only. Therefore, a certain 
formalisation of similar cross-border and private-public sector crisis management 
structures in line with the VI framework at the European level could also be 
helpful. As part of an imaginary “Paris” Initiative or “Frankfurt” Initiative 
(due to the headquarters of the European Banking Authority in Paris or ECB 
in Frankfurt), major euro area/EU banks or other creditors could be offered 
credible and coordinated stand-still agreements (e.g., for cross-border banking 
exposures or sovereign bond holdings) in exchange for temporary ECB/Outright 
Monetary Transactions support. Finally, a robust European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM)-sponsored stabilisation and reform package – a structure similar to the VI 
1.0 format would be productive. In order to increase the reach of such a would-be 
“Paris” or “Frankfurt” Initiative or agreement, it would be helpful to boost the 
reach of the BU beyond the euro area. 
It is positive news that the BU’s design foresees f lexible forms of “opt-in” and 
“close cooperation” when it comes to European/EU countries that have not yet 
joined the euro area. However, the “opt-in” option has not been used up to now, 
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as the incentives for non-euro countries to join are weak. This may change if a 
somewhat more formalised but f lexible cross-border private and public sector 
crisis management architecture could be established at the European level, 
reaching beyond the euro area/BU. Moreover, establishing some sort of crisis 
management beyond the euro area may contribute to more enlightened decisions 
about the benefits of joining the euro area on a national level. Due to the lack 
of support measures beyond the euro area, entering the currency union could 
still be considered an “easy” option to boost the resilience of an economy with 
substantial ties to the euro area banking sector. 
That said, an envisaged entry into the euro area could be even more attractive for 
EU countries with a lower degree of financial sector stability or credibility than for 
countries with a high degree of resilience and credibility. Therefore, the decision to 
join the euro area could be possibly also driven by factors other than the readiness to 
succeed economically within the single currency area.  Hence, with more effective and 
flexible crisis management tools, the euro area could be confronted less often with 
“unqualified” applications. Moreover, a repetition of stabilisation exercises, as within 
the VI format at the EU or European level with ESM participation – if needed – could 
support the ESM going forward. The ESM may gain in profile as an institution with 
its own policy identity and agenda. However, such a crisis management architecture 
would certainly require some institutional change. For instance, the ESM mandate 
should be enlarged, reaching beyond the euro area. When it comes to financial stability 
operations, the ESM should be in a position to get involved in all EU countries, 
possibly even in non-EU countries with close economic and financial sector linkages 
to the euro area/EU and euro area/EU banks.16
As sketched previously, somewhat more “formalised” cross-border private-public 
sector banking crisis management architecture could be helpful and preferable 
compared to ad hoc solutions. However, too much formalisation of a “Paris/
Frankfurt Initiative” does not seem possible either. Firstly, a framework like the 
VI has to keep a certain degree of flexibility. Moreover, the VI process has shown 
that established national and/or supranational public sector actors and institutions 
could be more critical to the establishment of a new formal institutional set-up. 
Nevertheless, a definition of certain pre-conditions for public-private sector 
coordination and crisis framework could make sense (e.g., with regards to Private 
16 For ideas on the institutional architecture of the euro area and EU institutions, see G. Deuber, 2018. EMU/EU 
Economic Integration – “Soft Deepening” looked-for as “Quantum Leap” not feasible for longer, in: G. Sander 
and G. Deuber (eds.), EU und EWU vor neuen Herausforderungen im Nachgang der Staatsschuldenkrise, Verlag 
Dr. Kovač, Hamburg.
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Sector Involvement (PSI), minimum criteria such as keeping banking sector or 
market instrument exposures constant in exchange for IFI support, maintenance 
of capitalisation levels in bank subsidiaries). Moreover, it has to be clear that such a 
format would be about limiting tail risks with a substantial cross-border dimension. 
Effective crisis management between the private and public sector (as in the VI 
framework) is not about complete risk insurance or an equalisation of financing or 
banking sector conditions across Europe. Neither should short- to medium-term 
oriented crisis management (with a focus on the next 12-36 months) limit any 
longer-term structural adjustments (as we have seen in CESEE, including some 
VI countries), which may last for some 5-10 years. In this context it seems that 
longer-lasting and orderly adjustments in the CESEE banking sectors, following 
a procyclical overleveraging pre-crisis, are partially overshadowing the fact that 
the VI (including the engagement of private sector banks) helped to avoid a rapid, 
steep and dangerous deleveraging as well as possible balance of payments and/or 
financial market crises in the first place. 
Longer-term structural adjustments in some CESEE banking sectors with high 
foreign/Western banking sector ownership have definitely contributed to local 
scepticism about economic integration and/or foreign investment, most notably 
in banking. Prominent examples include Hungary, Poland and Romania (and to 
a certain extent the Czech Republic), where re-nationalisation or domestication 
for formerly foreign-owned banks and/or "envy" (in terms of profitability) have 
become established in recent years in relation to the banking sector. Here, political 
discourse often overlooks the fact that cross-border equity integration implies 
profit and risk sharing across economic and financial cycles. In this respect, 
cross-border equity integration means that in "good" times, for example, cross-
border dividend payments from host to home countries will also take place. But 
lessons from the VI and financial market integration will be obscured by lingering 
nationalist sentiments, not just in CESEE. In Western Europe, too, there have been 
demonstrated political tendencies (quite questionable) to preserve or even expand 
upon the "national champions” approach to banking. For example, the debate in 
Germany regarding the possible Deutsche/Commerzbank merger (an idea that 
has now been abandoned) was very much centred on how to maintain politically 
susceptible commercial bank behemoths. Meanwhile, cross-border bank mergers, 
even if they would better support the euro, are not necessarily valued in such political 
circles. Against the background of the multifaceted experiences in the context of 
the VI and with cross-border equity capital integration in the banking sector in 
CESEE, these nationalist attitudes and policies run counter to some of the most 
important empirical findings of the crisis.
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Conclusion
The Vienna Initiative has shown that effective public and private sector crisis 
management could become a key feature of integrated European banking and financial 
markets. This holds especially true as large-scale banking sector risks cannot be 
insured at the national level and only by the public sector. The evolving structures 
of the “Banking Union” offer increased opportunities to engage in effective private-
public cross-border crisis management in times of instability. Such crisis management 
structures may also help to formulate a proper risk assessment in challenging times 
and should be seen as an effective way to secure private-public sector coordination and 
burden-sharing. Effective private-public sector coordination may also help to deploy 
less public sector funding for the same “amount of financial stability”. A limited 
formalisation of relevant crisis mechanisms, or a repeat of the VI structures within 
a “Paris” Initiative or “Frankfurt” Initiative – if needed – would definitely help to 
further boost banking sector integration in Europe – and to avoid backlashes in crisis 
times. Here, market structures still do not match recent institutional progress within 
the BU. Furthermore, BU institutions will undergo further change. The financial 
stability mandate of BU/EU institutions should be much broader than just for the 
euro area. For such a mandate, a somewhat formalised but still flexible private and 
public sector crisis management framework would definitely be supportive. 
In this brief chapter not only have we stressed the extent to which market structures, 
especially in Western Europe, have not kept pace with the needs of euro area governance, 
but we also note that key actors – national governments especially – are not embracing 
the main findings from the VI episode and its implications for euro area management. 
And in Eastern Europe it appears that some of the key lessons have even been unlearned. 
In particular, our past research shows that: cross-border equity investment in banking 
was a stabilising factor in the financial crisis; cross-border debt flows were by contrast 
highly destabilising; forging ahead with more transnational bank ownership in the 
EU would support the euro as well as the ECB’s new bank oversight and governance 
institutions; and cross-border bank mergers would also ease the coming political 
struggle over pan-European and mutualised deposit insurance. It is true that our 
recommendations violate past practice with respect to traditional government ties to 
banks (especially in Western Europe). But it is also true that, in light of the common 
currency and single market, now is the time to embrace further change rather than the 
nationalist mobilisation that threatens to stymie the European integration project. 
All in all, the experience of the VI has shown that effective banking sector crisis 
management requires a certain alignment of interest between the public and private 
sectors. Such an alignment could be supported by deep equity-based banking 
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sector integration that transcends national thinking in the banking sphere. In the 
case of (Western) Europe there seems to be a lot of room for further equity-based 
cross-border banking sector integration, driven by larger European banks with a 
sustainable business model. However, such an integrated market may bring a degree 
of individual or systemic risk concentration (e.g., in terms of regional exposures at 
certain banks and/or of home country concentration, or that cross-border banks 
from 2-3 European countries may dominate the overall banking sector in Europe 
much more than now). However, the VI framework has shown that such risk 
concentration does not necessarily increase financial instability risks if and when 
effective crisis management is able to meet the long-term interests of all relevant 
actors in the public and private sector.
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Conference 
on the tenth anniversary 
of the Vienna Initiative:
a summary
Held in the Austrian National Bank,  
Vienna, 27 March 2019
The conference was under the chairmanship of Boris Vujčić, Governor of the 
Croatian National Bank and Chairman of the Vienna Initiative. The two opening 
addresses were given by the hosts, Harald Waiglein, Director General of the 
Austrian Federal Ministry of Finance, and Ewald Nowotny, Governor of the 
Austrian National Bank. 
Director Harald Waiglein, standing in for Minister Hartwig Löger, recalled the 
tension in the Austrian Federal Ministry of Finance ten years previously. Austria 
had a caretaker government at the time of the collapse of Lehman Brothers. At that 
point, the spread on Austrian bonds began to widen, and those in the Ministry 
started to get worried. In those circumstances, the staffs of international financial 
institutions (IFIs) started to coordinate their efforts to support the countries of 
Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe (CESEE), and the Ministry encouraged 
Austrian banks active in the region to engage with the IFIs in support of these 
countries. The IFI Joint Action Plan for the region was hatched as a leg of the Vienna 
Initiative. Ten years later, one question is whether the Vienna Initiative could be 
replicated today, should it be necessary. Director Waiglein was inclined to doubt it, 
as it seemed unlikely today that private banks could be persuaded to extend their 
exposure in the international interest.
Governor Ewald Nowotny was somewhat more sanguine. The Vienna Initiative 
had been a model of how to deal with the Prisoner’s Dilemma. If each of the banks 
involved had followed its first instinct and reduced its exposure, the system of 
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cross-border banking in the CESEE region would have collapsed. Over time, the 
participants faced coordination fatigue. But the lessons of the Vienna Initiative 
remain very important. While cross-border banking in Europe continues to have 
problems, the efficiency gains are large. If these gains are to be realised over the 
long run, there must be cooperation on regulation, taxation and other issues, which 
are being tackled in the Vienna Initiative. It is good that the chair of the Initiative, 
Boris Vujčić, is someone able to deliver this message effectively. 
The keynote address was given by Thomas Wieser, former president of the EU’s 
Economic and Financial Committee and of the Eurogroup Working Group, and 
with the Austrian Federal Ministry of Finance at the time of the Vienna Initiative. 
The crisis that led to the Vienna Initiative and the Initiative itself taught us many 
lessons. The first might be that our economic systems, national and international, 
move from one disequilibrium to another. Our intellectual and institutional 
frameworks therefore need to be flexible and adaptable, and we should be prepared 
to scrutinise ourselves. Looking back ten years, we should pay tribute to the 
work of Klaus Regling and the late Max Watson, who saw how things were 
developing more clearly than most. They criss-crossed the continent warning 
about the emerging bank-sovereign “doom loop” and being told that there was 
no correlation in country risk, and that European banks’ capital buffers against 
such a circumstance were just fine. If Max were still alive, he would be calling 
today for the building of buffers. The second lesson is that strong systems need 
to be put in place during the good times.
But when the crisis strikes, there needs to be a clear lead institution and a clear 
attribution of responsibilities, as well as a broad understanding of how risks and 
losses are to be allocated. Europe has since created a multitude of bodies to handle 
these things, but the goal is not yet in sight. A remarkable aspect of 2009 is that the 
stars were aligned and there was excellent cooperation between the myriad actors. 
But, the third lesson – this only happened because the conditions for nurturing 
such cooperative attitudes had been created. 
Cross-border banking involves risk taking, rather as trapeze artists do. But the 
banking safety net is not under the trapeze. For banks and countries, it makes a 
big difference whether or not the country is in the European monetary union. The 
local safety net of the monetary union, the European Stability Mechanism, is not 
well aligned with the global safety net, nor does the European Stability Mechanism 
provide comfort for European countries outside the European Union. Greater 
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integration increases the risks of contagion and correlation. The fourth lesson is 
that this integration makes a structured dialogue based on mutual trust essential – 
indeed, the closer the integration, the greater the need for regular surveillance. 
The temptation to stick one’s head in the sand is not helpful – the fifth lesson is 
that closing borders does not work. If we build barriers around Europe, around 
individual countries and then around institutions, we will return to the Stone Age 
of European integration. A corollary to this is the sixth lesson – we encountered 
a significant lack of understanding of CESEE in Brussels ten years ago. We 
are a European Union of 28 (or 27) countries, no longer a grouping of West 
Europeans. But by the same token, many on the Eastern side of the continent do 
not understand the EU. And, finally, a seventh lesson – politicians want to wish 
away losses, shifting them to other balance sheets, but losses always remain as 
losses. There needs to be honesty on this. 
But looking back ten years, what is most cherished is the friendship and enthusiastic 
cooperation of those most involved, and their sense of a shared destiny. This was a 
time when people believed in cooperative, multilateral solutions to problems. While 
we can hope, it is not obvious that this optimism and this belief still reign today.
The first session of the conference covered lessons from the crisis  
in the context of the Vienna Initiative and was chaired by 
Boris Vujčić
Julia Király recalled that the first time she visited Vienna in the capacity of Deputy 
Governor of the National Bank of Hungary in charge of financial stability was 
in October 2007. Together with Boris Vujčić of the Croatian National Bank and 
Christian Popa of the National Bank of Romania, she had met with Thomas 
Wieser to discuss the credit bubble in CESEE. At the time they were all confident 
that they could cope with such a small bubble – maybe the Baltics had more of a 
problem. But the first lesson in her view was that when you see a bubble, be careful. 
Subsequently, Andreas Treichl, CEO of Erste Group, visited Budapest, and the 
officials of the National Bank asked him to stop foreign exchange lending in 
Hungary. But there was no response to this request, until a sudden stop of capital 
hit the CESEE region in October 2008, right after the Lehman crisis. 
At the start of the crisis, it was believed that there was an umbrella over the eurozone 
countries, but as Zsolt Davas pointed out, the actions of the European Central 
Bank (ECB) exacerbated the effect of the crisis on the CESEE region. It didn’t 
feel as if European institutions were offering much help. The CEOs of major 
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parent banks wrote to the European institutions about the urgent need for action 
to preserve stability. Piroska Nagy-Mohácsi and Erik Berglöf of the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) ran around Europe trying to 
get something done. They proposed a public-private partnership to deal with the 
situation where no one cared about their neighbour and, as Thomas Wieser noted 
in January 2009, everyone was focused on preserving their own country. 
It was not an easy time to get action – nothing was easy and there was the prospect 
of a big recession. Everyone was facing their own local problems. The CESEE region 
was seen as source of contagion. Thus, on 3 March 2009, US President Obama 
called for “a common set of principles [concerning] banking, so that problems that 
exist in emerging markets like Hungary or the Ukraine don't have these enormous 
ripple effects that wash back onto our shores”. And yet cooperation was mobilised 
through the organisation of the Vienna Initiative.
Jörg Decressin, Deputy Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
European Department, noted that the CESEE region in 2009-10 managed a greater 
and less costly adjustment in external imbalances than did many other parts of the 
world. The Vienna Initiative probably contributed to this outcome. Before the 
crisis, the rate of CESEE per capita income convergence was similar to that of Korea, 
and banks helped finance this growth but also the resulting imbalances. The real 
GDP contraction in 2009 was 6% – a very deep recession but without contagious 
financial meltdown. Governments in the region avoided large devaluations, and 
in this they were supported both with IFI and EU financial packages and by the 
commitment by banks to the region.
The policy aim was to avoid a panicked withdrawal of foreign funding. Seventeen 
banks were involved, and no subsidiaries failed. Parent banks provided additional 
capital and liquidity. Five CESEE countries were supported by the IMF, and banks 
renewed their commitments within IMF-supported programmes. A study by Ralph 
de Haas has shown that parent banks which signed commitment letters behaved 
better than those which did not. The recessions experienced by the countries were 
smaller than during the Asian crisis, and adjustment was as large. The Vienna 
Initiative meant there was more commitment and more buy-in. 
Looking ahead, the Vienna Initiative should focus on financial surveillance. A regular 
dialogue in anticipation of crises is a necessary coordination device. And it can also 
be a forum for sensitising EU regulators to the region. Finally, the withdrawal of 
some banks from the Western Balkans now underway is a matter of concern. 
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Helmut Ettl, Executive Director of the Austrian Financial Market Authority 
(FMA), recalled that 2006-7 was a bonanza for Austrian banking groups operating 
in the CESEE region. They had up to 40% market share and were willing to pay 
high prices to take over local banks. This was considered a major success story 
for Austrian banks. The main area of business was lending to households and 
companies, and the parents provided the funding in the form of cheap liquidity 
and capital transfers. A side effect of the funding model was extensive foreign 
exchange lending. 
Once the crisis was underway in 2009, Paul Krugman famously described Austria as 
the advanced country at most risk. The IMF and others shared this view, and they 
were probably not completely wrong. A crisis was emerging in the real economies 
of the region, and if there had been payments difficulties, it would have had 
implications for Austrian banks at home. The Vienna Initiative was intended to avoid 
uncoordinated reactions, and to ensure that bank support packages also helped their 
subsidiaries abroad. In this regard, the Austrian government stabilisation package 
of November-December 2008 included €2 billion to help Austrian banking groups, 
and this was not restricted to domestic use. It was not easy for Austrian politicians 
to explain to the public, but those then in charge had the courage to do so. 
So how should we judge the Vienna Initiative? It was developed and implemented 
at the right time and by the right people. But this should not be taken for granted – 
we tend to think that what happened had to happen. But in 2009 things were not 
so clear. Economic understanding and political expertise were in short supply, and 
who was to be trusted in such a strained environment? Trust has to be built in good 
times, so you can employ it when you need it. Austria had the luck to have Thomas 
Wieser. Was the environment favourable to cooperative approaches, despite some 
theories of economic competition? In fact, it was not an anonymous market, but a 
limited number of people and players. The public institutions were willing to avoid 
ring-fencing, as supervisors agreed that it would make no sense. The organisation 
under an international and EU umbrella and close monitoring by a respected third 
party both played their part. And one important precondition was that the assets of 
Austrian banks were not reduced. We can now see with hindsight that the portfolio 
of subsidiaries consistently produced profits, except in 2016 when nonperforming 
loans (NPLs) were shed from balance sheets. And with the hindsight of ten years, 
we can see that the Vienna Initiative was a success.
Andreas Treichl, CEO of Erste Group, saw at the conference a number of people 
who had been very helpful in 2008-9 and with whom he had been able to talk 
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through the issues. The Vienna Initiative had worked extremely well as it was a 
cooperative venture between politicians, regulators and bankers willing to work 
together without any preconditions. All were fighting against those who thought 
that the CESEE was disaster zone – foremost among them, Paul Krugman. 
In 2008 Erste Group saw the crisis approaching. The thing that got Erste into 
trouble was the price of its most recent acquisitions. As Treichl explained: we were 
worried that everything we had built up over the previous eight years would be 
destroyed. We had tried to recreate what had been founded two hundred years 
previously with the establishment of Moravian and Bohemian savings banks 
in 1825. We were trying to recreate this structure and had Asian and UAE 
investors willing to give us the capital we needed. The Austrian Government was 
supportive. We had a Chancellor and Minister of finance with three-digit IQs, 
advised by brilliant people with three-digit IQs. Some colleagues were against 
our use of foreign capital. We did it. It was not pleasant, but it helped. And we 
thought we were safe. 
When the real crisis broke out, our share price started to fall dramatically. The 
value of the bank, worth €14 billion in 2007, collapsed to €1 billion. We were 
really furious at President Obama when he talked disparagingly about the CESEE 
region. We got calls from investors saying there would be no more capital. That 
phase didn’t last long, but it was a very frightening experience. We learned the lesson 
that intragroup funding is basically contingent capital. The loan-to-deposit ratio 
in Hungary was 300, but now it is 60. 
The Vienna Initiative was more than a success. No country in the region required 
any support to its banking system – the whole region was kept clean of government 
support, a huge success. It is a wonderful story to tell regulators in Brussels. A 
case of professional people getting together to solve a problem and having the 
guts to do it. The ECB should ask itself whether they would be allowed to do 
this again. Would such an approach get the approval of the EC and the ECB in 
2019? Are we in an environment that is so heavily regulated that this Initiative 
would now be impossible?
Piroska Nagy-Mohácsi, London School of Economics (originally with the EBRD), 
spoke of the personal bonds created during the first phase of the Initiative. She drew 
attention to the subsequent developments of Vienna Initiative Plus and Vienna 
Initiative 2.0. After victory had been declared in the crisis management phase in 
2010, the Vienna Initiative platform was used for financial discussions. Various 
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pressing issues such as NPL reduction, foreign exchange lending and the utilisation of 
EU structural funds were examined. Then the eurozone shock occurred and Vienna 
2.0 was established with the strong support of the Commission. Now it was time 
for Vienna 3.0 to cover the issues that Jörg Decressin had mentioned. 
In looking at the experience of the Vienna Initiative, three points emerge. The 
first is the importance of any supranational coordination being rooted in strong 
national interests. The post-war system is now being challenged. The Vienna 
Initiative Plus approach showed that any supranational coordination has to be 
anchored in national sovereign self-interest. Voters are nation-based. The luck 
of the Vienna Initiative was that Thomas Wieser was able to link up sovereign 
interests. He showed that it was not just Austria, but France, Italy and others 
who would benefit, plus, on the host-country side, as Julia Király has mentioned, 
Hungary, Serbia and others. And European structures also benefitted from this. 
Vienna Initiative Plus complemented what could be done at the EU level, and so 
Mario Nava and Sean Berrigan urged us to continue with the Vienna Initiative. 
The emergence of clubs inside the EU may be a way forward and help to reduce 
the democratic deficit.
A second point is how to involve the private sector, a signal strength of the Vienna 
Initiative, which itself was prompted by the famous letter from bank CEOs. 
Schemes for private sector involvement had been in existence for some time. 
But in the Vienna Initiative, it was not private sector involvement, but private 
sector engagement. It was not simply something called for, to be followed by the 
application of moral suasion, but the banks had an input. This was both a very 
important element and a major strength. The banks’ commitment was part of the 
overall support package, and conditional on appropriate adjustment in the host 
countries. Post review meetings were held with the banks, and it was clear that if 
the country programme went off track, commitments could be abandoned. This 
was never a matter of regulatory capture, and EU institutions did a great job.
The third point is the importance of the IFI community. Of course, the central 
banks and ministries of finances of home and host countries and EU institutions 
were centrally involved. But, fundamentally, it was the technical convening 
power of the IFIs that gave impetus to the process. This was the first time the 
IFIs worked together as a system, as indeed they should. The importance of this 
collaboration is a major lesson from the Vienna Initiative. The result was that, in 
addition to the macroeconomic IFI programmes that were put in place, micro-
oriented IFIs also played a complementary role. This was not a matter of one or 
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two institutions leading, but true cooperation. Looking at this from an academic 
perspective, the Vienna Initiative was a form of “democratic experimentalism” 
with transnational institutions. 
In the subsequent discussion, Helmut Ettl noted that Vienna 1.0 was about 
stabilisation, but the Austrian authorities urgently needed to strengthen their 
banking groups. The Austrian stabilisation package launched in 2012 was 
controversial, since it not only asked a lot of the banks but had an effect on host 
countries. The system up till then had given false comfort to the host countries, and 
that needed to change. The Vienna Initiative did a good job in handling this matter. 
Andreas Treichl thought that the Vienna Initiative would be required in the future, 
but will have to involve a different set of players. The European banking system 
now provides about 80% of the economy’s financing, a figure which reaches 92% in 
CESEE. By contrast, banking only constitutes 25% of the US financial system. The 
emerging European regulatory system does not allow for banks to finance 92% of 
the economy, and much of this financing will have to be replaced by capital markets. 
But in that case, a different set of people will have to sit around the Vienna Initiative 
table. Piroska Nagy-Mohácsi considered that the challenges ahead related to such 
matters as restructuring the financial sector and digitalisation. Finally, Julia Király 
concluded that there were dark sides to globalisation and freedom of cross-border 
capital movement, and among the lessons was that intragroup capital becomes 
contingent capital. But the most remarkable aspect of the Vienna Initiative was 
that no bank was bailed out in CESEE as a result of the crisis, and the recovery of 
the CESEE region had been stronger than that following other crises.
The second session of the conference dealt with the future of 
cross-border banking and was chaired by Andreas Ittner, Vice-
Governor of the Austrian National Bank 
Dinosaurs, Ittner remarked, were huge animals whose extinction was due to a change 
in environment and a lack of adaptability. Such a fate should not be that of the Vienna 
Initiative. The regulatory environment was changing rapidly with the establishment of 
the Single Supervisory Mechanism, memoranda of understanding, deposit insurance, 
etc., but equally important was the evolution of the banks themselves. Cross-border 
banking, despite all its problems, is an important driver of financial integration. Even 
if Europe will have to rely more on capital markets, the financial system will not work 
without banks. The business model of banks has been changing rapidly, and new 
competitors, such as Fintech have emerged. With protectionism increasing at global 
levels, strengthened multilateral coordination is becoming more important than ever, 
but we must strive to make it relevant to the emerging environment. 
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Sabine Lautenschläger, until recently the head of the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (SSM), called for more discussion of cross-border banking. It was clear 
that if it is done correctly, it provides for a diversification of risks and thus more 
financial stability. Clearly, cooperation among supervisors was critical, but one of the 
lessons of the crisis was that even if there was excellent informal cooperation before 
the crisis, it all became much more difficult when the crisis started. Lautenschläger 
recalls: in 2008, when the crisis struck, half my contacts seemed dead – or were just 
not answering the phone. Everyone was scrambling for information on their own 
or on other banks. Markets and banks turned out to be much more interconnected 
than we had expected. In the aftermath of the crisis, there was much discussion of 
information exchange, and global and European standards were raised substantially. 
A structural framework was put in place on what to exchange, how to do on-site 
inspections, SREP ratios, etc. 
But it is vital that this not stop now. The key to the process is trust and constant 
cooperation and making friends. It is important to get to know one’s counterparts 
in other authorities. To know how and whether to rely on another authority’s 
supervision. This is easier in theory than in practice. When a host supervisor 
requests an exchange of information, you have to explain what information you 
collect, what rules you apply and why the request is wanted. The Vienna Initiative 
is a very good example of cooperation in time of crisis. 
It shows how important it is to create structures for a deeper dialogue between 
supervisors. At the start of the SSM, things were quite difficult, since there were no 
memoranda of understanding, just an inherited network of 104 old memoranda. 
Since then our appreciation of the issues has increased enormously, as the SSM is 
both home supervisor in some cases and host supervisor in others. It would be good 
if some of the matters which do not work well in cross-border banking, such as “fit 
and proper”, capital waivers, large exposure waivers and liquidity waivers, could be 
left as national options at the discretion of Member States. 
Filip Keereman, Head of Unit, DG FISMA European Commission, spoke on 
how to prevent crises in cross-border banking. The banking system was strongly 
interconnected, but this was more a problem for the host country than the home 
country. As a result, tackling the problem of contagion required action at the central 
level while paying attention to the impact on individual countries and at the regional 
level. Since the crisis, the examination of policies during the European semester 
under the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure paid increasing attention to 
financial variables. Critical thresholds had been established for several variables, 
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including the real house price index, the total balance sheet, private sector credit 
flows and private debt. There was now an examination on an annual cycle, with 
the Commission producing recommendations.
The Vienna Initiative had been a temporary success, in that it allowed time for an 
orderly deleveraging and the building up of local deposits. But it did not work in 
the Greek context, which provides some sort of counterfactual case. One difference 
was the absence of a strong international banking footprint in Greece. The support 
required from the private sector became a haircut on its exposure and this led to 
contagion to Cyprus. Another reason for the differential success was that there 
was a better understanding in the CESEE region concerning policy needs than 
there was in Greece.
Anita Angelovska-Bezhoska, Governor of the National Bank of North Macedonia, 
agreed that cross-border banking had played an immense role in her country, with 
exposure reaching 69% of GDP at some point. It had brought large benefits and 
increasing access to finance and had been among the main drivers of convergence. 
Surveys by the ECB have shown the advantages of cross-border banking, including 
the introduction of financial know-how into the region. And, in coping with the 
crisis, the Vienna Initiative played a critical role.
In the future, the region is going to have to rely more on domestic resources. A 
significant share of banks are planning to reduce their operations in the region, 
and interest in it is declining. There is still a lot to be done to increase cooperation. 
Much progress has been made – local deposits are rising throughout the region 
and the ratio of credit to deposits is falling rapidly. But the economies suffer 
from low savings levels, and so cannot rely on this for convergence in future. If 
investment levels are to rise, the cash that is currently outside official channels 
needs to be mobilised.
Erik Berglöf, London School of Economics (previously Chief Economist, EBRD), 
recalled that, when the crisis struck CESEE, the EBRD had a strong incentive 
to engage, as it had relations with 200 banks in the region. The challenge was to 
find a way to work together to get the region through the crisis, and here personal 
relations were critical. Most of those in the room would not be friends had it 
not been for the global financial crisis. For himself, the crisis had completely 
changed his life. The lesson was that these personal relationships needed to be 
built up in peacetime, and this was especially important when the whole structure 
of international cooperation was under threat.
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We are seeing a retrenchment of cross-border banking across the globe. This is partly 
about risk aversion, but it is also about capital flows from rich to poor countries. 
There clearly were too many risks in cross-border banking, especially in Europe, 
but he wondered whether we had gone too far in our response.
There seemed to be three trends concerning this cross-border banking. Firstly, 
there was retrenchment, with a lowering of risk levels and disintermediation. 
Corporate bonds were becoming more important in international financial flows, 
but this meant that the risk had been shifted to a less regulated part of the system. 
Secondly, concentration had increased and there were now fewer banks involved in 
cross-border banking. This might be a good thing, but it also brought heightened 
vulnerabilities. Finally, the political atmosphere had worsened. Populism in 
finance may have started in Hungary, but there were signs elsewhere – and globally. 
Institutions were trapped as sitting ducks for political movements. This also was 
a worrying development. 
These three factors could come together, possibly in the event of a downturn. To 
find the right balance, we need to be aware of the value of these capital flows. It 
is essential to create an environment that provides a stable basis for such flows. 
Progress in creating the Banking Union in the EU is encouraging, but the problem 
of how to create the right structures elsewhere to deal with the volatility of capital 
flows has not yet been resolved.
Aurelio Maccario, head of regulatory affairs at the Unicredit Group, said that 
memories of the Vienna Initiative came to him each year when looking at the 
scenarios that the bank prepared for the SSM. The lessons of the Vienna Initiative 
had been well explained by Governor Nowotny and Thomas Wieser. In times 
of crisis, things depended on the individuals involved – everyone needed to be 
seated round the table. The European cycle was getting worse, and thus good 
times needed to be used to strengthen cooperation. The European Capital Market 
Union had to be created from scratch and would not work if other capital markets 
were copied blindly. Post-crisis, the traditional commercial banking model still 
prevails. In developing capital markets, it was most important to look at the buy 
side – pension funds, insurance, etc., – and to recognise European specificities. 
Finally, on the Banking Union, Maccario said that the Vienna Initiative was the 
first attempt to bring all relevant parties around the table. It showed that with 
a bit of planning and strategic direction, things can be done even before the 
Banking Union is fully developed. Group recovery plans can now be prepared 
for all supervisors, as opposed to the situation before.
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In the subsequent discussion, Chris Muyldermans of KBC noted that the panels 
seemed to see cross-border banking primarily as a matter of capital f lows. She 
thought that the full range of cross-border activities needed to be considered so 
that, for example, a customer could use a single account in his or her transactions 
across the continent. Jörg Decressin wondered whether it would be possible to do 
something like the Vienna Initiative in the event of a new crisis. Piroska Nagy-
Mohácsi explored the question of whether the Vienna Initiative could work in 
other circumstances. In the case of Ukraine, an attempt to use Vienna Initiative 
mechanisms foundered because, in the absence of a strong host country adjustment 
programme, it was impossible to get bank commitment. And in the case of Greece, 
the approach was not that of the Vienna Initiative – there was no collective 
treatment of the banks; nor was peer pressure applied. In response, Andreas Ittner 
pointed out that facing a sudden stop of capital f lows was a situation in which 
countries had limited options. They could nationalise the banks, but this would 
not have helped with the funding problem. The case of Greece was different, in that 
funding help was expected from the eurozone. As for the question as to whether 
this could happen again, it was doubtful that the supervisor would be able to let 
banks keep lending to a country where government policy was unclear. 
Sabine Lautenschläger referred to some principles that a supervisor should 
follow. The first was that a supervisor should not tell a bank what sort of 
business it should or should not undertake. But a second principle was that 
a supervisor should not be blind to the emergence of risk. The eurozone was 
now in a better place in regard to the legal environment, but there was a fear 
that the procyclical behaviour of supervisors and the banks could make things 
worse. It was important to focus not only on the crisis but on whether enough 
risk-mitigants – counter-cyclical buffers – were in place before the crisis. Now 
was the time to be bold, so that the supervisor can say it comfortable with the 
available buffers. If a risk-mitigating structure, such as Vienna Initiative, exists, 
then the supervisor can take it into account. But supervisors do not want to be 
told to be as lax as possible during a crisis.
Erik Berglöf agreed that cross-border banking was a relatively stable and safe way 
of transferring capital between countries. But it had also made other important 
contributions to the prosperity of the CESEE region, even if it allowed risks to build 
up. But there was little prospect of this happening in the rest of the world because 
of the new constraints that were being placed on commercial banks. In emerging 
Europe we have a chance to do better than elsewhere, as we have an anchor to 
support cross-border banking.
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Aurelio Maccario agreed that, thanks to the single market, there was no problem 
in servicing corporates cross border. But, with the movement to a Capital Markets 
Union, and facing a lot of new regulations, it was becoming harder to lend to many 
new clients, as the banks did not want to build up more NPLs. Since the bulk 
of companies were small to medium-sized enterprises, the conditions needed to 
be created to provide more equity finance for such companies. The new capital 
requirements will typically penalise European banking, and it was to be hoped that 
this matter would be on the new European Parliament’s agenda. 
At the end of the session Andreas Ittner summarised that cross-border banking 
was urgently needed within the SSM, and that trust between stakeholders should 
be built up during peacetime. 
The third session of the conference, under the chairmanship of 
Boris Vujčić, covered the future role of the Vienna Initiative in 
preserving financial stability and promoting growth. 
The chairman pointed out that the structures of cross-border banking in the 
region had changed, and that would matter in a future crisis. The loan-to-deposit 
ratio was now below unity, so that would be less of a factor, but there was still the 
matter of MREL. And the Capital Market Union would also affect the structure 
of the financial system.
Cyril Muller, Vice President, Europe and Central Asia of the World Bank, 
argued that it was important to understand why the Vienna Initiative worked. 
The key was collective action to address challenges and problems by stakeholders 
who trusted each other. Personal relationships mattered, as well as the ability to 
leverage the power of international institutions for a greater purpose. But how is 
such credibility to be built? Ten years ago, he was an observer of the process, then 
President of the World Bank Group Robert Zoellick placed huge emphasis on 
private banks being around the table. It was also vital that the interventions of the 
multilateral development banks be credible and in sufficient amounts, and in the 
end, commitments under the Joint IFI Action Plan were exceeded significantly. 
One indicator of the success of the Vienna Initiative is the fate of countries where 
such a mechanism was not in place, such as Ukraine and Turkey. 
The next crisis is unlikely to come from the banking sector, since there is no 
longer such excessive leverage. However, there is stronger dependence between 
the financial and fiscal sectors. Central banks did a good job in the crisis, but 
the performance of the fiscal authorities is less clear. And the financial sector is 
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evolving, with fintech a particular growth area. But it is striking how surveys of 
companies in the tech sector never mention access to finance and credit. And then 
there is the question of ownership of private and privatised banks, since some of 
the potential owners have doubtful track records.
Pierre Heilbronn, Vice President, EBRD, remarked that trust and friendship had 
been an important part of the Vienna Initiative, which in turn had contributed to 
orderly and gradual deleveraging. As for the challenges ahead, the macroeconomic 
picture had changed, and the growth model needed to be reinvented. European 
countries had not converged in the last ten years and growth had slowed down. 
There is a debate about why productivity has slowed down and whether financial 
integration contributed to this outcome. For the future, innovation needed to be 
put at the centre of attention. It was not just a matter of money, but policy and 
investment needed to be applied to the issue. 
The Vienna Initiative continues to play a very important part in bringing the 
region’s NPLs down rapidly. Other areas where it has a role are in promoting the 
transparency of shareholding in the region’s financial institutions, and sustainable 
finance, which is also vital to bringing the region onto the path for sustainable 
growth. The EBRD takes climate change into account in its dealings with each 
country and with partner banks. The Vienna Initiative has also had a role in 
supporting European financial integration, going well beyond the banking sector. 
It should continue to bring together European and domestic stakeholders, both in 
EU Member States and in Candidate Countries.
Vazil Hudák, Vice President, EIB, recalled that it was important to celebrate the 
successes of joint action in today’s Europe. Crises, in his view, were good for Europe, 
since it was in response to these that forward-looking plans were drawn up. Both the 
European Energy Union and the European Banking Union had been accelerated by 
crises. Looking to the future, the banking system was there to collect deposits and 
to lend. But convergence in Europe has slowed down and a new model for economic 
growth was needed. He agreed with Pierre Heilbronn that innovation from the region 
was central. Europe still faced an investment gap of €400 billion a year, despite the 
Juncker Plan. Research and development (R&D) expenditure was only about 2% of 
GDP, well behind China and the US. Clearly the small share of capital markets in 
finance was one problem here, and there needed to be more support for scale-ups. 
Local banks are well capitalised and have large domestic deposits, but do not engage 
in enough cross-border projects. Investment platforms for cross-border projects should 
be created involving close partnership with banks and governments.
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Johann Strobl, CEO, Raiffeisen Bank International, pointed out how the situation 
of the banking sector had changed substantially since 2007-8. The loan-to-deposit 
ratios in the region had fallen sharply and banks’ capital positions were now much 
stronger. The banking part of the financial system is now very safe and well-positioned 
to cope with potential problems, especially from the political sphere. Therefore, as 
for the potential roles for the Vienna Initiative, he highlighted the importance of a 
common EU approach towards tackling political instability and unilateralism in some 
countries of the region, and actively asked for the governments and local ministries to 
the Vienna Initiative to be invited to foster the understanding and insight of the topics 
of this private-public platform. A constructive dialogue with all relevant stakeholders 
and trustworthy impact assessments would be of great value in the period ahead. All 
kinds of national measures affecting the financial stability in the region should be 
subject to this treatment. From a cross-border perspective, the Vienna Initiative should 
continue coordination between policymakers and bankers to address the resolution 
of bad debt, regulatory reform and the availability of funding for innovation. Strobl 
mentioned Raiffeisen’s Elevator Lab, which is looking for innovative fintech solutions 
and showcases best practices of the fintech collaboration model in CESEE.
In the subsequent discussion, Piroska Nagy-Mohácsi raised the issue of a new 
growth model. The previous model had been driven by the availability of cheap 
labour in the region, and now the challenge was to switch to a knowledge-based 
agenda. Vazil Hudák remarked that banks were still constrained in providing 
support for small to medium-sized enterprises. They now had plenty of liquidity, 
but needed capital saving finance. 
Mattia Romani, Managing Director for Economics, Policy and Governance at the 
EBRD, wondered whether the Vienna Initiative was still a relevant mechanism in 
a world where multilateralism was under threat. Cyril Muller pointed out that, 
before the financial crisis, the main criticism by some countries of IFIs’ activities 
was that they had too much financing and should get into riskier lending. But when 
the crisis hit, these players wanted the IFIs to make a “big announcement”, but did 
not want to put their own money into it. He wondered if the global system was now 
prepared to put in the money if a similar situation arose. The new phase of the Vienna 
Initiative focused on the nexus between banks, supervisors and the IFIs. But this 
level of activity was not in the public consciousness, and the political context was 
much more complicated than before. There had to be a better dialogue involving 
broader groups of stakeholders. Collective action with governments was much more 
difficult when those governments were changing more frequently. Pierre Heilbronn 
also referred to the relationship between the political landscape and what the EBRD 
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was trying to do at the local political level. The Bank was intensely involved, since 
among its aims were democracy and more open democratic governance, matters that 
were in the hands of many actors. 
Boris Vujčić asked how participants saw the banks’ involvement in the new model. 
Would the operations be more decentralised or would the Banking Union bring 
back centralisation? Johann Strobl responded that Raiffeisen had always been 
decentralised. It had adjusted its model, if not quickly enough. Before 2007, the 
lack of local funds was countered with a central supply, which had led to over-
indebtedness in some countries and sectors. Now the region is growing twice as 
fast as the core eurozone, and Raiffeisen could bring in capital as needed. The real 
need was for investment in infrastructure and R&D. The potential was certainly 
there – technical capacity existed in the region, and local people were brilliant. 
With money and local government cooperation, a lot could be done. 
Closing the conference, the chairman, Boris Vujčić drew the lesson that the Vienna 
Initiative should continue to do the relatively small initiatives required by cross-border 
banking in the region and stand ready for a larger crisis. The Vienna Initiative and 
its effectiveness were an example for other regions, maybe the eurozone itself. Work 
should continue on shareholder transparency, and there would be a discussion of work 
on anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism. Trust is built 
by sitting round a table and working together. It was the cooperation, not finding the 
right people, that mattered. The working groups on sustainable finance and green 
finance were building consensus among the participants, the banks, their supervisors 
and the international institutions. The longer-term view was more in the hands of 
the various institutions. On the matter of finance for innovation, both the banks 
and the institutions had a problem, in that it was hard to provide the finance at the 
appropriate stage in the process. And so, the working group included private equity 
and venture capital firms with the aim of creating a product of interest to everyone. 
There was also the matter of a new growth model and how to accelerate convergence. 
It was encouraging that Johann Strobl, speaking for one of the major banks, did not 
see this as too much of a problem. The chairman also paid tribute to the work done 
on monitoring and reducing NPLs, and the way that regulators and banks had been 
brought together to improve communications in the area.
Winding up the conference, the chairman thanked the Austrian National Bank and 
its staff, particularly Alexandra Schober-Rhomberg, for the excellent organisation.
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